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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 14th August, 2026
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CNR No. DLHC016225132015
W.P.(C) 4661/2016
KANHAYA LAL
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Navin Kumar, Ms. Prakriti Priya,
Mr. Sahil Javed and Ms. Nikita,
Advocates.
versus
NATIONAL BAL BHAWAN & ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. S. Rajappa, Mr. R. Gowrishankar
and Mr. G. Dhivyasri, Advocates for
R-1 & 2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):
1.
The present petition arises from disciplinary proceedings initiated
against Kanhaya Lal in 2004, which culminated in the imposition of a
penalty after his retirement. An appeal preferred against the said penalty was
rejected as time-barred on 24th September, 2005. During the pendency of the
present petition, Kanhaya Lal died and his legal representatives were
brought on record. The surviving grievance is principally directed against
the findings returned in the departmental inquiry and, more particularly,
against the penalty imposed upon him, namely, permanent reduction of
pension by 50% coupled with denial of gratuity.
Factual Background
2.
Kanhaya Lal was serving as Officer Incharge (Training) and was also
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assigned charge of the Stores Section of National Bal Bhawan [“NBB”]. By
memorandum dated 29th January, 2004, two Articles of Charge were framed
against him. Article I concerned the procurement of stores from NAFED
during 2001 and 2002, while Article II concerned his failure to properly
scrutinize bills submitted by NCCF during 2003. Mr. V.S. Bhanot was
appointed as the Inquiry Officer on 24th February, 2004. He submitted his
report on 27th July, 2004. Of the seven constituent charges framed under the
two Articles of Charge, five were held proved and two were held not proved.
3.
A copy of the Inquiry Report was supplied to Kanhaya Lal on 28 th
July, 2004, and he submitted his representation on 3 rd September, 2004.
Kanhaya Lal retired on 31st July, 2004. The inquiry proceedings were
thereafter continued under Rule 9 of the Central Civil Services (Pension)
Rules, 1972 [“1972 Pension Rules”], the powers under which were vested in
the Board of Management of NBB under Rule 43 of its Service Bye-laws.
The Board considered the charges, the Inquiry Officer’s Report and
Kanhaya Lal’s defence at its meeting held on 19th March, 2005 and, by order
dated 9th April, 2005, directed that his pension be permanently reduced by
50% and that he be not entitled to any gratuity. The order records that the
Board of Management took the decision and directed that it be signed by Dr.
Madhu Pant, Member Secretary, for and on behalf of the Board.
4.
Kanhaya Lal thereafter preferred an appeal against the penalty order,
which was rejected as time-barred on 24th September, 2005. He challenged
the said rejection before this Court. By order dated 16 th September, 2010,
this Court set aside the earlier appellate order and permitted him to prefer a
fresh appeal before the competent authority. Pursuant thereto, Kanhaya Lal
preferred a fresh appeal, which was considered on merits and rejected by the
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Appellate Authority by order dated 8th April, 2015. The present writ petition
followed. The petition, inter alia, challenges the appellate order dated 8th
April, 2015, the Inquiry Report dated 27th July, 2004 and the penalty order
dated 9th April, 2005.
Contentions
5.
During the course of arguments, Mr. Navin Kumar, counsel for the
Petitioner, on instructions, did not press the challenge to the competence of
Dr. Madhu Pant to exercise disciplinary powers. The objections founded
upon her alleged lack of authority, therefore, do not require adjudication.
6.
Mr. Kumar confines the Petitioner’s challenge substantially to three
areas. First, the principal finding relating to document S-2 is said to rest on
conjecture rather than evidence. No witness, according to him, saw Kanhaya
Lal procure or fabricate S-2. Ms. Neelam Chawla herself had stated that,
although she found the document in her drawer, she did not know who had
placed it there. The absence of any criminal complaint alleging forgery is
also relied upon. Second, the proceedings are attacked as having been
coloured by the hostility of Dr. Madhu Pant, who, according to the
Petitioner, believed that Kanhaya Lal had played a part in the events which
resulted in her suspension and subsequent disciplinary proceedings against
her. Third, the punishment is said to be wholly out of proportion to what was
actually established in the inquiry, particularly when no quantified financial
loss or personal pecuniary gain has been proved.
