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2026:JHHC:15103
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. M. P. No. 199 of 2025
Kinshuk Saurabh @ Kinsukh Sourabh
….. Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand, through Anti Corruption Bureau (Vigilance)
….. Opposite Party
----CORAM
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
----For the Petitioner:
Mr. Saurav Arun, Advocate
For the State:
Mr. Vineet Kr. Vashishtha, Spl. P.P
----09/15.05.2026
The present Cr.M.P has been preferred for quashing the entire criminal
proceeding including the order taking cognizance dated 22.09.2020 and the
order framing charge dated 19.07.2024 passed by the Special Judge (A.C.B),
West Singhbhum at Chaibasa in connection with Vigilance Case No. 02/2019,
arising out of Chaibasa (Sadar) P.S. Case No. 66 of 2006 (corresponding to G.R.
No. 515 of 2006) for the
offences under Sections 409/120(B) of I.P.C,
Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1988’) and Sections 4, 5 & 6 of
the Bihar Prevention of Specified Corrupt Practices Act, 1983 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act, 1983’).
2.
The prosecution case, as per the written report of the informant, namely,
Lalit Kumar Tekriwal, the then Executive Engineer, Road Construction Division,
Chaibasa, is that a report regarding irregularity and excess payment in
connection with construction, widening and strengthening of Hata-SwaspurMusabani road (0.0 to 42 K.Ms.) was submitted by the then Chief Engineer
(Communication), Road
the Secretary,
Road
Construction
Department,
Construction
Jharkhand,
Department,
Ranchi
Government
to
of
Jharkhand alleging that the said road was not constructed according to the
prescribed specification and irregularity was committed regarding quality of the
work as well as excess payment of Rs.103.364 Lakhs was made to the
concerned contractor without performing any work.
2026:JHHC:15103
3.
On the basis of the said report, the Deputy Secretary, Road Construction
Department,
Government
of
Jharkhand
vide
his
letter
no.
3662(s)
dated 23.08.2006, directed the informant to institute a case against the erring
officers, namely, (i) K. P. Singh, the then suspended Executive Engineer, Road
Construction Division, Chaibasa, (ii) Kinsukh Saurabh, the then suspended
Assistant Engineer, Road Construction Division, Chaibasa (the petitioner herein)
(iii) Kali Charan Singh Munda, the then suspended Junior Engineer, Road
Construction Division, Chaibasa (iv) Durlabh Bandhu Surin, the then suspended
Junior Engineer, Road Construction Division, Chaibasa and (v) M/s Makintosh
Barn Ltd.-the contractor.
4.
Thereafter, Chaibasa P.S. Case No. 66 of 2006 (corresponding to G.R.
No. 515 of 2006) was instituted for the offences under Sections 409/120(B) of
IPC. The learned C.J.M, Chaibasa took cognizance of the offences under
Section 409 of I.P.C, Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of the Act, 1988
and Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Act, 1983 vide order dated 05.09.2012 and issued
summons against all the accused persons including the petitioner.
5.
Thereafter, the petitioner challenged the said order by filing Cr.M.P. No.
2069 of 2012, which was heard along with other analogous cases. A co-ordinate
Bench of this Court vide order dated 08.07.2020, remitted the matter to the
C.J.M, Chaibasa to pass a fresh order observing that the order taking
cognizance dated
05.09.2012 and the order issuing summons against
the petitioner and other accused persons were absolutely non-speaking. The
Bench further directed the C.J.M, Chaibasa that if any material under Section
13(2) of the Act, 1988 was found, the record of the case would be forwarded to
the Special Judge appointed in terms with Section 3 of the Act, 1988 for taking
further action.
6.
The learned C.J.M, Chaibasa prima-facie found sufficient material on
record against the accused persons for further proceedings under Sections
2026:JHHC:15103
409/120B of IPC, Section 13(2) of the Act, 1988 and Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the
Act, 1983. The record of the case was accordingly transferred to the Special
Judge (A.C.B), Chaibasa on 24.08.2020, who took fresh cognizance in the
matter vide order dated 22.09.2020 and summons were issued to the accused
persons including the petitioner observing that a prima-facie case was made out
under Sections 409/120(B) of I.P.C, Section 13(2) r/w Sections 13(1)(c)
& 13(1)(d) of the Act, 1988 and Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Act, 1983.
7.
Subsequently, the charges were also framed against all the accused
persons including the petitioner vide order dated 19.07.2024 passed by the
Special Judge (A.C.B), West Singhbhum at Chaibasa for the alleged offences
committed under Sections 409/120(B) of I.P.C, Section 13(2) r/w Sections
13(1)(c) & 13(1)(d) of the Act, 1988 and Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Act, 1983.
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated
22.09.2020 has been passed merely on the basis of surmises and conjectures.
The said order has been passed considering the enquiry report dated
10.08.2006 submitted by the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department,
on the basis of which, the FIR was lodged completely ignoring the subsequent
report dated 18.09.2007 submitted by the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction
Department, which was prepared on the basis of the report of BIT, Mesra,
which is an expert body to test the materials and specifications of work done.
