Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
$~17 & 18
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
FAO (COMM) 159/2024, CM APPLs. 45709/2024, 45710/2024
& 45711/2024
KEDAR NATH MISHRA
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Vikas Khera, Ms. Sneha
Sethia, Mr. Rohit Yadav and Mr. Jatin
Gautam, Advs.
versus
INVISION MEDI SCIENCES PVT. LTD.
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Shantanu Sood and Mr.
Shekhar Sri Prakash, Advs.
+
FAO (COMM) 160/2024, CM APPLs. 45737/2024, 45738/2024
& 45739/2024
KEDAR NATH MISHRA
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Vikas Khera, Ms. Sneha
Sethia, Mr. Rohit Yadav and Mr. Jatin
Gautam, Advs.
versus
INVISION MEDI SCIENCES PVT. LTD.
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Shantanu Sood and Mr.
Shekhar Sri Prakash, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
%
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
13.01.2026
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
Introduction
1.
The present appeals have been filed under Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 19081, assailing the impugned order dated
07.06.20242 passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court01), South, Saket, Delhi in CS (COMM) 702/2022. The aforementioned
suit was filed by the appellant (“plaintiffs” before the Trial Court)
against the respondent (“defendant” before the Trial Court) seeking,
inter alia, a decree of permanent injunction to restrain the alleged
trademark infringement and passing off, along with delivery up,
damages and other consequential reliefs.
2.
By the impugned order dated 07.06.2024, passed in CS (COMM)
702/2022, the learned Commercial Court disposed of the applications
under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC filed by the appellant as well as
an interim application filed by the respondent in its counter-claim for
issuance of ad-interim injunction, and application under Section 124 (2)
of the Trade Marks Act, 19993. An application under Section 340 Code
of Criminal Procedure4 application filed by the appellant was kept
pending. Thus, FAO (COMM.) No. 160/2024 came to be filed by Kedar
Nath Mishra (“appellant” herein), challenging the dismissal of its
application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC in CS
(COMM) No. 702/2022, whereas FAO (Comm.) No. 159/2024 has
1 “CPC” hereinafter
2 “Impugned order” hereinafter
3 “Trade Marks Act” hereinafter
4 “CrPC” hereinafter
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
been filed by the appellant assailing the grant of injunction against him
on the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC filed
by Invision Medi Sciences Private Limited (“respondent” herein) in the
counterclaim filed by the respondent in the aforesaid suit.
3.
Mr. Vikas Khera, learned Counsel for the appellant, at the very
outset, points out that he is assailing the impugned order only to the
extent, that it has granted an interim injunction in favour of the
respondent and against the appellant, and, therefore, the present lis is
restricted to the challenge against the injunction granted on the
respondent’s application in the counter-claim.
Factual Matrix
4.
It has been averred that the appellant is engaged in the business
of marketing, selling and distribution of pharmaceutical and medicinal
preparations under the mark “BONERICH” since 29.08.2011. It was
further averred that by virtue of the continuous and uninterrupted use
of the mark “BONERICH”, the mark has, over a period of time,
acquired distinctiveness and has come to denote and identify the
pharmaceutical products originating exclusively from the appellant.
5.
In order to obtain statutory protection, it is claimed that the
appellant initially applied for registration of the said mark
“BONERICH” under Class 5 on 18.09.2013. However, the said
application was refused due to non-appearance at the hearing in respect
of the objections raised by the Trademarks Registry under Sections 9
and 11 of the Trade Marks Act. In consequence, a fresh application for
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
registration was filed on 05.12.2018, pursuant to which the appellant
secured registration for the mark “BONERICH” under Class 5 on
08.02.2021. Both applications were filed claiming prior use since
29.08.2011.
6.
Respondent is also dealing in the business of marketing and
trading of pharmaceutical and medicinal products under the mark
“BONRICH”. It is the case of the respondent that it is an old,
established and reputed company incorporated on 22.02.2011 and
engaged in the business of pharmaceuticals, allopathic, ayurvedic,
homoeopathic medicines etc.
