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2026:HHC:3360
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 3033 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.01.2026
Date of Decision: 23.01.2026.
Kishore Kumar
...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No
For the Petitioner
:
Ms Ragini Dogra, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No.131/2025 dated 19.05.2025, registered at
Police Station Sadar, Distt. Mandi, H.P for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 109, 118(1) and 115(2) of
Bhartiya Nayay Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
petitioner is a friend of the informant’s husband. The
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. 2026:HHC:3360
informant and her husband were going to Kullu on 18.05.2025.
The petitioner asked the informant’s husband to visit him. The
informant and her husband went to the petitioner’s house. The
petitioner was drunk, and he demanded ₹ 5000/- from the
informant’s husband, who declined by saying that he did not
have any money. All three of them slept on the mattress. The
petitioner inflicted injuries to the informant’s husband at about
2:30 am. He shouted for help and the Informant woke up. She
raised an alarm. The informant’s husband was taken to the
hospital, from where he was referred to ZH Mandi. The
allegations made in the petition are false. No case is made out
against the petitioner. The petitioner has been in judicial
custody since 20.05.2025. The investigation is complete, and
the charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The petitioner
is a permanent resident of District Mandi. He has roots in
society, and there is no chance of his absconding. The police
recovered the knife, but the DNA analysis was inconclusive. The
petitioner’s blood report mentions that no alcohol was found in
his blood, which falsifies the prosecution's case that the
petitioner was intoxicated. The petitioner would abide by the
3. 2026:HHC:3360
terms and conditions that the Court may impose; hence the
petition.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the informant Komal and her husband Jatin were
going to Kullu on 18.05.2025. Petitioner Kishore Kumar called
Jatin and asked Jatin and his wife to stay with him. The
informant and Jatin went to the petitioner’s house. The
petitioner was intoxicated, and he demanded ₹ 5,000/- from
Jatin. Jatin replied that he had no money. The informant, her
husband and the petitioner slept. The petitioner woke up at 2:30
am and inflicted injuries on Jatin's chest. Jatin shouted for help.
The informant woke up after hearing his cries. The petitioner
again inflicted injuries with the knife on the neck and the leg of
Jatin. The informant shouted for help, and the petitioner ran
away. Jatin was taken to the Hospital. The police registered the
FIR and investigated the matter. The police arrested the
petitioner, and the petitioner got the handle of the knife, and
his pant recovered. Human blood was detected on the bed sheet,
mattress, blood collected from the spot, t-shirt, a pair of
chappal and the lower of Jatin during the chemical analysis.
Injuries were found on the person of Jatin, which could have
4. 2026:HHC:3360
been caused by means of a sharp-edged weapon like a knife.
DNA analysis of the knife blade and plastic handle could not be
conducted because the DNA had degraded. The police filed the
charge-sheet before the Court, and the matter is listed for
recording
the
statement
of
prosecution
witnesses
on
13.03.2026. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Ms Ragni Dogra, learned Legal Aid
Counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5.
Ms Ragni Dogra, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. The prosecution's version that the petitioner
was intoxicated is falsified by the report of analysis, in which no
traces of alcohol were found in the petitioner’s blood. The
police recovered the blade and handle of the knife, but the DNA
was found to be degraded. There is no evidence that the knife
was used for the commission of a crime. The petitioner is a
permanent resident of the district of Mandi. He has roots in the
society and would abide by the terms & conditions, which the
Court may impose; hence, she prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
5. 2026:HHC:3360
6.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner
was involved in the commission of a heinous crime. He would
abscond and intimidate the witnesses if released on bail.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I
have
given
considerable
thought
to
the
submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380: (i)Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. InGudikantiNarasimhuluv.High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of
a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that
should be considered while granting bail, which are
extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge
is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is
also pertinent. The punishment to which the party
may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is
confirmed, also bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of
justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the
6. 2026:HHC:3360
benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the
time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal
Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press,
London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81,
Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant
interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only
traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire
into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail
to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a
record which suggests that he is likely to commit
serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals,
it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless
bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members
of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence
about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore
not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhativ.State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted
various aspects that the courts should keep in mind
while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same
may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised
on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard
to the circumstances of each case and not in an
arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court
has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the
nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of
the punishment which conviction will entail, the
character, behaviour, means and standing of the
accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the
presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with,
the larger interests of the public or State and similar
7. 2026:HHC:3360
other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind
that for the purposes of granting the bail the
legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds
for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means
the court dealing with the grant of bail can only
satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine
case against the accused and that the prosecution will
be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of
the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court inRam Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same
judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be
granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent
reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602,
para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,
but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion
in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course.
