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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT
SHIMLA
CMP(M) No. 2219 of 2025
Reserved on:
28.10.2026
Date of decision: 03.11.2026
Date of uploading on website:
03.11.2026
________________________________________________
Kaushalya Devi
…..Applicant.
Versus
Land Acquisition Collector (Railways) & others
…..Non-applicants.
______________________________________________
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
________________________________________________
For the applicant:
Mr. Ajay Sharma, Sr. Advocate,
with Mr. Atharv Sharma,
Advocate.
For non-applicants No. 1&2:
Mr. Manoj Chauhan, Additional
Advocate General.
For non-applicant No. 3:
Mr. Avinash Jaryal,
Panel Counsel.
Senior
Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
The instant application has been filed by the
applicant-Smt. Kaushalya Devi, who was petitioner before
the learned Reference Court (hereinafter referred to as “the
applicant”), under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act,
1963 (for short “the Act”) seeking condonation of delay in
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
filing the accompanying appeal under Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, against award, dated 12.03.2019, in
LAC Petition RBT No. 42/5/2003, passed by learned
Additional
District
Judge-II,
Una,
District
Una,
H.P.
(hereinafter referred to as “the learned Reference Court”),
with a prayer to modify the impugned award and to grant
interest @ 9% per annum for the first year and @ 15% per
annum for the remaining period from the date of taking
possession till its payment.
2.
As per the applicant, after passing of the
impugned award, dated 12.03.2019, she had preferred a
petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on
09.08.2019, which was registered as CMP(O) No. 429 of
2019 and it was decided on 18.08.2025.
Thereafter, the
applicant had filed an application for obtaining certified copy
of the decision on 26.08.2025, which was attested on
29.08.2025, as such a delay of six years seven months and
15 days occurred in filing the accompanying appeal.
The
applicant further averred in her application that the delay,
which occurred in filing the accompanying appeal, was
bonafide and it occurred owing to the fact that remedy in the
wrong court was being pursued by her. She prayed that the
delay in filing the accompanying appeal be condoned and
the appeal be heard and decided on merits to secure the
ends of justice.
3.
Non-applicants No. 1 and 2 contested the
application by filing reply, wherein it was averred that the
instant application is not maintainable, as the same does not
disclose any sufficient cause for condonation of delay. On
merits it was averred that applicant had filed an appeal
before this Court against award dated 12.03.2019, passed by
the learned Trial Court, beyond the limitation period of 30
days. Moreover, filing a case before a wrong forum by the
applicant, due to her own negligence or ignorance of law
does not amount to good faith. The applicant had preferred
the instant appeal before this Court after a lapse of more
than six years, thus the delay in filing the same cannot be
condoned. As per the replying non-applicants, there is no
meritorious question involved in the instant appeal.
The
replying non-applicants prayed for dismissal of the instant
application.
4.
Non-applicant No. 3 contested the application by
filing its separate reply, wherein it was averred that the
applicant had not mentioned the bonafide cause for
condonining the delay, moreover while disposing CMPMO
No. 429 of 2019, this Court had granted the permission to
withdraw the petition in accordance with law, therefore, the
cause of delay should not be accepted to condone the delay,
because the applicant remained silent for a long period of
time during the pendency of the matter and not even tried to
get her matter listed. The replying non-applicant prayed for
dismissal of the application.
5.
The applicant filed rejoinders to the replies filed
by the non-applicants, wherein she reiterated the averments
made in her application and refuted the stand taken by the
non-applicants.
6.
I have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the
applicant, learned Additional Advocate General for nonapplicants No. 1 and 2 and learned Senior Panel Counsel for
non-applicant No. 3 and carefully examined the entire
records.
7.
Learned
Senior
Counsel
for
the
applicant
contended that the delay is bonafide and, in fact the same
has occurred owing to the fact that the remedy in wrong
Court was being pursued by the applicant and if the delay is
not condoned the meritorious case of the applicant will be
buried under the technicalities of law.
8.
Conversely, the learned Additional Advocate
General for non-applicants No. 1 & 2/State and learned
Senior Panel Counsel for non-applicant No. 3 contended that
no satisfactory explanation has been given by the applicant
for condoning the delay, as such the application deserves to
be dismissed.
9.
It is a settled position of law that every case is to
be decided considering the facts and circumstances of that
case only and there cannot be a straitjacket formula or rule
either for condonation of delay or to reject the condonation.
The only requirement for condonation of delay is that
whether there is 'sufficient cause' for the litigant not to initiate
the litigation in prescribed time of limitation. If sufficient cause
is shown, delay can be condoned and that term 'sufficient
cause' is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law
in a manner which sub-serves ends of justice and that there
cannot be hard and fast rule laid down for condonation of
delay. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
and Another vs. Mst. Katiji & ors., reported in (1987) 2
SCC 107 the term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by
the Apex Court to be adequately elastic to enable the courts
to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves
the ends of justice. The Apex Court in the particular case had
directed a liberal approach to be adopted on principle and
had observed that when substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred. He further
submits that there can be no presumption that delay is
occasioned
deliberately,
or
on
account
negligence, or on account of mala fides.
of
culpable
The relevant
portion of the judgment (supra) is reproduced as under:
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting section 5 of the Indian Limitation
Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters
on ‘merits’.