7.
Against the aforementioned backdrop, the appellant stated that it
first became aware of the respondent’s use of the mark “BONRICH”
on 29.07.2021, when the respondent filed Application No. 5064847 for
registration of the said mark in Class 5, claiming use since 18.11.2011.
The appellant, thereafter, also noticed the respondent’s pharmaceutical
products in the market. According to the appellant, the respondent’s
mark “BONRICH” is identical and deceptively similar to its registered
trademark “BONERICH” in respect of identical pharmaceutical goods.
8.
Therefore, the appellant instituted a suit before the learned
Commercial Court seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining
the respondent from using the mark “BONRICH” or any other mark
deceptively similar to “BONERICH”, along with the reliefs of
delivery-up, damages, and other consequential reliefs.
9.
Upon service of summons on 12.01.2023 in the aforesaid suit, the
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
respondent filed its written statement, denying the appellant’s
averments and alleging suppression and misrepresentation regarding
the adoption and use of the mark “BONERICH” by the appellant. The
respondent also filed a counter-claim bearing CS (COMM) No. 79/
2023 along with the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of
the CPC.
10.
The respondent pleaded that it was incorporated on 22.02.2011
for the purpose of carrying on the business of pharmaceutical products.
It was further asserted by the respondent’s that, in terms of its
Memorandum of Association5 dated 10.02.2011, the respondent
company had been formed to take over the running business of the sole
proprietorship of Mr. Mukesh Kumar, carried on in the name of
“Invision Medi Sciences”.
11.
It has been further stated that Mr. Mukesh Kumar, the promoter
and director of the respondent, had adopted and used the mark
“BONRICH” in relation to pharmaceutical and medicinal products
since 2007 through his proprietorship firm, Marx Remedies/Invision
Medi Sciences. Upon incorporation in the year 2011, it was stated that
the entire business of the proprietorship, together with all rights,
goodwill and liabilities, stood transferred to the respondent. On this
footing, it was asserted that the respondent has been continuously using
the mark “BONRICH” since 2007, which is prior to the appellant’s
claimed adoption of 29.08.2011, and therefore, they enjoy prior rights
in the mark, entitling it to protection against an infringement action
5 “MoA” hereinafter
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act and simultaneously to
maintain a claim for passing off against the appellant.
12.
It was further pleaded that the respondent applied for registration
of the mark “BONRICH” on 29.07.2021 under Application No.
5064847, initially claiming user from 18.11.2011. This was stated to be
an inadvertent error, which was sought to be corrected by an
amendment application filed on 18.01.2023 in Form TM-M, revising
the claimed date of first use to 31.12.2007. It was also stated that, since
the earlier use related to the period during which the mark was used by
Mr. Mukesh Kumar as proprietor of Marx Remedies, a confirmatory
Assignment Deed dated 14.01.2023 in that regard was executed in
favour of the respondent to formally record the transfer of rights in the
mark “BONRICH”.
13.
Accordingly, based on its plea of prior use and its asserted
goodwill and reputation, the respondent, by way of counterclaim,
sought a decree of permanent injunction in an action for passing off,
seeking restraining the appellant from using the mark “BONERICH”
or any other mark identical or deceptively similar to “BONRICH”,
along with the reliefs of damages, delivery up, rendition of accounts
and costs.
Impugned Order
14.
By the impugned order dated 07.06.2024, the learned
Commercial Court considered the applications filed by both parties
under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC, the respondent’s
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
application under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, and the
appellant’s application under Section 340 of the CrPC.
15.
The learned Commercial Court allowed the respondent’s interim
injunction filed in the counter-claim and restrained the appellant from
using the mark “BONERICH” or any other mark deceptively similar
to “BONRICH”, while dismissing the appellant’s application for an
injunction.
