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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 09th January, 2026
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ARB.P. 1455/2025
KALPATARU PROJECTS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Arvind Nayar, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Ayush Agrawal, Mr. Vikrant
Bloria, Mr. Sushant Tomar, Dr. Sunil
Mittal, Mr. Amit Sagar, Mr. Amit
Kumar, Mr. Shubham Devrani, Mr.
Divyanshu Negi, Mr. Akshay Joshi
and Ms. Diksha Dadu, Advs.
Mob: 9711753862
Email: vikrant@Lcoaa.com
Versus
NORTHERN RAILWAY
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. P.S. Singh, CGSC, with Ms.
Minakshi Singh, Mr. Ashutosh Bharti
and Mr. Rajneesh K. Sharma, Advs.
Mob: 9810282890
Email: legalaxis.ps@gmail.com
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
MINI PUSHKARNA, J. (Oral):
1.
The present petition has been filed under Sections 11(4) read with
11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) filed
on behalf of Kalpataru Projects International Limited. The petition initially
sought appointment of the respondent’s nominee Arbitrator in terms of the
Arbitration Clause between the parties, however, at the time of hearing of
the petition, the petitioner has prayed for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator.
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2.
It is the case of the petitioner that in terms of the agreed procedure,
the petitioner by way of Notice of dispute dated 13th June, 2025, under
Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, nominated Justice (Retd.) Kamalkishore
Kapoorchandji Tated, Former Judge, High Court of Bombay as its nominee
Arbitrator. Since the respondent failed to appoint its nominee Arbitrator, the
present petition has been filed.
3.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that an
independent Arbitrator be appointed by this Court, and the Arbitral Tribunal
constituted by the Central Organisation for Railway Electrification
(“CORE”), for adjudication of disputes between the parties arising out of the
Engineering Procurement and Construction Agreement dated 25th February,
2021 (“Agreement”), be set aside.
4.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner raises objection as regards
the legality of the Arbitration Clause, i.e., Clause 24 of the Agreement
between the parties, which envisages three retired Railway Officers, not
below the grade JA, for the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. He submits
that the said Arbitration Clause is invalid, in view of the law laid down by
the Supreme Court.
5.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has justified
the terms of the Arbitration Clause as contained in the Agreement. He
submits that the present is not a case of unilateral appointment of Arbitrator,
since in the present case there is a three member Tribunal, and the petitioner
has a choice of choosing one nominee Arbitrator from the list of panel of
three names of retired Railway Officers.
6.
In response, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relies
upon the order dated 14th August, 2024, passed by the Supreme Court in SLP
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(C) 2777/2024, titled as “M/s. Kalpataru Projects International Limited
Versus Central Organisation for Railway Electrification & Anr.”, to submit
that disputes arising out of the same Agreement were referred to a Sole
Arbitrator, as appointed by the Supreme Court. He submits that a similar
order for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator be also passed by this Court.
7.
Having heard learned counsels for the parties, at the outset, this Court
notes that in the present case, the Arbitration Clause as contained in Article
24 of the Agreement dated 25th February, 2021, includes Clause 24.1, which
details the procedure for appointment of Arbitral Tribunal, and the same
reads as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
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8.
Perusal of the aforesaid Arbitration Clause shows that the same
envisages that the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three retired Railway
Officers, not below JA grade. For the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal,
the authority will recommend a panel of three names of retired Railway
Officers and the contractor is required to intimate in writing, two names
from the said list to the authority. Accordingly, the authority shall appoint at
least one of them as the contractor’s nominee. Further, the authority will
also simultaneously appoint the balance number of Arbitrators from the
panel approved by the authority, indicating the presiding Arbitrator from
amongst the three Arbitrators so appointed.
9.
Reference to the Arbitration Clause in the present case makes it
evident that the same is not in consonance with the Principle of
Independence and Impartiality of the Arbitrators. The aforesaid Arbitration
Clause falls foul of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, as the said Section
renders such a person ineligible for appointment as an Arbitrator, whose
relationship with the parties falls under any of the categories specified under
the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration Act. Retired employees of the
respondent fall under the category of ineligible persons for appointment as
an Arbitrator, in terms of the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration Act.
