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2025:KER:31232
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
FRIDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 21ST CHAITHRA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 443 OF 2025
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 30.01.2025 IN CRMP NO.504 OF 2024
OF SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.1:
KALIDAS @ SEKHAR @ MANI
AGED 54 YEARS
S/O ARAKKAS, RESIDING AT 3/503, PONNAYYAPURAM,
PARAMBAKKUDY TALUK, RAMANATHAPURAM,
TAMIL NADU, PIN - 623501
BY ADVS.
KALEESWARAM RAJ
THULASI K. RAJ
CHINNU MARIA ANTONY
APARNA NARAYAN MENON
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR GENERAL,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, KOCHI,
ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682020
SRI.AR.L.SUNDARESAN, ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR
GENERAL OF INDIA
SRI.K.S.PRENJITH KUMAR, CGC
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON
02.04.2025,
FOLLOWING:
THE
COURT
ON
11.04.2025
DELIVERED
THE
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P.B.SURESH KUMAR & JOBIN SEBASTIAN, JJ.
----------------------------------------------Crl. Appeal No.443 of 2025
----------------------------------------------Dated this the 11th day of April, 2025
JUDGMENT
P.B.Suresh Kumar, J.
This appeal is preferred invoking Section 21 of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 challenging an order passed
by the Special Court for Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam (the Special
Court) dismissing an application for bail submitted by the appellant
who is the first accused in SC No.02/21/NIA/KOC.
2.
The
case
was
one
originally
registered
by
Edakkara Police based on the disclosure made by the appellant
during the investigation pursuant to his arrest in connection with
another crime. The disclosure made by the appellant was that he
and others had organized a training camp during September 2016 in
Karulai forest with arms, including automatic rifles for furthering the
activities of the proscribed terrorist organization, CPI (Maoist), with a
view to wage war against the Government of India. The case was
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later transferred to the Anti Terrorist Squad of the State Government
and whilst so, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) took over the
investigation and concluded the same by submitting the final report.
The offences alleged against the appellant are offences punishable
under Sections 120B, 121, 121A and 122 of Indian Penal Code (IPC),
Section 27(1)(e)(iv) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, Section 7 read
with Section 27(2) of the Arms Act and Sections 18, 18A, 20, 38 and
39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
3.
The appellant was arrested in connection with the
case as early as on 17.10.2017 by Edakkara Police and he is in
custody ever since his arrest. The application submitted by the
appellant for bail was dismissed by the Special Court placing
reliance on Section 43D(5) of the UAPA Act which provides that no
person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI
of the UAPA Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail if the court,
on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such
person is prima facie true.
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4.
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A written objection has been filed by the NIA in the
appeal contending, among others, that the case involves serious
offences directly relating to anti-national activities, which require
extensive judicial scrutiny; that while the right to a speedy trial is
essential, it cannot supersede public safety and national security
when the accused concerned are involved in terrorism related
activities and that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA bars the court from
granting bail to such accused. It was also contended in the objection
that the appellant is accused in 19 other cases across multiple
States
and
that
his
involvement
in
armed
training
camps,
conspiracy, and other unlawful activities has been conclusively
established through multiple forms of evidence collected by the
Investigating Agency. The relevant passages in the objection dealing
with the evidence collected against the appellant read thus:
“A. Oral Evidence: Statements of witnesses CW-1, 2, 3, 11, 48,
49, 50, 66, 97, 117, and approver Shobha (A-20), confirms his
role as an armed cadre of CPI (Maoist). The statement of
Shobha (A-20) recorded u/s 164 of CrPC (D No-276) and 161 of
CrPC proves the crime and the physical and arms training
camp conducted by CPI (Maoist) in the deep reserve forest of
Nilambur. It also establishes the participation of A-1 to A-28 in
the said training camp during the period from May 2016 to
September 2016 and the use of arms for training.
a. The statement of CW-11 confirms the presence of the
accused in the video of physical/arms training of CPI
(Maoist), which was found in the seized digital devices of
accused in Crime No. 536/2016 and analyzed by him.
