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2026:HHC:3353
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2939 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.1.2026
Date of Decision: 23.1.2026.
Kushal Singh alias Kushal Samrat
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Peeyush Verma, Senior
Advocate, with Mr Kush
Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 5 of 2025, dated 27.1.2025,
registered at Police Station, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 109, 118(1),
126(2) and 115(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3353
2.
It
has
been
asserted
that,
according
to
the
prosecution, the petitioner Kushal Singh, informant Rajiv,
Yashwant, Bal Krishan and Vicky Sharma were consuming liquor
at Butthli. An altercation occurred between them, and the
petitioner inflicted a knife blow to the informant’s stomach and
his right-hand thumb. These allegations are false. The
petitioner has also filed a complaint against Rajiv and Yashwant,
and an FIR No. 7 of 2025, dated 28.1.2025, was registered against
them. The petitioner had earlier filed a regular bail petition
before this Court, which was dismissed. The petitioner is
innocent and was not involved in the commission of any offence.
The petitioner is suffering from various ailments and he
requires regular medical check-ups. The police have completed
the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court. No
fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in
custody. Hence, the petition.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the informant Rajiv, Yashwant, Balkrishan, Vicky,
and the petitioner were consuming liquor on 26.01.2025 at 9:30
p.m. The petitioner abused the informant, which led to an
altercation. The informant tried to leave the spot, but the
2026:HHC:3353
petitioner stopped him and inflicted a blow on his stomach with
a knife. The petitioner again inflicted a blow, which the
informant tried to stop with his hand. He suffered an injury on
his right thumb. The informant was taken to the Hospital, and
an intimation was given to the police. The police conducted the
investigation and seized the blood-stained soil from the spot.
As per the report of the analysis, the DNA in the soil matched the
DNA of the informant’s blood. The petitioner was arrested, and
he made a disclosure statement leading to the discovery of the
knife.
As per the report of the Medical Officer, the knife
produced by the petitioner could have caused the injuries
sustained by the informant. The injuries were dangerous to life.
The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 28.6.2025. Hence,
the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior
Counsel, assisted by Mr Kush Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate
General, for the respondent-State.
5.
Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he
2026:HHC:3353
was falsely implicated. The petitioner had also registered an FIR
against the informant and another person. The petitioner’s
version that he had acted in self-defence is highly probable. The
police have filed a charge sheet before the Court. No fruitful
purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner had
earlier filed a bail petition which was dismissed by this Court. A
subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the
circumstances. The petitioner has not pleaded any change in the
circumstance and he is not entitled to bail. Hence, he prayed that
the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a
bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1635 of 2025
and was dismissed on 29.7.2025. It was held in the State of
Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC
2026:HHC:3353
605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a
subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a
change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question
of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of
little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was
a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during
these two days, drastic changes had taken place,
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial
discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the
impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all
earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J.,
only a couple of days before, in the absence of any
substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is
necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that
the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an
impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either
successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure
an order which had hitherto eluded him.
9.
Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
2026:HHC:3353
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then
the said court will have to give specific reasons why in
spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail
application should be granted.”
10.
A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of
course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of
circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”
11.
This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant
Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was
observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for
the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent
bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”
2026:HHC:3353
12.
It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive
bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the
existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine
qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a
material change in circumstances. A material change in
circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact
situation or law that requires the earlier view to be
interfered with or where the earlier finding has become
obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no
bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that
successive bail application needs to be decided by the
same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of
sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a
judge to consider the application and a person's right
based on a material change in circumstances. A material
change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an
offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the
power to decide such a subsequent application operates in
a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts
of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and
judicially recognized principle that if successive bail
applications on the same subject are permitted to be
disposed of by different Judges, there would be
conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering
every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in
the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other
side being put in issue and there would be wastage of
Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such
matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is
2026:HHC:3353
available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change
in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same
Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore,
the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a
change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant,
which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”
13.
Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and
it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
14.
The Court held in the earlier petition that there was
sufficient material on record to prima facie, connect the
petitioner to the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 109 of BNS, and the registration of the FIR at the
instance of the petitioner would not, prima facie, establish the
plea taken by the petitioner that he had acted in the right of his
private defence. Both these circumstances have not changed.
15.
It was submitted that a charge sheet has been filed,
and this is a change in circumstance. This submission cannot be
accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406:
(2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 542: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 295 that the filing of a
charge sheet does not amount to change in circumstances. It was
observed:
2026:HHC:3353
“12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial
Judge, we find that he has been swayed by the fact that
when a charge sheet is filed, it amounts to a change of
circumstance. Needless to say, the filing of the charge
sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made
by the prosecution. On the contrary, filing of the charge
sheet establishes that after due investigation, the
investigating agency, having found materials, has placed
the charge sheet for the trial of the accused persons.”
16.
It was submitted that the plea taken by the petitioner
that he had acted in the right of his private defence is highly
probable. This plea has already been found to be not established
by the Court in the earlier petition and cannot be adjudicated
afresh in the present case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001
SCC (Cri) 1520: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070 that it is impermissible
to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition,
and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It
was observed on page 676:
8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the
rejection of his earlier bail application bearing
Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has
not been denied by the respondent. It is true that
successive bail applications are permissible under the
changed circumstances. But without the change in the
circumstances, the second application would be deemed
to be seeking review of the earlier judgment, which is not
permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this
Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa
2026:HHC:3353
[(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other
judgments.
17.
Therefore, it is impermissible to review the earlier
order passed by this Court.
18.
The burden of proving that the case of the accused
comes within the exception lies upon him, as per Section 108 of
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Thus, the proof of the
exception is a matter for trial and cannot be adjudicated merely
on the basis of an FIR registered after the registration of the
present FIR.
19.
The petitioner is prima facie involved in the
commission of the offence under Section 109 of BNS, which is
punishable with imprisonment for life. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115:
1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the
person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244:
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
principle around which other relevant factors must
revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person
is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different
footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage,
and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to
secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be
2026:HHC:3353
liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the
event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In
this perspective, the relevance of considerations is
regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the
applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible
in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime
charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of
the highest magnitude and the punishment for it
assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may
reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no
amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at
the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law
Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J.,
concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J.
set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev.
ibid., pp. 50-51]
“I do not think that an accused party is detained in
custody because of his guilt, but because there are
sufficient probable grounds for the charge against
him as to make it proper that he should be tried,
and because the detention is necessary to ensure
his appearance at trial .... It is a very important
element in considering whether the party, if
admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and
I think that in coming to a determination on that
point three elements will generally be found the
most important: the charge, the nature of the
evidence by which it is supported, and the
punishment to which the party would be liable if
convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of
wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission
by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the
punishment of the offence is, by law, death.”
7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
2026:HHC:3353
20.
Considering the nature of the offence and the
severity of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail.
21.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission cannot be accepted. The
petitioner has not filed the copies of the order sheets to
demonstrate that the delay is not attributable to him. In any
case, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil
Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of
incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail. It was
observed at page 141:
“24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the
grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the
Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than
one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the
accused was in custody for more than one year may not be
a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala
v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri)
743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by
itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail.
The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688”
22.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot seek bail on the
ground of delay in the progress of the trial.
2026:HHC:3353
23.
No other point was urged.
24.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
25.
The observations made here-in-above are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case's merits.
23rd January, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
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