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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Reserved on: 16th March, 2026
Pronounced on: 1st July, 2026
RSA 150/2018 & CM APPL. 43827/2018
+
1.
KIRAN TALWAR
W/o Sh. Harish Talwar
2.
VIKAS TALWAR
S/o Sh. Harish Talwar
3.
ANKUR TALWAR
S/o Sh. Harish Talwar
All R/o JG-1/48B, IInd Floor,
Vikas Puri, New Delhi
Through:
Mr.
Rakesh
Advocate.
.....Appellants
Kumar
Burman,
Versus
1.
ANIL GUPTA
S/o Sh. S.S. Gupta
R/o C-6, New Krishna Park,
Najafgarh Road, New Delhi
2.
HARISH TALWAR
S/o Late Sh. Ascharaj Lal
R/oB-10, Shanker Garden,
Main Najafgarh Road,
New Delhi -110018
.....Respondents
Through:
None.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M
E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
16:15:59
RSA 150/2018
1.
Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (CPC) has been filed against the Judgment dated
23.08.2018 of the First Appellate Court in RCA no.60990/2016,wherein it
upheld the Judgment dated 18.01.2014 of the Learned Civil Judge, whereby
the Suit for possession wasdecreed in favour of the Plaintiff.
2.
The Plaintiff/ Respondent No. 1, Sh. Anil Gupta had filed Civil Suit
No. 262/2011 for Possession, recovery of Damages/ Mesne Profit of Rs.
3,000/- per month, for unauthorised use and occupation and for Permanent
Injunctionqua the property bearing no. JG-1/48-B, 2nd Floor, LIG Flat,
Vikas Puri, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”)
against the defendants.
3.
The facts in brief as narrated in the plaint, are that the “suit
property” was allotted to Sh. Harish Chander Bhatt, vide Allotment Letter
dated 10.01.1983, for Rs. 38,200/-. He was handed over the possession of
the said flat by the DDA, vide Letter dated 19.04.1983 with leasehold rights
underneath the flat, on the hire purchase basis.
4.
Sh. Harish Chander Bhatt sold the suit property to Sh. Ascharaj Lal,
for a consideration of Rs 16, 000/-, with the balance instalments payable by
him, and executed the documents, viz. the Agreement to Sell & purchase
and Will dated 14.07.1983, in favour of Sh. Ascharaj Lal, and the General
Power of Attorney dated 14.07.1983 in favour of Sh. Ashok Kumar, at the
instance of Sh. Ascharaj Lal.
5.
Thereafter,Sh. Ascharaj Lal sold the suit property to his son,
Defendant No. l/ Defendant No. l/Harish Talwar for a sale consideration of
Rs 20,000/- along with the remaining instalments to be paid by him, vide the
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SHARMA
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Agreement to Sell & Purchase and Receipt and registered Will dated
01.11.1985.
6.
Defendant No. 1/ Harish Talwar then entered into the transaction of
sale dated 01.12.2005 in favour of Smt. Kiran Talwar for the consideration
of Rs.50,000/- plus the balance instalments payable, and also executed the
registered General Power of Attorney dated 01.12.2005. However, the said
transaction of sale between Harish Talwar and Smt. Kiran Talwar could not
be finalised, and the sale transaction was cancelled by the Defendant No. l/
Harish Talwar. Cancellation of the General Power of Attorney was executed
by Defendant No. 1 with consideration vide Cancellation Deed dated
18.10.2006, by refunding the amount of Rs. 1, 50,000/- to Smt. Kiran
Talwar.
7.
On the very same day, i.e. on 18.10.2006, the Defendant no.1/ Harish
Talwar sold the said LIG Flat to the Plaintiff/ Anil Gupta for a
consideration of Rs. 2,00,000/- and executed the documents of title, i.e.
Agreement to Sell and purchase for valuable consideration, Registered
General Power of Attorney, Will and Receipt dated 18.10.2006, in favour of
the plaintiff.
8.
