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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
W.P.(C) 1106/2026 & CM APPL. 5443/2026
KULDEEP KUMAR AND ORS
Through:
.....Petitioners
Mr. Yash Vardhan Singh and Ms.
Deepti Ahuja, Advocates.
versus
DELHI POWER COMPANY LIMITED (DPCL) AND ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sushil Pandey, SPC with Mr.
Sharves Srivastv and Mr. Shivam
Singh, Advocates for R-1.
Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, SC (GNCTD)
with Ms. Aliza Alam and Mohnish
Sehrawat, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Anupam Varma, Mr. Nikhil
Sharma, Ms. Simran Kohli and Ms.
Shivali Rawat, Advocates for R2-11.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
ORDER
27.01.2026
%
1.
This petition has been instituted jointly by seven Petitioners. Each
Petitioner assails a separate memorandum/charge-sheet, issued at different
points of time, ranging from November 2013 to March 2025. The relief
sought is framed as a writ of mandamus for quashing the disciplinary
proceedings, the impugned memoranda/charge-sheets, and Notification No.
HR(BYPL)/2024-25/01 dated 1st April, 2024. The principal ground urged is
that the charge-sheets were issued without the approval of the President of
India, or of an authority duly empowered by the President, as required under
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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Rules 13 and 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 19651.
2.
At the outset, the petition suffers from an evident misjoinder of
different causes of action. Each memorandum concerns a different
Petitioner, a different factual substratum, different allegations, different
stages of disciplinary proceedings, and in some cases, even different
employers within the distribution entities. The mere assertion of a common
question of law does not, by itself, cure the structural defect of clubbing
seven independent service disputes into one omnibus petition. Even so, since
the Petitioners press a threshold jurisdictional objection, the Court proceeds
to examine that legal plank, while keeping it clear that the individual merits,
defences, and factual controversies in each memorandum are not being
adjudicated in this proceeding.
3.
The Petitioner’s principal submission is that the CCS (CCA) Rules
apply to them, and under Rule 13 read with Rule 14, disciplinary
proceedings can be instituted only by the President of India or by an
authority empowered by the President by general or special order. On that
premise, they contend that charge-sheets issued by officers of the
Respondent companies, without demonstrable Presidential approval, are ab
initio void and are liable to be treated as “non est”.
4.
The Petitioners also place reliance on decisions which hold that where
an action is without jurisdiction, doctrines such as estoppel, waiver, or res
judicata cannot be invoked to validate it. The submission, in substance, is
that if the initiation of disciplinary proceedings itself is void, all
consequential steps must necessarily fail.
“CCS (CCA) Rules”
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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5.
The Respondents oppose the petition on multiple grounds, including
misjoinder, delay and laches, particularly for memoranda dating back to
2013-2019, and the impropriety of invoking writ jurisdiction to challenge
charge-sheets, especially where some Petitioners have already assailed final
disciplinary orders in independent proceedings. On the central legal issue, it
is contended that the Petitioners’ construction of Rule 13 is misplaced. It is
further submitted that the Notification dated 1 st April, 2024 merely
delineates the internal disciplinary and appellate hierarchy and does not
supplant or dilute the CCS (CCA) Rules.
Scope of interference at the stage of charge-sheet
6.
It is well settled that ordinarily a writ court does not interdict a
charge-sheet, since such a document does not determine rights and is merely
a step in aid of the disciplinary process. The Supreme Court in Union of
India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana2 has cautioned that a charge-sheet
does not ordinarily give rise to any cause of action, and that premature
intervention would result in converting the writ jurisdiction into a forum for
stalling disciplinary proceedings. Judicial interference at this stage is,
therefore, confined to rare and exceptional cases, such as where the action is
wholly without jurisdiction, or is otherwise wholly illegal. The Petitioners,
therefore, can succeed only if the foundational objection on competence is
established in clear terms, on the text of the governing rules and the status of
the issuing authority.
Rule 13 / “competent authority”
7.
The Petitioners’ challenge proceeds at a high level of abstraction.
Proceeding on the premise that the CCS (CCA) Rules apply, it is urged that
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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the power to institute disciplinary proceedings must trace exclusively to the
President under Rule 13, or to an authority expressly empowered by the
President. On this footing, the charge-sheets are characterised as
jurisdictionally void.
8.
This line of argument overlooks the statutory framework governing
the transition of employees following the unbundling of the Delhi Vidyut
Board3. The Delhi Electricity Reform (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 20014
effected a statutory severance from the transferor entity. Rule 6(6) of the
Transfer Scheme Rules makes the position plain: upon transfer, the
personnel “shall cease to be in the service of the Board” and cannot assert or
claim any service benefits under the Board. Rule 6(7) preserves continuity
of service conditions only as an interim arrangement, by providing that until
the transferee frames its own regulations, the existing service conditions of
the Board shall “mutandis apply”. Rule 6(11) is equally telling: all
proceedings, including disciplinary proceedings, pending or relatable to pretransfer misconduct “shall not abate” and may be continued by the relevant
transferee.
