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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI
****
WRIT PETITION NO: 27799 of 2025
KOTA VENKATA NARAYANA, S/O VENKATESWARARAO, AGE 53
YEARS, OCC CONTRACTOR, R/O. 3-97, VELADIKOTHAPALEM,
CHANDRALAPADU MANDAL, KRISHNA DISTRICT.
… Petitioner
Versus
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY, PANCHAYAT RAJ DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT,
VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATHI GUNTUR DISTRICT AND OTHERS
… Respondents
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED :
24.02.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the order?
:
Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of order may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals?
:
Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the order?
:
Yes/No
_____________________
SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J
* HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
WRIT PETITION NO: 27799 of 2025
% 24.02.2026
Writ Petition No. 27799 of 2025
KOTA VENKATA NARAYANA, S/O VENKATESWARARAO, AGE 53
YEARS, OCC CONTRACTOR, R/O. 3-97, VELADIKOTHAPALEM,
CHANDRALAPADU MANDAL, KRISHNA DISTRICT.
… Petitioner
Versus
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY, PANCHAYAT RAJ DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT,
VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATHI GUNTUR DISTRICT AND OTHERS
… Respondents
! Counsel for Petitioner
:
^ Counsel for Respondents :
< Gist
> Head Note
? Cases referred
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
Sri D.V. Sasidhar
learned counsel
Sri P. Rajesh, learned Assistant
Government Pleader for Panchayat
Raj and Finance Department and
Sri Chaitanya, learned counsel
representing Sri Y. Koteswara Rao,
learned standing counsel
:
:
:
1973 (1) SCC 163
[ History of English Law — W.S. Holdsworth — Seventh Edn., Vol. 1, p. 252-54]
(1996) 1 SCC 345
AIR 1954 SC 282
(1971) 2 SCC 236
(1977) 3 SCC 457
1996 (6) SCC 22
2002 (1) SCC 216
(2004) 3 SCC 553
(2015) 7 SCC 728
(2019) 16 SCC 794
2025 SCC online SC 1400
This Court made the following:
APHC010538332025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3331]
TUESDAY,THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
WRIT PETITION NO: 27799/2025
Between:
1. KOTA VENKATA NARAYANA, S/O VENKATESWARARAO, AGE
YEARS,
OCC
CONTRACTOR,
R/O.
3-97,
VELADIKOTHAPALEM, CHANDRALAPADU MANDAL, KRISHNA
DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY,
PANCHAYAT
RAJ
DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATHI
GUNTUR
DISTRICT.
2. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY,
FINANCE
PLANNING DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATHI,
GUNTUR
DISTRICT. 3.
3. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, VIJAYAWADA, NTR DISTRICT 4.
4. THE COMMISSIONER, PANCHAYAT RAJ AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT
PVS ICON, TADEPALLI
GUNTUR DISTRICT 5.
5. THE DISTRICT PANCHAYAT OFFICER, VIJAYAWADA, NTR
DISTRICT. 6.
6. MUPPALA GRAM PANCHAYAT, CHANDRALAPADU MANDAL,
NTR DISTRICT
REPRESENTED BY ITS PANCHAYAT
SECRETARY 7.
7. THE MPDO, CHANDRALAPADU MANDAL, NTR DISTRICT
8. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, NANDIGAMA, NTR
DISTRICT 9.
9. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, CHANDRALAPADU
MANDAL, NTR DISTRICT
...RESPONDENT(S):
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in
the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court
may be pleased to issue a writ order or direction more particularly one in
the nature of writ of MANDAMUS declaring the action of the respondents
in not releasing the payments for the works executed by the petitioner in
relation to SI. Name of the work Estimation in lakhsNo. 1. Construction
of CC Drain from BC area Anganwadi building to Ravuri Srinu house
(Bit-1) in Muppalla (V) Construction of CC Drain from BC area
Anganwadi building to Ravuri Srinu house (Bit-2) in Muppalla (V)
Construction of CC Drain from BC area Anganwadi building to Ravuri
Srinu house (Bit-3) in Muppalla (V) Construction of CC Drain from Dulla
Badraiah house to Ravuri Ranga Rao in Muppalla (V) Construction of
CC Drain from Kavartapu Nageswara Rao to Hindu Burrial ground in
Muppalla (V) Construction of CC Drain from Nallani Venkateswara Rao
house to R B road (Bit-1) in Muppalla (V) Construction of CC Drain from
Nallani Venkateswara Rao house to R B road (Bit-2) in Muppalla (V)
Construction of CC Drain from Ravuri Venkateswara Rao house to
Bandarupalli Ramesh house in Muppalla 2.00 2. 2.00 3. 2.00 4. 1.88
5. 2.00 6. 2.00 7. 2.00 8. 1.81 (V) 9. Construction of CC Drain from
D.Venkateswarlu house to Hindu Burrial ground in Muppalla (V)
Construction of CC Drain from Hindu Burrial ground to ending (Bit-1) in
Muppalla (V) . Construction of CC Drain from Hindu Burrial ground to
ending (Bit-2) in Muppalla (V) Construction of CC Drain from Popuri
house to Ravuri Harish babu (Bit-1) in Muppalla(V) Construction of CC
Drain from Popuri house to Ravuri Harish babu (Bit-2) in Muppalla (V)
Construction of CC Drain from Alii Parameswara Rao house to
Anganwadi building (Bit-1) in Muppalla (V) Construction of CC Drain
from Alii Parameswara Rao house to Anganwadi building (Bit-2) in
Muppalla (V) Construction of CC Drain from Ourangabad Veeraiah
house to Talupula Kasaiah house (Bit-1) in Muppalla 1.51 10. 2.00 11.
1.38 12. 2.00 13. 1.00 14. 2.00 15. 1.62 16. 2.00 (V) 17.
Construction of CC Drain from Ourangabad Veeraiah house to Talupula
Kasaiah house (Bit-2) in Muppalla 1.83 (V) 18. Construction of CC
Drain from Rachabandia Kanakarao house to Baluguri Pothuraju house
(Bit-1) in Muppalla (V) Construction of CC Drain from Rachabandia
Kanakarao house to Baluguri Pothuraju house (Bit-2) in Muppalla (V)
2.00 19. 2.00 Total 35.03 in Muppala Village, Chandralapadu Mandal,
NTR District to the tune of Rs. 31,18,844/- (Rupees Thirty One Lakhs
Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty Four only) as bad, illegal,
arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution
of India and consequently direct the respondents to forthwith release the
payments due to the petitioner the tune of Rs. 31,18,844/- (Rupees
Thirty One Lakhs Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty Four
only) along with interest from the date of entry in M-Books and pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances
stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may
be pleased pleased to direct the respondents to forthwith release the
payment for the works executed by the petitioner in relation to the
aforesaid works to the tune of Rs.31,18,844/- (Rupees Thirty One Lakhs
Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty Four only) and pass
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. D V SASIDHAR
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR PANCHAYAT RAJ RURAL DEV
2. Yarraguntla.Koteswara Rao,Standing Counsel For Zilla Praja
Parishads,Mandal Praja Parishads and Gra
3. GP FOR FINANCE PLANNING
The Court made the following:
ORDER
The above writ petition was filed to declare the action of the
respondents in not releasing an amount of Rs.31,18,844/- payable to the
petitioner in relation to the works done by him i.e. „Construction of CC
Drains in Muppala village, Chandralapadu Mandal, NTR District‟, as
illegal and arbitrary.
2.
Heard Sri D.V.Sasidhar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri P.
Rajesh, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Panchayat Raj and
Finance Department, for respondents 1 to 5, 8 and 9, and Sri Chaitanya,
learned counsel representing Sri Y. Koteswara Rao, learned standing
counsel for respondents 6.
3.
The Panchayat Secretary of respondent No.6-Gram Panchayat
entrusted different works to the petitioner, a member of the Works
Committee, Muppala Village. Though the orders were dated 20.02.2024,
19 different orders were issued for distinct works and entrusted to the
petitioner. All the works, as seen from the orders/agreements, relate to
the construction of C.C. drains in Muppalla Village. In the orders-Ex.P1, it
was noted as follows:
“Hence, after careful consideration of the proposals received and in
the light of Guide lines received in following works sanctioned under
15th Finance funds of Grama Panchayat, Muppalla is hereby
entrusted to Sri Kota Venkata Narayana, Member, Works
Committee, Muppalla.”
4.
