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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.698 of 2025
Date of Decision: 22.05.2026
_________________________________________________________________________
Kuldeep Singh
……...Petitioner
Versus
Satpal Singh & Anr.
…....Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Rahul Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Narender Singh
respondent No.1.
Thakur,
Advocate,
for
Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocates General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr.
Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for
respondent No.2-State.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 read
with Section 442 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays
challenge to judgment dated 01.11.2025 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal
Appeal No.10 of 2024, affirming the judgment of conviction dated
19.01.2024 and order of sentence dated 27.02.2024, passed by the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, Himachal
Pradesh, in Criminal Complaint No.15 of 2017, whereby the learned Court
below, while holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter "accused") guilty of
having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (in short the "Act”), convicted and sentenced him to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and pay
compensation to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- to respondent No.1-complainant
(hereinafter "complainant").
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as
well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties are that
complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the
competent Court of law, alleging therein that complainant’s wife was
running a shop of fabrication in the name and style of M/s Nav-Nirman at
lower Bazar, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh. He alleged that
on 07.11.2013, he engaged the accused to file his quarterly sale tax on
account of his wife business and on the same day, paid sum of Rs.13,000/on account of sale tax liability. He stated that since then, he had been
paying quarterly sales tax to the accused and till 30.09.2016, had paid a
total sum of Rs.1,59,185/-. He alleged that on 06.12.2016, he, after having
visited the office of Excise and Taxation Officer at Lower Bazaar Sarkaghat,
came to know that accused had deposited only three or four installments
on account of sales tax and thereafter, he contacted the accused
telephonically, whereupon the accused apologized for the same and
assured him that the entire sales tax amount would be deposited on or
before 13.12.2016. He alleged that on 13.12.2016, in discharge of aforesaid
liability, accused issued a cheque bearing No.026635 dated 13.12.2016 for
an amount of Rs.1,59,185/-, drawn on State Bank of Patiala, Branch Office
Sarkaghat, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in favour of the complainant
towards
lawful
consideration.
However,
aforesaid
cheque
on
its
presentation to the bank concerned was returned back vide memo dated
28.12.2016 with the remarks “Funds Insufficient”. Since accused failed to
make the payment good within the stipulated period despite his having
received legal notice dated 25.01.2017, complainant had no option, but to
initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of
law.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
3.
by
the
respective
parties,
vide
judgment/order
dated
19.01.2024/
27.02.2024, held the accused guilty of his having committed offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and
sentenced him as per the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Sarkaghat, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, accused preferred an appeal
before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi,
Himachal Pradesh, but same was dismissed vide judgment dated
01.11.2025.
In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this
Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his acquittal after
setting-aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by
the learned Court below.
5.
Vide order dated 15.12.2025, this Court suspended the
substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below subject to
accused depositing 30% of the cheque amount and furnishing personal
bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount within a
period of eight weeks, however, fact remains that aforesaid order was never
complied with. Repeatedly matter was adjourned, enabling the accused
either to deposit the amount or settle the dispute with the complainant, but
in vain. On 07.04.2026, though it came to be stated at the behest of the
accused that sum of Rs.1,00,000/-, out of total amount of Rs.2,00,000/awarded by learned trial Court, has already been deposited with the
learned trial Court, but since remaining sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was
undertaken to be deposited within a period of six weeks, this Court
adjourned the matter for today’s date. However, fact remains that balance
amount has not been paid till date, as such, this Court has no option but
to decide the petition on its own merits.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sarkaghat,
District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, whereby judgment of conviction and
order of sentence recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld,
this Court is not persuaded to agree with Mr. Rahul Sharma, learned
counsel for the petitioner, that learned Courts below have failed to
appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that
both the Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter
meticulously and there is no scope left for this Court to interfere.
Interestingly, in the case hand, factum of issuance of cheque as well as
signatures thereupon never came to be disputed. Though in the instant
case, accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, denied
the case of the complainant in toto and claimed himself to be innocent, but
pattern of cross-examination conducted upon the complainant clearly
establishes factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signatures
thereupon. If it is so, no illegality otherwise can be said to have been
committed by learned Courts below, while invoking Section 118 and 139 of
the Act, which talk about presumption in favour of holder of cheque that
cheque in question was issued towards discharge of lawful liability.
7.