16.
In arriving at its finding, the learned Commercial Court first
examined the rival claims of prior use and held that the respondent had
placed extensive documentary material on record to establish
continuous use of the mark “BONRICH” since 2007 through its
predecessor and thereafter by the respondent from 2011 onwards. The
material relied upon included VAT registrations, licences, stock
registers, invoices, Chartered Accountant6’s certificates and the Local
Commissioner’s report, which were found to reflect sales of
approximately Rs. 25.73 lakhs during 2007–2011 and Rs. 1.05 crores
from 2011–2022, along with pan-India distribution of the respondent’s
products.
17.
The learned Commercial Court, thereafter, considered the
appellant’s claim of use of the mark “BONERICH” from 29.08.2011,
supported by invoices and its registration dated 08.02.2021, but
observed that the appellant’s sales were comparatively lower and
confined to limited geographical areas.
6 “CA” hereinafter
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
18.
On this comparative assessment, the learned Commercial Court
prima facie held that, notwithstanding the appellant’s registration, the
respondent is the prior user of “BONRICH”, and that the marks
“BONERICH” and “BONRICH” were deceptively similar, and
therefore, concurrent use of both the marks is likely to cause confusion
in the minds of the consumers.
19.
Proceeding on this basis, the learned Commercial Court
concluded that the respondent had established a prima facie case, the
balance of convenience lies in its favour, and irreparable injury would
be caused if the appellant were allowed to continue using the mark
“BONERICH”. Accordingly, the appellant was restrained from using
“BONERICH” or any deceptively similar mark during the pendency
of the suit. The paragraph capturing the above mentioned findings is
reproduced:
“36. The mark being used by both the parties establish likelihood of
deceptive and confusing similarity of the plaintiff's mark with that
of the defendant/counter claimant and same can have the effect of
causing confusion in the minds of innocent purchasers.
Significantly the defendant/counter claimant is the prior user.
Unwary purchasers which include each and every section of society
are bound to be deceived while dealing with and purchasing the
plaintiff's products under the impugned trademarks/label under the
impression that they are emanating from the defendant's source or
that some strong and vital links exist between plaintiff and the
defendant. Possibility of defendant suffering losses and damages,
both in business and reputation cannot be ruled out. Such losses and
damages are unliquidated as loss of reputation is incapable of exact
and accurate assessment. Thus, in view of the above facts and
circumstances and after perusing all the documents on record, this
Court is of the considered view that use of the impugned trademark
by the plaintiff in similar kind of activities can give an impression
that it belongs to same person or company and there is every
likelihood of confusion in the mind of the present and future
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
customers, as they are identical. Resultantly, the defendant/counter
claimant has been able to make out a strong prima facie case in its
favour for grant of interim injunction. The balance of convenience
also tilts in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. The
defendant /counter claimant shall suffer an irreparable loss, which
cannot be compensated in monetary terms, if the confusion in the
minds of unwary customers is continued by plaintiff's use of
impugned trademark/label and reputation of the defendant/counter
claimant is adversely effected. Accordingly, the plaintiff by itself
as also through its agents, representatives, distributors, assigns,
heirs, successors, stockists and all others acting for an on its behalf
from using, selling, soliciting, manufacturing, marketing,
enquiring, importing, exporting, displaying, advertising physically
or through social networking websites or through its or by any other
mode or manner dealing in or using the impugned trademark/label
‘BONERICH’ or any other deceptively similar mark/label to the
defendant's trademark/label, in relation to the impugned goods and
business and and related/allied goods and from doing any other acts
or deeds amounting to or likely to passing off its goods as that of
the defendant/counter claimant till the final disposal of the present
suit. The application U/o 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC filed on behalf of
the defendant/counter claimant stands allowed and the application
under order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC filed by plaintiff stands dismissed.
Nothing stated herein above, however, shall tantamount to any
expression on the merits of the case.”