Though the Defendant No. 1 had clearly mentioned in paragraph Iof
the said Agreement that the unencumbered vacant physical possession of the
said flat was given to the second party, i.e. purchaser plaintiff, at the spot
along with the documents related thereto, but the Defendant No. 1 requested
the plaintiff that he would vacate the premises after a month or two, as he
could not arrange another accommodation. On the persistent request of the
Defendant No. l, the Plaintiff agreed to such a request.
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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RSA 150/2018
9.
Defendant No. l did not vacate the premises within the said period,
and when the plaintiff put pressure to hand over the vacant possession, the
Defendant No. 2/ Kiran Talwar, wife of the Defendant No. l, Harish Talwar,
conspired with the Defendant No. 3 and 4 and filed a Suit bearing No.
261/11, on 12.01.2007, against her husband Harish Talwar/ Defendant No. 1
and the Plaintiff Anil Gupta (he was defendant no. 2 in the Civil Suit bearing
No. 261/2011), for Declaration that she be declared owner of the suit
property in view of the Will, executed by her late father-in-law Sh. Ascharaj
Lal, in her favour and Permanent Injunction against the Defendant No. 1,
her husband, Harish Talwar and the Plaintiff/ Anil Gupta.
10.
It is claimed that she took false and frivolous pleas therein and
claimed the Declaration that she is the owner of the suit property, by virtue
of a Will dated 15.08.1986 executed by Late Sh. Ascharaj Lal. However, she
did not file any alleged Will dated 15.08.1986 in the court or supply any
copy thereof. It was alleged that the Suit was totally false and frivolous, and
the Will, if any, was a forged and fabricated document.
11.
Moreover, it was claimed by the Plaintiff/ Anil Gupta, that the
defendants are in illegal possession of the said flat, and their possession of
the same is that of a trespasser. The Defendants have no right to use the said
premises.
12.
The Defendants are thus, liable to pay the damages for unauthorised
use and occupation of the said premises at the rate of Rs. 3000/- per month,
as that is the rent that can be fetched with regard to the suit property as per
the prevalent market rate. Hence, the Plaintiff filed the Suit for possession,
recovery of damages/ mesne and Permanent Injunction.
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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13.
Defendant No. l/ Harish Talwar failed to appear despite service and
was proceeded ex parte, on 30.07.2008.
14.
The Defendants Nos. 2 Kiran Talwar, 3 and 4 filed Joint Written
Statement asserting that the Agreement to sell and purchase dated
01.11.1985, Receipt and Registered Will, General Power of Attorney dated
01.11.1985, documents executed in favour of Defendant No. 1/Harish
Talwar by Sh. Ashcharaj Lal, are forged and fabricated documents.
15.
On merits, it was asserted that on 15.08.1986 Late Sh. Aschraj Lal
executed a hand written Will, duly signed by him, in respect of suit property
in favour of Defendant no. 2/ Kiran Talwar, in the presence of Smt.
Suman Anand and Smt. Swaran Dua, who were the witness to the Will. At
the time of execution of the Will, Ascharaj Lal was in possession of the suit
property. It was further asserted that the said Will, however, had been
snatched by Defendant No. l/ Harish Talwar from Defendant no. 2, on the
same day. Sh. Ascharaj Lal expired on 27.09.1986,and after the death of Sh.
Ascharaj Lal, Defendant No. 2/ Kiran Talwar became the absolute and
exclusive owner of the suit property, by virtue of the Will dated 15.08.1986,.
16.
It was further submitted that Defendant No. 1 was living in the suit
property as a licensee of Defendant No. 2, Smt. Kiran Talwar and thus, was
not entitled to enter into any transaction of sale in favour of any person,
because he had no title in the suit property. The documents in favour of the
Plaintiff were got signed by Defendant No. 3, Sh. Vikas Talwar on the
stamp papers and other papers that were blank, and thereafter, Defendant
No. l, Harish Talwar, with the connivance of Plaintiff, executed the said
documents. Hence, the suit of the Plaintiff is baseless and liable to be
dismissed.
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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RSA 150/2018
17.
No Replication was filed by the Plaintiff/ Anil Gupta, to the Written
Statement of the Defendant Nos. 2 to 4.
