Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:3001
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2905 of 2025
Reserved on: 1.1.2026
Date of Decision: 09.1.2026.
Kamlesh
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No
For the Petitioner
:
M/s B.L. Soni and Nitin Soni,
Advocates.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 30 of 2023, dated 20.9.2023,
registered at Police Station, Manali, District Kullu, H.P., for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act),
1985.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3001
2.
It has been asserted that as per the prosecution the
petitioner was found in possession of 5.70 kgs. of charas on
19.2.2023. The matter is pending since 1.5.2023. The statements
of four witnesses have been recorded and the matter is listed for
the prosecution’s evidence on 10.4.2026. Hence the petition.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 19.2.2023.
They reached Haripur College Curve at about 7.00 PM. They saw
a person walking on the road carrying a backpack. He was
looking over his shoulder. The police became suspicious and
apprehended him. The police called Ward Member Hotam Ram
and inquired about the name and address of the person. He
identified himself as Kamlesh. The police checked the backpack
and recovered 5.70 kilograms of charas. The police arrested the
petitioner and seized the charas. The charge sheet was filed
before the Court. Statements of four witnesses have been
recorded and the matter is listed for recording the statements of
three witnesses on 10.4.2026.
4.
I have heard M/s B.L. Soni and Nitin Soni, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
2026:HHC:3001
5.
Mr. B.L. Soni, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the report of the analysis shows that a
representative and homogenous sample was analyzed in the
laboratory. No representative or homogenous sample was drawn
in the present case and the whole bulk was sent to the laboratory
as per the prosecution. This report makes it doubtful that the
petitioner was found in possession of commercial quantity of
charas. There is a delay in the progress of trial and the petitioner
is entitled to bail on this ground as well. Hence, he prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
6.
Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the error in
the report of the analysis is clerical and will not take the case out
of the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner was
involved in the commission of a heinous offence involving the
commercial quantity of the charas. He has not satisfied the
requirement laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Hence,
he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
2026:HHC:3001
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant
interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only
traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into
the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which
2026:HHC:3001
suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while
on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes
on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of
evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is
therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis
supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on
the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment which
conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means
and standing of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the
larger interests of the public or State and similar other
considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the
purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is
a genuine case against the accused and that the
prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence
in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same
judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be
2026:HHC:3001
granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning,
this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,
but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in
a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An
order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be
sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of
bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter
being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary
from case to case. While placement of the accused in the
society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be
a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the
same should always be coupled with other circumstances
warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is
one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail —
the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance
of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on
the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that
although it is established that a court considering a bail
application cannot undertake a detailed examination of
evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the
case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application
of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court
granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
2026:HHC:3001
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to
be borne in mind while considering an application for
bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted
by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC
497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench
of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and
casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC
OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC
OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the
accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu
Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p.
511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose
sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an
2026:HHC:3001
accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case,
particularly, when the accusations may not be false,
frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as to enable a
court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must
be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the
nature of punishment that would follow a conviction
vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
The report of the analysis mentions that the FSL had
received 5.069 kilograms of the substance. The actual weight of
the exhibit was found to be 5.015 kilograms. This was the
quantity recovered by the police as per the status report. The
report reads that various scientific tests were conducted in the
laboratory with the exhibit stated as charas with representative
and homogenous sample. Since the quantity of the charas was
huge namely 5.015 kilograms, therefore, it was not possible to
analyse the whole of the charas and the analysis could have only
been carried out with a sample of the charas. Therefore,
mentioning representative and homogenous sample will not
2026:HHC:3001
mean that such a sample was received but that the analysis was
carried out with homogenous and representative sample. Thus
the report does not show that the petitioner was not found in
possession of the charas.
11.
The status report shows that the petitioner was
found in possession of 5.70 kilograms of charas. The exact
weight of the charas in the laboratory was found to be 5.015
kilograms after excluding the weight of poly packets. Thus, it
was a commercial quantity and rigours of Section 37 of NDPS Act
apply to the present case.
12.
Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an
offence involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be
satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an
offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It
reads as follows:
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19, section 24, or section
27A and also for offences involving commercial
2026:HHC:3001
quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond
unless–
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)
or any other law for the time being in force, on granting
of bail.”
13.
This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin& Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that
the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to
commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released. It was
observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special
provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of
certain offences enumerated under the said Section.
They are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
2026:HHC:3001
(4) offences involving a commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth
factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the
Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person
accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a
person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in
addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the
Cr.P.C. or any other enactment.
14.
(1)
The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the person is
not guilty of such an offence;
(2)
that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act.
In Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC
429, it has been elaborated as under: "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a
murder case, the accused commits the murder of
one or two persons, while those persons who are
dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in
causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to
the society; even if they are released temporarily, in
all probability, they would continue their nefarious
activities of trafÏcking and/or dealing in
intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the
2026:HHC:3001
large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court,
dealing with the contention with regard to
punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly
observed about the adverse effect of such activities
in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy. Union Territory of Goa,
(1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld
and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances into this
country and illegal trafÏcking in such drugs
and substances have led to drug addiction
among a sizeable section of the public,
particularly the adolescents and students of
both sexes and the menace has assumed
serious and alarming proportions in the
recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively
control and eradicate this proliferating and
booming devastating menace, causing
deleterious effects and a deadly impact on
society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom,
has made effective provisions by introducing
Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory
minimum imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs
flooding the market, Parliament has provided that
the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial unless
the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not
abiding by the aforesaid mandate while
2026:HHC:3001
ordering the release of the respondent
accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take
a holistic view of the harmful socioeconomic consequences and health hazards
which would accompany trafÏcking illegally
in dangerous drugs, the court should
implement the law in the spirit with which
Parliament, after due deliberation, has
amended."
