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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF JULY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.5955 OF 2025 (KPIDFA)
C/W
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.6511 OF 2025 (KPIDFA)
WRIT PETITION NO.38115 OF 2025 (GM-DRT)
IN MFA No.5955/2025
BETWEEN:
SRI. BYRANNA
S/O. LATE PUTTAIAH
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
R/AT YENTAGANAHALLI VILLAGE
KASABA HOBLI
NELAMANGALA TALUK
BENGALURU-562 123
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. SAMPATH A., ADVOCATE)
Digitally
signed by
AND:
PAVITHRA
N
1. COMPETENT AUTHORITY FOR
Location:
High Court
M/S. YELLOW EXPRESS LOGISTICS LTD.
of Karnataka
REP. BY ITS COMPETENT AUTHORITY
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
DODDABALLAPURA SUB-DIVISION
DODDABALLAPURA
SMT. DURGA SREE N.
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS
2.
M/S. YELLOW EXPRESS LOGISTICS LTD.
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT:
-2-
JAKKASANDRA
KASABA HOBLI
NELAMANGALA TALUK
BENGALURU-562 123.
REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
SRI JOJU THOMAS
AGED MAJOR
R/AT NO.68, 3RD CROSS
NANDANA NAGAR NEAR
ESKAY HOSPITAL
SHETTIHALLI
BENGALURU-560 015
3.
SMT. GEETHA C. L.
W/O LATE CHIKKANASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
R/AT NO.18
VTC YENTAGANAHALLI POST
NELAMANGALA
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562 123
4.
PAWAN C.
S/O CHIKKANNASWAMY P. Y.
AGED ABOUT 18 YEARS
R/AT NO.3,
2ND MAIN 2ND CROSS
KAMAKSHIPALYA
BENGALURU NORTH
BENGALURU-560 079
5.
MS. HARSHITA C.
D/O CHIKKANNASWAMY
AGED AOBUT 8 YEARS
R/AT NO.3,
2ND MAIN, 2ND CROSS
KAMAKSHIPALYA
NEAR MARUTHINAGAR
BENGALURU NORTH
BENGALURU-560 079
SINCE RESPONDENT NO.5 IS A MINOR
REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER
-3-
SMT. GEETHA C. L. - RESPONDENT NO.3
(AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 02.06.2026)
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE FOR R1)
THIS MFA IS FILED
UNDER
SECTION
OF THE
KARNATAKA PROTECTION OF INTEREST OF DEPOSITORS IN
FINANCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS ACT, 2004, AGAINST THE ORDER
DATED 04.03.2025 PASSED IN MISC.NO.1430/2024 ON THE
FILE OF THE XCI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE FOR KPIDFE CASES, BENGALURU
(CCH-92),
ALLOWING THE PETITION FILED U/S.5(2) OF THE
KARNATAKA PROTECTION OF INTEREST OF DEPOSITORS IN
FINANCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS ACT, 2004.
IN MFA NO. 6511/2025
BETWEEN:
SRI CHIKKANNASWAMY
S/O LATE PUTTAIAH
(DIED ON 01/05/2021)
SMT. GEETHA C. L.
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
W/O LATE CHIKKANNASWAMY
R/AT YENTAGANAHALLI VILLAGE
KASBA HOBLI
NELAMANGALA TALUK
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562 123
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. NAGESH S., ADV.)
AND:
1.
THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY FOR
M/S. YELLOW EXPRESS LOGISTICS LTD.
-4-
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPETENT AUTHORITY
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
DODDABALLAPURA SUB-DIVISION
DODDABALLAPURA
SMT. DURGASHREE N.
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
2.
M/S YELLOW EXPRESS LOGISTICS LTD.
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE
AT JAKKASANDRA, KASABA HOBLI
NELAMANGALA TALUK
BENGALURU-562 123
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
SRI JOJU THOMAS
AGED MAJOR
R/AT NO.68, 3RD CROSS
NANDANA NAGAR
NEAR ESKAY HOSPITAL, SHETTIHALLI
BENGALURU-560 015
3.