18.
The issues on the pleadings were framed on 16.11.2011, as under:
“i) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable
as the same has not been properly valued? OPD
ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of
possession as claimed for? OPP
iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of
recovery of damages/mesne profits as claimed for? OPP
iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of
recovery of future damages/mesne profits as claimed
for? OPP
v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of
permanent injunction as claimed for? OPP
vi) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to any interest as
claimed for? OPP
vii) Relief.”
19.
The Ld. Civil Judge vide Order dated 16.11.2011 directed that
common evidence would be recorded in this Suit as well as Suit bearing No.
261/11, filed by defendant No.2 Kiran Talwar and Suit bearing No.261/11
was treated as the lead suit, and the evidence was led in the said suit. The
evidence of Plaintiff Anil Gupta was recorded in the Suit bearing no.
261/2011 as DW. The evidence of Defendants no. 2 to 4 was recorded as
PW.
20.
The Plaintiff/ Anil Gupta to establish his case, examined his attorney,
DW-1 Harsh Jhulka, who proved the Power of Attorney Ex. DW1/1. He
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SHARMA
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deposed that the suit property was originally allotted to Harish Chand, who
sold it to Ascharaj Lal on 14.07.1983 for ₹16,000/- along with liability for
the remaining DDA instalments. This chain of title was not disputed by
Defendants Nos. 2 to 4.
21.
It was further deposed that Ascharaj Lal transferred the property to his
son, Defendant No. 1/Harish Talwar, on 01.11.1985, who subsequently sold
it to the Plaintiff/Anil Gupta on 18.10.2006 through a registered GPA Ex.
DW1/2 and Agreement to Sell Ex. DW1/3, for a consideration of
₹2,00,000/-. The Agreement to Sell specifically recorded that Defendant No.
1/ Harish Talwar had acquired ownership from his father, Ascharaj Lal.
22.
Defendant No. 2/Kiran Talwar examined herself as PW-1 and
admitted that Ascharaj Lal had purchased the property from the original
allottee, Harish Chand, on 14.07.1983, relying upon the Allotment Letter
Mark G and Agreement to Sell dated 14.07.1983 Mark H. She deposed that
owing to the ill-treatment meted out by Defendant No. 1, Ascharaj Lal had
excluded all other legal heirs and bequeathed the suit property exclusively to
her, through the Will dated 15.08.1986. According to her, upon the death of
Ascharaj Lal on 27.09.1986, she became the absolute owner of the suit
property. She further deposed that on 08.09.2006, Defendant No. 1
HarishTalwar, her husband, assaulted her and forcibly took away the
Will,and despite repeated requests, failed to return it.
23.
Defendant No. 2/Kiran Talwar, during her cross-examination,
admitted that her father-in-law had executed all property documents in
favour of Defendant No. 1/ Harish Talwar, in 1985. She further admitted
that the alleged Will had never been registered.
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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RSA 150/2018
24.
PW2 Smt. Suman Anand and PW3 Smt. Swarn Dua, Sisters of
Defendant No. 2 Kiran Talwar, both deposed that they were present when
Sh. Ascharaj Lal executed the Will in favour of Kiran Talwar and they had
signed it as attesting witnesses.
25.
Ld. Civil Judge on appreciation of evidence held that the Will dated
15.08.1986, or even its photocopy, which forms the basis of the defence, has
not been filed in the judicial record. Although the Will itself was not
produced, the Defendants attempted to prove its execution and contents
through two witnesses, PW2 Smt. Suman Anand and PW3 Smt. Swarn Dua,
sisters of Defendant No. 2. In their examination-in-chief, both witnesses
claimed that they were present when Sh. Ascharaj Lal executed the Will,
and they had signed it as attesting witnesses. However, during crossexamination, both admitted that they had not signed the Will.
26.
The Ld. Civil Judge rejected the Defendants’ version regarding the
non-production of Will as having been forcibly taken away by Harish
Talwar, her husband. Moreover, the oral evidence of PW-2 and PW-3,
sisters of Defendant No. 2, who were alleged to be the attesting witnesses to
the alleged Will, was noted to be self-contradictory and unreliable. Smt.