Thereafter, separate agreements were entered into, and the
petitioner, the Panchayat Secretary and Sarpanch of respondent No.6,
signed the said agreements. The copies of the agreements are filed as
Ex.P4. As seen from the averments of the writ affidavit, the petitioner
completed the work. In fact, as seen from Ex.P2, the Sarpanch of Gram
Panchayat issued the proceedings, whereby the bill was passed to pay
the amount in respect of each of the works. However, the amount was
not paid, and hence, the petitioner filed the above writ petition.
5.
The writ petition was listed on 09.10.2025 and adjourned at the
request of learned counsel for the respondents, enabling them to get
instructions.
6.
Today, when the matter is taken up, Sri Y. Koteswara Rao, learned
standing counsel, submitted the written instructions of Panchayat
Secretary of respondent No.6. In the instructions, it was noted as follows:
“Pursuant to the filing of the writ petition, the issue was brought to
the notice of the Pay and Accounts Office, Vijayawada and the
technical problem has since been rectified. At present, the
petitioner‟s bills have been successfully forwarded from the
Gram Panchayat login to the PAO through CFMS with few
remarks the bills are Returned from PAO login hence Remarks has
been updated measurement books in bill payments and are under
processing at the approval stage (ready to send) bill processing
dates from 17th to month ending in every month. The relevant bill
numbers are enclosed.
Upon approval by the Pay and Accounts Office, the bill
amounts will be directly credited to the petitioner’s bank
account. The bill will be processed within three months, and the bill
amount will be directly credited to the vendor‟s account.”
7.
Thus, as seen from the written instructions of Panchayat Secretary
coupled with Ex.P2-proceedings issued by the Gram Panchayat, the
petitioner completed the works in pursuance of Ex.P1-orders and Ex.P4agreements and is entitled to the amount of Rs.29,58,648/-, after
statutory deductions.
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioner endorses the same.
9.
Of late, several writ petitions are being instituted seeking a writ of
Mandamus to direct the State and its authorities to release the amount in
respect of the works, be it a statutory contract or non-statutory contracts,
executed by the contractors. Those writ petitions are disposed of either
by this court or other coordinate benches, directing the State and its
authorities to pay or release the admitted amounts.
10. It is pertinent to mention here that in several writ petitions, including
the present one, the petitioners, be it individuals or companies or
proprietary concerns, are filing a single writ petition by paying the court
fee of Rs.100/- in respect of different works executed under different
agreements, though the cause of action is distinct. In this case at hand,
the petitioner filed the above writ petition seeking a direction to the
respondent authorities to release payment in relation to 19 different
works, entrusted to the petitioner under different agreements, by paying
the court fee of Rs.100/-.
11.
Since the issue regarding the maintainability of one writ petition in
respect of multiple agreements by paying the court fee of Rs.100/- by
treating all the agreements as one, and the said aspect is attached with
general importance, this court intends to deliberate on these aspects in
the present writ petition.
12.
Whether the Court Fee of Rs.100/- paid by the petitioner for 19
works under different agreements is legally permissible?
13. To answer the point, let this court, in the first instance, explore the
background of the court fee and its evaluation.
14.
The Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Secretary to the
Government of Madras, Home Department and another vs. Zenith
Lamp and Electrical Limited1, considered the court fee and its evolution
and observed as follows:
According to Holdsworth2 the Judges, from the first, were
paid salaries by the Crown, which, in the course of years, were
increased. “But from the earliest times, the salaries of the Judges
had not formed their only source of income. Though they did not
hold their offices as their freeholds, though they could be dismissed
by the Crown, they nevertheless drew a considerable part of their
income from fees”. “When the income of the Judges from fees was
taken away in 1826, their salaries were raised from £2400 a year to
£5500.”
As far as the officials of the courts were concerned “the
earliest information which we get about the officials of the courts of
common law shows that they were paid almost entirely by fees. In
fact it would be true to say that the official staff of all the central
courts (except the Lord Chancellor and the Judges) was almost
entirely self-supporting”. “But probably the largest part of the
remuneration of the official staff of the courts came from fees in
1973 (1) SCC 163
[ History of English Law — W.S. Holdsworth — Seventh Edn., Vol. 1, p.