SRI BYRANNA
S/O LATE PUTTAIAH
AGED MAJOR
YENTAGANAHALLI VILLAGE
KASABA HOBLI
NELAMANGALA TALUK
BENGALURU-562 123
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE FOR R1)
THIS MFA IS FILED
UNDER
SECTION
OF THE
KARNATAKA PROTECTION OF INTEREST OF DEPOSITORS IN
FINANCIAL
ESTABLISHMENTS
ACT,
AGAINST
THE ORDER
DATED 04.03.2025 PASSED IN MISC.NO.1430/2024 ON THE
FILE OF THE XCI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE FOR KPIDFE CASES, BENGALURU
(CCH-92),
ALLOWING THE PETITIONS FILED U/S.5(2) OF THE
-5-
KARNATAKA PROTECTION OF INTEREST OF DEPOSITORS IN
FINANCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS ACT, 2004.
IN WP NO. 38115/2025
BETWEEN:
KARNATAKA BANK LIMITED
HAVING ITS HEAD OFFICE AT
P.B.NO.599, MAHAVEERA CIRCLE
KANKANADY
MANGALURU-575 002
HAVING BRANCH OFFICE AT
HSR LAYOUT, 031, SHREYAS ARCADE
1031, 24TH MAIN RD,
1ST SECTOR, HSR LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 102
REP. BY ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SRIRANGA S., SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SMT. SUMANA NAGANAND, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
ROOM NO.558, M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
2.
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
DODDABALLAPURA SUB-DIVISION
NELAMANGALA TALUK
DODDABALLAPURA
KARNATAKA-561 203
3.
MRS. DADDABYLAMMA
AGED MAJOR
RESIDING AT NELAMANGALA TALUK
-6-
YENTIGANAHALLI
BENGALURU-562 123
4.
MR. BYARANNA
AGED MAJOR
RESIDING AT NELAMANGALA TALUK
YENTIGANAHALLI
BENGALURU-562 123
5.
MRS. CHIKKANNASWAMY
AGED MAJOR
RESIDING AT NELAMANGALA TALUK
YENTIGANAHALLI
BENGALURU-562 123
6.
M/S. YELLOW EXPRESS LOGISTICS LIMITED
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
JAKKASANDRA, KASABA HOBLI
NELAMANGALA-562 123
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR R1 & R2;
SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE FOR IMPLEADING ON
IA-1/2026)
THIS
WP
IS
FILED
UNDER
ARTICLE
OF
THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS OR ANY OTHER WRIT, ORDER, OR DIRECTION
DIRECTING RESPONDENT NO.2 TO REMOVE THE SEIZED
VEHICLES IN THE SCHEDULE PROPERTY AND ETC.
THESE APPEALS AND PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD
AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 24.06.2026 AND COMING
ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU
SIVARAMAN J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
-7-
CORAM:
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)
Miscellaneous
6511/2025
are
First
filed
Appeals
challenging
No.5955/2025
the
Order
and
dated
04.03.2025 passed by the XCI Additional City Civil and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-92) ('Special Court' for
short) in Misc.No.1430/2024.
Writ Petition No.38115/2025 is filed seeking the
following reliefs:"a.
Issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ,
order, or direction directing Respondent No.2 to
remove the seized vehicles in the Schedule
Property;
b.
Issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ,
order, or direction directing Respondent No.2 to
consider the representations dated 26.09.2024
(Annexure 'L');
c.
Declare that the action of Respondent No.2 in
not removing the seized vehicles in Schedule
Property is illegal and arbitrary;
d.
Issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ,
order, or direction directing Respondent No.2 to
-8-
auction the vehicles in the Schedule Property as
directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat,
(2002) 10 SCC 283."
2.
We have heard Shri. Sriranga S, learned senior
counsel as instructed by Smt. Sumana Naganand, learned
counsel appearing for the writ petitioner; Shri. Sampath A,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant in MFA
No.5955/2025
and
Shri.
