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2026:HHC:3000
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2903 of 2025
Reserved on: 01.01.2026
Date of Decision: 09.01.2026.
_____________________________________
Kashin Kashyap
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Sunil Kumar Banyal, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Mr. Lokender Kutlehira, Additional
Advocate
General,
for
the
respondent/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail, in FIR No.204 of 2025, dated 22.09.2025,
registered
for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 20,25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) at Police Station Sundernagar
District Mandi, H.P.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police party was on patrolling duty on 22.09.2025. They
intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No.UP16AX-2143. They
searched the vehicle in the presence of Kuldeep Kumar, Mukesh
Kumar and Constable Satish Kumar. The driver identified himself
as Divyansh Patel.
The person sitting beside him identified
himself Nakul Mittal and the persons sitting on the rear seat
identified themselves as Arnav Chauhan, Saksham Bharti and
Rohit Kumar. The police searched the vehicle and recovered a
backpack containing 1.174 kilograms of charas. The police
arrested the occupants of the vehicles and seized the charas. The
occupants named the petitioner as the person who had supplied
the charas. The allegations are false. The petitioner was added
after he was named by the co-accused. The petitioner was not
found in possession of any charas. The investigation is complete.
No recovery is to be made. No fruitful purpose would be served by
detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by
all the terms and conditions, which the Court may impose. Hence,
the petition.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party had set up a nakka at Pungh four-
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lane and were checking the vehicles on 22.09.2025.
They
intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. UP16AX-2143. The
driver and occupants of the vehicle got frightened after seeing the
police.
The police associated Kuldeep Kumar, Mukesh Kumar
Constable Satish Kumar as witnesses. The police inquired the
names of the occupants of the vehicle bearing registration No.
UP16AX-2143. The driver identified himself as Devyansh Patel,
the person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Nakul
Mittal and the persons sitting on the rear seat identified
themselves as Arnav Chauhan, Saksham Bharti and Rohit Kumar.
The police searched the vehicle and recovered a carry bag
containing 1.174 kilograms of charas. The police seized the charas
and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The charas was sent to
SFSL, Junga, and as per the report of analysis, it was confirmed to
be a sample of charas. The occupants revealed
during
interrogation that they had handed over ₹5000/- each to Kashin
Kashyap
(present
petitioner).
The
petitioner
had
also
accompanied the Co-accused on his motorcycle. They identified
the room where they had stayed at Kullu. The bank details of the
petitioner showed that an amount of ₹50,000/- was transferred
from the account of the petitioner’s mother. CCTV footage was
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also checked and petitioner was found with other occupants of
the vehicle. The police arrested the petitioner. The petitioner
made a disclosure statement that he could show the place where
he had purchased the charas.
He led the police to a bridge
constructed on Naulgari Nala at Lag valley. The bank account
detail of Rewat Ram also showed the receipt of ₹50,000/-. The
police arrested Rewat Ram, who confirmed that he had sold the
charas at a place mentioned by the petitioner. No other case has
been registered against the petitioner. The mobile phone of the
petitioner was found in the vehicle from which the recovery of
charas was made. The charas was meant for the sale to students.
The investigation is complete and challan is to be prepared.
Hence the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr. Sunil Kumar Banyal, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr. Sunil Kumar Banyal, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated based on the statement made by the co accused.
The petitioner is a student and has no criminal antecedents, The
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investigation is complete and no fruitful purpose would be served
by keeping the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State submitted that the petitioner is
a drug peddler. He had abetted the possession of charas by his coaccused. The charas was meant for sale to students. No leniency
should be shown to the petitioner. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
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liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of
the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
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public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself)
as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always
be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant
of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
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60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought
to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
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(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by
reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the
vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration
must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature
of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail,
except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating
other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or
intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who
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seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
Perusal of the status report shows that the petitioner
was not travelling in the vehicle from which the recovery was
made. The police connected the petitioner to the commission of
crime based on the statement
made by co-accused and
the
financial transaction between him and Rewat Ram. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra
Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361:
2019 SCC OnLine SC 588 that a statement made by a co-accused
during the investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. and cannot
be used as a piece of evidence. It was also held that the confession
made by the co-accused is inadmissible under Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page 568: 44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the FIR,
and therefore, the accused in the eye of the law, can indeed
be questioned, and the statement is taken by the police
ofÏcer. A confession that is made to a police ofÏcer would
be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the
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Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section
24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A
confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala
Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor,
1939 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47]
and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an
admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This,
however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a
statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a
statement contains an admission, the statement being one
under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar
under Section 162 CrPC.”
12.
Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs
Intelligence OfÏcer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC
271 that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be taken as a
substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and can
only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus
State of Tamil Nadu 2021 (4) SCC 1 that a confession made to a
police ofÏcer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act and is not saved by the provisions of Section
67 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by the
prosecution from the confessional statement made by the coaccused implicating the petitioner.