20.
The learned Commercial Court further held that, in view of its
prima facie finding in favour of the respondent on prior user, the
respondent’s plea regarding the invalidity of the appellant’s registration
was also prima facie tenable.
21.
Accordingly, the respondent was granted a period of three
months to initiate rectification proceedings under Section 124 of the
Trade Marks Act. However, the appellant’s application under Section
340 of the CrPC, alleging fabrication of the Assignment Deed dated
14.01.2023, CA certificates and false statements, was kept pending on
the ground that such allegations required evidence and could be
adjudicated only at the stage of trial.
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
Rival Contentions before this Court
22.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
22.1 Mr. Vikas Khera, learned Counsel for the appellant, contends that
they had honestly adopted and commenced use of the mark
“BONERICH” on 29.08.2011, and that such use has been continuous
and commercial, as reflected from the invoices on record. It is submitted
that the prior use since 29.08.2011 had been consistently asserted in its
trademark applications of 2013 and 2018, which culminated in
registration on 08.02.2021, thereby demonstrating a bona fide and
independent adoption of the mark, and not a later-stage fabrication or a
reaction to the respondent’s claim.
22.2 It is further submitted that the respondent had applied for
registration of the mark “BONRICH” only on 29.07.2021 vide
Application No. 5064847, claiming user from 18.11.2011, which was
subsequent to the appellant’s adoption of the mark on 29.08.2011.
Therefore, it was contended that the respondent was not a prior user of
the mark.
22.3 It is further pointed out that only pursuant to receipt of summons
in the present suit on 12.01.2023, the respondent had executed a
purported Assignment Deed dated 14.01.2023, allegedly transferring
rights in the mark “BONRICH” along with goodwill. It is submitted
that prior to 12.01.2023, there was neither any Assignment Deed nor
any application for amendment of the respondent’s user claim, and that
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
the said Assignment Deed was brought into existence only to make a
false claim of prior rights during the pendency of the litigation.
22.4 A further challenge is made to the respondent’s reliance on Marx
Remedies as a source of alleged prior use, contending that the
respondent had taken mutually destructive stands by pleadings in its
written statements that Marx Remedies was not in existence, while
simultaneously relying upon it as the assignor of the trademark
“BONRICH”. It is contended that a non-existent and non-using entity
cannot assign any rights or goodwill in an unregistered mark, thereby
rendering the Assignment Deed dated 14.01.2023 legally untenable.
22.5 It is also contended that the learned Commercial Court had
travelled beyond the pleadings in holding that Marx Remedies was still
in existence and that the Assignment Deed was unnecessary, even
though the respondent’s entire claim to the mark was founded on that
assignment from Marx Remedies to the respondent, and therefore, the
Court erred in reconstructing or substituting the respondent’s pleaded
case to sustain the grant of the injunction which is impermissible in law.
22.6 It is also submitted that the respondent has no lawful basis to
claim goodwill or proprietary rights in the mark “BONRICH”, since
the respondent’s own MoA dated 10.02.2011 records the takeover only
of Invision Medi Sciences, and not of Marx Remedies, which was the
entity that allegedly used the mark from 31.12.2007 to 07.01.2010.
Therefore, no goodwill of Marx Remedies could have vested in the
respondent, and the learned Commercial Court erred in relying upon the
MoA to presume that trademark rights in the mark “BONRICH” stood
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
conferred upon the respondent, when in fact no such transfer of rights
or goodwill was ever effected.
22.7 It is further pointed out that an application under Section 340 of
the CrPC challenging the Assignment Deed dated 14.01.2023 and the
respondent’s user claims are pending, yet the learned Commercial
Court has restrained the appellant on the strength of those very disputed
documents, thereby causing grave and irreparable prejudice to the
appellant.