252-54]
connection with the very numerous acts that must be done to set
and keep in motion the complicated machinery of the courts, from
the issue of the original writ to the execution of final judgment”
(Holdsworth, p. 256)
In India according to the Fifth Report on East India Affairs,
Vol. 1 (1812) chapter “the civil courts of justice”, “the chouthay or
fourth part of the value of property recovered in a Court of
judicature seems to be considered in most parts of the Indian
Peninsula as the compensation or fee due to the ruling power for
the administration of justice”. This was abolished on the accession
of the British power to the Government of Bengal, and in lieu of it,
the introduction of a small percentage on the institution of a suit has
been noticed.
In the preamble to Bengal Regulation 6 of 1797, the object is
stated to be to discourage litigations, complaints and the filing of
superfluous exhibits and the summoning of unnecessary witnesses
on the trial of suits and also to provide for deficiency which would
be occasioned in the public revenue by abolition of the police tax as
well as to add eventually public resources, without burdening
individuals. The same object of discouraging litigation is stated in
clause 1 of the Bombay Regulation 8 of 1802.
In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Court Fees
Bill, 1869, it is stated that “the experience gained of their (stamp
fees) working during the two years in which they have been in
force, seems to be conclusive as to their repressive effect on the
general litigation of the country”. “It is, therefore, thought expedient
to make a general reduction in the rates now chargeable on the
institution of civil suits, and to revert to the principle of a maximum
fee which obtained under the former law.”
15.
Three-judge bench in the State of Madras v. P.R. Sriramulu3,
considered the scope and object of the payment of the court fee and
observed at para 6 and 7 as follows:
6. Before we embark upon the points in controversy and respective
contentions relating thereto we may briefly trace the history with
regard to the levy of court fees in this country on the litigating
parties. Before the advent of British rule in India the administration
of justice was considered to be the basic function of the State as
guardian of the people without the levy of any charge on the party
approaching the court for redress of its grievance. As far as the
memory goes during the Moghul rule and the period prior to that,
there was no fee payable even on administration of civil justice and
the administration of justice was totally free. It was only after the
British rule that regulations imposing court fees were brought into
existence. In the beginning the imposition of the fee was nominal
but in the course of time it was enhanced gradually under the
impression that it would prevent the institution of frivolous and
groundless litigation and as an effective deterrent to the abuse of
process of the court without causing any impediment in the
institution of just claims. However insignificant this view may be that
the levy of fees would have a tendency to put a restraint on
frivolous litigation, that view at any rate had the merit of seeking to
achieve a purpose which was believed to have some relevance to
the administration of justice. Since about past two decades the levy
of court fees on higher scales would seem to find its justification,
not in any purpose related to the sound administration of justice,
but in the need of the State Government for revenue as a means
for recompense. It may be seen that the Central Court Fees Act of
1870 fixed, what may be described in view of subsequent
(1996) 1 SCC 345
happenings, a moderate scale of court fees. But the fact may not
be lost sight of that after the enactment of the Court Fees Act, 1870
the financial needs of the State Governments have multiplied to a
much larger extent. Consequently, most of the States have enacted
their own Court Fees Acts or have amended the original Acts
themselves beyond recognition and thereby have increased the
scale of fees to a level which has given rise to the feeling that it is
no longer a fee but a heavy tax on the litigants.
7. It cannot be disputed that the administration of justice is one of
the main functions of the State. It is also a fact that the functions of
the
State
in
modern
times
have
become
too
extensive,
encompassing a large area of activity. Now the State has not only
to maintain a system of administration of justice for the
maintenance of law and order, but it has also to provide a system to
enable its citizens to canvass their rights against wrongs done to
them as well as to the State itself, statutory bodies and government
corporations, they being now the largest litigants by reason of the
growing tendency of all the States to project themselves into
various social, economic and industrial spheres of the society,
which during pre-independence days, was a rare phenomenon. It is
for all these reasons that the States came forward to levy fee by
legislative amendments in order to cover up the expenses towards
the pay, allowances and pensions of Judicial Officers and
establishment
staff,
their
residential
accommodations,
court
buildings, repairs and maintenance thereof as well as provision for
transport, libraries and stationery, besides other expenses under
various heads and machinery engaged and employed for the
administration of justice.
16.
Later, the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Court Fee Act 1880,
were promulgated and in force till the Andhra Pradesh Court-Fees and
Suit Valuation Act, 1956 came into force.
17.