Nagesh
S,
learned
counsel
appearing for the appellant in MFA No.6511/2025; Shri.
Veeresh
R.
Budihal,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
respondent No.1 in both the Miscellaneous First Appeals
and for the impleading applicant in IA No.1/2026 in the
writ petition and Shri. Vikas Rojipura, learned Additional
Government Advocate, appearing for respondents No.1
and 2 in the writ petition.
3.
For the sake of convenience, the parties are
referred to as per their rankings before the Special Court.
4.
The brief facts of the case are as follows:-
M/s. Yellow Express Logistics Limited ('Company' for
short) is a Company incorporated under the Companies
-9-
Act, 2013. The Company entered into a registered Lease
Deed dated 02.11.2018 with the appellants, Shri. Byranna
and Shri. Chikkannaswamy, the joint owners of the
schedule property, whereby the property was leased to the
Company for a period of ten years at a monthly rent of
Rs.6,07,500/-, subject to a lock-in period of two years and
the Company paid a security deposit of Rs.60,75,000/-.
The Company had accepted the deposits from the
public, which it was unable to repay. Consequently,
several
FIRs
were
registered
against
the
persons
associated with the Company. The Government issued an
interim order of attachment under Section 3(2) of the
Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial
Establishments Act, 2004, ('KPIDFE Act' for short) by
Notification
dated
04.03.2024.
The
interim
order
of
attachment was published in the Official Gazette on
04.03.2024 and thereafter published in two newspapers,
namely, 'The Hindu' and 'Vijayavani' on 15.03.2024. The
order of attachment was also affixed at a conspicuous
place on the schedule property and a mahazar was drawn
to that effect.
- 10 -
The
under
Competent
Section
Authority
7(1)
of
instituted
the
proceedings
KPIDFE
Act
in
Misc.No.789/2024, which was allowed on 09.07.2024.
Relying upon the said order, the Competent Authority filed
the petition on 09.12.2024 under Section 5(2) of the
KPIDFE
Act
seeking
to
make
the
interim
order
of
attachment absolute with a delay of 228 days.
5.
The Special Court held that, in the absence of
an express bar on the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 or any prescribed consequence for
delay under Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act, the limitation
period is directory in nature and, considering the interests
of innocent depositors, condoned the delay of 228 days in
filing the petition. Further, the Special Court held that, as
respondents No.2 and 3 had received a security deposit of
Rs.60,75,000/- under the Lease Deed and the assets of
the Company were insufficient to satisfy the claims of the
depositors, the leasehold property was liable to be
proceeded against in terms of Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE
Act. The Special Court also observed that it was not the
- 11 -
case of respondents No.2 and 3 that there were sufficient
assets with the Company to satisfy the claims of the
depositors. Accordingly, the petition was allowed on
04.03.2025, and by exercising powers under Section 12(4)
of the KPIDFE Act, the Special Court made the interim
attachment absolute to the extent of Rs.60,75,000/- with
interest
at
6%
per
annum
from
07.12.2024
until
realisation. The Special Court further directed respondents
No.2 and 3 to deposit the amount within two months to
secure release of the attached property and in default,
authorised the Competent Authority to sell the attached
property through e-auction and distribute the proceeds
among the depositors in accordance with law.
6.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
in MFA No.5955/2025 contends that the impugned order is
vitiated in law, as it was passed against respondent No.2,
Late Shri. Chikkannaswamy, who had admittedly expired
on 01.05.2021, despite the Special Court recording that
the notice issued to him had been refused. It is contended
that once respondent No.2 had died prior to the institution
- 12 -
of the proceedings, there could have been no valid service
or refusal of notice upon him and the proceedings initiated
and continued without impleading his legal representatives
are void and unsustainable in law.
7.
It is further contended that the attachment
could not have been made absolute since the appellants
had entered into a valid Lease Agreement with the
Company. The Company was in substantial arrears of rent
and therefore the security deposit paid under the lease
was liable to be appropriated towards the outstanding rent
dues to the appellants. It is further contended that the
amount paid as security deposit cannot be treated as a
deposit as per Section 2(2) of the KPIDFE Act, particularly,
when the appellant also falls within the class of persons
entitled to protection as a depositor under the KPIDFE Act.