10.
It is also an undisputed position of law that a person, who is ineligible
for appointment as an Arbitrator in view of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration
Act, is disentitled from nominating another person as an Arbitrator. Thus, in
the case of Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and Another Versus HSCC
(India) Limited, (2020) 20 SCC 760, the Supreme Court dealt with a
situation where a person who was rendered ineligible in terms of Section
12(5) of the Arbitration Act, was making an appointment of Sole Arbitrator.
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The Supreme Court held that a person, who has an interest in the dispute or
its outcome, should not have the power to unilaterally appoint a Sole
Arbitrator. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in the said case, held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
21. But, in our view that has to be the logical deduction from TRF Ltd.
[TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engg. Projects Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 377 : (2017) 4
SCC (Civ) 72] Para 50 of the decision shows that this Court was
concerned with the issue, “whether the Managing Director, after
becoming ineligible by operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate
an arbitrator” The ineligibility referred to therein, was as a result of
operation of law, in that a person having an interest in the dispute or
in the outcome or decision thereof, must not only be ineligible to act
as an arbitrator but must also not be eligible to appoint anyone else
as an arbitrator and that such person cannot and should not have
any role in charting out any course to the dispute resolution by
having the power to appoint an arbitrator. The next sentences in the
paragraph, further show that cases where both the parties could
nominate respective arbitrators of their choice were found to be
completely a different situation. The reason is clear that whatever
advantage a party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its
choice would get counter-balanced by equal power with the other
party. But, in a case where only one party has a right to appoint a sole
arbitrator, its choice will always have an element of exclusivity in
determining or charting the course for dispute resolution. Naturally,
the person who has an interest in the outcome or decision of the
dispute must not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator. That
has to be taken as the essence of the amendments brought in by the
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016)
and recognised by the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Central Organization
for Railway Electrification Versus ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) Joint
Venture Company, (2025) 4 SCC 641, has held that composition of the
Arbitral Tribunal must be consistent with the mandatory standards laid down
under the Arbitration Act, and in case of a conflict, the mandatory
provisions of the Arbitration Act prevail over the Arbitration Agreement
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between the parties. It has further been laid down that Independence and
Impartiality of arbitral proceedings can be effectively enforced only if the
parties can participate equally at all stages of an arbitral process, including,
the stage of the appointment of Arbitrators. Thus, the Supreme Court has
held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
31. The above extract suggests that an arbitration agreement entered
into by the parties is subject to certain well-defined and mandatory
legal principles. For instance, Section 34(2)(a)(v) allows for refusal
of enforcement of arbitral awards if the composition of the Arbitral
Tribunal or arbitral procedure was not following the agreement of
the parties unless such agreement conflicts with the mandatory
provisions of the law. [Section 34(2)(a)(v), Arbitration Act. It
reads:“34. (2)(a)(v) the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this
Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or failing, such
agreement, was not in accordance with this Part;”] The composition
of the Arbitral Tribunal or the arbitral procedure must not only be
in accordance with the agreement of the parties but also be
consistent with the mandatory standards laid down under the
Arbitration Act. [Report of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law on the work of its Eighteenth Session (3-61985 to 21-6-1985) Supplement No. 17 (A/40/17) [290]. The Report
states:“290. As regards the standards set forth in the sub-paragraph,
it was understood that priority was accorded to the agreement of the
parties. However, where the agreement was in conflict with a
mandatory provision of “this Law” or where the parties had not made
an agreement on the procedural point at issue, the provisions of “this
Law”, whether mandatory or not, provided the standards against
which the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and the arbitral
procedure were to be measured.”] In case of a conflict, mandatory
provisions of the Arbitration Act prevail over the arbitration
agreement between the parties. [A/CN.9/246, para 135.]