The Andhra Pradesh Court-Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1956 (Act
VII of 1956) (for short „APCF and SV Act‟) received the assent of the
President on 16.03.1956 and was published in the Andhra Gazette Part
IV B (Ext) dated 22.03.1956.
Chapter IV of the APCF and SV Act
prescribes the computation of fees for different suits, and Section 19 of
the said Act sets out how the fee is to be computed. As per Section 19 of
the Act, the fee payable under the Act shall be computed in accordance
with the provisions of Chapters VI and VIII and Schedules I and II.
18.
Chapter VI deals with probates, letters of administration and
certificates of administration. Chapter VIII deals with miscellaneous. The
computation of the fee in respect of writ petitions has not been prescribed
either in Chapter IV or VI or VIII.
19.
Schedule I of the Act delineates an ad valorem fee, and Schedule
II prescribes a fixed Court Fee. Schedule-II Article 11 (S) of the APCF
and SV Act prescribes the court fee in respect of the issue in the writ
petition, which is apt, is extracted hereunder:
“Petition to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a
writ other than the writ of Habeas Corpus or a petition under Article
227 of the Constitution. The Court Fee payable, as per column
No.3, is Rs.100/-.
20.
Thus, a conspectus of the provisions of the Act and the
expressions of the Apex Court, in the considered opinion of this court, the
purpose of the APCF and SV Act is to facilitate the collection of a Court
Fee from the litigant public in the Court and Public Offices, for the
administration of justice. A fee may be charged for the privilege or benefit
offered or service rendered to meet the expenses connected therewith.
Thus, the fee is nothing but payment for some special privilege granted
and service rendered.
21.
At this juncture, let this court consider the Writ Proceeding Rules
and their relevance. The Writ Proceedings Rules 1977 (for short „the
Rules‟) framed by virtue of Article 225 of the Constitution of India to
regulate the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, do
not indicate the fee payable in a writ petition. Rule 4-A incorporated by
ROC No.92/SO/86 dated 19.03.1986, published in R.S. to Part II A.P.
Gazette No.8, dated 10.04.1986, throws some light regarding the fee
payable, which reads as follows:
“Two or more persons raising common questions of law or
persons having a common cause of action may join in a single
writ petition paying a single set of Court Fees.”
22.
No specific fee is prescribed under the Writ proceedings Rules.
Court fee in respect of Writ Petitions is prescribed in the APCF and SV
Act, as mentioned supra. A conjoint reading of Article 11(S) of the APCF
and SV Act read with Rule 4-A of the Rules, the Court Fee prescribed in
a petition to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
other than a Writ of Habeas Corpus or a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, is Rs.100/-.
Whether the Court Fee paid is a Fee or a Tax?
23. The answer to the question is no longer res integra. In fact, the
issue was settled by the Privy Council and the Apex Court. A court fee
paid cannot be termed as a Tax. A tax is a compulsory extraction of
money from the public, whereas a fee is a charge for special service or
benefit rendered.
24. The classic distinction between a tax and a fee was highlighted by
the Privy Council in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v.
Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt4 and consistently
followed thereafter. A tax was described as a compulsory exaction of
money by public authority for public purposes, not in return for any
specific service, whereas a fee was understood as a charge for a special
service or benefit rendered to individuals by a governmental agency, the
amount of the fee being broadly related to the expenses incurred in
rendering such service.
25.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Mica and Micanite
Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar5 held that before any levy can be
upheld as a fee, there must be a reasonable correlation between the levy
and the services rendered by the State, though an exact or arithmetical
co‑relation is not required. The levy must operate as a quid pro quo in a
general sense for the administration of civil justice and cannot be used as
a means of augmenting the general revenues of the State.
26. In Zenith Lamp’s case the Apex Court explained that “fees taken in
court” are a distinct category recognised by the Constitution while levying
such fees, the legislature is entitled to take into account factors like the
value of the subject‑matter, the nature of the proceedings and the overall
cost of maintaining the system of administration of justice, but it is not
AIR 1954 SC 282
(1971) 2 SCC 236
competent to tax litigation to make litigants contribute to general public
purposes such as road building or education. The fees collected must
bear a broad relationship to the cost of administering civil justice and
cannot be imposed with a view to securing a profit or surplus for the
State.
27.
Thus, a conspectus of the judgments referred to supra, the fee
prescribed under the APCF and SV Act is only a fee, but not a tax. As
seen from the judicial precedents to secure revenue for the benefit of the
State, the APCF and SV Act was enacted.