Kiran failed to produce either the alleged original Will dated 15.08.1986 or
even a copy of it, and toprove it in accordance with law.
27.
Accordingly, it was held that the Defendants had miserably failed to
establish the existence, execution, attestation, or contents of the alleged Will
dated 15.08.1986. and that Defendant Nos. 2 to 4 had failed to establish any
legal right, title, or interest in the suit property. Conversely, the Plaintiff was
found to have established a better title and a superior right to possession.
DigitallySigned By:RITA
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Accordingly, Defendant Nos. 2 to 4 were held to be in unauthorised
occupation of the suit property.
28.
Ld. Civil Judge thus, held that the Plaintiff, Anil Gupta was entitled to
recover mesne profits/damages for the Defendants’ unauthorised occupation
and use of the suit property for the period from 18.10.2006 to 31.07.2007 at
the rate of ₹3,000 per month. Further, interest was awarded on the decreed
amount, granting pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 10% per
annum until realisation.
29.
The Suit of the plaintiff, Anil Gupta, was accordingly decreed for
possession and mesne profits.
30.
Suit No. 261/2011filed by Defendant No. 2 Kiran Talwar, was
dismissed, vide separate judgment dated 18.01.2014. However, this
judgement has not been challenged by Kiran Talwar.
31.
The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 challenged the decree passed in favour of
Plaintiff Anil Gupta in Civil Suit No. 262/2011, by filing the Regular First
Appeal No.60990/2016.
32.
Ld. Additional District Judge observed that the Defendants no. 2 to 4
nowhere, in the entire trial of the suit, denied the execution of documents
dated 01.11.1985 by late Sh. Ascharaj Lal in favour of Defendant no. 1;
rather Kiran Talwar has specifically admitted in her cross-examination that
the suit property was transferred by late Sh. Ascharaj Lal, in favour of her
husband Harish Talwar.
33.
The Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 had only contended that title documents
in favour of Harish Talwar are forged and fabricated, but they have
nowhere, in the entire suit, stated how those documents are forged and
fabricated.
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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RSA 150/2018
34.
Ld. Additional District Judge found no infirmity in the judgment
dated 18.01.2014 of the Ld. Civil Judgeand dismissed the Regular First
Appeal, vide Order dated 23.08.2018.
35.
Aggrieved, the Second Regular Appeal under Section 100 CPC has
been filed.
36.
The grounds of challenge are that the Defendant No.1/ Harish Talwar
was not the owner of the suit property and was not competent to enter into
Agreement to sell the suit property. Plaintiff/Anil Gupta has also not
produced any documents of ownership of the Defendant No.1/ Harish
Talwar in the suit property.
37.
It was also claimed that DW-1 Sh. Harsh Jhulka gave evidence on
behalf of the Plaintiff Anil Gupta, on the basis of Power of Attorney
executed by the Plaintiff, in his favour, which is against Section 59 and
Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
38.
Hence, it is submitted that the impugned Judgment is liable to be set
aside.
Submissions heard and record perused.
39.
The Substantial Question of Law had been framed by this Court
vide order dated 22.10.2018,as follows:
1.
Whether the disposition of immovable property
can be proved without production of the
documents of the said disposition and whether
the provision of section 91 of The Indian
Evidence Act is not a bar?
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
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2.
Whether the contents of the documents of
disposition of the Immovable property may be
proved by oral evidence?
40.
It is the admitted case of the parties that originally the suit property
was allotted to one Sh. Harish Chander vide allotment letter dated
10.01.1983.The suit property was sold by said Sh. Harish Chander to late
Sh. Ascharaj Lal, for a total sale consideration amount of Rs. 16,000/- by
way of Agreement to Sell, Will and GPA, all dated 14.07.1983.Hence, it is
not disputed by either of the parties that late Sh. Ascharaj Lal was the owner
of the suit property, by virtue of the title documents dated 14.07.1983.
41.