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b. The statements of residents of Mundakadavu colony
proving the scene of crime, and the statements of
residents of Pulimunda colony identifying A-1 as an armed
cadre of CPI (Maoist) and confirming his presence in the
video and Protected Witness- S and T.
c. The statements of relatives/neighbors of accused
Kalidas (A-1), proving his deep influence by Maoist
ideology, his long disappearance from home, and his
presence in the video containing physical/arms training of
CPI (Maoist).
d. The statements of proving the seizure of digital devices
from the SOC of Crime No. 536/2016, containing videos
related to physical/arms training of Maoist members,
including A-1, corroborates the evidence of the approver.
e. The statement of Dy. SP (Arms), Thiruvananthapuram
(CW-72), proves that the firearms used for training in the
forensically extracted video are prohibited arms.
B. Material Evidence: Seizure of prohibited arms MO-91
(Tapacha gun and ammunition) during his arrest in Crime No.
153/2017. Four numbers of 303 rifles were seized from crime
scenes of Exchange of Fire (EOF) between Maoists and the
Thunderbolts unit of Kerala Police in Crime 291/2019 (MO No92) and Crime 292/2019 of Agali P.S. (MO No-93) and another
in Crime 531/2020 of Padinjarathara P.S. (MO No-94).
C. Digital & Scientific Evidence: Seized laptop and memory
card containing videos of arms training camps (MO NO-97, 98,
99 and 100).
a. Forensic examination of videos from Crime 536/16 of
Edakkara, confirming his participation. The video
comparison analysis by SFSL, Thiruvananthapuram,
matching the Appellant’s image to arms training footage.
(D No-277).
b. The video path (VID-20160719-141109) retrieved from
the digital device seized from the crime scene of Crime No.
536/16 of Edakkara P.S, showing the appellant carrying a
prohibited 303 rifle along with other co-accused, who were
armed with a double-barrel gun, AK-47 and other deadly
weapons.
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D.
Documentary Evidence: Seizure mahazars, digital
evidence reports, and other documents proves his active role.
Arrest Memo (D No-3), Seizure mahazar (D No.8), Search list
(D No-113), D No. 114 to 118, Certified copies of FIR of crime
No-153/2017 (D No.353), seizure mahazar (D No.354), Arrest
Memo (D No-355), and other documents (D No. 356), FIR in
Crime No. 536/2016 of Edakkara P.S (D No.320), Scene
Mahazar (D No.321), Seizure Mahazer (D No.322), and other
documents (D No. 323 to 329) proves the seizure of digital
devices (Asus Laptop, external Hard-disk, and one Memory
card) which contain videos of physical/arms training organized
by CPI (Maoist) in the instant crime. Forensic examination
report of video comparison from SFSL, Trivandrum which
provides positive result regarding the video of accused doing
arms training (D No. 397). The disclosure cum pointing out
proceedings of A-1 (D No.4), A-4, A-11, A-18, A-19, A-20, A-21,
A-22, and A-24, proving the incident, scene of crime (SOC),
and corroborating the 164 statement of A-20. The video
identification proceedings (D No.277) prepared as disclosed by
A-20, confirming the active participation of the accused in the
training camp organized by CPI (Maoist).”
In short, according to the NIA, this is not a case where the court
should extend indulgence to enlarge the accused on bail.
5.
Heard Adv.Kaleeswaram Raj, the learned counsel
for the appellant as also Sri.AR. L.Sundaresan, the learned Additional
Solicitor General of India.
6.
The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out
that even though the final report in the case was submitted as early
as on 22.05.2015, the trial is yet to begin and even if the trial begins
shortly, its completion is unlikely for a considerably long period as
there are as many as 274 witnesses to be examined in the case in
terms of the final report. According to the learned counsel, inasmuch
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as the appellant is in custody for almost 8 years now, his continued
detention would violate his right to life guaranteed under Article 21
of the Constitution. It was argued by the learned counsel that the
provisions in the nature of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is not an
impediment for this court in enlarging the appellant on bail, once it
is established that he is being subjected to long incarceration and
that the trial is unlikely to be completed
for a considerably long
period.