32. Under the Arbitration Act, the mandatory provisions must be
deduced from their content. For instance, the use of the phrase
“unless otherwise agreed by the parties” is an indicator of the fact
that the provision is derogable because it gives priority to the
agreement of the parties. In contrast, the use of the word “shall” in a
provision is an indicator that the legislature intended to give it a
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mandatory effect. However, the use of “shall” is not the sole indicator
to determine the mandatory nature of a provision. The provision must
be interpreted by having regard to its text and the context to determine
its nature. [State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, 1960 SCC OnLine
SC 5, para 29 : AIR 1961 SC 751 : (1961) 2 SCR 679, para 29; Raza
Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur, 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 119, para 8]
xxx xxx xxx
67. Section 18 contains the principle of natural justice to give full
opportunity to parties to present their case. [Associate Builders v.
DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, para 30 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204; Srei
Infrastructure Finance Ltd. v. Tuff Drilling (P) Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC
470, para 16 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 156] In Union of India v. Vedanta
Ltd. [Union of India v. Vedanta Ltd., (2020) 10 SCC 1, para 121] ,
Indu Malhotra, J., writing for a three-Judge Bench, observed that the
“[f]air and equal treatment of the parties is a non-derogable and
mandatory provision, on which the entire edifice of the alternative
dispute resolution mechanism is based”. The purpose of Section 18 is
to give the arbitral process a semblance of judicial proceedings by
infusing the principles of equality and fairness. [Lord Mustill and
Stewart Boyd, Commercial Arbitration (2nd Edn., Butterworths, 2001)
p. 58.] The theoretical basis for this understanding stems from the fact
that arbitrators are authorities vested with powers to resolve disputes
under the law. [Ilias Bantekas, “Equal treatment of parties in
International Commercial Arbitration”, (2020) 69(4) International &
Comparative Law Quarterly 991, 992.]
68. The first part of Section 18 provides that “parties shall be treated
with equality”. The broad nature of the prescription has to be
complied with not only by the Arbitral Tribunals, but also by the
parties while giving expression to party autonomy. The principle has
to be followed in all procedural contexts of arbitral proceedings,
including the stage of appointment of arbitrators. [Fouchard
Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer
Law International, 1999) p. 465.] According to Peter Binder, the
principle of equal treatment of parties “means that no party may be
given preference in the arbitrator-selection process regardless of how
strong its bargaining power may be”. [Peter Binder, International
Commercial Arbitration and Conciliations in Uncitral Model Law
Jurisdictions, (2nd Edn., Sweet and Maxwell, 2005) p. 109.] Countries
such as Germany, [Section 1034(2) of the German Code of Civil
Procedure, 1877. It reads:“1034. Composition of the Arbitral
Tribunal.—(1) The parties are free to agree on the number of
arbitrators. Absent such agreement, the number of arbitrators is three.
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(2) If the arbitration agreement grants preponderant rights to one
party with regard to the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal, thus
placing the other party at a disadvantage, the latter part y may
request that the court appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators in
derogation from the appointment or appointments already made or in
derogation from the appointment procedure agreed. The application
is to be made no later than the expiry of two weeks after the party has
become aware of the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal. Section
1032(3) applies accordingly.”] the Netherlands, [ Article 1028(1) of
the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, 2003. It reads:“If the arbitration
agreement gives one of the parties a privileged position with regard to
the appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators, the other party may,
despite the method of appointment laid down in that agreement,
request the Provisional Relief Judge of the District Court within one
month after the commencement of the arbitration to appoint the
arbitrator or arbitrators. The other party shall be given an
opportunity to be heard. The provisions of Article 1027(4) shall apply
accordingly.”] Spain, [ Article 15(2), Spanish Arbitration Act, 2003.
It reads:“15. Appointment of arbitrators.—(1)
*
*
*2.