22.8 It is also contended that the impugned order is non-speaking and
legally unsustainable, as it grants an injunction without recording any
finding on the essential ingredients of a passing off action, particularly
goodwill and reputation to be proved in favour of the respondent from
2007 to 2011, and proceeded solely on the basis that the respondent is
the prior user and the mark “BONRICH” and “BONERICH” is
deceptively similar and can cause likelihood of confusion in the minds
of the consumer.
23.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent
23.1 Mr. Shantanu Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent,
contends that the appellant is seeking a re-appreciation of evidence and
substitution of the learned Commercial Court’s discretion, which is
beyond the limited scope of appellate review. It is submitted that the
impugned order is based on a detailed consideration of the material on
record, including invoices, sales figures, website archives, stock
registers and the Local Commissioner’s report, and does not suffer from
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
arbitrariness, perversity or any legal infirmity warranting interference
of this Court.
23.2 It is further contended that the respondent is the prior and
continuous user of the mark “BONRICH” since 2007 through a single
source, initially through its predecessor and thereafter by the respondent
company from 2011 onwards, and that such prior user rights prevail
over the appellant’s subsequent registration of the mark “BONERICH”
in 2021. Therefore, it is argued that the appellant’s statutory registration
cannot override the respondent’s prior common-law rights arising from
long, continuous and bona fide commercial use.
23.3 Learned Counsel for the respondent rebuts the allegation that the
Assignment Deed dated 14.01.2023 is fabricated and submits that it was
validly executed by the proprietor of Marx Remedies, the owner and
user of the mark “BONRICH”, to formally record the transfer of rights
to the respondent. It is contended that the deed merely perfected an
existing arrangement under which the respondent had been using the
mark since 2011, and that its timing does not affect its validity, as it
only confirms the respondent’s right to assert the mark against third
parties.
23.4 It is further submitted that the application under Section 340 of
the CrPC raises issues which can be adjudicated only at the stage of
trial, and that the learned Commercial Court was justified in granting
interim protection on the basis that the respondent had prima facie
established the essential ingredients of a passing off action.
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
23.5 Upon being questioned about the absence of a specific finding on
goodwill and reputation in the impugned order, learned Counsel for the
respondent relied on paragraphs 19 and 20 of the impugned order to
contend that the learned Commercial Court had taken note of the
respondent’s sales figures, invoices and pan-India presence of the mark
“BONRICH” since 2007. It was submitted that the recording of sales
of Rs. 25.73 lakhs between 2007–2011 and over Rs. 1.05 crores
thereafter, together with the geographical spread of sales, sufficiently
demonstrates market presence and reputation, and that a finding on
goodwill must therefore be treated as implicit, even if not expressly
recorded.
Reasons and findings
24.
We have heard the learned Counsels for both parties and perused
the material on record.
25.
At the outset, we may begin by noting that this court is conscious
that the appeal arising from an order passed under Order XXXIX Rule
1 and 2 of the CPC is an appeal on principle.
26.
In the teeth of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd7, this court is
aware that it cannot substitute its own view merely because another
view is possible, and that interference is warranted only where the
discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or in
disregard of settled legal principles governing interim relief.
7 1990 Supp SCC 727
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
27.
Being cognisant of this settled position, we are of the view that
the appellant has made out a case for interference as the impugned order
suffers from a fundamental error on principle of law for the reasons and
findings set out below.
28.
On the aspect of infringement, we find that the appellant has
secured registration for the mark “BONERICH” under Class 5 on
08.02.2021. Accordingly, at best, the claim of passing off can be made
against the appellant.
29.
Therefore, we deem it relevant to understand the ingredients of
passing off to understand the correctness of the impugned order.
30.
In this regard, we begin by noting that passing off is a common
law remedy intended to protect the goodwill and reputation of a trader
against misrepresentation by another, which causes or is likely to cause
confusion in the minds of the consumers. Unlike trademark
infringement, which is a statutory remedy available only in respect of
registered marks, an action for passing off is available even in respect
of unregistered marks, provided the plaintiff can establish (i) the
existence of goodwill or reputation in the mark, (ii) misrepresentation
made by the defendant, and (iii) a likelihood of damage to the plaintiff’s
goodwill.
