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Date of reserved for orders : 18.08.2026
Date of pronouncement
: 03.09.2026
Date of uploading
: 10.09.2026
APHC010552372023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY, THE 03rd DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
WRIT PETITION NO: 28631 OF 2023
Between:
1. KHATEEB MUNWAR, age 39 years, Occ. Junior Assistant (terminated), S/o
Iqbal Mean, C/o Kothapeta, Beside Post Office, Rapur Village and Mandal,
SPSR Nellore District, A.P. - 524408.
...Petitioner
AND
1. The State of Andhra Pradesh, , Rep by its Principal Secretary, Minority
Welfare Department, A.P. Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Amaravathi,
Guntur District, A.P.-522237.
2. A P State Waqf Board, 4th Floor, Imdadghar Waqf Complex, Opp. K.R.
Market, Vijayawada, NTR District, A.P.-520001.
3. The Chairperson, A.P. State Waqf Board, 4th Floor, Imdadghar Waqf
Complex, Opp. K.R. Market, Vijayawada, NTR District, A.P.-520001.
4. Andhra Pradesh State Waqf Board, Rep by its Chief Executive Officer,
Imdadghar Waqf Complex, Opp. K.R. Market, Vijayawada, NTR District, A.P520001.
...Respondents
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Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be
pleased to issue order or direction more particularly in the nature of writ of
Mandamus
to
declare
the
proceedings
F.No.E1/17/2022-A.P.,
dated
09.12.2022 issued by the 4th respondent terminating the service of the
petitioner without conducting proper enquiry, without following service rules as
per the provision of Waqf Act is illegal, arbitrary, biased, discriminative unconstitutional against the principals of natural justice and voilating of article 14,
19, 21 Constitution of India and further with consequent direction to set aside
the proceedings F.No.E1/17/2022-A.P., dated. 09.12.2022 issued by the 4th
respondent and consequently directs the respondents to consider the
representation dated. 21.02.2023, 25.04.2023, 25.07.2023, 28.08.2023,
13.10.2023 given by the petitioner to continue the services of the petitioner by
regularization of his services on par with others and to settle all benefits
entitled by the petitioner including salary from the date of termination
09.12.2022 and to pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2023
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
direct the urgent orders by restore the services of petitioner as Junior
Assistant in Wakf Board, Vijayawada till pending the disposal of writ petition
and pass
Counsel for the Petitioner: K V RAGHU VEER
Counsel for the Respondents: MOHAMMED GAYASUDDIN
Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR SERVICES II
Counsel for the Respondents: SHAIK KHAJA BASHA
The Court made the following order:
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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
WRIT PETITION NO: 28631 of 2023
O R D E R:
1.
This Writ Petition is filed for the following relief:
“……to issue order or direction more particularly in the nature of writ of
Mandamus to declare the proceedings F.No.E1/17/2022-A.P., dated
09.12.2022 issued by the 4th respondent terminating the service of the
petitioner without conducting proper enquiry, without following service rules
as per the provision of Waqf Act is illegal, arbitrary, biased, discriminative
un-constitutional against the principals of natural justice and voilating of
articles 14, 19, 21 of Constitution of India and further with consequent
direction to set aside the proceedings F.No.E1/17/2022-A.P., dated
09.12.2022 issued by the 4th respondent and consequently directs the
respondents
to
consider
the
representations
dated.
21.02.2023,
25.04.2023, 25.07.2023, 28.08.2023, 13.10.2023 given by the petitioner to
continue the services of the petitioner by regularization of his services on
par with others and to settle all benefits entitled by the petitioner including
salary from the date of termination 09.12.2022…”
2.
The facts of the case, as narrated by the petitioner in the writ petition,
are briefly set out hereunder:
Petitioner was appointed as a Junior Assistant in the A.P. State Waqf
Board, Head Office, against a clear vacancy in April, 2014, initially on daily
wages of Rs.300/- per day. Subsequently, by proceedings dated
03.02.2015, he was engaged on consolidated pay of Rs.15,000/- per month.