The parties are able to freely agree on the procedure for the
appointment of the arbitrators, provided that there is no violation of
the principle of equal treatment.”] and Estonia [Section 721(2),
Estonian Code of Civil Procedure. It reads:“(2) If an arbitral
agreement gives one of the parties, in the formation of an Arbitral
Tribunal, an economic or other advantage over the other party which
is materially damaging to the other party, such party may request that
the court appoint one arbitrator or several arbitrators differently from
the appointment which already took place of from the rules of
appointment agreed upon earlier.”] allow the party that has been
disadvantaged by an asymmetric appointment clause to request courts
to appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators. The underlying principle is
that the courts should not recognise and enforce agreements that are
unfair and biased.
xxx xxx xxx
71. Arbitration is an adversarial system. It relies on the parties to
produce facts and evidence before the Arbitral Tribunal to render a
decision. Procedural equality is generally considered to contain the
following indicia : (i) equal capability of parties to produce facts and
legal arguments; (ii) equal opportunities to parties to present their
case; and (iii) neutrality of the adjudicator. [Jerry L. Mashaw, “The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. H Eldridge, 1976 SCC OnLine US SC 22 :
47 L Ed 2d 18 : 424 US 319 (1976) : Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value”, (1976) 44(28) University of Chicago Law Review
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29, 52. [Professor Mashaw states that “insofar as adjudicatory
procedure is perceived to be adversarial and dispute resolving, the
degree to which procedures facilitate equal opportunities for the
adversaries to influence the decision may be the most important
criterion by which fairness is evaluated.”]] In an adversarial process,
formal equality is important because it helps secure legitimate
adjudicative outcomes and create a level playing field between
parties. [William B. Rubenstein, “The Concept of Equality in Civil
Procedure”, (2001-2002) 23 Cardozo Law Review 1865 at p. 1890.]
72. The defining characteristic of arbitration law (particularly ad hoc
arbitration) is that it allows freedom to the parties to select their
arbitrators. This is unlike domestic courts or tribunals where the
parties have to litigate their claims before a pre-selected and
randomly allocated Bench of Judges. Section 11(2) of the Arbitration
Act allows parties to agree on a procedure for appointing the
arbitrators. The “procedure” contemplated under Section 11(2) is a
set of actions which parties undertake in their endeavour to appoint
arbitrators to adjudicate their dispute independently and impartially.
Without formal equality at the stage of appointment of arbitrators, a
party may not have an equal say in facilitating the appointment of an
unbiased Arbitral Tribunal. In a quasi-judicial process such as
arbitration, the appointment of an independent and impartial
arbitrator ensures procedural equality between parties during the
arbitral proceedings. This is also recognised under Section 11(8)
which requires the appointing authority to appoint independent and
impartial arbitrators.
73. The 2015 Amendment has introduced concrete standards of
impartiality and independence of arbitrators. One of the facets of
impartiality is procedural impartiality. Procedural impartiality
implies that the rules constitutive of the decision-making process
must favour neither party to the dispute or favour or inhibit both
parties equally. [William Lucy, “The Possibility of Impartiality”,
(2005) 25(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3, p. 11.] Further, a
procedurally impartial adjudication entails equal participation of
parties in all aspects of adjudication for the process to approach
legitimacy. [Id, p. 22.] Participation in the adjudicatory process is
meaningless for a party against whom the arbitrator is already
prejudiced. [Lon Fueller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication”,
(1978) 92(2) Harvard Law Review 353, 364. [Professor Fueller
states:“…whole analysis will derive from one simple proposition,
namely, that the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in
the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of
participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned
arguments for decision in his favor. Whatever heightens the
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significance of this participation lifts the adjudication towards its
optimum expression. Whatever destroys the meaning of that
participation destroys the integrity of adjudication itself. Thus,
participation through reasoned argument loses its meaning if the
arbiter of the dispute is inaccessible to reason because he is insane,
has been bribed, or is hopelessly prejudiced.”]] Equal participation
of parties in the process of appointment of arbitrators ensures that
both sides have an equal say in the establishment of a genuinely
independent and impartial arbitral process.
xxx xxx xxx
75. Independence and impartiality of arbitral proceedings and
equality of parties are concomitant principles. The independence
and impartiality of arbitral proceedings can be effectively enforced
only if the parties can participate equally at all stages of an arbitral
process. Therefore, the principle of equal treatment of parties
applies at all stages of arbitral proceedings, including the stage of
the appointment of arbitrators.
xxx xxx xxx
170.3. A clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole
arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and
impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is
exclusive and hinders equal participation of the other party in the
appointment process of arbitrators;
170.4. In the appointment of a three-member panel, mandating the
other party to select its arbitrator from a curated panel of potential
arbitrators is against the principle of equal treatment of parties. In
this situation, there is no effective counterbalance because parties do
not participate equally in the process of appointing arbitrators. The
process of appointing arbitrators in CORE [Central Organisation
for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2020)
14 SCC 712] is unequal and prejudiced in favour of the Railways.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
12.