9.
It is further submitted that perusal of the first paragraph of the impugned
order dated 22.09.2020, would suggests that the record of the case was
received by the Trial Court from the Court of the S.D.J.M, Sadar, Chaibasa on
16.03.2021. Thus, the order dated 22.09.2020 taking cognizance of the offences
is antedated, which is rather indication of the fact that the said order is bad in
eye of law and is liable to be quashed by this Court.
10.
It is further submitted that no effective purpose will be served, if the
present criminal proceeding is allowed to continue as the entire allegations of
2026:JHHC:15103
inferior materials and acting in violation of the entrusted specifications against
the petitioner have been declared completely imaginary in terms with the report
of the BIT, Mesra.
11.
It is further contended that the execution of the work in question was
carried out by the concerned contractor, with whom the then Executive
Engineer had entered into an agreement and thus he was responsible for
disbursing payments to the said contractor. The then Junior Engineer was
assigned with the work of supervising the execution of the work. The petitioner
was serving in the capacity of Assistant Engineer, who had merely forwarded
the work progress report prepared by the Junior Engineer to Executive
Engineer. The role of the petitioner was purely supervisory in nature. In fact, he
was functioning entirely under the direction and discretion of the Executive
Engineer without any independent power in contractual or financial matters.
12.
It is also submitted that the report of the Chief Engineer dated
10.08.2006 was not accompanying any quality testing or technical verification.
In fact, vide the said report itself, the Chief Engineer had recommended for
quality testing so as to properly assess the work. Thus, the conclusion drawn in
the said report was speculative and not based on true factual assessment.
13.
It is further submitted that in the report dated 10.08.2006, adverse
findings were noted at only three points each covering approximately 0.00002
Kilometer i.e. 0.02% of the total 42-Kilometers road stretch to draw sweeping
conclusions about the overall quality of the entire project. The reliance on such
an insignificant sample size raises serious doubts about the credibility and
fairness of the enquiry process. Such a method of evaluation is in clear violation
of the procedural safeguards and the standards prescribed under the Public
Works Department (PWD) Code.
14.
It is further contended that there is no material on record to suggest any
act of embezzlement or receipt of illegal gratification on the part of the
2026:JHHC:15103
petitioner. Moreover, the prosecution has failed to bring forth any cogent
evidence indicating mens rea or dishonest intention attributable to the petitioner
and in absence of any direct or circumstantial evidence establishing criminal
intent, the allegations remain unsubstantiated and are liable to be discarded as
baseless.
15.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also argues that the construction work
of civil road is carried out in
open and uncontrolled environment and
the construction site remains exposed to environmental and external factors
such as
rainfall,
water
logging,
vehicular
movements
over
incomplete
stretches and interference by local inhabitants including unauthorized digging.
These unavoidable circumstances naturally affect the quality and appearance of
the work at different stages and therefore making allegations of dishonesty
against the petitioner without any substantive
evidence of misconduct is
contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.
16.
It is lastly contended that in the present case, the nature of the
agreement was based on ‘running account bills’, which inherently provided
procedural safeguards for all concerned including the petitioner. As per the
provisions of the Public Works Account Code, the payments made to the
contractors under running account bills are treated strictly as 'advance
payments.' Such payments are subject to final measurement and adjustment
upon completion of the work ensuring that overpayment or deficiencies, if any,
can be duly rectified at the time of final billing. Therefore, mere release of
interim payments under the running account mechanism cannot be construed as
the evidence of misconduct or criminal intent, particularly, in the absence of any
final determination of loss or irregularity.
17.
On the contrary, learned counsel for the State submits that cognizance of
the offence has already been taken by the competent Court and at this stage,
the petitioner does not deserve any relief from this Court as sufficient materials
2026:JHHC:15103
are available against him to proceed with the trial. It is further submitted that
the re-statement of the informant was recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C and
he fully supported the facts alleged in the FIR. It is further submitted that the
signatures of the petitioner were found in the ‘Measurement Book (MB)’-3633,
which would show his involvement in the alleged offence.
18.
It is also submitted that the Chief Engineer, Road Construction
Department in his report dated 10.08.2006 had found that the construction of
the road was not made as per specifications and that a sum of Rs.103.364
Lakhs was paid to the contractor without any work and the said allegation was
found true during the investigation of the case. The learned Special Judge
(A.C.B), West Singhbhum, Chaibasa has thus rightly taken cognizance of the
alleged offences against the petitioner vide order dated 22.09.2020, which
needs no interference by this Court.
19.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials
available on record.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in series of judgments [Rajiv Thapar and
20.
Others Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330; Amanullah and
Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 699; State of
Gujarat Vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, reported in (2023) 17 SCC 688)], has dealt
with the scope of interference by the High Courts in exercise of power conferred
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the cases where challenges are
made to the orders taking cognizance or framing of charge. The law laid down
in the said cases are summarized as under:(i)
At the stage of taking cognizance, the Court should not get into the
merits of the case made out by the police, in the charge-sheet filed by
them, with a view to calculate the success rate of prosecution in that
particular case.