A similar situation arose before this Court in Dinesh
Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564, and it was
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held that a confession of the co-accused and the phone calls are
not sufÏcient to deny bail to a person.
14.
It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of
Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211 that where the police
have no material except the call details record and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, the petitioner cannot be kept in
custody. It was observed: “[16] In the facts of the instant case also the prosecution,
for implicating the petitioner, relies upon firstly the
confessional statement made by accused Dabe Ram and
secondly the CDR details of calls exchanged between the
petitioner and the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking
into consideration the evidence with respect to the
availability of CDR details involving the phone number of
the petitioner and the mobile phone number of the wife of
co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered the
existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and
had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the
conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
[17] Since the existence of CDR details of accused person(s)
has not been considered as a circumstance sufÏcient to
hold a prima facie case against the accused person(s), in
Pallulabid Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is of the view
that petitioner has made out a case for maintainability of
his successive bail application as also for grant of bail in his
favour.
[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to
have been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure
made by the co-accused cannot be read against the
petitioner as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme
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Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1.
Further, on the basis of the aforesaid elucidation, the
petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of bail.
15.
A similar view was taken by this Court in Dabe Ram vs.
State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 1894 of 2023, decided on 01.09.2023,
Parvesh Saini vs State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 2355 of 2023, decided on
06.10.2023 and Relu Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 1061 of
2023, decided on 15.05.2023.
16.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot be detained in
custody based on a statement made by the co-accused or the
confession made by him, as they are not legally admissible.
17.
The police have relied upon the financial transaction
between Rewat Ram and the petitioner; this is not sufÏcient. It
was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Amal E vs State of Kerala
2023:KER:39393 that financial transactions are not sufÏcient to
connect the accused with the commission of crime. It was
observed:
“From the perusal of the case records, it can be seen that,
apart from the aforesaid transactions, there is nothing to
show the involvement of the petitioners. It is true that the
documents indicate the monetary transactions between the
petitioners and some of the accused persons, but the
question that arises is whether the said transactions were
in connection with the sale of Narcotic drugs. To establish
the same, apart from the confession statements of the
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accused, there is nothing. However, as it is an aspect to be
established during the trial, I do not intend to enter into
any finding at this stage, but the said aspect is sufÏcient to
record the satisfaction of the conditions contemplated
under section 37 of the NDPS Act, as the lack of such
materials evokes a reasonable doubt as to the involvement
of the petitioner.”
18.
A heavy reliance was placed on the petitioner’s
disclosure of the place where he had purchased the charas from
Rewat Ram. This disclosure will not assist the prosecution. It is
undisputed that no recovery was effected pursuant to the
petitioner’s disclosure statement. It was laid down in Gajrani vs.
Emperor, AIR 1933 Allahabad 394, that where the disclosure of the
place from where the accused had purchased something does not
lead to the discovery of any fact. It was observed:
“We do not consider that the pointing out of the shop in
this statement can be held to amount to the discovery of a
fact, and consequently, we do not consider that this
evidence is admissible under Section 27, Evidence Act.”
19.
Similarly, in H.P. Administration vs. Om Parkash, AIR
1972 SC 975, the accused pointed out the witness from whom he
had purchased the dagger. This was held to be outside the purview
of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed:
“12. Thereafter, on the information furnished by the
accused that he had purchased the weapon from Ganga
Singh, P. W. 11, and that he would take them to him, they
went to the thari of P. W. 11, where the accused pointed him
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out to them. It is contended that the information given by
the accused that he purchased the dagger from P. W. 11,
followed by his leading the police to his thari and pointing
him out, is inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act. In our view, there is a force in this contention. A fact
discovered within the meaning of Section 27 must refer to
a material fact to which the information directly relates. To
render the information admissible, the fact discovered
must be relevant and must have been such that it
constitutes the information through which the discovery
was made. What is the fact discovered in this case? Not the
dagger, but the dagger hidden under the stone, which is
not known to the police. (See Pulukuri Kottaya v. KingEmperor, 74 Ind App 65 = (AIR 1947 PC 67). But thereafter,
can it be said that the information furnished by the accused
that he purchased the dagger from P. W. 11 led to a fact
discovered when the accused took the police to the thari of
P. W. 11 and pointed him out. A single Bench of the Madras
High Court in Public Prosecutor v. India China Lingiah, AIR
1954 Mad 433, and In re Vellingiri, AIR 1950 Mad 613, seems
to have taken the view that the information by an accused
leading to the discovery of a witness to whom he had given
stolen articles is a discovery of a fact within the meaning of
Section 27. In Emperor v. Ramanuja Ayyanger, AIR 1935 Mad
528 a full Bench of three Judges by a majority held that the
statement of the accused "I purchased the mattress from
this shop and it was this Woman (another witness) that
carried the mattress" as proved by the witness who visited
him with the police was admissible because the word 'fact'
is not restricted to something which can be exhibited as a
material object. This judgement was before Pulukuri
Kattaya's case, when, as far as the Presidency of Madras
was concerned law laid down by the Full Bench of the
Court, In Re Athappa Goundan, ILR (1937) Mad 695 = (AIR
1937 Mad 618) prevailed. It held that where the accused's
statement connects the fact discovered with the offence
and makes it relevant, even though the statement amounts
to a confession of the offence. It must be admitted because
it is what has led directly to the discovery. This view was
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overruled by the Privy Council in Pulukari Kottaya's case,
and this Court had approved the Privy Council case in
Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of Bombay, (1955)