The position of law is, thus, clear that even in cases, where there is a
three member panel, an Arbitration Clause mandating the other party to
select its Arbitrator from a curated panel of potential Arbitrators, is against
the Principle of Equal Treatment of Parties. Accordingly, it is evident that
the Arbitration Clause detailing the procedure for appointment of the
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Arbitral Tribunal, i.e., Clause 24.1 in the present case cannot be sustained,
and would be invalid.
13.
In the present scenario, when the Arbitration Clause, i.e., Clause 24.1
of the Agreement between the parties is unsustainable, this Court is not
powerless to pass an order for appointment of an Arbitrator to make
appropriate alternative arrangements to give effect to the Arbitration Clause.
Thus, in the case of M/S. Singh Builders Syndicate Versus Union of India,
2006 SCC OnLine Del 389, this Court held that the Court has power to
appoint a Sole Arbitrator where Court doubts the impartiality of the
designated authority and the Arbitrator. In the said case also, the Arbitration
Clause envisaged an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three employees of the
authority in question. Considering the facts and circumstances of the said
case, the Court appointed an independent Sole Arbitrator, by holding as
follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
11. I may say at the outset that in view of provisions of Section 11(4),
(5) & (6) of the Act, normally the procedure that has to be followed
for appointment of an arbitrator should be the one which is agreed
to between the parties. [See: J.L. Prasad v. The General Manager,
Southern Railway, Chennai, 2002 (1) Arb. LR 584, National Thermal
Power Corporation Ltd. v. Raghul Constructions Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2005
Kerala 115]. In the instant case, as per the procedure prescribed in
clause 64 of the general terms and conditions of the contract; for the
purpose of nominating its arbitrator, the petitioner has to choose one
name out of the list for appointment forwarded by the General
Manager. This is the procedure which was followed in the first
instance when application filed by the petitioner (AA No. 202/2000)
was disposed of vide order dated 11th November, 2002. Even when
the nominee of the petitioner resigned, in subsequent applications
filed by the petitioner, again, direction was given by this court to
follow the said procedure.
12. However, the petitioner now wants an independent arbitrator to
be appointed on the ground that the respondent has lost its right to
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suggest the names. Under certain circumstances, notwithstanding
the aforesaid procedure, the court has power to appoint its
arbitrator.
13. Some of the circumstances which can be culled out from the
case law, are the following:
(a) Where the designated authority fails to appoint the arbitrator.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Where the court doubts the impartiality of the designated
authority and the arbitrator, the court can appoint an independent
arbitrator. This happened in the case of Interstate Construction v.
NPCC Construction reported as 2004 3 RAJ 672 (Del.) wherein the
court observed as under;
“It is this type of conduct and dealing which sometimes
compels a Court to override clauses in an agreement which waive
objection as to impartiality of the Arbitration on the grounds that he
is an officer of one of the parties to the dispute.”
(c) In peculiar circumstances where the court is faced with a move
which is not covered by the provisions of the Act, this situation
occurred in the case of Sushil Kumar Rant v. Hotel Marina reported
as 2005 (81) DRJ 533 and the Division Bench appointed an
independent arbitrator by observing as under:
“We are conscious of the position that arbitration admits of
least judicial intervention and the manner in which an arbitrator is to
be appointed. But we are faced with an impasse which is neither
covered by the provisions of the Arbitration Act, nor any precedent.
This, if left unattended would have the natural consequence of leaving
the dispute between the parties unresolved which would be contrary
to the spirit and intent of the Arbitration Act. It would, therefore,
require to be broken which can be only done by the appointment of an
impartial arbitrator. This may not be technically or strictly in tune
with the provisions of the Act which do not provide for such tike
eventualities but it is surely dictated by the interests of justice.