2026:JHHC:15103
(ii)
At the said stage, the duty of the Court is limited to the extent of
finding out whether from the material placed before it, the offence
alleged against the accused is made out or not with a view to proceed
further with the case.
(iii)
The power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases. The Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint and the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or
caprice.
(iv)
The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C at the
stage
of
initiation
consequences
of
prosecution
inasmuch
as
prosecution's/complainant's
case
it
would
have
would
without
far-reaching
negate
the
allowing
the
prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. As such, before exercising
such power, the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material
produced by the accused is such that the same would lead to the
conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and
indubitable facts; the material produced should rule out and displace
the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused
as well as the same should clearly reject and overrule the veracity of
the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant.
(v)
At the time of taking cognizance, the accused has no right to produce
any material and call upon the Court to examine the same. No
provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any
material or document at the stage of framing of charge. The trial
court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be
necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the
prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only.
21.
Thus, the question that falls for consideration of this Court is as to
whether in the present case, the prima-facie materials were available before the
Trial Court to take cognizance of the alleged offences and to proceed against
the petitioner for conducting the trial.
2026:JHHC:15103
22.
On perusal of the impugned order dated 22.09.2020, it would be evident
that the learned Special Judge (A.C.B), on due consideration of the case diary
produced before him by the prosecution, found that the allegations against the
accused persons including the petitioner were duly supported by the
complainant in his re-statement and by the witnesses examined under Section
161 of Cr.P.C.
23.
The learned Special Judge (A.C.B) observed that on inspection of the
place of occurrence i.e. Hata-Swaspur Musabani road, the investigating officer
found that the work was not completed as per the agreement as well as the
work order and that the materials used, were of very low quality.
24.
The learned Special Judge (A.C.B) also perused the supervision report of
the Superintendent of Police and observed that the payment was received by
the contractor without completion of work. Moreover, the officers of
P.W.D/Road Construction Department also did not perform their duty resulting
in unlawful payment to the contractors, which can be said to be
misappropriation of government money out of criminal conspiracy. This also
amounted to criminal misconduct on their part. It certainly comes under the
purview of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned Special Court also
observed that the sanction order for prosecution against the accused persons
was also received on 14.08.2012 vide letter no. JHA-Vidhi-Avi-Swi-117/2011135/J Ranchi dated 15.09.2012.
25.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously relied upon the report
of the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, Jharkhand dated
16.06.2007. The said report was prepared on the basis of the report of the BIT,
Mesra, which had made inspection of the work in question and had found that
the quality of the work was satisfactory.
2026:JHHC:15103
26.
The said report was also taken into consideration by the learned Special
Judge (A.C.B) and has observed in the impugned order dated 22.09.2020 as
under:“It is relevant to mention here that the first team inquired the
road on 31.07.2006 and the second team inquired the road in
question on 16.06.2007 after a gap of eleven months, it may
be in the meantime, road may be made as per agreement by
the accused persons. Apart from this, it is also relevant to
mention here that the first team conducted inquiry of the
road on 1,2,4,5,7,10 and 12 km which was not found as per
specification and the second team did not inquire same part
of the road, it is also the reason of difference between
reports of both the inquiry teams.”
27.
Thus, it appears that while taking cognizance vide order dated
22.09.2020, the learned Special Judge (A.C.B) perused the case diary, enquiry
reports and other materials available on record and found that a prima facie
case was made out against the accused persons for the offences under Sections
409/120(B) of I.P.C, Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(c) & (d) of the Act, 1988
and Sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Act, 1983.
28.
One of the contentions of the petitioner is that he was not responsible for
inspection of the work site and for excess payment made to the contractor. This
Court is of the view that the veracity of the said claim is to be determined in
course of the trial by the Trial Court after considering the evidence led by the
parties. Moreover, the learned Special Judge (A.C.B), on perusal of the case
diary, found that the petitioner had made his signatures on some pages of the
‘Measurement Book’ and as such his prima-facie involvement was found in the
alleged offence.
29.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised some factual pleas,
which cannot be entertained by this Court at this stage, rather the same can
2026:JHHC:15103
effectively be taken during trial, which will be considered by the Trial Court on
the basis of the evidences led by the parties.
30.
The petitioner has failed to show any such material on the basis of the
documents available on record, which could outrightly demolish the very
foundation of the allegations made in the chargesheet.
31.
In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the
subject as well as the factual position of the present case, I do not find any
ground for interfering with the impugned orders dated 22.09.2020 and
19.07.2024 taking cognizance and framing charge respectively against the
petitioner.
32.
The present Cr.M.P is accordingly dismissed.
33.
The interim order dated 04.03.2025 stands vacated.
(RAJESH SHANKAR, J)
Satish/A.F.R
Uploaded on 16.05.2026
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