7.
Per contra, the learned Additional Solicitor General
supported the impugned decision pointing out that inasmuch as the
case involves serious offences which are directly related to antinational activities, the Special Court is justified in rejecting the
request of the appellant for bail. It is all the more so, in the light of
the evidence collected by the Investigating Agency, submitted the
learned Additional Solicitor General. The fact that the appellant is a
person involved in 19 other cases across multiple States has also
been highlighted by the learned Additional Solicitor General, to
justify the argument that the impugned decision is in order. As
regards the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant based on the
fundamental right guaranteed to the
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appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution, the learned Additional
Solicitor General contended that inasmuch as the appellant is
involved in terrorist activities, the delay in the trial is not a ground to
seek bail. The learned Additional Solicitor General
relied on the
decisions of the Apex Court in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2024) 5 SCC 403 and Sk. Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2024) 8 SCC
293, in support of his contentions.
8.
In the course of the arguments, the learned
Additional Solicitor General has made available, the particulars of
various other cases in which the appellant is involved and the same
would show that out of the 20 cases including the present one, the
appellant was enlarged on bail in 18 cases and the said cases
include even cases registered under Sections 124A and 121 IPC as
in the case on hand.
9.
We have examined the arguments advanced by
the learned counsel for the parties on either side.
10.
Bail cannot be refused to an accused who is
subjected to long incarceration, if the trial is unlikely to be
completed within a reasonable time. This proposition applies even to
accused in cases involving offences punishable under penal statutes
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containing clauses restricting grant of bail. There cannot be any
doubt to these propositions. A Division Bench of this Court has
reiterated these propositions in a recent case namely, Nassar v.
Union of India, 2025 KHC OnLine 410. The relevant passages in the
said decision read thus:
8.2. In Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India ((1996) 2 SCC
616), the Apex Court taking note of the long incarceration
suffered by the accused, granted bail to the accused by
categorising them into different groups based on their
involvement and role and ordered their release if the
conditions are satisfied. Reference was also made to the
observations in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab ((1994) 3 SCC
569), wherein it was held that no one can justify the gross
delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in
jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify
invocation of Art.21. It was held that there is a need to adopt
a pragmatic and constitutionally sensitive approach in
situations where an undertrial is deprived of personal liberty
for an extended period and there is no reasonable prospect of
the trial concluding within a foreseeable timeframe. In
paragraph 14 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court
observed that where undertrials are not directly accused of
engaging in terrorist acts, but are instead booked under
S.120B or 147 of the Indian Penal Code, or merely found in
possession of allegedly incriminating material, a lenient view
may be taken taking note of the long period of incarceration
that has been undergone. The Court further held that in such
cases, release may be considered if the undertrials have been
in custody for periods of three years and two years,
respectively.
8.3. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (supra), the Apex Court
has clarified that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only
due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a
speedy trial. Reliance was placed on the judgment in Supreme
Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners)
v. Union of India ((1994) 6 SCC 731), wherein it was held that
undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Once
it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the
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accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of
time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them
on bail. The Apex Court went on to observe that the presence
of statutory restrictions like S.43D(5) of the UAPA per se does
not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on
grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both
the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers
exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well
harmonised. Whereas at the commencement of proceedings,
the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy
against the grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will
melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being
completed within a reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial
part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would
safeguard against the possibility of provisions like S.43D(5) of
the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for
wholesale breach of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
(emphasis supplied)
8.4. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), the Apex Court
reiterated that the presence of statutory restrictions like
S.43D(5) or S.37 of the NDPS Act, per se, do not oust the
ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution. In the said case, the
accused had been undergoing incarceration for about 4 years.