Maintainability of writ petition in contractual matters
28.
In the present-day scenario, the litigants are approaching the High
Court and filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, seeking reliefs beyond the enforcement of fundamental rights in
Part III of the Constitution of India and the Constitutional Right under
Article 300-A etc., to enforce the contractual rights and to release or
payment of the amount out of the said contract.
29.
The law on maintainability of writ petitions in matters arising out of
contracts with the State has undergone a distinct evolution. In
Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar6, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
drew a distinction between the exercise of statutory powers at the
threshold of a contract and disputes arising in the course of performance,
and held that, in the latter category, a writ petition would ordinarily not lie
and the parties must work out their remedies in the civil court or in
accordance with the contract. This approach was reiterated in decisions
(1977) 3 SCC 457
such as State of U.P. and Ors v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd.7, State
of Bihar and Ors v. Jain Plastics & Chemicals Ltd.8, where it was
emphasised that the writ court is not a forum for the enforcement of pure
money claims or for specific performance of contractual obligations,
particularly
when
alternative
remedies,
including
arbitration,
are
available.
30.
The apparent conflict between this issue was again dealt with in
ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of
India Ltd.9, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that in an
appropriate case a writ petition as against the State or its instrumentality,
arising out of a contractual obligation, is maintainable and that the mere
existence of disputed questions of fact is not, by itself, a ground to refuse
to entertain a writ petition in all cases. At the same time, the Court
underscored that the power under Article 226 is discretionary and would
ordinarily not be exercised where an effective alternative remedy is
available, unless the action of the State is arbitrary, unreasonable or
otherwise violative of constitutional mandates.
31.
In Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India10,
The Apex Court reaffirmed the principles in ABL International case and
cautioned that writ jurisdiction in commercial contractual matters must be
exercised sparingly and in exceptional situations. At the same time, it
was reiterated that where the State’s conduct in contractual matters is
arbitrary, unfair or patently unreasonable to offend Article 14, a writ
petition would be maintainable.
1996 (6) SCC 22
2002 (1) SCC 216
(2004) 3 SCC 553
(2015) 7 SCC 728
32.
The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Surya Constructions v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others11, in Para Nos.3 & 4, has observed as follows:
“3. It is clear, therefore, from the aforesaid order dated
22-3-2014 that there is no dispute as to the amount that has
to be paid to the appellant. Despite this, when the appellant
knocked at the doors of the High Court in a writ petition being
Writ Civil No. 25216 of 2014, the impugned judgment dated
2-5-2014 [Surya Construction v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC
OnLine All 6071] dismissed the writ petition stating that
disputed questions of fact arise and that the amount due
arises out of a contract. We are afraid the High Court was
wholly incorrect inasmuch as there was no disputed question
of fact. On the contrary, the amount payable to the appellant
is wholly undisputed. Equally, it is well settled that where the
State behaves arbitrarily, even in the realm of contract, the
High Court could interfere under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India (ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit
Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. [ABL International Ltd. v.
Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC
553] )
4. This being the case and the work having been
completed long back in 2009, we direct Uttar Pradesh Jal
Nigam to make the necessary payment within a period of
four weeks from today. Given the long period of delay,
interest @ 6% p.a. may also be awarded.”
33.
In M/s Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General
Manager & Ors12, it was held at Para No.8 as under:
“Be that as it may, the High court has not dealt with the merits of the writ
petition. Moreover, it is not an inviolable rule that no money claim can be
adjudicated upon in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Non-payment of admitted
(2019) 16 SCC 794
2025 SCC online SC 1400
dues, inter alia, may be considered an arbitrary action on the part of
respondents and for claiming the same, a writ petition may lie. Further,
throwing a writ petition on ground of availability of alternative remedy after 10
years, particularly, when parties have exchanged their affidavits, is not the
correct course unless there are disputed questions of fact which by their very
nature cannot be adjudicated upon without recording formal evidence.”
34.
A conspectus of the pronouncements by the Apex Court manifests
the evaluation of law vis-à-vis maintainability of writ petition even in
contractual matters. Barring disputed questions of fact, where it requires
evidence to let in, writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India are maintainable even in contractual matters. The judgments of the
Apex Court, being the law of the land, this court must follow them and
infact binding on this court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
Thus, this Court concludes that the Writ petition is maintainable and there
is no absolute barrier to maintain a writ petition in contractual matters.