Further, without first proceeding against the personal and
other assets of the Company, the action of attaching the
appellants' property is contrary to the provisions of the
KPIDFE Act. In any event, the property does not belong to
the
Company
and
therefore,
its
attachment
is
- 13 -
unsustainable in law. It is also contended that there was
an inordinate delay in filing the petition and no satisfactory
reasons were assigned and that the appellants deserve an
opportunity to contest the case before the Special Court.
8.
in
MFA
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
No.5955/2025
has
relied
on
the
following
decisions:•
Sri Srikanth M N v. The Competent Authority
For Sri Gurusarvabhauma Souharda Credit Cooperative Limited, Bengaluru and Additional
Regional Commissioner Office of the Regional
Commissioner and Another, by Judgment dated
16.05.2024
passed
in
MFA
No.2982/2024
(KPIDFA);
•
M/s. The Karntiveera Sangolli Rayanna Urban
Co-operative Society Limited and Another v.
The
Competent
Karntiveera
Authority
Sangolli
For
M/s.
The
Rayanna
Urban
Co-
operative Society Limited by Judgment dated
17.01.2025
passed
in
MFA
No.8493/2022
(KPIDFA); and
• Sri Shankar Venkappa Naikar and Another v.
The
Competent
Regional
Authority
Commissioner
For
and
Additional
S.M.N
Credit
Souharda Sahakari Niyamitha, Vijayapura and
- 14 -
Others, by Judgment dated 10.07.2025 passed in
MFA No.3694/2025 (KPIDFA).
9.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
in MFA No.6511/2025 contends that the suit schedule
properties are ancestral and joint family properties jointly
owned and enjoyed by the family members. Late Shri.
Chikkannaswamy, as the manager and Karta of the joint
family, secured loans for construction of a godown,
utilising the lease income and other joint family resources
for repayment of liabilities. Following the death of Shri.
Puttaiah in the year 2017 and the subsequent demise of
Late Shri. Chikkannaswamy on 01.05.2021, the legal heirs
assumed management of the family affairs and continued
to utilise the lease proceeds for the benefit of the joint
family and discharge of liabilities.
10.
It is further contended that the legal heirs came
to know of the impugned order only in August 2025. The
impugned order is vitiated in law, having been passed
against a deceased person without bringing his legal
representatives on record and without affording them an
opportunity of hearing. The appellant had no knowledge of
- 15 -
the proceedings or the alleged liabilities of the Company,
and there was no occasion for service or refusal of
summons by the deceased. It is further contended that,
the leased property forms part of the schedule properties
involved in the pending partition suit. It is further
contended that the Karnataka Bank had also issued a sale
notice in the year 2023 in respect of the schedule
property. Despite these material facts, the Competent
Authority proceeded against deceased persons without
impleading their legal representatives and obtained the
impugned order.
11.
in
MFA
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
No.6511/2025
has
relied
on
the
following
decisions:•
The Income Tax Officer and Another v. Smt.
Preethi V by Judgment dated 22.01.2025 passed
in Writ Appeal No.1407/2024 (T-IT), and
•
Rampratab
Brijmohandas
v.
Gavrishankar
Kashiram reported in LAWS(PVC)-1922-9-23.
12.
No.1
-
The learned counsel appearing for respondent
Competent
Authority,
contends
that
the
- 16 -
proceedings before the Special Court were instituted and
respondents No.2 and 3 therein were placed ex parte only
upon their failure to appear and contest the matter. The
mere fact that an order is ex parte does not render it
illegal or void, particularly when the Special Court, acting
within its statutory jurisdiction under the KPIDFE Act,
proceeded on the basis of the pleadings and materials
placed before it to protect the interests of depositors. It is
further contended that the KPIDFE Act is a welfare
legislation intended to provide expeditious and effective
remedies against fraudulent financial establishments, and
permitting parties to frustrate proceedings through nonparticipation would defeat the legislative object and
prejudice the claims of innocent depositors. Respondents
No.2 and 3 therein had every opportunity to enter
appearance, file objections, and contest the alleged nexus
between the attached property and the depositors' funds,
but failed to do so and cannot now complain of denial of
opportunity. It is further contended that no substantial
prejudice has been demonstrated by respondents No.2
and 3 therein, particularly when they have admitted the
- 17 -
receipt of the lease security deposit and have not disputed
the existence or validity of the lease transaction.