The following pertinent observations were made:
16. Criminals are not born but made. The human potential in
everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond
redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when
dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint
has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is committed,
a variety of factors is responsible for making the offender commit
the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the
result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the
stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a
milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations.
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court
concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Art.21 of the Constitution then the State or any
other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on
the ground that the crime committed is serious. Art.21 of the
Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused;
not a convict. The over - arching postulate of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever
stringent the penal law may be.
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19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting
agency as well as the Court have proceeded, the right of the
accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been
infringed thereby violating Art.21 of the Constitution.
8.5. In Athar Parwez (supra), the facts were that Athar along
with the co - accused were arrested on the ground that he was
an active member of the PFI and that they were planning to
cause disturbance during the proposed visit of the Prime
Minister to Patna. During the raid that was carried out certain
recoveries were carried out, prominent amongst them was a
document titled "India 2047 towards rule of Islam in India. His
application for bail having been dismissed, he approached the
Apex Court seeking bail. One of the contentions was
prolonged incarceration without trial. In the said case, the
accused had been undergoing incarceration for 2 Years and 4
months at the time of consideration of the Appeal by the Apex
Court. While allowing the application on the ground of
prolonged incarceration, the Apex Court observed as under:
32. The Appellant was arrested on 12/07/2022. He has undergone
custody for more than two years and four months. Chargesheet
was filed on 07/01/2023 but till date charges have not been
framed which is an admitted position. There are 40 accused and
354 witnesses cited by the prosecution to be examined. There can
be no doubt that the trial is not likely to complete soon, and as has
been laid down by various judgments of this Court as has been
referred to above, the Appellant cannot be allowed to languish in
jail indefinitely and that too without a trial. If such an approach is
allowed Art.21 of the Constitution of India would stand violated.
The ratio as laid down by this Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb
(supra) as also the other judgments in Javed Ghulam Nabi Shaikh
v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India
(supra) would be applicable to this case and would squarely apply
entitling the Appellant for grant of bail.
Reverting to the facts of the case on hand, the appellant was
arrested on 17.10.2017, and since then, he is in custody. In other
words, the appellant is in custody for almost 8 years. The appellant
has by now, completed the maximum term of imprisonment
provided for some of the offences charged against him. No doubt, as
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already noticed, some of the offences charged against him are
offences for which either life imprisonment or capital punishment is
provided for. But that does not justify incarceration for such a long
term without the trial being commenced. The greater the severity of
the offence, the more expeditious the trial ought to be. Failure to
adhere to this principle yields detrimental consequences to both the
accused as also the society. For the accused, prolonged delay
particularly in custodial cases, infringe upon his right to life and
liberty and significantly impair the ability to mount a robust defence.
For society, such delays erode public trust in the justice system,
fostering a perception of inefficiency and undermining the rule of
law. The next aspect concerns the trial. There is no dispute to the
fact that the trial in the case is yet to begin. Similarly, there is also
no dispute to the fact that as many as 274 witnesses have been
cited in the final report, even though it was pointed out by the
learned Additional Solicitor General that all the cited witnesses may
not be examined. Even if the examination of some of the witnesses
is dispensed with, having regard to the nature of allegations, we
have no doubt in our minds that the trial is not likely to be
concluded any time soon.
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11.
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Be that as it may, the accusation against the
appellant as contained in paragraph 18.1 of the final report reads
thus:
“That, the accused Kalidas @ Sekhar @ Mani @ Thyagu @
Ramachandra @RC (A-1), being a District Committee member
of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) and the
Commander of the Shiruvani Dalam (Squad) of CPI (Maoist)
organisation, active in Tri-Junction of Kerala, Karnataka and
Tamil Nadu, conspired with co-accused inside deep reserve
forest of Malappuram District of Kerala, during different
occasions in the year 2016, for conducting and participating in
physical and arms training so as to commit terrorist acts and
to wage war against the Government of India, collected arms
and men and abetted waging war. Being a member of
proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) which is involved
in terrorist acts and also being an in-charge of the training
camp of CPI (Maoist), he along with co-accused trespassed
into the reserve forest of Malappuram District in Kerala and
actively participated in the physical and arms training using
prohibited arms, in the period between last week of May 2016
to last week of September 2016, to strengthen the proscribed
terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) with intention to commit
terrorist acts for furthering the activities of CPI (Maoist) and
thereby to wage war against the Government of India.”