He states that, he qualified in the departmental examination conducted on
27.11.2016. While the services of some similarly situated employees were
regularized, petitioner continued on consolidated pay despite submitting
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representations seeking regularization. Petitioner was subsequently deputed
to Chittoor District as Additional Inspector/Auditor, Waqfs, and later
transferred back to the Head Office. He thereafter filed W.P.No.36986 of
2022 seeking consideration of his claim for regularization. By order dated
15.11.2022, this Court directed respondents to consider his representations
after affording him an opportunity of hearing. Thereafter, respondents issued
a memo calling for his explanation on certain allegations. Petitioner
submitted a detailed explanation along with supporting documents, denying
the allegations. However, without conducting an enquiry, affording him an
opportunity of personal hearing, or duly considering his explanation and the
material placed in support thereof, the 4th respondent terminated his
services by proceedings dated 09.12.2022 in F.No.E1/17/2022-AP.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned
termination order is arbitrary, violates the principles of natural justice.
Complaints relied upon by the respondents were not supported by any
material evidence; complainants were not examined; and petitioner was not
afforded an opportunity to effectively respond to the allegations or the material
relied upon against him. Petitioner also questions the competence of the
authority in issuing the order of termination and contends that the impugned
action was intended to defeat his claim for regularization and to prevent him
from pursuing the earlier order passed by this Court. Despite the petitioner
submitting several representations seeking reinstatement, the respondents
have not considered his case. Hence, the present writ petition has been filed
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under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the termination order
dated 09.12.2022 and seeking consequential reliefs.
4.
Respondent No.4 filed a counter-affidavit contending that petitioner was
appointed as a Junior Assistant on purely a temporary and consolidated-pay
basis, with a condition that his services could be terminated without prior
notice or assigning reasons, and that his services were never regularized.
Several complaints alleging corruption, demand of bribes, misconduct and
disobedience were received against the petitioner. After a preliminary enquiry,
a memo dated 19.10.2022 was issued calling for his explanation, which he
submitted on 25.10.2022 denying the allegations. Upon considering the
complaints, petitioner's explanation and the legal opinion obtained, the
competent authority discharged him from temporary service by proceedings
dated 09.12.2022. It is further contended that, being a temporary employee,
petitioner was not entitled for a regular departmental enquiry and that the
impugned order constitutes discharge simpliciter. Accordingly, respondents
seek dismissal of the writ petition.
5.
Heard Sri K.V. Raghuveer, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Sheik Abdullah, learned counsel representing Sri Shaik Khaja Basha, learned
Standing Counsel for respondent No.4.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, in response to the
explanation called for, the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation, which
was referred to as the 8th reference in the impugned proceedings. In the said
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explanation, the petitioner specifically refuted each of the allegations leveled
against him and referred to the relevant documents in support of his case.
However, the respondents neither consider the said explanation nor recorded
findings on the contentions raised therein. They merely referred to the
explanation and proceeded to pass the impugned orders. It is further
submitted that, though petitioner is a temporary employee, the allegations of
misconduct, misbehaviour or financial irregularities may have an adverse
effect on his future employment prospects. Therefore, before taking adverse
action, the respondents were required to consider petitioner's explanation and,
if necessary, conduct an appropriate enquiry. Instead, respondents merely
observed that the explanation was a denial of the allegations and did not
consider the defence raised by the petitioner.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioner had drawn the attention of this Court
to the explanation dated 25.10.2022 submitted by the petitioner, along with the
material placed in support thereof. The documents filed by the respondents
along with the counter indicate that, petitioner had enclosed 23 documents,
comprising 53 pages, along with his explanation, specifically refuting the
allegations levelled against him.
8.
The grievance of the petitioner is that his case was not properly
considered and the explanation submitted by him was not considered in its
proper perspective. Without referring to the contents of the explanation or
considering the defence raised by the petitioner, respondents merely relied
upon the alleged complaints, terminated his services on the ground that he
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was appointed on a temporary or consolidated-pay basis and that, under the
terms of his appointment, he could be removed from the temporary post at
any time without assigning any reason.
9.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, though, petitioner is a
temporary employee, the allegations of misconduct, misbehaviour and
financial misappropriation levelled against him amount to imputations which
are stigmatic in nature. Such allegations, particularly, when made the basis for
termination, are likely to adversely affect the petitioner’s future employment
prospects. Therefore, the termination cannot be treated as a mere discharge
from temporary service, and the nature and substance of the allegations and
the basis on which the termination was effected are required to be considered.
Learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Swati Priyadarshini v. State of M.P.1, wherein it held that:
34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid
down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [Parshotam Lal Dhingra
v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5] : (SCC OnLine SC para 28)
“28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and
every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in
rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a
contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by
this Court in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India [Satish Chandra
Anand v. Union of India, (1953) 1 SCC 420] . Likewise the termination of
service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the
conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment
and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in
Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. [Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., (1954) 1 SCC
572] In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the
service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or
allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the
(2024) 19 SCC 128
Page |8
motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take
action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific
service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules,
to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the
Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of
India [Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, 1956 SCC OnLine Bom 38 :
AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service
is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then,
prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil
consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the
Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the
employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting
the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the
Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the
termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the
requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if
the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the
contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services
cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the
service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and,
therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a
forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss
of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting
his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of
punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant
has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will
operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges
of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his
reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will
not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no
title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express
or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does
not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank
cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for
determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of
punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the
servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or
provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his
seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his
future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that
although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to
terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under
the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and
reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of
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penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not
conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court
has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the
servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been
visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the
case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant
has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a
dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank
must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the
rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have
not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in
rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right
of the servant.”
(emphasis supplied)
10.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment
of the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.2, wherein
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
7. The principal question is whether the impugned action is violative of
principles of natural justice. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2
SCC 262] a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the distinction
between quasi-judicial and administrative order has gradually become
thin. Now it is totally eclipsed and obliterated. The aim of the rule of
natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent
miscarriage of justice. These rules operate in the area not covered by law
validly made or expressly excluded as held in Col. J.N. Sinha v. Union of
India [(1970) 2 SCC 458 : (1971) 1 SCR 791] . It is settled law that
certified standing orders have statutory force which do not expressly
exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. Conversely the
Act made exceptions for the application of principles of natural justice by
necessary implication from specific provisions in the Act like Sections 25F; 25-FF; 25-FFF etc. The need for temporary hands to cope with sudden
and temporary spurt of work demands appointment temporarily to a
service of such temporary workmen to meet such exigencies and as soon
as the work or service is completed, the need to dispense with the
services may arise. In that situation, on compliance with the provisions of
Section 25-F resort could be had to retrench the employees in conformity
therewith. Particular statute or statutory rules or orders having statutory
flavour may also exclude the application of the principles of natural justice
expressly or by necessary implication. In other respects the principles of
(1993) 3 SCC 259
P a g e | 10
natural justice would apply unless the employer should justify its
exclusion on given special and exceptional exigencies.
8. The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is
whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of
presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably
and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly,
namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the
particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the
principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard
intends to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily affecting the rights
of the concerned person.
11. The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that procedure
prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of
Article 14 and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Article
14 and the procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or
orders affecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have
to answer the requirement of Article 14. So it must be right, just and fair
and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. There can be no distinction
between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the
purpose of principles of natural justice. The aim of both administrative
inquiry as well as the quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision
and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice or to put it
negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it
should be applicable only to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to
administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both.
12. Therefore, fair play in action requires that the procedure adopted
must be just, fair and reasonable. The manner of exercise of the power
and its impact on the rights of the person affected would be in conformity
with the principles of natural justice. Article 21 clubs life with liberty,
dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious
content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. When
it is interpreted that the colour and content of procedure established by
law must be in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual
justice, it would relieve legislative callousness despising opportunity of
being heard and fair opportunities of defence. Article 14 has a pervasive
processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and
allergic to discriminatory dictates. Equality is the antithesis of
arbitrariness. It is, thereby, conclusively held by this Court that the
principles of natural justice are part of Article 14 and the procedure
prescribed by law must be just, fair and reasonable.
15. In this case admittedly no opportunity was given to the appellant and
no inquiry was held. The appellant's plea put forth at the earliest was that
despite his reporting to duty on December 3, 1980 and on all subsequent
days and readiness to join duty he was prevented from reporting to duty,
P a g e | 11
nor was he permitted to sign the attendance register. The Tribunal did not
record any conclusive finding in this behalf. It concluded that the
management had power under Clause 13 of the Certified Standing
Orders to terminate with the service of the appellant. Therefore, we hold
that the principles of natural justice must be read into the Standing Order
No. 13(2)(iv). Otherwise it would become arbitrary, unjust and unfair
violating Article 14. When so read the impugned action is violative of the
principles of natural justice.
11.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that, once allegations are
levelled against the petitioner, the principles of natural justice require that the
matter be considered fairly and reasonably so as to prevent miscarriage of
justice. In the present case, the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation;
however, the respondents neither considered its contents nor dealt with the
grounds raised therein. The impugned order was passed without even
referring to the explanation and stated that the petitioner had merely denied
the allegations contained in the complaints’.