13.
The Competent Authority also relies upon the
fact that the attachment Notification was duly published in
newspapers and affixed on the schedule property, thereby
providing
adequate
public
notice
and
enabling
any
interested person to approach the Special Court. As
regards the appellants' prayer for reopening of the
proceedings on the ground of improper service, it is
contended the fact that one of the respondents had died
prior to service does not confer an automatic right to
reopen concluded proceedings. It is further contended that
reopening proceedings under the KPIDFE Act can be
permitted only in exceptional circumstances, which is
absent in the present case, as the appellants herein have
not disclosed any bona fide defence. It is emphasised that
any remand or reopening at this stage would prejudice the
interests of
depositors and undermine the statutory
scheme, particularly when the appellants herein have
- 18 -
failed to demonstrate any substantive defence or actual
prejudice.
14.
It is further contended that the assets of the
Company are about Rs.9.80 crores, whereas the liability
towards the gullible depositors stands at Rs.41.66 crores.
It is further contended that the question with regard to the
applicability of the Limitation Act to proceedings of a
Special Court has already been decided by this Court in
the
case
of
Smt.
Yashoda
and
Others
v.
The
Competent Authority and Another passed in MFA
No.380/2025
(KPIDFA)
by
Judgment
dated
20.01.2026 and it has been held that the power of the
Special Court to condone the delay, applying Section 5 of
the Limitation Act is unaffected by the timeline as provided
in Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act.
15.
The learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.1 has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court
in the case of Krishna Swaroop Agarwal (Dead) THR.
LR. v. Arvind Kumar, by Judgment dated 16.07.2025
passed in Civil Appeal No.9518/2025.
- 19 -
16.
The learned senior counsel appearing for the
writ petitioner submits that the writ petitioner, a scheduled
Commercial
Bank,
had
sanctioned
a
term
loan
of
Rs.8,00,00,000/- to respondents No.3 to 5 on 02.01.2019,
secured by an assignment of lease rentals payable by
respondent No.6 - Company and by an equitable mortgage
over properties bearing Survey No.89 and 94/8 situated at
Yantaganahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Nelamangala. Upon
default in repayment, the loan account was classified as a
Non-Performing Asset on 29.02.2020, whereupon the writ
petitioner initiated proceedings under the Securitisation
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002 ('SARFAESI Act') and obtained
orders for taking possession of the secured assets. It is
submitted that repeated e-auction attempts conducted
between January 2023 and July 2024 failed due to the
presence of 159 vehicles belonging to the Financial
Establishment on the schedule property. Respondent No.6,
which was engaged in the business of car rentals, became
the subject matter of criminal proceedings in Crime
- 20 -
No.143/2019
involving
allegations
of
unauthorised
acceptance of deposits, pursuant to which the Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, by
order dated 18.02.2022, directed the Investigating Officer
to hand over custody of the seized vehicles to respondent
No.2 - Competent Authority under the provisions of the
Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019
('BUDS
Act'
for
short).
Although
the
vehicles
were
inventoried and formally handed over to respondent No.2
on 30.03.2022, respondent No.2 has allegedly failed to
remove or otherwise deal with the said vehicles.
17.
The learned senior counsel appearing for the
writ petitioner contends that, as the secured creditor and
mortgagee of the schedule property, the writ petitioner is
entitled to enforce its security interest and realise its dues
in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. It
is contended that the continued presence of the 159
vehicles
on
the
schedule
property
has
effectively
prevented the writ petitioner from conducting a successful
auction of the mortgaged property and recovering the
- 21 -
outstanding
dues.