The case of the plaintiff/Anil Gupta, was that Late Sh. Ascharaj Lal
sold the suit property to his son, i.e. Defendant No. 1 Harish Talwar, for a
sale consideration amount of Rs. 20,000/- by virtue of an Agreement to sell,
receipt, Will, etc., all dated 01.11.1985. Thereafter, Defendant no. 1 Harish
Talwar sold the suit property to the plaintiff Sh. Anil Gupta, by virtue of
registered GPA, Will and receipt, all dated 18.10.2006. Thereby, the plaintiff
has become the owner of the suit property.
42.
The Defendant No.2 Smt. Kiran Talwar, in her cross-examination
dated 01.11.2010, admitted that her father-in-law, Late Sh. Ascharaj Lal had
executed the documents for the sale of the property, in favour of her
husband, Harish Talwar/Defendant No.1, in the year 1985. Smt. Kiran
Talwar thus, admitted the execution of the sale documents in favour of
Harish Talwar.
43.
She had asserted that the title documents of the suit property, i.e.
registered GPA, Will, etc., dated 01.11.1985, executed in favour of Harish
Talwar, Defendant No.1, were forged and fabricated, but there is no
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explanation, whatsoever, or the grounds specified on which the alleged
documents in favour of Harish Talwar were claimed to be forged and
fabricated.
44.
Further, Defendant No. 2Kiran Talwarwas claiming her ownership in
the suit property on the ground that late Sh. Ascharaj Lal, her father-in-law
(who expired on 27.09.1986), had executed a Will dated 15.08.1986,
whereby he bequeathed the suit property to Smt. Kiran Talwar.
45.
The substantial questions of law as framed, are whether the oral
evidence in respect of a document is barred under Section 91 Indian
Evidence Act; and whether oral evidence in respect of a Document is
admissible?
46.
Section 91 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872provides that when a
document has been reduced to writing, no other evidence except the
document itself or secondary evidence of its content in cases where it is
admissible, shall be permissible.
47.
It has been further explained in Section 92 of Indian Evidence Act
that no oral evidence is admissible in respect of a document executed
between the parties for the purpose of contradicting, waiving, adding or
subtracting from its terms.
48.
The Supreme Court in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) 6 SCC
595, explained the scope of Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act and
observed that when the parties have deliberately put their Agreement into
writing, it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement is contained
in the document itself and oral evidence is excluded for proving the terms
thereof. It was also held that Section 91 forbids proving the contents of a
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writing otherwise than by the writing itself and is founded upon the doctrine
that documentary evidence is superior to oral evidence.
49.
The distinction between proving a collateral fact and proving the
contents of a document, was explained by the Supreme Court in Gangabai v.
Chhabubai (1982) 1 SCC 4.It was held that while oral evidence may in
certain circumstances be admissible to show that a document was never
intended to operate or was merely sham and nominal, oral evidence is not
admissible to prove the actual contents of the document itself where the law
requires the transaction to be proved through the writing.
50.
Similarly, in Bai Hira Devi v. Official Assignee of Bombay, AIR 1958
SC 448, the Supreme Court observed that when rights in immovable
property are sought to be established through a written instrument, the
contents of that instrument cannot be proved by oral testimony. The law
insists upon the production of the document because it is the most reliable
and authentic evidence of its own contents.
51.
Further, in K.B. Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Development Consultant
Ltd.(2008) 8 SCC 564,the Supreme Court held that where a document is
inadmissible for want of registration, its terms cannot be received in
evidence to prove the transaction affecting immovable property. The Court
clarified that a party cannot circumvent statutory requirements by seeking to
prove through oral testimony what the law requires to be proved through a
duly admissible document.
52.
Accordingly, it is well settled that the contents of a document
embodying a disposition of immovable property cannot be proved by oral
evidence. Such contents can be proved only by the document itself or by
admissible secondary evidence after laying the necessary foundation
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contemplated by law. Oral testimony cannot be used as a substitute for
proof of the document or its contents.Section 91 operates as a complete bar
against proving the terms of such a disposition by oral evidence.
53.