7.
Mr. S. Rajappa, counsel for NBB, defends both the inquiry and the
penalty. He submits that judicial review of a disciplinary proceeding does
not permit a fresh appreciation of evidence. S-2 was denied as authentic by
NAFED; the Inquiry Officer found that Kanhaya Lal had acted upon the
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document, obtained approval for purchases from NAFED and thereafter
participated in purchases exceeding INR 45 lakhs. Mr. Rajappa also points
out that, on the advice of the CVC, major penalty proceedings were initiated
against other officers, including the then officiating Director and officiating
Deputy Director (Administration), and major penalties were imposed upon
them. The allegation that Kanhaya Lal alone was singled out is, therefore,
disputed.
Analysis
8.
There is no difficulty with the governing principle. A writ court does
not sit in appeal over a departmental inquiry. Where there is some evidence
upon which a reasonable disciplinary authority could reach the conclusion in
question, the adequacy of that evidence or the possibility of another view is
ordinarily outside the scope of judicial review. Interference remains
available where the finding rests on no evidence, is perverse, or proceeds
upon considerations which the record cannot sustain.1 It is against this
standard, and not by re-trying the charges, that the Inquiry Report must be
examined.
9.
Before turning to the principal objections, it is useful to place the
seven constituent charges, the Inquiry Officer’s findings, and this Court’s
assessment in one view:
Charge
Inquiry
Officer’s
finding
Article I(i): alleged fraudulent
Proved
procurement and use of S-2
Article I(ii): obtaining approval
Proved
on S-2 without safeguards or
This Court’s assessment
Sustainable on the cumulative
circumstances; not a case of ‘no
evidence’.
No ground for interference,
though the role of senior officers
B.C. Chaturvedi v. UOI & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 749.
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procurement restrictions
Article
I(iii):
large-scale
procurement from NAFED in Proved
disregard of financial procedure
Article I(iv): purchases without
formal orders or financial Not proved
sanction
Article I(v): alteration in Bill
No. 1804 from Rs. 950 to Rs. Proved
2,950
Article II(i): deficient scrutiny of
Proved
NCCF bills
Article
II(ii):
doubtful
Not proved
genuineness of NCCF invoices
10.
is relevant to penalty.
Sustainable as to irregular
procurement and procedural
breach; not, without more, as
proof of quantified loss or
personal gain.
No occasion to disturb the
finding.
Supported by contemporaneous
record.
Sustainable as a lapse in
scrutiny; ulterior motive cannot
be presumed.
No occasion to disturb the
finding.
Article I substantially turns on document S-2. It was a communication
purportedly issued on NAFED letterhead, but it bore no number, no date and
no designation of the person who had signed it. NAFED vide letter dated
23rd January, 2003 denied the authenticity of the document. The charge
against Kanhaya Lal, therefore, was not limited to his having processed an
irregular document. The gravamen was more serious: that he had
fraudulently procured and used S-2 to create an official basis for treating
NAFED as an authorised source for procurement by offices in Delhi.
11.
It is true that there was no direct witness who saw Kanhaya Lal
prepare S-2 or physically procure it; Ms. Neelam Chawla did not depose to
that effect. Her evidence was narrower. She stated that, sometime in MayJune 2001, Kanhaya Lal told her that purchases should thereafter be made
from NAFED and that approval of the higher authorities had already been
obtained. Later, when Dr. Madhu Pant questioned her in April 2002 about
the purchases from NAFED, she stated that Kanhaya Lal could explain
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them, since the orders had been placed at his instance. On returning to the
Stores Section, she found S-2 in her drawer. She also stated that she did not
know who had kept it there.
12.
If the matter had rested there, the finding on fraudulent procurement
would have been vulnerable. The Inquiry Officer, however, did not proceed
on that circumstance alone.
13.
Kanhaya Lal himself made the note dated 28 th March, 2001 on S-2.