9.
This statutory scheme directly answers the question as to the identity
of the competent disciplinary authority. The transferee is not a mere conduit
mechanically applying legacy rules; disciplinary control is intended to
migrate to, and vest in, the transferee. That is precisely how the issue was
analysed by this Court in Brij Mohan v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.5.
The Court held that once absorption took effect, the employee could not
(2006) 12 SCC 28.
“DVB”
Transfer Scheme Rules”
W.P.(C) 6902/2003.
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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insist on the transferor’s disciplinary architecture, and disciplinary action
undertaken by the transferee under the transfer scheme framework could not
be faulted as contrary to law. The relevant portion of the order is as follows:
“1. Whether the removal order is passed by a competent authority.
31. The first challenge raised by the petitioner is that the order of
removal from services was not passed by the competent authority,
since, the services of the petitioner were governed by the DESU
Regulations and hence, could have only been initiated by the Officers
of respondent no. 1 or the original employer, however, the order was
passed on behalf of the respondent no. 2 by the respondent no. 3. On
the other hand, the respondents have argued that the rules applicable
were in terms with the Transfer Scheme and the authority passing the
removal of services order was passed by the competent authority: This
Court has considered the contentions raised on behalf of both the
parties. The petitioner was absorbed by the respondent no. 2 from the
Delhi Vidyut Board. The transfer of services of the petitioner was
regulated in terms of the provisions of the Delhi Electricity Reform
(Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001 as post the absorption of the
petitioner, the rights and entitlement available to the petitioner were
to be regulated in accordance with the Scheme until the regulations
of the respondent no. 2 were to be made applicable to the petitioner.
Once the petitioner's services ceased to be with the Delhi Vidyut
Board, there remained no benefit, entitlement or claim which could
be sought by him under the regulations of the DESU.
xx………………..xx…………………xx
33. It is evident from a bare reading of the provisions that
subsequent to the absorption of the petitioner to the respondent no. 2,
he was not entitled to claim any benefit from the transferor entity.
Moreover, the Sub-clause 11 of Clause 6 of the Transfer Scheme
stipulates that the pending disciplinary actions against any employees
initiated prior to the transfer were to be continued, and not abated, by
the transferee. This provision makes it abundantly clear that the
intention of the framers of the Scheme was that the provisions of the
transferee entity were to be made applicable on the personnel after
their services were transferred and absorbed into the transferee
Company and had to be continued accordingly. The conclusion
which reasonably flows upon a bare reading of this provision
suggests that the intention was to subject the personnel to the
regulations of the Company to which the employees were being
transferred. Therefore, an inquiry based on the Transfer Scheme or
the rules and regulations of the respondent no. 12 cannot be said to be
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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in violation of the law or procedure laid down.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
10.
The consequence is that even where the CCS (CCA) Rules continue
to apply as an interim service code under Rule 6(7) of the Transfer Scheme
Rules, they operate in a modified institutional setting. The appointing and
disciplinary powers stand reallocated within the transferee’s corporate
structure.
11.
Once this prism is applied, the Petitioners’ argument to treat the
“President” in Rule 13 of CCS (CCA) Rules as the exclusive and literal
source of power to initiate disciplinary action for absorbed DVB personnel
serving under successor entities, is rendered untenable.
Reliance on Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath does, and does not, establish
12.
The Petitioners also rely on decisions which emphasise that where the
governing rules require approval of the disciplinary authority at the stage of
issuance of the charge memorandum, such approval cannot be presumed or
treated as a mere formality. Reliance is placed on Union of India & Ors. v.
B.V. Gopinath6, where the Supreme Court held, on the facts of that case,
that approval for initiation could not be equated with approval of the charge
memorandum, particularly when the record disclosed that the memorandum
was never placed before the identified disciplinary authority. Two
clarifications are apposite. First, B.V. Gopinath turned on the governing
framework in that case and the demonstrable absence of approval by the
identified disciplinary authority. It does not lay down a universal rule that
‘President approval’ is required in every disciplinary action governed by the
(2014) 1 SCC 351.
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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CCS (CCA) Rules. Secondly, the later jurisprudence noted hereinafter has
expressly cautioned against reading B.V. Gopinath (and allied decisions) as
a one-size-fits-all proposition divorced from the applicable rules and factual
setting.
13.
In State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra7, the Supreme
Court undertook a careful review of the competing lines of authority,
including the earlier cases, and clarified that the application of B.V.
Gopinath and State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar, IPS & Anr.8 must be
understood as confined to the rule-framework and facts of those cases, and
that the question whether the charge memo required approval at a particular
stage depends on the governing disciplinary rules and their construction.
14.
This is precisely where the Petitioners’ case falters. They have not
demonstrated, by reference to the applicable framework governing the
issuing authority in their employment set-up, that the President is the
disciplinary authority for them, or that the charge-sheets mandatorily
required Presidential approval as opposed to approval by the competent
disciplinary authority identified within the hierarchy. The challenge rests on
assumption and generalisation, rather than on a rule-based identification of
the competent disciplinary authority within the post-transfer regime.