It
is
further
contended
that,
notwithstanding the order dated 18.02.2022, directing
transfer of custody of the seized vehicles to respondent
No.2 and the formal handover effected on 30.03.2022,
respondent No.2 has failed to remove, dispose of, or
otherwise deal with the vehicles in accordance with law.
18.
The learned senior counsel appearing for the
writ petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v.
State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 10 SCC 283, to
contend that in the said judgment, directions were issued
for the expeditious disposal of seized properties, the
continued retention of the vehicles on the schedule
property amounts to unauthorised interference with the
writ
petitioner's
rights
as
a
secured
creditor
and
mortgagee.
19.
It is further contended that the Bank is ready
and willing to pay the entire amounts which are found to
be due from the appellants, with interest, on condition that
attachment may be lifted and the secured properties may
- 22 -
be released so that the Bank can proceed in accordance
with law under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.
20.
We have considered the contentions advanced.
Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act provides for issuance of an
order by publishing in the Official Gazette, attaching the
money or property believed to have been acquired by the
Financial Establishment in its own name, or in the name of
any other person from and out of deposits collected by the
Financial Establishment. Where such property is not
sufficient for repayment of the deposits, such other
property of the Financial Establishment or the personal
assets of promoters, partners, or other persons related to
the establishment can also be attached.
It is clear that
what is contemplated under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE
Act is only an order of interim attachment of money or
property which is "believed to have been acquired" by the
Financial Establishment or the personal assets of its
Directors etc. The said provisional attachment can be
made absolute only after following the procedure under
Section 5 of the KPIDFE Act.
- 23 -
21.
Further,
Section
of
the
KPIDFE
Act
contemplates an application to be made by the competent
authority under the Act before the Special Court to make
the order of attachment, absolute. It also contemplates a
consideration of objections by any person having an
interest in the property. Section 11 of the KPIDFE Act
provides for the powers of the Special Court regarding
realisation of assets and payment to depositors.
Section
12 of the KPIDFE Act provides for consideration of
objections by persons claiming an interest in the attached
property.
22.
Further, Section
12(3)
of
the KPIDFE Act
specifically provides that any person claiming an interest
in the property attached or any portion thereof may,
notwithstanding that no notice has been served upon him
under this Section, make an objection, as aforesaid, to the
Special Court at any time before an order is passed under
sub-Section (4) or sub-Section (6).
- 24 -
23.
It is clear that the KPIDFE Act is an enactment
intended to provide for protection of interest of gullible
depositors in Financial Establishments. It is a regulatory
and penal statute and has to be construed specifically as
such, so that the purpose of the enactment can be given
effect to.
24.
Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act provides a
period of 30 days from the date of the order made under
Section 3 of the KPIDFE Act for the competent authority to
apply to the Special Court for making the order of
attachment absolute. A proviso has been added to subSection 5(2) by the Karnataka Act No.06 of 2021,
providing as follows:"Provided that, the Secretary to Government,
Revenue Department, may on the request of the
Competent Authority, extend this period by another
fifteen days in cases having valid reasons and based on
the merits of the case."
25.
The contention urged by the learned counsel
appearing for the appellants is that the petition filed by the
Competent Authority under Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act
- 25 -
was barred by limitation and that the Special Court lacked
jurisdiction to condone the delay of 228 days. It is
contended that the proviso to Section 5(2) specifically
empowers only the Secretary to the Government, Revenue
Department, to extend the period of limitation by a further
period of 30 days and, therefore, the provisions of Section
5 of the Limitation Act stand excluded.
26.
The question as to whether the Special Court
constituted under Section 10 of the KPIDFE Act possesses
the power to condone delay by applying Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is no longer res integra. This Court in Smt.