12.
As seen from the impugned order, though the respondents have
referred to the allegations levelled against the petitioner in various complaints,
they have neither considered the detailed explanation submitted by the
petitioner nor the documents enclosed therewith. The impugned order,
therefore, suffers from non-consideration of petitioner’s explanation and the
material placed in support thereof. Further, the petitioner was not afforded an
opportunity of personal hearing before the adverse action was taken. The
same constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice and, on this
ground, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. At the same time, this
Court cannot overlook the serious allegations made against the petitioner by
P a g e | 12
various persons, as reflected in the complaints. The competent authorities are,
therefore, entitled to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law.
However, such consideration shall be undertaken fairly and transparently,
after taking into account the petitioner’s explanation and the documents
submitted therewith and after affording him a reasonable opportunity of
personal hearing. Thereafter, the authorities shall pass a reasoned order on
the allegations in accordance with law.
13.
In LIC v. A. Masilamani3, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows:
14. In the present case, the High Court after reappreciating the entire
evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that in the course
of enquiry proceedings, certain witnesses had not been examined in the
presence of the delinquent respondent, and that hence, no proper
opportunity was given to him to cross-examine such witnesses.
Moreover, the documents relied upon by the enquiry officer, were not
properly proved by any witness and ultimately, it was held that the
findings of the enquiry officer stood vitiated for non-compliance with
mandatory requirements of the Regulations applicable herein, as well as
for violating the principles of natural justice. The Court further held that
the appellate authority had not applied its mind to the case, and had
failed to consider the case as required under Regulation 46(2) of the
1960 Regulations. Thus, in light of the aforementioned observations, the
Court set aside the punishment imposed upon the respondent, and also
refused to give the appellant any opportunity to continue the enquiry
from the point that it stood vitiated, consequently therefore, denying any
opportunity to prove the documents relied upon, as also denying the
respondent adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
concerned, etc. only on the ground that a long time had now passed.
16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the court sets aside an
order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly
conducted, the court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the
case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry
from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide ECIL
v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25
ATC 704 : AIR 1994 SC 1074] , Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. S.M.
School for Girls [(2002) 10 SCC 293 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1033] , U.P.
(2013) 6 SCC 530
P a g e | 13
State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey [(2005) 8 SCC 264 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 78] and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu [(2008) 12 SCC 30 : (2009)
1 SCC (L&S) 126] .)
17. The second question involved herein is also no longer res integra.
Whether or not the disciplinary authority should be given an opportunity
to complete the enquiry afresh from the point that it stood vitiated
depends upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must
examine the magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent
employee. It is in view of this, that courts/tribunals are not competent to
quash the charge-sheet and related disciplinary proceedings, before the
same are concluded on the aforementioned grounds.
14.
A perusal of the aforesaid decision makes it clear that, where
disciplinary proceedings are vitiated by violation of the principles of natural
justice or other procedural requirements, the matter ordinarily ought to be
remitted to the disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage at which the
defect occurred. The necessity for such remand depends upon the nature and
gravity of the alleged misconduct. Ordinarily, disciplinary proceedings ought
not to be quashed at the threshold merely on account of such procedural
violation.
15.
In view of the foregoing, this Court is of the considered view that the
impugned order suffers from violation of the principles of natural justice and is,
therefore, liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside
and the matter is remitted to the competent authority for fresh consideration
from the stage at which the violation occurred. The competent authority shall
afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing, consider the detailed
explanation already submitted by him along with the documents enclosed
thereto and, if an enquiry is warranted, conduct the same in accordance with
P a g e | 14
law and the principles of natural justice. Thereafter, the competent authority
shall pass a reasoned and speaking order on merits, uninfluenced by any
observations made in this order.
16.
Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.
The respondents shall complete the aforesaid exercise within a period of two
(02) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Reinstatement of
the petitioner shall be subject to the outcome of the above said enquiry and
the consequential final orders to be passed by the competent authority. There
shall be no order as to costs.
Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all
pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________________
JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
Date: 03.09.2026
SAK
Whether the order is:
Speaking
Reportable
☑
Reasoned
Non-reportable
☑
P a g e | 15
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
WRIT PETITION NO: 28631 OF 2023
Date: 03.09.2026
SAK
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