The evidence before the Inquiry Officer also connected him with securing
approval for the purchases from NAFED, the subsequent supply orders and
processing of bills. Document D-6 showed a marked change in the pattern of
procurement: between 25th April, 2001 and 30th March, 2002, purchases
from NAFED amounted to INR 46,95,760 out of total purchases of INR
58,36,502, or approximately 80.5%. When asked how S-2 had reached him,
Kanhaya Lal stated that papers used to come from the Stores Section and
that S-2 “possibly” came along with other papers or files. It was upon this
set of circumstances that the Inquiry Officer held Article I(i) proved.
14.
Certain observations in the Inquiry Report, however, go beyond what
the evidence safely permits. The Inquiry Officer observed that, since S-2 had
been branded as forged by NAFED, it would have been “interesting” if
Kanhaya Lal had himself produced, as a defence witness, the person who
had delivered the document. The absence of such a witness was then used to
reinforce the conclusion against Kanhaya Lal. This comes close to shifting
the burden of proof, which at all times remained with the department. The
evidence of Ms. Neelam Chawla, in any event, did not establish who had
placed S-2 in her drawer. Similarly, the inference that the preference for
NAFED was “obviously for some financial gain” is unsupported by any
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proof of pecuniary benefit received by him. These observations cannot,
therefore, be treated as independent findings of personal enrichment or as
aggravating circumstances for the purpose of penalty.
15.
The overstatement in parts of the Inquiry Report does not, however,
reduce the finding on Article I(i) to a case of ‘no evidence’. Departmental
charges are tested on the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The appearance of S-2 in the Stores Section, its
subsequent use by Kanhaya Lal, the approval obtained for the NAFED
purchases, his role in the ensuing procurement, and the concentration of
purchases with NAFED together furnished material from which the Inquiry
Officer could reasonably draw the inference recorded. This Court cannot
substitute another view merely because the evidence was circumstantial.
16.
Article I(ii) also survives for substantially the same reason. Kanhaya
Lal’s explanation was that he was unfamiliar with the procurement rules and
that the approving authority ought independently to have scrutinised S-2.
The Inquiry Officer rejected that explanation in view of his position as Store
Incharge and the responsibilities attached to that position. At the same time,
the Report itself records that senior officers, including the then Officiating
Director, failed to notice the character of S-2. That circumstance may bear
upon the measure of penalty, but it does not efface the responsibility
attached to Kanhaya Lal’s own office.
17.
Article I(iii) requires a more careful separation of what is proved from
what is assumed. The charge alleged large-scale procurement from NAFED,
disregard of financial procedure, purchase at exorbitant rates and consequent
loss to NBB. The first two elements are sufficiently supported by the record.
D-6 placed the value of purchases from NAFED at INR 46,95,760. The
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Inquiry Officer also referred to supply orders signed by Kanhaya Lal, oral
directions attributed to him and his role in processing bills.
18.
The record is less satisfactory on the further allegation that the
purchases were, as a class, made at exorbitant rates or that the entire amount,
or any identified portion of it, represented financial loss. Kanhaya Lal had
specifically pointed out that payment of approximately INR 15 lakhs had
been stopped at the instance of Mr. J.K. Sharma, the then DD(A). The
Inquiry Report does not appear to undertake a transaction-wise comparison
of specifications, prevailing rates and amounts allegedly overpaid.
19.
The finding under Article I(iii) is therefore sustained only to this
extent: that procurement from NAFED was unusually large and was
undertaken in disregard of the prescribed financial procedure. The value of
purchases cannot, by itself, be treated as the quantum of loss. Nor does
procedural irregularity, without more, establish personal pecuniary gain.
These distinctions are material when the Court later examines the severity of
the pensionary consequence.
20.
Article I(v) stands on firmer documentary footing. Bill No. 1804
dated 25th March, 2002 contained an alteration by which the price of one
trunk appeared as INR 2,950 instead of INR 950. The Inquiry Officer found
that this resulted in an additional payment of INR 12,000. The record also
contains Kanhaya Lal’s letter dated 28th May, 2002 to NAFED stating:
“We confirm that the supply rate of one trunk i.e. Rs. 2950/- each charged
in your bill no. 1804 dated 25-3-2002 is correct and its payment has been
released to NAFED accordingly.”
