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2026:HHC:20432
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.104 of 2026
Date of Decision: 29.5.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
Kuldeep
……...Petitioner
Versus
Nisha Gautam and Ors.
…....Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Ms. Kanta Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Ms. Kanchan Singh, Advocate, for respondent No.1.
Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocates General and Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy
Advocate General, for respondent No.2.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment
dated 6.9.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan,
District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.116-ASJ-II/10 of
2024 affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
6.5.2024, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan, District
Solan, Himachal Pradesh in Criminal Complaint No.77/3 of 2022, whereby
the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having
committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to
2026:HHC:20432
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay
compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,40,000/- to the complainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the
Act before the competent court of law, alleging therein that accused entered
into an agreement with her for sale of land measuring 00.05 biswas,
comprised in Khata/Khatani No. 39 min. Khasra No. 3162/297/199 in
Mauza Dharja, Hadbast No. 578, Tehsil and District Solan, Himachal
Pradesh, for a total consideration of Rs. 4,00,000/-. Complainant alleged
that in terms of afore agreement, she paid sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- to the
accused, however accused failed to get the same executed in her favour and
subsequently, with a view to discharge his liability issued cheque bearing
No.042374 dated 8.12.2021, amounting to Rs.4,00,000/-, drawn on State
Bank of India Branch Nauni, in favour of the complainant, however cheque
on its presentation to the bank concerned was dishonoured with remarks
“Exceeds Arrangement” vide memo Ext.CW1/C. Immediately, after receipt
of aforesaid memo, complainant served legal noticeExt.CW1/D upon the
accused, thereby calling upon him to make the payment good within
stipulated time, but in vain, as such, complainant had no option but to
initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of
law.
3.
2026:HHC:20432
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 6.5.2024, held the
petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per
the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction and order of sentence recorded by the learned trial Court,
petitioner-accused preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate
Court, but the same was dismissed vide judgment dated 6.9.2025. In the
aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant
proceedings, praying therein to set-aside the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence recorded by the learned courts below.
5.
Vide order dated 18.2.2026, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by the learned trial court, subject to
petitioner’s depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing
personal bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like
amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court. Though aforesaid
order was complied with, but thereafter matter was repeatedly adjourned
enabling the petitioner-accused to deposit the balance amount or settle the
matter with complainant, but in vain. In the afore background, this Court
has no option but to decide the petition on merit.
6.
2026:HHC:20432
Having carefully perused grounds taken in the appeal vis-à-vis
reasoning assigned by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, thereby
upholding the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the
learned trial Court, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner that the learned courts below have
failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court
finds that both the learned courts below have dealt with each and every
aspect of the matter very meticulously and there is no scope of interference.
7.
In the case at hand, petitioner-accused has never denied the
factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon.
In his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, though accused
claimed himself to be innocent, but despite sufficient opportunity, failed to
lead any evidence.
8.
To the contrary, complainant with a view to prove her case,
examined herself as CW1 and tendered her evidence by way of affidavit
Ext.CW1/A, reiterating therein contents of the complaint. She also
tendered in evidence cheque Ext.CW1/B, memo Ext.CW1/C, legal notice
Ext.CW1/D, postal receipt Ext.CW1/E, consignment report Ext.CW1/F and
Agreement Ext.CW1/G, rather pattern of cross-examination conducted
upon this witness clearly establishes factum with regard to issuance of
cheque as well as signatures of the accused thereupon. While admitting
2026:HHC:20432
that he does not have any receipt of payment, this witness denied that
there is a lack of transaction between him and the complainant.
While
admitting that she has not mentioned the exact date, month and year of
execution of the agreement, she categorically stated that payment was
made for agreement qua land.
Though she admitted that no date of
agreement has been mentioned in the complaint, but she categorically
stated factum with regard to her having received cheque from the accused
towards discharge of lawful liability.
In nutshell, accused attempted to carve out a case that only
9.
sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-was paid at the time of execution of agreement and
remaining amount was to be paid after rejection of sale deed, which in the
case at hand, could not be executed. Since there was no execution of sale
deed,
accused
could
not
have
issued
cheque
of
Rs.
4,00,000/-.
Interestingly, no suggestion worth the name ever came to be put to the
complainant with regard to cheque amount as well as signature of the
accused upon the same. While admitting putting suggestion with regard to
payment of Rs. 1,00,000/- at the time of execution of agreement to sell,
petitioner
has virtually admitted the claim of the complainant that
agreement was executed inter-se complainant and accused for sale of land
and at the time of execution of such agreement, sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was
received by the complainant.
10.
2026:HHC:20432
Similarly, pattern of cross-examination as discussed herein
above, clearly establishes factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well
as signature thereupon, no suggestion worth the name ever came to be put
to the complainant that accused had never issued any cheque, rather by
putting certain suggestions with regard to amount mentioned in the
agreement coupled with the fact that only sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was
received, clearly proves the case of the complainant that cheque in question
was issued towards discharge of lawful liability. Though at this stage, Ms.
Kanta, Advocate, appearing for the accused, attempted to argue that since
agreement Ext.CW1/G clearly provided for balance payment after the
execution of the sale deed, which in the instant case, was never executed,
there was no occasion, if any, to receive remaining sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-,
however, such plea of accused never came to be probablised by leading
cogent and convincing evidence.
11.
To the contrary, complainant successfully proved on record
that in terms of agreement Ext.CW1/G, she had paid Rs. 1,00,000/- at the
time of execution of agreement to sell and thereafter, she had also paid Rs.
3,00,000/- before registration of the sale deed. Since factum with regard to
issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon never came to be
disputed, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the courts
below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments
2026:HHC:20432
Act, which clearly provide that there shall be presumption available in
favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the
lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that
purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence.
Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the
documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant or by
leading some cogent and convincing evidence.
However, in the case at
hand, accused, despite sufficient opportunity, failed to raise probable
defence.
12.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR (Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
2026:HHC:20432
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent
undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further
observed that it must be remembered that the offence made
punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a
civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of
reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected
to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable
defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused
can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to
raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the
accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If
however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a
probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play
2026:HHC:20432
if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by
the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered
by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of
such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the
amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases,
the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or
liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a
matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the
evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption
that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for
a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial
judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed
in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
13.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as
security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State
of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
2026:HHC:20432
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction
cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every
circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe
and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of
payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the
fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are
bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower
agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a
cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is
not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no
other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the
payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would
mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be
entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and
the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
14.
Needless to say, expression “Security Cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act
does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
“security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
15.
2026:HHC:20432
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view
of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated
even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would
not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge
in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the
High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage
of justice.”
16.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
2026:HHC:20432
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
17.
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the
process
or
miscarriage
of
justice
or
to
correct
irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts
below.
18.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
19.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within thirty days to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
2026:HHC:20432
if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the
amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate
application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
May 29, 2026
(manjit)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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