31.
Therefore, the existence of goodwill and reputation attached to
the mark is the sine qua non for a passing off action, as also affirmed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pernod Ricard India Private Limited
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
& Anr. v Karanveer Singh Chhabra8.
32.
The same view has, time and again, been reiterated by this Court
as well as by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, to avoid prolixity,
we may refer only to the decision of this Court in FDC Ltd. v. Faraway
Foods (P) Ltd9., wherein this Court, speaking through one of us (C.
Hari Shankar, J.), observed as follows on the subject of the ingredients
of passing off. This Court, following the judgments of the Apex Court
in Wockhardt Ltd. v. Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd.10 and Cadila
Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.11, held as follows:
“75. (i) Passing off, though an action based on deceit, does not
require the establishment of fraud as a necessary element to sustain
the action. Imitation or adoption, by the defendant, of the plaintiff's
trade mark, in such manner as to cause confusion or deception in the
mind of prospective customers, is sufficient.
(ii) The principles for grant of injunction, in passing off actions, are
the same as those which govern the grant of injunctions in other
cases i.e. the existence of a prima facie case, the balance of
convenience, and the likelihood of irreparable loss in issuing to the
plaintiff, were injunction not to be granted.
(iii) Proof of actual damage is not necessary, to establish passing
off. However, proof of Misrepresentation is necessary, even if intent
to misrepresent is not approved. The question of intent may,
nevertheless, be relevant, when it comes to the ultimate relief to be
granted to the plaintiff.
(iv) Passing off may be alleged by a claimant who owns sufficient
proprietary interest in the goodwill associated with the product,
which is really likely to be damaged by the alleged
misrepresentation.
(v) Grant of injunction, in cases where passing off is found to exist,
is intended to serve two purposes, the first being preservation of the
8 2025 INSC 981
9 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1539
10 (2018) 18 SCC 346
11 (2001) 5 SCC 73
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
reputation of the plaintiff, and the second, safeguarding of the public
against goods which are passed off as those of the plaintiff.
(vi) The ingredients/indicia of the tort of passing off are the
following:
(a) There must be sale, by the defendant, of goods/services
in a manner which is likely to deceive the public into
thinking that the goods/services are those of the plaintiff.
(b) The plaintiff is not required to prove long user to prove
established reputation. The existence, or otherwise, of
reputation, would depend upon the volume of the plaintiff's
sales and the extent of its advertisement.
(c) The plaintiff is required to establish:
(i) Misrepresentation by the defendant to the public, though
not necessarily mala fide;
(ii) Likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public (the
public being the potential customers/users of the product)
that the goods of the defendant are those of the plaintiff,
applying the test of a person of “imperfect recollection and
ordinary memory.”
(iii) Loss, or likelihood of loss.
(iv) Goodwill of the plaintiff, as a prior user.
Elsewhere, the five elements of passing off have been
identified as: (a) misrepresentation; (b) made by the trader in
the course of trade; (c) to prospective customers or ultimate
consumers of the 0goods or services supplied by him; (d)
calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another (i.e.
that such injury is reasonably foreseeable); and (e) actual
damage, or the possibility of actual damage, to the business
or goodwill of the plaintiff.
*****
(x) Passing off differs from infringement. Passing off is based on the
goodwill that the trader has in his name, whereas infringement is
based on the trader's proprietary right in the name, registered in his
favour. Passing off is an action for deceit, involving passing off the
goods of one person as those of another, whereas an action for
infringement is a statutory remedy conferred on the registered
proprietor of a registered trade mark for vindication of its exclusive
right to use the trade mark in relation to the goods in respect of which
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
registration has been granted. Use of the trade mark by the defendant
is not necessary for infringement, but it is a sine qua non for passing
off. Once sufficient similarity, as is likely to deceive, is shown,
infringement stands established. Passing off, however, may be
resisted on the ground of added material, such as packing,
procurement through different trade channels, etc. which would
distinguish the goods of the defendant from those of the plaintiff and
belie the possibility of confusion or deception.”