Furthermore, oral evidence may be admissible only in respect of
matters collateral to the document and independent of the terms creating
rights and obligations. However, where the very purpose is to establish the
contents of the document constituting the disposition of immovable
property, oral evidence is wholly inadmissible. If such evidence were
allowed, it would amount to permitting witnesses to reconstruct the contents
of documents from memory, thereby undermining certainty in property
transactions and defeating the legislative intent underlying Sections 91
Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
54.
The connected proposition of law is that where the original documents
is not available, it may be proved through secondary evidence, in terms of
Section 92 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
55.
Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the content
of a document may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence.
Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines what the secondary
evidence means and includes.
56.
Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 further explains the
circumstances in which secondary evidence in respect of a document may
be given. Section 65 reads as under:“S.65. Secondary evidence may be given of the
existence, condition or contents of a document in the
following cases:
(a) When the original is shown or appears to be
in the possession or power of the person
against whom the document is sought to
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(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
57.
beproved, or of any person out of reach of, or
not subject to, the process of the Court, or of
any person legally bound to produce it, and
when, after the notice mentioned in section
66, such person does not produce it;
When the existence, condition or contents of
the original have been proved to be admitted
in writing by the person against whom it is
proved or by his representative in interest;
When the original has been destroyed or lost,
or when the party offering evidence of its
contents cannot, for any other reason not
arising from his own default or neglect,
produce it in reasonable time;
When the original is of such a nature as not to
be easily movable;
When the original is a public document within
the meaning of section 74;
[When the original is a document of which a
certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by
any other law in force in [India] [Cf. the
Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 (18 of
1891), Section 4.]], to be given in evidence;
When the originals consist of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot
conveniently be examined in Court, and the
fact to be proved is the general result of the
whole collection.
It is trite that under Indian Evidence Act, 1872, facts have to be
established by primary evidence and secondary evidence is only an
exception to the rules for which foundational facts have to be established to
account for the existence of the primary evidence. Similar observations had
been reiterated in the case of H. Siddiqui (Dead) by LRs v. A. Ramalingam,
(2011) 4 SCC 240.
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58.
From Clause (b) and (c) of Section 65 Indian Evidence Act, 1872it
emerges that secondary evidence in respect of a document, the original of
which is not available or is destroyed or lost, can be proved by way of oral
evidence.
59.
In Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri & Ors. (2016) 16 SCC 483, it was
observed that the pre-condition for leading secondary evidence is that such
original document could not be produced by the party relyingon the
document despite best efforts, as the same is beyond their control. The party
seeking to produce secondary evidence, must establish the reason for nonproduction of primary evidence;unless it is established that the original
document is lost or destroyed or is being deliberately withheld by the party
in respect of that document, secondary evidence in respect of such
document, cannot be accepted.
60.
Thus, before secondary evidence can be admitted, the party relying on
it, must lay a factual foundation, which involves two steps: (i) the party must
prove that the original document factually existed and was executed; (ii) the
party must establish valid reasons as to why the original cannot be
furnished.
61.
The secondary evidence is inadmissible, unless the aforesaid two
circumstances are established.
62.
In view of the aforesaid, it becomes imperative to consider whether
the Appellant, Kiran Talwar, has been able to prove the existence of the
alleged Will dated 15.08.1986, in her favour. She admitted that she cannot
produce the Will in original or its copy, on the ground that the Will had been
snatched away by Shri Harish Talwar/Defendant No.1 on 15.08.1986 (the
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date on which the Will was allegedly executed), and therefore, she was not
in possession of the Will.
63.
In order to corroborate her assertions of snatching of the Will dated
15.08.1986 by her husband, the Appellant had relied upon a copy of the
Police Complaint dated 26.02.2007, Mark A.
The learned Civil Judge
rightly observed that the said Complaint made by Defendant No.2, reported
the missing of her husband since 09.01.2007 and also mentioned the
snatching of the Will on 08.09.2006. The Complaint was first made on
26.02.2007, i.e. after the filing of the connected Suit No.261/2011. Hence,
the inevitable conclusion was that this Complaint had been made belatedly,
only to create evidence. The explanation given by the Appellant to explain
non-production of alleged Will, is absolutely untenable.