21.
The stock entries were also found to have been made by Kanhaya Lal
himself. When asked why he had thereafter confirmed the rate of INR 2,950
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per trunk to NAFED, he stated that the case was old, he could not recollect
why the letter had been sent, and “there must have been some reference” to
which it was a reply. The Inquiry Officer was entitled to find that
explanation unsatisfactory. The documentary record, thus, is sufficient to
sustain Article I(v).
22.
Article II(i) concerned NCCF bills in which rates exceeded the MRP
and, in some instances, the specifications billed did not correspond with the
goods received. Kanhaya Lal maintained that excess charging was for NCCF
to explain and that discrepancies in the goods received ought to have been
noticed by the Store Keeper. The Inquiry Officer rejected that defence,
holding that scrutiny of the bills was part of his responsibility as Store
Incharge. The Disciplinary Authority, however, went further and attributed
an “ulterior motive” to the lapse, principally because Mr. P.K. Mohanty was
subsequently able to secure a substantial reduction in the rates from NCCF.
That circumstance may support the finding that the bills were not properly
scrutinised; it does not, without more, establish an improper motive.
23.
Articles I(iv) and II(ii) need not detain the Court. The Inquiry Officer
found no worthwhile evidence in support of the former and recorded that the
latter was still at the investigation stage. Both were held not proved, and the
penalty order did not reverse those findings. The objection based on absence
of a disagreement note in respect of these two charges is, therefore,
misconceived.
24.
Nor does the absence of a criminal prosecution for forgery alter the
position. A disciplinary proceeding is not dependent on a criminal trial and
is not governed by the criminal standard of proof. The relevant question is
whether the departmental findings have some evidentiary support. For the
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reasons already recorded, that threshold stands crossed.
25.
The allegation of personal bias against Dr. Madhu Pant requires
separate consideration, particularly because another disciplinary matter from
the same institution has since reached the Supreme Court.
26.
The Petitioner pleads that Dr. Madhu Pant believed Kanhaya Lal to
have sided with the then Chairperson, Ajay Singh, and to have been
instrumental in the events which led to her suspension. Reliance was placed
on Khazan Chand v. National Bal Bhawan & Ors.2, where this Court found
a likelihood of bias on the part of Dr. Madhu Pant and held that it was unfair
and legally impermissible for her to act as the Disciplinary Authority in
proceedings initiated against the petitioner.
27.
That matter thereafter reached the Supreme Court in National Bal
Bhawan & Anr. v. Khazan Chand & Ors3. The Supreme Court noted that
the Disciplinary Authority was the very person against whom Khazan Chand
had sent the letter in question and had also filed a writ petition. In these
circumstances, the Court held that the allegation of the Disciplinary
Authority carrying “ill will” against Khazan Chand could not be brushed
aside. The Court further observed that, where the person required to take the
final decision in the disciplinary proceeding had already been the subject of
serious allegations by the delinquent, the authorities ought to have been
mindful of not leaving any occasion for grievance, particularly when the
delinquent had expressed his lack of faith in that person. The Supreme Court
accordingly declined to interfere with the setting aside of the dismissal, but,
treating the defect as procedural and capable of correction, revived the
W.P.(C) 8711/2007, decided on 2nd August, 2004 (Delhi High Court).
Civil Appeal No. 4216/2026, decided on 6th April, 2026.
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disciplinary proceeding from the stage of consideration of the Inquiry
Report by a different Disciplinary Authority.
28.
The facts here are materially different. No contemporaneous
document has been shown in which Kanhaya Lal himself made allegations
against Dr. Pant which subsequently became the subject matter of
proceedings against him. The Staff Welfare Association material placed on
record bears, among others, the signatures of Banwari Lal and Khazan
Chand; it does not establish Kanhaya Lal as its author or signatory. More
importantly, after his retirement, the final order under Rule 9 was not
expressed to be the individual decision of Dr. Pant. It records that the Board
of Management considered the charges, the Inquiry Report and Kanhaya
Lal’s defence at its meeting held on 19th March, 2005 and itself decided the
penalty. Dr. Pant signed the order as Member Secretary “for and on behalf
of” the Board.