Yashoda's case (supra), after considering the provisions
of the KPIDFE Act and the Limitation Act, has categorically
held that the Special Court constituted under Section 10 of
the KPIDFE Act is a Court for the purposes of the
Limitation Act and that, in the absence of an express
exclusion, the power of the Special Court to condone delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act remains unaffected
by the period prescribed under Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE
Act. It was further held that the power conferred on the
- 26 -
Government to extend the period of limitation does not, by
itself, exclude the jurisdiction of the Special Court to
condone the delay.
27.
Further,
in
Sri.
N.
Shivprasad
v.
The
Competent Authority and Another passed in MFA
No.2959/2023 (KPIDFA) by order dated 09.03.2026,
this Court has held as follows:"17.
The Special Court is constituted under
Section 10 of the KPIDFE Act. Such Court is clearly a
"Court" for the application of the Limitation Act. As
such, the Special Court exercises its power under
Section 5 of the KPIDFE Act by virtue of its status as a
Court. The time period provided under the Act and the
power provided to the Government to extend the time
for a period of 15 days thereafter cannot therefore, be
construed as limiting the powers of the Special Court
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the instant
case, the delay in filing the application under Section
5(2) of the KPIDFE Act had been condoned by a
separate order which is not under challenge before us.
In any view of the matter, the contention that a delay
cannot be condoned cannot be accepted by this
Court."
28.
In the said circumstances, we are of the
considered view that the Special Court was justified in
- 27 -
condoning the delay of 228 days in filing the petition under
Section 5(2) of the KPIDFE Act.
29.
The
further
ground
raised
is
that
the
attachment under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act was
against a dead person and was therefore non est in law.
The learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 has
relied on several decisions to contend that it is not in all
circumstances that an order passed against a dead person
becomes invalid.
In Smt. Lila Vati Bai v. State of
Bombay reported in 1957 AIR SC 521, the Apex Court
has clearly held that an order cannot be said to be
unenforceable only because it was directed against a dead
person in all proceedings. Where the order is not the one
in the nature of an order in judicial proceedings and is
administrative in nature, the order will not be rendered
non est only on account of the fact that it is passed
against a dead person. In Savithri Ammal v. State of
Tamil Nadu reported in (2006) 3 MLJ 389 and Tmt
Leelavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2008) 5
MLJ 1063, the Madras High Court had considered the
- 28 -
contention that a Notification issued under Section 4(1) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against a dead person
vitiates the proceedings. It was held that it is true that as
a general principle of law, proceedings against dead
persons are null and void but the principle is not without
exception. It was held that where the proceedings are
against the property and the name of the person recorded
in the Record of Rights is mentioned in the Notification,
the contention that the acquisition is bad in law in respect
of the property, cannot be accepted.
30.
In the instant case, the order of attachment is
passed as against the property. The order is notified and
duly published. The copy of the order is also affixed on all
the
properties
Thereafter,
an
which
are
opportunity
subject
to
attachment.
is
to
any
given
person
interested in the property or any part thereof to show
cause as to why the order of attachment shall not be made
absolute.
- 29 -
31.
In the above circumstances, it is clear that no
prejudice has been caused to the appellants by virtue of
an administrative order of attachment having been passed
as against the property in question. In the scheme of the
KPIDFE Act, the initial attachment is only a temporary
attachment. Once the application under Section 5 of the
KPIDFE Act is preferred before the Special Court, there is a
clear opportunity provided under Section 12(3) of the
KPIDFE Act to any person interested in any of the attached
properties, or having a right in the same, to approach the
Special Court and show cause as to why the attachment
shall not be made absolute.
If sufficient cause can be
shown by the persons having an interest in the property or
portions
thereof,
the
attachment
cannot
be
made
absolute.
32.
Further, in the light of the provisions of the
KPIDFE Act and the intentions of the Act, we are of the
clear
opinion
that
the
contention
that
the
entire
proceedings are bad on account of the fact that the initial
order of temporary attachment had been issued as against
- 30 -
a dead person, cannot be accepted. As rightly contended
by the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1,
relying on the decisions of the Apex Court, it is not in
every situation that legal proceedings against a dead
person become invalid.
33.