As revealed from the extracted passage, the accusation against the
appellant, in essence, is that he has participated in physical and
arms training so as to commit terrorist acts and to wage war against
the Government of India as also collected arms and men and
abetted waging war against the Government of India.
The
particulars of the evidence stated to have been collected by the
Investigating Agency as narrated in the written objection, if true,
would make the allegations more serious. On a specific query by this
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court as to whether there are any allegations against the appellant
in any of the cases registered against him that he participated in
any armed rebellion, the answer of the learned Additional Solicitor
General was in the negative. As noted in Shaheen Welfare Assn. v.
Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616, referred to by this Court in Nassar,
the Apex Court has observed that a pragmatic and constitutionally
sensitive approach has to be taken where an undertrial is deprived
of personal liberty for an extended period and that there is no
reasonable prospect of the trial concluding within a reasonable time
frame. It was also observed by the Apex Court in Shaheen Welfare
Assn. that where undertrials are not directly accused of engaging in
any terrorist acts, but are instead booked under Section 120B IPC, or
booked merely on the ground that they are found in possession of
incriminating materials, a lenient view has to be taken. Similarly, as
already mentioned, Section 43D(5) of the UAPA does not by itself
bar constitutional courts from granting bail, especially when the
continued detention amounts to violation of the rights guaranteed
under Part III of the Constitution of India. In Sk. Javed Iqbal, the Apex
Court has held that bail cannot be denied in such cases on the
ground that the charges are serious.
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12.
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True, in Gurwinder Singh referred to by the learned
Additional Solicitor General, the Apex Court has observed that mere
delay in trial pertaining to grave offences cannot be used as a
ground to grant bail. In Gurwinder Singh, the Apex Court has
referred to Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 and
distinguished the same on the facts of that case. In other words, the
observation aforesaid has to be understood as one made in the facts
of that case. Gurwinder Singh cannot, therefore, be understood as
one diluting the proposition of law laid down in K.A.Najeeb.
13.
Paragraph 42 of the judgment in Sk. Javed Iqbal
relied on by the learned Additional Solicitor General reads thus:
“42. This Court has, time and again, emphasised that right to
life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A
constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to
an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a
penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial
under Article 21of the Constitution of India has been infringed.
In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in
the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute,
howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to
lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which
liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular
case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it
would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute,
bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain
of our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter,
K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713]
being rendered by a three-Judge Bench is binding on a Bench
of two Judges like us.”
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As seen from the extracted passage, the proposition laid down is
that even in a case involving interpretation of a penal statute,
howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in
favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which, liberty is an
intrinsic part. No doubt, it is observed in Sk. Javed Iqbal that in the
given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to
grant bail. But the said observation was made to hold that merely
on account of that reason, it is wrong to say that bail cannot be
granted under a particular statute. The said judgment, according to
us, does not in any manner, help the respondent to sustain the
impugned order.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order
is set aside and the appellant is enlarged on bail on executing a
bond for Rs.1,00,000/- with two solvent sureties each for the like
sum to the satisfaction of the Special Court. It shall be open to the
Special Court to impose such additional conditions as it may deem
fit and necessary in the interests of justice. It is made clear that in
the event of breach of any of the conditions, it shall be open to the
prosecution to move for cancellation of the bail granted to the
appellant before the Special Court, notwithstanding the fact that bail
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was granted by this Court. Upon such application being made, the
Special Court shall consider the same on merits and pass
appropriate orders in accordance with law.
Sd/P.B.SURESH KUMAR, JUDGE.
Sd/JOBIN SEBASTIAN, JUDGE.
YKB
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