29.
There is no material from which the Court can conclude that the
collective decision of the Board was merely a device to give effect to an
individual decision already taken by Dr. Pant. The aforesaid decisions
cannot be read as holding that every disciplinary proceeding initiated during
her tenure was infected by bias. The objection, therefore, does not furnish a
ground to annul either the inquiry or the findings returned against Kanhaya
Lal.
30.
The challenge therefore narrows to the pensionary penalty. It is at this
stage that the impugned orders fall short.
31.
Rule 9, as it stood when the impugned order was passed, was both the
source and the limit of the power to interfere with pensionary benefits after
retirement. It authorised withholding or withdrawal of pension or gratuity, or
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both, but conditioned that power upon the pensioner being found, in
departmental or judicial proceedings, guilty of grave misconduct or
negligence during service. In D.V. Kapoor v. UOI & Ors.4, the Supreme
Court observed that the exercise of the power under Rule 9 is “hedged with
a condition precedent” that a finding must be recorded in departmental or
judicial proceedings that the pensioner is guilty of grave misconduct or
negligence in the discharge of his duties. The Court further observed that
pension is a statutory right and held that the measure of deprivation must be
“correlative to or commensurate with the gravity” of the grave misconduct
or irregularity.
32.
The Petitioner is therefore right in submitting that proof of some
misconduct does not, by itself, insulate a pensionary deprivation from
scrutiny. He is not, however, right in contending that the penalty order under
Rule 9 must be set aside merely because it does not employ the exact
expression “grave misconduct”.
33.
The requirement, however, is substantive and not one of terminology.
In Pandit D. Aher v. State of Maharashtra5, the Supreme Court reiterated
that what is necessary is a finding of misconduct “which is of grave nature
or misconduct involving negligence”. Where the delinquent has been found
guilty of such misconduct in the departmental inquiry, it is not necessary
that the final order should specifically mention “grave misconduct or
negligence”. The question, therefore, is whether the misconduct found
against the pensioner, read as a whole, is of the nature contemplated by Rule
9, and not whether the order reproduces the language of the Rule verbatim.
(1990) 4 SCC 314.
(2007) 1 SCC 445.
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34.
The penalty order dated 9th April, 2005 recites the Rule 9 standard and
then records that the Board found Kanhaya Lal guilty of “gross misconduct”
involving “serious irregularities”. That conclusion has to be read with the
findings which this Court has declined to disturb, particularly those
concerning S-2, disregard of procurement norms, Bill No. 1804 and
deficient scrutiny of NCCF bills. So read, the jurisdictional threshold cannot
be said to be absent merely because the Board used the word “gross” rather
than “grave”.
35.
There is also no merit in treating D.V. Kapoor as authority for the
proposition that gratuity could never be withheld under Rule 9. The decision
was concerned with Rule 9(1) as it then stood, under which the Court found
no provision empowering the President to withhold gratuity after retirement
as a measure of punishment. Rule 9(1) was subsequently substituted by
notification dated 23rd August, 1991 and, in its substituted form, expressly
empowered the President to withhold “pension or gratuity, or both”, in
whole or in part, subject to the conditions prescribed therein. Since the order
under consideration was passed in 2005, the power to deal with gratuity was
available under the Rule as it then stood.
36.
The difficulty, however, lies in the manner in which the consequence
was calibrated. After discussing the charges, the Board stated: “Sh. Lal
committed gross misconduct inasmuch as he indulged in serious
irregularities, as discussed above ... which resulted into sizeable financial
loss to N.B.B.” The operative part then reads: “considering the totality of the
circumstances, N.B.B. Board of Management ordered that pension of Sh. K.
Lal shall be reduced permanently by 50%. It was further ordered that he
shall not be entitled to any gratuity.” Between these two conclusions, the
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order supplies no reasoning for the measure chosen. It does not explain why
one-half of the pension had to be withheld, why the reduction had to operate
permanently, or why gratuity had to be denied in full in addition to that
permanent reduction.
37.