However, the writ court will usually refuse to interfere in cases involving
pure contractual interpretation, disputed facts or where a more effective
remedy is available. It will only intervene if the state or its agents, while
acting
within
the
contractual
sphere,
have
acted
arbitrarily or
unreasonably.
35.
In the case at hand, the petitioner filed the writ petition seeking
directions to the Government to release the funds relating to the works
done by him. As noted, supra, the petitioner was entrusted with 19 works
under different agreements, and the cause of action is distinct.
36.
Whether the payment of the Court Fee of Rs.100/- is adequate
when the writ petition is filed seeking to release the amount based
on different agreements, and the cause of action is distinct?
37.
To analyse this issue, it is relevant and apt to consider Sec 6 of the
APCF and SV Act. Section 6 of the APCF and SV Act prescribes the
Court Fee for multifarious suits. Section 6(3), which is relevant, is
extracted herewith:
(3)(a) Where a suit is based on two or more distinct and different
causes of action and separate reliefs are sought in respect thereof,
either alternatively or cumulatively, the plaint shall be chargeable
with the aggregate amount of the fees that would be chargeable on
the plaints under this Act if separate suits were instituted in respect
of the several causes of action.
Provided that, where the cause of action in respect of reliefs
claimed alternatively against the same person arise out of the same
transaction, the plaint shall be chargeable only with the highest of
the fees chargeable on them.
(b) ----
38.
Thus, a bare reading of the section extracted supra, where a suit is
filed based on two or more different and distinct causes of action and
separate reliefs, one must pay the aggregate court fee payable in case of
filing separate suits. Of course, there is no specific provision in the APCF
and SV Act in relation to the writ petitions to meet the contingency (filed
on different causes of action and distinct agreements) except Schedule-II
Article 11(S), which prescribes a Court Fee of Rs.100/- in the writ
petition.
39. In the normal course, since the agreements are separate and the
cause of action is distinct, the petitioner had to file separate writ petitions
in respect of 19 agreements. However, applying the rationale in Section
6(3) of the APCF and SV Act, the petitioner can maintain one writ
petition, subject to payment of an aggregate treating each agreement as
a separate and distinct cause of action.
40.
In Land Acquisition Officer v. Land Acquisition Officer and
Special Tahsildar13, while dealing with distinct subjects, it was held at
paras 7 and 8:
7. I am fortified in my view by the following decisions.
In Venkatanarayana Aiyar v. State of Madras [1953 (1) M.L.J. 231.]
a number of plaintiffs joined together and instituted a single suit for
declaring that an order of resumption passed by the Revenue
Divisional Officer and Collector on appeal in respect of nine distinct
inams in favour of distinct individuals and under nine inam title
deeds was illegal and a nullity. Before the Revenue Divisional
Officer nine separate applications were filed. The Revenue
Divisional Officer and the Collector passed a single order in respect
of the nine applications. In the circumstances, a question arose
whether the suit comprised nine distinct subjects within the meaning
of sec. 17 of old Court fees Act. Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J.
answering the question held.
“The words “distinct subjects” used in Sec. 17, though not
defined, should be interpreted to mean distinct subject matters only.
If the words “distinct subjects” are to be construed as including
distinct categories of subjects taking the word “subject” in a very
1968 SCC OnLine AP 86
comprehensive sense, then the meaning of Sec. 17 would become
absurd”.
8. The learned Judge held that distinct subjects used in Sec. 17
meant only distinct subject matters. The learned judge observed
further that:—
“Because it is possible to avoid multiplicity of suits combining
causes of action and parties without offending against the provisions
of Civil Procedure Code it cannot be contended that such suits
ceased to be multifarious or that they become suits on a single
cause of action, or they embrace a single subject matter. The only
commonalty which can be postulated in the present case is that the
Revenue Divisional Officer and the Collector passed a single order
of resumption, as a matter of convenience. This cannot be said to
have taken away the distinctness of the subjects comprised in the
suit”.
41.
In the case at hand, as noted supra, the petitioner has paid
Rs.100/- as a Court Fee for 19 different agreements and distinct causes
of action. The petitioner entered into 19 different agreements. Of course,
the Gram panchayat is one. However, keeping in view the analogy in Sec
6(3) of the APCF and SV Act and the authoritative pronouncement, the
Court fee paid by the petitioner is insufficient. The petitioner must make
good the deficit Court Fee.