33.
Thus, in view of the aforesaid settled legal framework, we shall
analyse the impugned order.
34.
Since, the respondent’s counterclaim was founded on passing off,
there is no doubt that the learned Commercial Court was required to
examine whether the respondent had established the three essential
elements of that cause of action, namely: (i) goodwill or reputation in
the mark “BONRICH”, (ii) misrepresentation by the appellant, and (iii)
likelihood of damage, in addition to prior use.
35.
A careful perusal of the impugned order demonstrates that the
learned Commercial Court granted an interim injunction restraining the
appellant and all persons acting on its behalf from dealing in
pharmaceutical products under the mark “BONERICH”, primarily on
the basis that the respondent was the prior user of the mark
“BONRICH”.
36.
We find that in arriving at this conclusion, the learned
Commercial Court, after examining the material placed on record,
concluded that the respondent had established continuous prior use of
the mark “BONRICH” since 2007 through its predecessor, and
thereafter its own right from 2011 onwards.
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
37.
Further, the learned Commercial Court also came to conclude
that the marks “BONRICH” and “BONERICH” are deceptively
similar and are being used in respect of identical pharmaceutical
products, thereby giving rise to a likelihood of confusion in the minds
of the consumers.
38.
However, the point that pricks the conscious of our mind is that,
even if we are to accept the finding of the learned Commercial Court
regarding the respondent’s prior use of the trademark “BONRICH”
since 2007, and proceed on the assumption that the respondent’s claim
in that regard is correct, we find that the impugned order does not record
any specific finding as to the existence of goodwill or reputation to be
proved in favour of the respondent or its predecessor-in-interest in
respect of the mark “BONRICH” for the period prior to the 29.08.2011,
when the appellant admittedly adopted the mark “BONERICH”.
39.
The judgments in Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius
Auto Industries Ltd.12 and Pernod Ricard (supra) clarify that, to
succeed in a claim of passing off, the plaintiff must demonstrate
accumulation of the requisite degree of goodwill and reputation by it,
in the asserted mark, prior to the adoption of the mark by the defendant.
40.
Therefore, we find it relevant to emphasise that passing off action
is not founded merely on priority of adoption, but on the existence of
protectable goodwill and reputation in the mark at the time when the
12 (2018) 2 SCC 1
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
rival enters the market. Only a trader who has, prior to the adoption by
the subsequent user, built up goodwill in the mark is entitled to restrain
such later user, even if the later user holds a statutory registration.
41.
Prior use, by itself, may operate as a defence under Section 34 of
the Trade Marks Act, in an action for infringement. However, the right
to maintain an action for passing off arises only upon proof of goodwill
and reputation attached to the mark.
42.
In our view, in the absence of an affirmative finding that such
goodwill existed in favour of the respondent prior to 29.08.2011, a
claim for passing off cannot be sustained.
43.
On being enquired about the findings on goodwill and reputation
of the respondent’s mark, learned Counsel for the respondent placed
reliance on paragraphs 19 and 20 of the impugned order reproduced
below, as well as on the material collected by the Local Commissioner.