That omission is significant because “sizeable financial loss” was one
of the considerations used to characterise the misconduct. As noticed earlier,
the record establishes purchases of INR 46,95,760 from NAFED. It does not
establish that this entire amount, or any substantial portion of it, represented
loss. Nor does the Inquiry Report identify or quantify the loss arising from
the NAFED purchases. A specific additional payment of INR 12,000
emerges from the record concerning Bill No. 1804. Beyond that, the
material before the Court does not permit the value of purchases to be
transposed into the amount of loss.
38.
This distinction does not dilute the misconduct. It is settled that a
financial irregularity exposing the employer to financial risk constitutes
misconduct, and that penal action on proof of such misconduct cannot be
questioned merely because no actual pecuniary loss has been suffered. The
issue in the present case, however, arises at a different stage. The Board
itself treated “sizeable financial loss” as part of the gravity of the
misconduct while imposing a permanent 50% cut in pension together with
complete withholding of gratuity. Rule 9 leaves the authority to determine
the extent and duration of such deprivation. D.V. Kapoor requires that the
measure of deprivation be correlative to or commensurate with the gravity of
the misconduct established. The impugned order, however, does not disclose
how the Board moved from the misconduct proved to the particular measure
of deprivation it chose.
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39.
The Respondents, inter alia, rely upon B.C. Chaturvedi and State of
Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra6 to submit that the disciplinary
authority, having found misconduct proved, has the discretion to impose an
appropriate punishment having regard to the magnitude or gravity of the
misconduct, and that the Court should not ordinarily substitute its own view
as to the penalty. That principle is well settled. The disciplinary authority
and, where applicable, the appellate authority are the authorities entrusted
with the discretion to determine the appropriate punishment. Where the
punishment warrants judicial interference, the normal course is to direct the
disciplinary or appellate authority to reconsider the penalty, rather than for
the Court to substitute its own punishment.
40.
The present conclusion does not rest on the failure of one or two
charges, followed by conjecture about what punishment might otherwise
have been imposed. Articles I(iv) and II(ii) had already failed before the
Inquiry Officer and never formed part of the proved misconduct. Nor is the
Court treating the surviving misconduct as minor. The error lies in the later
and distinct exercise under Rule 9. A composite pensionary deprivation of
unusual severity was imposed on a factual premise which included “sizeable
financial loss” and other aggravating expressions, without identifying the
loss or explaining how the extent and duration of deprivation were chosen.
41.
It would be equally inappropriate for this Court to cure that defect by
fixing a different measure of deprivation. Whether the pension should be
reduced by 10%, 20% or 30%, and whether such reduction should operate
for a specified period or permanently, calls for an assessment which
ordinarily belongs to the competent authority. B.C. Chaturvedi permits
1962 SCC OnLine SC 106.
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judicial substitution of penalty only in exceptional and rare cases. This is not
one of them. The proper course is therefore to remit the matter for
reconsideration confined to the question of penalty.
42.
The Petitioner also sought parity with other officers involved in the
transactions and contended that the responsibility of the senior officers had
not been appropriately taken into account. The Appellate Authority records
that, on the advice of the CVC, major penalty proceedings were initiated
against Y.D. Mathur, the then Officiating Director, and J.K. Sharma, the
then Officiating Deputy Director (Administration), and that major penalties
were imposed upon them.
43.
Rajendra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.7 recognises that
the doctrine of equality applies even among persons found guilty, and that
parity among co-delinquents has to be maintained where they are involved
in the same incident and the punishment imposed does not correspond to
their respective involvement. The necessary factual foundation is missing
here. The actual penalty orders against Mr. Mathur and Mr. Sharma, the
charges proved against them, and their respective service positions have not
been placed before this Court. No finding of discriminatory punishment can,
therefore, be returned. The competent authority, however, is not precluded
from considering comparable departmental treatment if the relevant records
are available when the penalty is reconsidered.
44.
The objection concerning continuation of the proceedings after
retirement also fails. The proceedings had been instituted while Kanhaya Lal
was still in service. Rule 9 permits such departmental proceedings to
continue after retirement in the manner contemplated by the rule. D.V.