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also
subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which
commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative
part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing
the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the
commission of an offence under the Act unless the two
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application, and the second is that the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these
two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail
operates.
21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires
the existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufÏcient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at
hand, the High Court seems to have completely
overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in
addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or
any other law for the time being in force, regulating the
grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail
under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
2026:HHC:3001
15.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the
grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19,
24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial
quantity are:
(i)
The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity
to oppose the application for bail; and
(ii)
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of
such an offence, and (b) he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of
this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv
Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505],
held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes
substantial probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this
reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufÏcient in themselves to justify the recording of
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the
offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difÏcult
2026:HHC:3001
to give an exact
“reasonable”.
definition
of
the
word
‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p.
2258 states that it would be unreasonable to
expect an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”.
Reason
varies
in
its
conclusions according to the idiosyncrasies
of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The
reasoning which built up the old scholastic
logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's
toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v.
Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497],
SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat)
(P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd.,
(1989) 1 SCC 532] ]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in
accordance with reason”. In the ultimate
analysis, it is a question of fact whether a
particular act is reasonable or not, which
depends on the circumstances in a given
situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn.
of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6
SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the
application for bail with reference to Section
37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a
finding of not guilty. It is for the limited
purpose essentially confined to the question
of releasing the accused on bail that the court
is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not
2026:HHC:3001
guilty and records its satisfaction about the
existence of such grounds. But the court has
not to consider the matter as if it is
pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and
recording a finding of not guilty.”(emphasis
supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High
Court and this Court are required to apply while granting
bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the accused has not committed an offence and
whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail.
Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the
NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug
trafÏcking in the country, stringent parameters for the
grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
16.
It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without
complying with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It
was observed:
4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing
the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person
accused of an offence involving commercial quantity
shall be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid
down therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public
prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the
bail application; and (ii) the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty
of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any
such offence while on bail.
15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is
reproduced hereinbelow:—
“37. Offences to be cognisable and nonbailable.-
2026:HHC:3001
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of
1974)(a) every offence punishable under this
Act shall be cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence
punishable for 2[offences under section 19
or section 24 or section 27A and also for
offences involving commercial quantity]
shall be released on bail or on his own
bond unless(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given
an
opportunity
to
oppose
the
application for such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor
opposes the application, the court is
satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on
bail.”
16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no
person accused of an offence involving trade in a
commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released
on bail unless the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of
such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
17.
It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga
Sailo, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without
considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was
observed:
2026:HHC:3001
“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position
that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while
considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to
ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)
(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:—
“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes
the application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.”
6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one
cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for
bringing the said enactment after repealing the thenexisting laws relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and
reasons given in the acts themselves read thus:—
“An act to consolidate and amend the law relating
to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for
the control and regulation of operations relating to
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to
provide for the forfeiture of property derived from,
or used in, illicit trafÏc in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, to implement the
provisions of the International Convention on
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for
matters connected therewith.”
In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the threejudge bench of this Court considered the provisions
under Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act, with regard to the expression
“reasonable grounds” used therein. This Court held
that it means something more than the prima facie
grounds and that it contemplates substantial and
probable causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was
held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the
2026:HHC:3001
provision would require the existence of such facts
and circumstances as are sufÏcient in themselves
to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence.
As relates to the twin conditions under Section
37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of such offence and, secondly,
he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail
it was held therein that they are cumulative and not
alternative. Satisfaction of the existence of those
twin conditions had to be based on the ‘reasonable
grounds’, as referred to above.
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by
this Court to be followed while considering an application
for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under
the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that
the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal
that the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not
only subject to the limitations contained under Section
439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to
the limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act.
Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions
thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would
operate.
8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the
consistent view of this Court that while considering the
application for bail made by an accused involved in an
offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring
the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is
impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for
granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be
avoided while passing orders on such applications.”
2026:HHC:3001
18.
In the present case, the prosecution has collected
sufÏcient material to ‘prima facie’ connect the petitioner with
the commission of the crime. There is nothing on record to
show that the petitioner would not indulge in the commission of
an offence if released on bail. Hence, he has not satisfied the
twin conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
19.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the
delay. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K.
Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the
prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions
laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: “17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A
conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing
the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and
antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
2026:HHC:3001
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the
discretion exercised by the High Court while considering
the grant of bail. However, offences involving a
commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct
statutory footing. Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on
the grant of bail and obligates the Court to record
satisfaction on the twin requirements noticed above, in
addition to the ordinary tests under the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
20.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the
recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but
the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities
2026:HHC:3001
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the
contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafÏcking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.”
21.
No other point was urged.
22.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
23.
The observations made here-in-above are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case's merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
9th January, 2026
(Chander)
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review