The contention that the security deposit paid
under the Lease Deed was liable to be appropriated
towards the alleged arrears of rent due from the Company
also cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the appellants had
received a sum of Rs.60,75,000/- from the Company
under the registered Lease Deed dated 02.11.2018. The
existence of any claim arising out of the contractual
relationship between the parties to the lease cannot
override the statutory proceedings initiated under the
KPIDFE Act for the protection of depositors.
Further, no
material is placed on record before the Special Court or
even before this Court in support of the contention that
there were arrears of rent due from the Company to the
lessor.
- 31 -
34.
The further contention that the lease security
deposit cannot be treated as a "deposit" within the
meaning
of
the
KPIDFE
Act
is
misconceived.
The
proceedings have not proceeded on the basis that the
lease security deposit itself constitutes a "deposit" under
the KPIDFE Act. The attachment has been effected on the
premise that the amount paid by the Company under the
lease
transaction
constitutes
property
liable
to
be
proceeded against under Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act,
particularly when the assets of the Financial Establishment
are found to be insufficient to satisfy the claims of the
depositors. The status of the appellants, if any, as
claimants or depositors of the Financial Establishment
would not create protection against proceedings under
Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act nor confer priority over
other depositors.
35.
We also find no merit in the contention that the
Competent Authority ought to have first realised the
assets of the Company before proceeding against the
attached property. Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE Act enables
- 32 -
attachment of money or property believed to have been
acquired by the Financial Establishment and also other
properties where the available assets are insufficient to
satisfy the claims of depositors. The finding of the Special
Court that the assets of the Company were insufficient to
satisfy the claims of depositors has not been shown to be
either
perverse
or
unsupported
by
material.
The
contention that the attached property does not belong to
the Company is also of no assistance, since Section 3(2) of
the KPIDFE Act permits attachment of property believed to
have been acquired by the Financial Establishment in its
own name or in the name of any other person and, where
such property is insufficient, such other properties as may
be attached in accordance with Section 3(2) of the KPIDFE
Act.
36.
The contention urged on behalf of the appellant
in MFA No.6511/2025 that the schedule properties are
ancestral and joint family properties and that a partition
suit is pending in respect thereof also cannot assist the
appellants. The pendency of civil proceedings relating to
- 33 -
inter se rights of family members cannot operate as a bar
to the exercise of statutory jurisdiction under the KPIDFE
Act. Similarly, the fact that Karnataka Bank had initiated
recovery proceedings in respect of the schedule property
does not render the attachment proceedings invalid.
Questions relating to priority, if any, between competing
claims over the property do not arise for consideration in
the
present
demonstrated
proceedings.
The
either
jurisdictional
any
appellants
have
error
or
not
any
perversity in the findings recorded by the Special Court
warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
37.
Having regard to the object and purpose of the
KPIDFE Act and the facts noticed above, we are of the
considered opinion that no ground is made out for
interference with the order passed by the Special Court.
Accordingly, Miscellaneous First Appeals No.5955/2025
and
6511/2025
dismissed.
fail
and
the
same
are
accordingly
- 34 -
We notice that repeated opportunities have been
given to the appellants in MFA to pay the amount of
Rs.60,75,000/- with interest to release the property from
the attachment. The learned senior counsel appearing for
the Karnataka Bank has raised clear contentions that the
property is a secured asset against which the Bank has
already initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act and
that the Bank is ready to make the entire payment due
from the appellants with interest. Considering the said
contentions against the backdrop of the facts of this case,
we are of the opinion that the said prayer is liable to be
granted.
Accordingly, there will be a direction that in case the
Bank pays the entire money due from the appellants with
interest at contractual rates, the attachment shall be lifted
and the Bank shall be free to proceed in accordance with
law treating the schedule property as a secured asset. The
seized vehicles which are kept in the schedule property
shall be removed by respondent No.2 within a period of
four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this
- 35 -
judgment.
Accordingly,
the
writ
petition
shall
stand
disposed of.
All pending interlocutory applications shall stand
disposed of.
Sd/(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
cp*
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