Article 311 and the “appointing authority” argument
15.
The Petitioners also invoke Article 311(1) of the Constitution and
asserts that no person can be dismissed or removed by an authority
subordinate to the authority by which the person was appointed. Petitioners’
submission proceeds on the premise that initiation of disciplinary
2025 SCC OnLine SC 676.
(2018) 17 SCC 677.
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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proceedings, and issuance of the charge-sheets, must invariably emanate
from the appointing authority and that, failing such approval, the
proceedings are a nullity. This premise does not reflect the constitutional
position.
16.
Article 311(1) interdicts dismissal or removal by an authority
subordinate to the appointing authority. It does not, invalidate the initiation
stage of a departmental proceeding. The Supreme Court in P.V. Srinivasa
Sastry & Ors. v. Comptroller and Auditor General & Ors.9 has explained
that disciplinary proceedings comprise distinct stages and, in the absence of
a rule prescribing otherwise, initiation need not be by the appointing
authority and may be undertaken by the superior controlling authority.
Rule 14 objections at the charge-sheet stage
17.
The Petitioners further contend that Rule 14 (procedure for imposing
major penalties) has not been followed, including objections to appointment
of inquiry officers and the alleged bias of disciplinary authorities. These are
not grounds to declare a charge-sheet void at inception. Rule 14 governs the
conduct of the inquiry after institution, including the manner of proving
charges, leading evidence, and defence. Complaints about procedural
deviations under Rule 14 are ordinarily tested at the appropriate stage, and in
any case require a fact-specific enquiry. They cannot be short-circuited
through a consolidated writ petition seeking to nullify multiple
memoranda/charge-sheets issued across a decade.
The Notification dated 1st April, 2024
18.
The Petitioners also assail Notification No. HR(BYPL)/2024-25/01
dated 1st April, 2024, which sets out the disciplinary and appellate
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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authorities for employees of specified categories. Even on the Petitioners’
own showing, several of the impugned memoranda pre-date this notification
by many years. A subsequent notification delineating internal disciplinary
hierarchies cannot retrospectively invalidate charge-sheets already issued,
unless it is demonstrated, with specificity, that the issuing authority earlier
lacked competence and that the notification constitutes an acknowledgment
of such lack. No such case has been made out.
19.
Further, a notification identifying disciplinary and appellate
authorities within an organisation is not, on its face, inconsistent with Rule
13(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, which contemplates institution of
disciplinary proceedings by the competent disciplinary authority. The
Petitioners’ argument proceeds on the erroneous assumption that any
internal delegation or mapping of authority is per se contrary to Rule 13,
which is not a tenable interpretation.
Delay, laches, and parallel proceedings
20.
Several of the charge-sheets assailed in the present petition date back
to 2013, 2018 and 2019. The Petitioners have not offered any satisfactory
explanation for invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court in 2026 to
challenge memoranda which have either been acted upon for years or have
culminated into proceedings at advanced stages. A writ court does not
ordinarily exercise discretionary jurisdiction to revive stale challenges,
particularly at the interlocutory stage of disciplinary process.
21.
The record also indicates that the impugned memoranda and the
proceedings arising from them have already travelled into other fora, and in
some cases have resulted in concluded disciplinary action, with independent
(1993) 1 SCC 419.
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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challenges already instituted. Thus, where disciplinary proceedings have
concluded and final orders are already under challenge in other proceedings,
a separate collateral attack on the initial charge-sheet through a composite
petition is, at the least, procedurally misconceived. The Petitioners cannot
maintain parallel tracks that fragment the disciplinary challenge, unless an
exceptional jurisdictional defect is clearly established. For reasons already
recorded, that jurisdictional defect has not been shown.
Conclusion
22.
The petition, in its present form, does not establish that the impugned
memoranda/charge-sheets were issued without competence. The Petitioners’
submission that Rule 13 of CCS (CCA) Rules mandates Presidential
approval in every case is not borne out from the text of the said Rule, and
their reliance on the ‘approval’ line of authority does not assist them in the
absence of a rule-specific demonstration that the President was the
disciplinary authority for them and that the charge memoranda mandatorily
required Presidential approval in their governing framework. The Supreme
Court’s clarification, in Rukma Kesh Mishra, that such precedents must be
applied with close attention to the governing rules and factual context
reinforces this conclusion.
23.
The Court is also not persuaded to entertain an omnibus challenge
combining seven separate memorandum/charge-sheets over a wide temporal
span, particularly when the settled discipline is that writ interference at the
charge-sheet stage is exceptional.
24.
The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s)
are also disposed of.
25.
It is clarified that this order does not preclude any Petitioner from
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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raising permissible defences in the respective disciplinary proceedings, or
from pursuing remedies available in law against final orders, subject to
limitation and maintainability.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
JANUARY 27, 2026
as
W.P.(C) 1106/2026
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