No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut
such presumption person seeking to rebut such presumption is expected to
raise probable defence.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence, which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused, besides leading evidence in defence,
can rely on the materials produced by the complainant. Needless to say, if
the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It
would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility
of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in
the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it
must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section
138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing
of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is
usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should
guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and
the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly
high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled
position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption
under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all
preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence
which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt
or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a
defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may
not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the
accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable
defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI
Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by
the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such
a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the
time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the
said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence,
hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not
there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have
to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in
view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is
presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this
the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct
the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment
despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
[
9.
In the instant case, though accused examined two witnesses
i.e. DW-1 Mukesh Kumar and DW-2 HASI Jagdarshan Singh, but
accused was unable to probablize the defence otherwise attempted to set
up by him.
10.
To the contrary, complainant, with a view to prove his case,
examined himself as CW-1, who by way of tendering affidavit
Ext.CW-1/A, reiterated the facts as averred in the complaint. Besides
above, he also tendered on record cheque Ex. CW1/B, memo Ex.
CW1/C, legal notice Ex. CW1/D, postal receipt Ex. CW1/E. If the crossexamination conducted upon this witness is perused in its entirety, it
can be safely concluded that accused was unable to extract anything
contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. In his
cross examination, afore witness stated that M/s Navnirman is a
registered firm. While stating that he is not partner in the said firm, he
stated that he used to assist his wife, who is the proprietor of the firm.
He stated that there is no other partner in the firm except his wife
Madhubala. While feigning ignorance as to whether the firm was
registered in the year 2012 or 2013, he stated that Kuldeep i.e. the
accused, used to deposit the sales tax of their firm. He stated that
though they had no agreement with the accused to deposit their tax, but
sales tax used to be deposited by him and they used to pay Rs.500/- for
three months to the accused to deposit the sales tax. He stated that
some part of tax was paid through cheque and some was paid by cash.
He stated the payment made by him to the accused through cheque had
been deposited by the accused as sales tax, but the payment made in
cash had not been deposited. While denying that entire receipts of sales
tax were with him, he stated that it was with the Kuldeep as he was
their accountant. While stating that accused used to work for him in
matters relating to tax, sales and accounts, he further stated he also
used to look after the work of excise. He stated that till the accused
worked for him, entire receipts of the tax were with him. He stated that
he could not state orally about the total sales from May 2016 to June
2016. He admitted that demonetization started on 08.11.2016. He
feigned ignorance that on 08.12.2016, he had deposited Rs.14,500/- in
the account of accused. He feigned ignorance that aforesaid amount of
Rs. 14,500/- had been deposited by the accused towards excise duty.
While feigning ignorance that afore sum of rupees had been deposited by
him in the account of accused so that he can exchange his old currency
notes, he admitted that e-challan was filed for VAT. While admitting that
in mark-A the VAT tax-II-A e-challan of his firm was Rs. 14,500/-, he
denied that on 28.06.2016, he asked the accused to issue a fraud bill of
Rs.30 Lakhs. He admitted that work of welding and preparation of
aluminum frames comes under the work of fabrication. While admitting
that cheque had been filled by him, he stated that accused had issued
the cheque as per his free will. While admitting that accused had lodged
a complaint against him that the cheque had been forcibly obtained by
him from the accused, he stated that at that time there was delivery of
his wife and he got this information telephonically. If pattern of crossexamination conducted upon the complainant is seen, accused virtually
admitted factum with to his regard to his having issued cheque as well
as signatures thereupon. Though accused attempted to carve out a case
that cheque in question was obtained forcibly by the complainant, but such
defence never came to be probablized by him by leading cogent and
convincing evidence. He was unable to produce on record copy of the
complaint, if any, lodged by him with the police with regard to forcible
procurement of cheque by the complainant.
Having scanned pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
11.
record
by
the
complainant,
this
Court
finds
that
complainant
successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act.
Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by
the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established
on record.
12.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in
view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts
below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by
Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein
it has been held as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine
the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an
appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the
High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court
which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
13.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal Court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the Courts
below.
14.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no reason
to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts below,
which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence
available on record and as such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
15.
being devoid of any merit. The accused is directed to surrender before the
learned trial Court within one month to serve the sentence as awarded by
the learned trial Court, if not already served.
Interim direction, if any,
stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Bail
bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are cancelled.
May 22, 2026
(sunil)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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