64.
Not only this, the Appellant Kiran Talwar had admitted in her cross-
examination that even prior to the execution of the alleged Will dated
15.08.1986 in her favour, the property had already been sold by Ascharaj
Lal to Defendant No.1 Harish Talwar, who along with Agreement to Sell,
etc, had also executed a Will dated 01.11.1985 in favour of Harish Talwar.
The Appellant cannot claim that the property was subsequently, bequeathed
to her by virtue of Will dated 15.08.1986, without producing or even
proving the very existence of this alleged subsequent Will in her favour.
65.
Having failed to produce the copy or the original alleged Will dated
15.08.1986 in her favour, she tried to prove it by examining PW2 Smt.
Suman Anand and PW3 Smt. Swarn Dua, her two sisters, who deposed that
they were the attesting witnesses to the alleged Will. However, both PW2
and PW3, in their cross-examination stated that they were not witnesses to
any Will. Both PW2 and PW3, therefore, did not support the Appellant
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Kiran Talwar in regard to the execution of the Will. The Appellant,
therefore, miserably failed to prove even the existence of the Will, what
to talk of its contents.
66.
The entire defence of the Appellant was based on oral deposition to
prove the contents of the document, i.e. the alleged Will dated 15.08.1986,
without even proving the existence of any such document. In the absence of
any proof of any Will ever being written in her favour, the question of
leading secondary evidence to prove this alleged Will does not arise under
Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
67.
It is also significant to observe that the Appellant, Kiran Talwar had
filed Suit No. 261/2011, seeking Declaration of being the Owner of the suit
property by virtue of this alleged Will dated 15.08.1986, but the Suit was
dismissed vide separate judgment dated 18.01.2014, which has not been
challenged and has attained finality. The findings of this Suit, thus operate
as res judicata;on this ground itself, this Appeal is liable to be dismissed.
68.
An objection was taken by the Appellant in this Appeal, that the
Plaintiff Anil Gupta himself did not step into the witness box, but had
examined DW1 Sh. Harsh Jhulka, in whose favour, Power of Attorney
Ex.DW1/1 had been executed by him. A Power of Attorney holder cannot
be a witness, on behalf of the Plaintiff.
69.
It is a settled law that any person who is aware of the facts of the case
is a competent witness and does not need any Power of Attorney, to depose
about the facts which are in his knowledge. Therefore, the objection that
DW1 was an incompetent witness only because he had relied on a Power of
Attorney in his favour is not tenable, under the law. He is competent to
depose about the facts as per his knowledge.
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
16:15:59
RSA 150/2018
70.
Moreover, the entire case, insofar as the execution of the sale
documents in favour of Anil Gupta, was not in dispute. It was only Kiran
Talwar who had tried to establish her possession by claiming execution of
an alleged Will dated 15.08.2026 in her favour by Late Sh. Ascharaj Lal,
which she has not been able to substantiate. Therefore, there is no merit in
this ground taken by the Appellant, in this Second Regular Appeal.
71.
The learned Civil Judge as well as learned ADJ have thus, rightly
held that not only was the Will in original or photocopy not produced, but
her two alleged attesting witnesses, namely PW2 Smt. Suman Anand and
PW3 Smt. Swarn Dua also contradicted the claim of the Appellant Kiran
Talwar, by denying being a witness to the alleged Will.
Both the Courts,
thus rightly disbelieved the defence of Kiran Talwar about her having
acquired the ownership by virtue of an alleged Will dated 15.08.1986 in her
favour.
72.
It is thus, concluded that there is no ground for interference in the
Judgment of the learned Civil Judge dated 18.01.2014, which has been
upheld by the learned ADJ in the Regular First Appeal, vide Judgment dated
23.08.2018.
Conclusion:
73.
In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that the two
question of law, do not favour the Appellant. It is held that the Appeal is
devoid of merit, and is accordingly, dismissed.
74.
All pending Applications are disposed of accordingly.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
JULY 1, 2026/VA
DigitallySigned By:RITA
SHARMA
16:15:59
RSA 150/2018
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