1 SCR 903 = (AIR 1955 SC 104).
13. In the Full Bench Judgment of Seven Judges in Sukhan v.
The Crown, ILR 10 Lah 283 = (AIR 1929 Lah 344) (FB) which
was approved by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotaya's case,
74 Ind App 65 = (AIR 1947 PC 67) Shadi Lal C.J, as he then
was speaking for the majority pointed out that the
expression 'fact' as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act
includes not only the physical fact which can be perceived
by the senses but also the psychological fact or mental
condition of which any person is conscious and that it is in
the former sense that the word used by the Legislature
refers to material and not to a mental fact. It is clear,
therefore, that what should be discovered is the material
fact, and the information that is admissible is that which
has caused that discovery to connect the information and
the fact with each other as cause and effect.' That
information, which does not distinctly connect with the
fact discovered, or that portion of the information, which
merely explains the material thing discovered, is not
admissible under Section 27 and cannot be proved. As
explained by this Court as well as by the Privy Council,
normally Section 27 is brought into operation where a
person in police custody produces from some place of
concealment some object said to be connected with the
crime of which the informant is the accused. The
concealment of the fact, which is not known to the police,
is what is discovered by the information and lends
assurance that the information was true. No witness with
whom some material fact, such as the weapon of murder,
stolen property or other incriminating article is not
hidden, sold or kept and which is unknown to the police,
can be said to be discovered as a consequence of the
information furnished by the accused. These examples,
however, are only by way of illustration and are exhaustive.
What makes the information leading to the discovery of the
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witness admissible is the discovery from him of the thing
sold to him, hidden, or kept with him, which the police did
not know until the information was furnished to them by
the accused. A witness cannot be said to be discovered if
nothing is to be found or recovered from him as a
consequence of the information furnished by the accused,
and the information that disclosed the identity of the
witness will not be admissible.
20.
It was held in State of Maharashtra Versus Damu
Gopinath Shinde, AIR 2000 S.C. 169, that where the statement of
the accused did not lead to the discovery of any fact, the same is
not admissible. It was observed:“The information permitted to be admitted in evidence is
confined to that portion of the information which
'distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered." But the
information to get admissibility need not be so truncated
as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of
the information admitted should be consistent with
understandability. In this case, the fact discovered by P.W.
44 is that A-3 Mukinda Thorat had carried the dead body of
Dipak to the spot on the motorcycle.
38. How particular information led to the discovery of the
fact? No doubt, the recovery of the dead body of Dipak from
the same canal was antecedent to the information, which
P.W. 44 obtained. If nothing more was recovered pursuant to
and subsequent to obtaining the information from the accused,
there would not have been any discovery of any fact at all. But
when the broken glass piece was recovered from that spot,
and that piece was found to be part of the tail lamp of the
motorcycle of A-2 Guruji, it can safely be held that the
Investigating OfÏcer discovered the fact that A-2 Guruji
had carried the dead body on that particular motorcycle up
to the spot.” (Emphasis supplied)
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21.
In the present case, nothing was recovered pursuant to
the statement made by the petitioner; therefore, the statement is,
prima facie, inadmissible.
22.
The police also relied upon the fact that the petitioner
and co-accused were found together in the CCTV footage and the
petitioner’s mobile phone was found in the car from which the
recovery was effected. The mere fact that the petitioner was with
the co-accused before the incident or his mobile phone was found
in the vehicle are not sufÏcient to connect the petitioner with the
possession of contraband or its abetment. The petitioner is a
classmate of the occupants of the vehicle and his presence with
the co-accused or the recovery of his mobile phone will not
connect him to the commission of crime.
23.
The investigation is complete and no fruitful purpose
would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.
The
petitioner is a student and keeping him behind the bars would
adversely affect his studies.
24.
In view of above, there is insufÏcient material on
record to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime.
Hence, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is
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ordered to be released on bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds
in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to
the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the
petitioner will abide by the following conditions: -
25.
(I)
The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will
he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.
(II)
The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III)
The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the
Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
(IV)
The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the
Court; and
(V)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social
media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide
by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court
through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of
any change in the mobile number or social media
accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court
within five days from the date of the change.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
26.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the District Jail Superintendent, Mandi, District
Mandi, H.P., and the learned Trial Court through FASTER.
2026:HHC:3000
27.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case's merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
9th January, 2026
(ravinder)
CHANDER
SHEKHAR
CHANDER
SHEKHAR
Date: 2026.01.09
16:11:15 +0530
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