Further, it was also contended that the learned Commercial Court in
addition also considered invoices, CA certificates and evidence of sales
and geographical spread, from which the finding of goodwill and
reputation in the mark “BONRICH” could be established. We, in this
regard, find ourselves compelled to quote paragraph 19 and 20 of the
impugned order, which inter alia states:
“19. Defendant has placed on record invoices and other documents
to establish its claim of prior user since the year 2007 by its
predecessor-in-interest i.e. the proprietorship firm and later on by
defendant w.e.f. 2011. Copies of VAT Registration Certificate,
Licenses and renewals issued in favour of Mr. Mukesh Kumar and
later on in favour of Defendant were placed on record. Defendant
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
relied upon Certificate issued by CA certifying the sales figures of
BONRICH by proprietorship firm of Mr. Mukesh Kumar from 20072008 to 2010-2011 dated 20.01.2023 as well as certifying the sales
figures of BONRICH by defendant from 2011-2012 to 2021-2022
dated 20.01.2023. Copies of invoices issued by defendant’s claimed
predecessor Marx Remedies for BONRICH products w.e.f. year
2007 till 07.01.2010 and copies of invoices issued by defendant for
BONRICH products from 24.02.2010 to 07.01.2023 were also
placed on record. Photocopies of some invoices alongwith computer
generated invoices issued by manufacturer namely COSMAS
PHARMACLS of claimed predecessor of defendant as well as
defendant for BONRICH products from 2007 to 2020 were also
placed on record. Printout of Stock Register of Defendant’s claimed
predecessor and Defendant from 01.10.2007 to 19.01.2023 with
regard to manufacture and sale of BONRICH products was placed
on record.
20. In terms of Certificate issued by Chartered Accountant, sales
figures for BONRICH from 2007-2008 to 2010-2011 were Rs.
25,73,072/-. For the years 2011-2012, till the year 2021-2022, sales
figures were Rs. 1,05,36,401/-. Invoices placed on record reflect the
sales pertaining to year 2007 onwards in Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Bangalore, Guwahati, Goa, Jodhpur, Mumbai,
Kerala, Haryana, U.P., Jharkhand etc., substantiating the
contention of Ld. counsel for defendant with regard to Pan India
presence of products of defendant.”
44.
Upon a plain reading of the aforesaid paragraphs, it is clear that
the learned Commercial Court merely took note of the documents
produced and recorded the figures reflected therein, including sales of
about Rs. 25.73 lakhs for the period 2007–2011 and higher figures
thereafter.
45.
We find that the impugned order goes no further than cataloguing
the documents placed on record. The learned commercial court does not
analyse whether, and in what manner, such figures translated into the
acquisition of goodwill or reputation in the market for the mark
“BONRICH” in Class 05 during the relevant period.
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
46.
Additionally, the learned Commercial Court did not undertake
the necessary inquiry to determine whether the respondent had, in fact,
acquired such goodwill and reputation in the mark prior to the
appellant’s adoption before granting an injunction.
47.
Therefore, even if the respondent’s sales figures and documents
are taken at face value, in the absence of a specific finding by the
learned Commercial Court that such material demonstrated goodwill
and reputation in the mark “BONRICH” in favour of the respondent
before 29.08.2011, the foundational requirement for sustaining a claim
of passing off remains unfulfilled.
48.
Thus, in the absence of any prima facie findings on goodwill or
reputation as held in Pernod Ricard (supra), we deem it appropriate to
interfere in the present case because we feel that the impugned order
erred on the established principle of law, while granting an injunction
in favour of the respondent.
49.
Accordingly, the view adopted by the learned Commercial Court
is erroneous when tested on the anvil of the aforesaid established
jurisprudence of granting a stay in a passing off suit. We have no doubt
in our mind that the error made on principle needs to be corrected. Thus,
the impugned order deserves interference and the application of the
respondent filed with its counterclaim seeking an interlocutory
injunction is dismissed.
50.
The impugned order, to the extent it grants an interim injunction
in favour of the respondent and against the appellant, is hereby quashed
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
and set aside.
51.
The appeals are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.
52.
We hereby clarify that the observations made hereinabove are
prima facie in nature and shall not in any manner influence the trial.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 13, 2026/rjd/pa
Signed By:RAJEEV FAO (COMM) 159/2024 and connected matter
DHANKHAR
17:22:38
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review