42.
Instead of extracting 19 different agreements referred to supra, this
court
is
extracting
five
agreements
with
different
certificate
numbers/agreement numbers, nature of work and cost allotted to the
petitioner:
S.No
Certificate No.
Name of the Work
Estimated Cost
1.
IN-AP73057070739986W
Rs. 2.00 Lakhs
2.
IN-AP73056638006214W
3.
IN-AP73057432298587W
4.
IN-AP73057629911448W
5.
IN-AP73057872639282W
Construction of CC Drain
from Kavartapu Nageswara
Rao house to Hindu Burial
ground in Muppalla (V)
Construction of CC Drain
from Nallani Venkateswara
Rao house to R&B road (Bit1) in Muppalla (V)
Construction of CC Drain
from Hindu Burial ground
starting to ending (Bit-1) in
Muppalla (V)
Construction of CC Drain
from Alli Parameswara Rao
house to Anganwadi building
(Bit-1) in Muppalla (V)
Construction of CC Drain
from Ourangabad Veeraiah
house to Talupula Kasayya
house (Bit-2) in Muppalla (V)
43.
This court is conscious that while enforcing the fundamental rights
Rs. 2.00 Lakhs
Rs. 2.00 Lakhs
Rs. 2.00 Lakhs
Rs. 1.83 Lakhs
under Part III of the Constitution of India, such rights may not be subject
to earning revenue, and it may not be the dominant purpose. However,
whether the right, that is guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of
India, and Article 300A of the Constitution, can be equated with a writ
petition filed to enforce the contractual liabilities of the State will be
debated in an appropriate writ petition. This court is also not going to the
other crucial aspect, at this juncture, that the court fee payable in a writ
petition to enforce the contractual rights is under Schedule I or Schedule
II of the APCF and SV Act and the said issue also needs to be
determined in an appropriate writ petition.
44. From the entire discussion supra, this court summed up as follows:
a) The purpose of the enactment of APCF and SV Act is to facilitate
the collection of a Court Fee from the litigant public in the Court
and Public Offices, for the administration of justice. A fee that may
be charged is towards the privilege or benefit offered or service
rendered to meet the expenses connected therewith. To secure
revenue for the benefit of the State. The fee is nothing but payment
for some special privilege granted and service rendered.
b) However, while enforcing the fundamental rights under Part III of
the Constitution of India and other Constitutional Rights viz., Article
300-A, revenue generation cannot be the dominant objective and
hence insistence of court fee may not be the prime criteria.
c) The court fee prescribed under the APCF and SV Act, 1956 is only
a fee, but not a tax.
d) A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even in
contractual matters, but for the disputed questions of fact, is
maintainable.
e) The fee payable in the writ petitions is prescribed in Schedule-II
Article 11(S), at Rs.100/- as per APCF and SV Act, 1956.
f) In writ petitions relating to contractual matters where the causes of
action are different and distinct, a single writ petition is
maintainable, however, subject to payment of aggregate court fee
as outlined in Sec 6(3) of the APCF and SV Act, 1956.
45.
Given the discussion supra, coupled with instructions furnished by
the Panchayat Secretary of respondent No.6, since there is no dispute
regarding the amount payable to the petitioner and the amount is
admitted and undisputed the Writ Petition is disposed of directing the
respondents to release an amount of Rs.29,58,648/- (Rupees Twenty
Nine Lakhs Fifty Eight Thousand Six Hundred and Forty Eight only)
payable to the petitioner regarding execution of the aforementioned work,
within four (04) months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.
No order as to costs.
46.
The petitioner is directed to pay the deficit Court Fee of Rs.1,800/-
within seven days from the receipt of a copy of the order and file a memo
before the Registry to that effect.
47.
The Registrar (Judicial) shall issue a Circular, in this regard, to the
Registry to insist on payment of Court Fee in a writ petitions filed by an
individual or entity for recovery of money/release of money/withheld
amount in relation to more than one agreement, i.e. cause of action is
different and distinct, keeping in view Section 6(3) of the APCF and SV
Act, 1956.
There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand
closed.
___________________________
JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI
Date: 24.02.2026
IKN
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