The expression “sufficient cause”
employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to
enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice-that
being the life-purpose for the existence of the
institution of courts. It is common knowledge that
this Court has been making a justifiably liberal
approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the
message does not appeal to have percolated down
to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a
liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is
realized that:
1.
Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2.
Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the
very threshold and cause of justice being
defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is
that a cause would be decided on merits
after hearing the parties.
3.
“Every day’s delay must be explained”
does not mean that a pedantic approach
should be made. Why not every hour’s
delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine
must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner.
4.
When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each
other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.
5.
There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of
mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he
runs a serious risk.
6.
It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its powers to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing
injustice and is expected to do so.”
…
10.
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
In the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. vs.
Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at
paragraph-12, it has been held that “sufficient cause" within
the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the
Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party.
The relevant portion of the judgment (supra) is
reproduced as under:
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient
cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or
Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar
provision should receive a liberal construction so as
to advance substantial justice when no negligence
or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation
furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not
will be dependent upon facts of each case. There
cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or
rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused
in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts
should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault
with the cause shown and reject the petition by a
slipshod order in over- jubilation of disposal drive.
Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the
rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be
imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand,
while considering the matter the courts should not
lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within
the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to
the other party which should not be lightly defeated
by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical
view of the matter the explanation furnished should
not be rejected when stakes are high and/or
arguable points of facts and law are involved in the
case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury
to the party against whom the lis terminates, either
by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of
such a party to have the decision on merit. While
considering the matter, courts have to strike a
balance between resultant effect of the order it is
going to pass upon the parties either way."
11.
As per the Judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & ors., reported in (2013)
12 SCC 649, that the term 'sufficient cause' should be
understand in proper spirit, since the term is basically elastic
and has to be applied in the proper perspective, that
substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical
considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis. The Apex Court had also held that the adherence
to strict proof should not affect public justice or cause public
mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so
that in the ultimate eventuate, there is no real failure of
justice. The Apex Court had also noticed the distinction
between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration of few
days and had observed that the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
12.
Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to
the effect that where a case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to
what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation and “sufficient cause" should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice The
Apex Court has time and again reiterated that there should
be a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach when
dealing with an application for condonation of delay and the
issue of limitation is to be taken liberally and not to be taken
in hyper technical manner.
13.
In the instant case, the impugned award was
passed on 12.03.2019 and after passing of the impugned
award, on 09.08.2019, a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India was filed by the applicant, which came
to be registered as CMPMO No. 429 of 2019 and the said
petition was decided on 18.08.2025.
Thereafter, the
applicant applied for the certified copy on 26.08.2025, which
was attested on 29.08.2025.
The perusal of the record
reveals that the delay has occurred on account of the fact
that the applicant was pursuing wrong remedy. Otherwise
also, the perusal of the impugned award reveals that the
applicant has got a very good case on merits, as the learned
Reference Court has not awarded statutory interest to the
applicant @ 9% per annum for the first year and thereafter @
15% per annum till the date of the payment/deposit of the
amount of compensation.
14.
In Inder Singh vs. The State of Madhya
Pradesh, 2025 SCC Online SC 600, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that if in a particular case, the merits have to be
examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of
limitation. The relevant para of the judgment (supra) is as
under:
"14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of
law that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient
cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in
mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits have to
be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the
basis of limitation.”
15.
Therefore, applying the law laid down by the
Apex Court to the facts of the present case, this court is
satisfied that the applicant has been able to render a
satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay, as
occurred in filing the present appeal. Although there might
be some weight in the submissions made by the learned
counsel/Senior Panel Counsel appearing for the nonapplicants that delay may not be condoned as a matter of
course in the present case, however, this Court finds that a
liberal approach and acceptance of the explanation given by
the applicant deserves to be considered. This Court is also
of the view that in case delay is not condoned, the same
would result in miscarriage of justice, as the applicants are
seeking modification of the impugned award only to the
extent that statutory interest @ 9% per annum for the first
year and thereafter @ 15% per annum from the date of the
award till the date of the payment/deposit of the amount of
the compensation, has not been awarded by the learned
Reference Court for which they are entitled under the statute.
16.
Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, the
present application is allowed and delay in filing the appeal is
condoned. Consequently, the Registry is directed to register
the instant appeal.
The application stands disposed of.
3rd November, 2026
(virender)
( Sushil Kukreja )
Judge
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