Therefore to promote and secure the interests of Justice, it would be
appropriate to set aside the impugned order and appoint an
independent arbitrator.”
14. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position in mind, I am of the
opinion that in the present case also time is ripe for constituting an
independent arbitral tribunal by this court. The arbitration clause
contains a peculiar procedure for appointment of arbitrators. In the
event of dispute, the General Manager, Railways has a right to
appoint its arbitrator. In so far as nominee of the contractor is
concerned, he is given choice of limited nature. There is no complete
freedom given to him in this behalf. The General Manager,
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Railways is required to send a panel of more than three names of
Gazetted railway offices of one or more departments of the Railways
to the contractor. The contractor is given an option to suggest to the
General Manager one name out of the said list who shall then be
appointed by the General Manager as the contractor's nominee.
Thus even the contractor's nominee has to be the officer of
Railways. The two arbitrators have to nominate the third arbitrator,
called umpire, who is also to be a gazetted railway officer. Thus the
tribunal consists of two/three arbitrators and all are the
Government/railway officers.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
14.
The aforesaid judgment of this Court was upheld by the Supreme
Court in the case of Union of India versus Singh Builders Syndicate,
(2009) 4 SCC 523, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
14. It was further held in Northern Railway case [(2008) 10 SCC
240: (2008) 11 Scale 500] that the Chief Justice or his designate
should first ensure that the remedies provided under the arbitration
agreement are exhausted, but at the same time also ensure that the
twin requirements of sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act are kept
in view. This would mean that invariably the court should first
appoint the arbitrators in the manner provided for in the arbitration
agreement. But where the independence and impartiality of the
arbitrator(s) appointed/nominated in terms of the arbitration
agreement is in doubt, or where the Arbitral Tribunal appointed in
the manner provided in the arbitration agreement has not
functioned and it becomes necessary to make fresh appointment, the
Chief Justice or his designate is not powerless to make appropriate
alternative arrangements to give effect to the provision for
arbitration.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
15.
This Court followed the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, in
the case of Twenty-Four Secure Services Pvt. Ltd. Versus Competent
Automobiles Company Limited, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4358, and
proceeded to appoint a Sole Arbitrator even when the Arbitration Clause
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ARB.P. 1455/2025
stipulated reference to arbitration by three arbitrators, each party having the
authority to appoint a nominee Arbitrator, when the parties were unable to
agree on appointment of a Sole Arbitrator. Thus, in the said case it was held
as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
22. In Union of India (UOI) v. Singh Builders Syndicate, (2009) 4
SCC 523 the High Court rejected the contention on behalf of the
Government that the Court was not vested with any powers to
appoint a Sole Arbitrator in distinction to the Arbitration Agreement
which provided for the Tribunal of three members. The Apex Court
upheld the order of this Court appointing a Sole Arbitrator by
observing that the appointment of the Sole Arbitrator was valid.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
16.
Accordingly, the dispute between the parties is referred to the Arbitral
Tribunal, comprising a Sole Arbitrator. The following directions are issued
in this regard:
(i)
HMJ (Retd.) Hima Kohli, Former Judge, Supreme Court of
India (Mob. 9871300036) is appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to
adjudicate the disputes between the parties.
(ii)
The learned Sole Arbitrator is requested to furnish a declaration
in terms of Section 12 of the Arbitration Act, prior to entering into the
reference. In the event there is any impediment to the Arbitrator’s
appointment on that count, the parties are given liberty to file an
appropriate application before this Court.
(iii)
The remuneration of the Arbitrator shall be in terms of
Schedule IV of the Arbitration Act.
(iv)
The parties shall approach the Arbitrator within two (02)
weeks, from today.
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17.
It shall be open to the respondent to raise counter-claims, if any, in the
arbitration proceedings.
18.
All the rights and contentions of the parties, including, the
arbitrability of any of the claims and/or counter-claims, any other
preliminary objection, as well as claims on merits of the dispute of either of
the parties, are left open for adjudication by the learned Arbitrator.
19.
It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the case.
20.
The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
MINI PUSHKARNA, J
JANUARY 9, 2026/AK/SK
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM SHARMA
20:10:02
ARB.P. 1455/2025
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