An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot
be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the
grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of
the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do
always vary from case to case. While the placement of
the accused in society, though it may be considered by
itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of
grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with
other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The
nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations
for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime,
the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of
the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkarv.Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that
although it is established that a court considering a bail
application cannot undertake a detailed examination of
8. 2026:HHC:3360
evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the
case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkarv.Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application
of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under
with regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para
9)
“9. …It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court
granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it
is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise
its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is
well settled that, among other circumstances, the
factors to be borne in mind while considering an
application for bail are:
(i)whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence;
(ii)nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii)severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv)danger of the accused absconding or
fleeing, if released on bail;
(v)character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi)likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii)reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
9. 2026:HHC:3360
(viii)danger, of course, of justice being
thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis
supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious
exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting
bail to the accused is Brijmani Deviv. Pappu Kumar,
(2022) 4 SCC 497: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a threeJudge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an
unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumarv. State of
Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singhv. State
of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court
granting bail to the accused, observed as follows:
(Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497: (2022) 2
SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35.While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of
an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time
while considering an application for bail courts
cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the
accusations against an accused and the facts that
have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the
accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in
nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a
prima facie conclusion. While considering an
application for the grant of bail, a prima facie
conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be
arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the
nature of punishment that would follow a conviction
vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. 2026:HHC:3360
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine
SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating
offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the
petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the
Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only
illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is
likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of
justice and must weigh with us when considering the
question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
The status report mentions that the informant had
seen the petitioner inflicting injuries upon her husband. Her
statement is duly corroborated by the report of the Medical
Officer, which mentions injuries on the chest, neck and finger
of Jatin, which could have been caused by means of a sharpedged weapon.
11. 2026:HHC:3360
12.
The medical officer opined that injuries near Jatin’s
heart could have caused his death. Therefore, prima facie, the
petitioner is involved in the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 109 of the BNS.
13.
It was submitted that the police recovered the
handle and blade of the knife. But these could not be connected
to the commission of a crime because the DNA on them was not
sufficient to carry out further analysis. This would make the
prosecution’s case suspect. This submission will not help the
petitioner. The non-recovery of the weapon of offence will be a
case of defective investigation, and the petitioner cannot be
acquitted because of defective investigation. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Arjun
Singh, (2011) 9 SCC 115, that non-recovery of the weapon of the
offence is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. It was observed :
“17. Learned senior counsel for the accused persons contended that in the absence of recovery of pellets from the
scene of occurrence or from the body of the injured persons, it is highly doubtful as to the scene of occurrence
and whether such an incident did take place in the manner suggested by the prosecution. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant pointed out that, though
there was an entry in the Malkhana Register (Ex. P31A)
wherein it was stated that a sealed packet containing
pellets was deposited but prosecution failed to lead any
12. 2026:HHC:3360
evidence on this point. It was also pointed out that,
though a report was received from the Forensic Science
Laboratory, no evidence regarding the recovery of the
pellets was produced.
18. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the State, that mere non-recovery of
a pistol or a cartridge does not detract from the case of the
prosecution where clinching and direct evidence is acceptable. Likewise, the absence of evidence regarding the recovery of used pellets, blood-stained clothes, etc., cannot be
taken or construed as no such occurrence had taken place. As
a matter of fact, we have already pointed out that the gunshot injuries tallied with medical evidence. It is also seen
that Raghuraj Singh and Himmat Raj Singh, who had died,
received 8 and 7 gunshot wounds respectively, while Raj
Singh (PW-2) also received 8 gunshot wounds scattered in
front of the left thigh. All these injuries have been noted by
the Doctor (PW-1) in his reports, Exs. P-1 to P-4.” (emphasis supplied)
14.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim bail because
the knife is not connected to the commission of the crime by
the report of the analysis.
15.
The informant had asserted in the FIR that the
petitioner had consumed alcohol; however, no methyl alcohol
was detected in the blood of the petitioner as per the report of
analysis. It was submitted that the report of analysis falsifies
the prosecution's version. This submission is not acceptable.
The informant never claimed that she had seen the petitioner
consuming alcohol. She stated that the petitioner was
13. 2026:HHC:3360
intoxicated, which is her opinion and may or may not be
correct; therefore, the absence of methyl alcohol in the blood
sample will not falsify the prosecution's case.
16.
The petitioner is, prima facie, involved in the
commission of an offence under Section 109 of the BNS, which
is punishable with imprisonment for life when the hurt is
caused; therefore, the nature of the punishment is severe. It
was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti
Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC
240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the
punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was
observed at page 244:
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
principle around which other relevant factors must
revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person
is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different
footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage,
and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be
to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be
liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the
event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In
this perspective, the relevance of considerations is
regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the
applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be
plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the
crime charged (of which a conviction has been
sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the
punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity,
14. 2026:HHC:3360
the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence
warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the
presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should
he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1]
Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that
case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as
follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51]
“I do not think that an accused party is detained in
custody because of his guilt, but because there are
sufficient probable grounds for the charge against
him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and
because the detention is necessary to ensure his
appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in
considering whether the party, if admitted to bail,
would appear to take his trial; and I think that in
coming to a determination on that point three
elements will generally be found the most important:
the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is
supported, and the punishment to which the party
would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the
charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains
an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the
charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law,
death.”
7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
17.
Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail
because of the nature of the offence and the severity of the
punishment.
18.
No other point was urged.
15. 2026:HHC:3360
19.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed, also, pending miscellaneous application (s), if
any.
20.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
January 23, 2026
(meera)
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