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Kapoor itself recognises the validity of such continuation.
45.
The objection founded on the absence of consultation with the UPSC
also does not succeed. Rule 43 of the NBB Service Bye-laws adopts the
pension scheme contained in the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and vests in the
Board of Management the powers which are exercisable by the President in
relation to Central Government employees. The question, therefore, is not
whether Rule 9 applies to NBB employees, but whether its provisions are to
be applied mechanically or with the institutional adaptations contemplated
by the NBB Service Bye-laws. In O.P. Gupta v. Delhi Vidyut Board &
Anr.8, this Court considered the same question in the context of an
autonomous body to which the CCS Pension Rules applied mutatis
mutandis. It held that the reference to the President had to be read as a
reference to the Board and, in that institutional setting, consultation with the
UPSC was not necessary before the Board passed the order under Rule 9.
The same reasoning applies here. Rule 43 of the NBB Service Bye-laws
vests the relevant powers of the President in the Board of Management, and
the penalty order records that the Board exercised those powers. The
absence of consultation with the UPSC, therefore, does not invalidate the
impugned order.
46.
The challenge based on non-supply of second-stage CVC advice also
does not take the matter further. The CVC, by OM No. 003/EDN/006 dated
2nd June, 2003, advised NBB that a penalty commensurate with the gravity
of the charges could be imposed upon Kanhaya Lal after finalisation of the
inquiry. The Appellate Authority specifically records that the CVC had not
(2013) 3 SCC 73.
2000 SCC OnLine Del 239.
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W.P.(C) 4661/2016
instructed NBB to seek second-stage advice in the case of Kanhaya Lal.
There is, therefore, no material before the Court to show that any subsequent
CVC opinion on the guilt or punishment of Kanhaya Lal was relied upon in
arriving at the impugned orders.
Conclusion and Directions
47.
The result is therefore limited. The inquiry and the findings of
misconduct
sustained
above
remain
undisturbed.
What
requires
reconsideration is only the measure of pensionary deprivation imposed
under Rule 9.
48.
Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed in the following terms:
(i)
The Inquiry Report dated 27th July, 2004 is not interfered with insofar
as it holds Articles I(i), I(ii), I(iii), I(v) and II(i) proved, subject to the
observations in this judgment concerning the extent of financial loss,
personal pecuniary gain, collusion and ulterior motive. Articles I(iv) and
II(ii) shall continue to stand not proved.
The order dated 9th April, 2005 is set aside only to the extent that it
(ii)
permanently reduces the pension of Kanhaya Lal by 50% and denies gratuity
in its entirety. The order dated 8th April, 2015 of the Appellate Authority
shall also stand set aside to the corresponding extent.
(iii)
The matter is remitted to the Appellate authority under the applicable
Service Bye-laws read with Rule 9 of the 1972 Pension Rules for a fresh
decision confined to the nature, extent and duration of the pensionary
consequence, if any.
(iv)
The authority shall proceed on the findings which survive this
judgment. It shall not treat the aggregate value of purchases from NAFED as
equivalent to pecuniary loss, nor shall personal financial gain, collusion or
Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
20:46:21
W.P.(C) 4661/2016
ulterior motive be assumed merely from the volume of procurement, unless
the existing record independently establishes such an aggravating
circumstance.
(v)
Since Kanhaya Lal has died during the pendency of this petition, his
legal representatives may, within three weeks from the date of this
judgment, submit a concise written representation confined to the question
of penalty. The findings of guilt shall not be reopened and no fresh inquiry
or recording of evidence shall take place.
(vi)
The Appellate authority shall pass a reasoned order within eight
weeks thereafter. In doing so, it shall separately consider the extent of
pension, the duration of any reduction or withdrawal, and the question of
gratuity rather than treating them as an indivisible consequence.
(vii) Any amount which becomes payable to the legal representatives as a
consequence of the fresh decision shall be released within six weeks of that
decision.
49.
The present petition, along with any pending application(s), stands
disposed of in the above terms.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
AUGUST 14, 2026/as
Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
20:46:21
W.P.(C) 4661/2016
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