Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 13th February, 2026
Uploaded on: 17th February, 2026
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
+
KAAYA BUILDTECH PRIVATE LTD
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Harshit Batra and Ms. Tanya
Karnwal, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Niraj Kumar, Sr. Central Govt.
Counsel with Mr. Chaitanya Kumar,
Adv. for R1
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, SC with Mr.
Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. Mohd Sueb
Akhtar, Advs. for LAC
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral)
1.
This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2.
The present petition has been filed by the Petitioner under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, inter alia, seeking issuance of an appropriate writ
directing the Respondents to refer the dispute regarding the enhancement of
compensation awarded to the Petitioner under Award Nos. 02/2022/SW,
4/2022/SW and 7/2020/SW to arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the National
Highways Act, 1956
3.
A large passage of land was acquired under the National Highway Act,
1956 between the year 2020 and 2022 for development of National Highway
being NH 334(M) and NH 334(N) in South West District, Delhi. The
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
compensation was assessed and the same was paid to the Petitioner. However,
the Petitioner was not satisfied with the compensation and on the ground that
the same was not commensurate with the market value, the Petitioner had
reserved its rights to seek enhanced compensation and prayed that the matter
be referred to arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act,
1956.
4.
The said request was made to the Special Secretary, Land and Building
Department, GNCTD. However, despite reminders, the matter was not
referred to arbitration. Hence, the present writ petition.
5.
Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner submits that under Section 3G(5) of the
National Highways Act, 1956, the Petitioner’s claim is liable to be referred to
arbitration to the Special Secretary, as notified by the Government.
6.
Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has also placed reliance upon the
decision in General Manager (Project) v. Prakash Chand Pradhan, Civil
Appeal No. 5250 of 2018, wherein it was held that in such cases, the
appropriate remedy is a writ petition. The said decision dated 16th May, 2018
is set out below:
“Section 3-G of the National Highways Act, 1956
provides for determination of the amount that is
payable by way of compensation. We are concerned
in these appeals with sub-sections (5) and (6) of
Section 3-G which read as under:
"(5) If the amount determined by the
competent authority under sub-section (1)
or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to
either of the parties, the amount shall, on
an application by either of the parties, be
determined by the arbitrator to be
appointed by the Central Government.
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act,
the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall
apply to every arbitration under this Act."
A cursory reading of sub-section (5) shows us
that appointment of the arbitrator under the said
sub-section is only in the hands of the Central
Government. Sub-section (6) begins with the
important expression "subject to the provisions of
this Act", the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties,
we are, therefore, of the view that a Section 11
application under the 1996 Act cannot be made as
the Central Government alone is to determine who
is to be an arbitrator under Section 3-G (5) of the
National Highways Act. If a demand is made for
the appointment of an arbitrator, and the Central
Government does not appoint an arbitrator within
a reasonable time, the remedy that is to be availed
of is a writ petition or a suit for the said purpose,
and not Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
A similar provision contained in Section 86 (1)(f)
of the Electricity Act, 2003 specifically gives the
State Commission power to refer any dispute for
arbitration. In this view of the matter, this Court in
Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Essar Power
Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 755, held as under:
"28. Section 86(1)(f) is a special provision
and hence will override the general
provision in Section 11 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 for arbitration
of disputes between the licensee and
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
generating companies. It is well settled
that the special law overrides the general
law. Hence, in our opinion, Section 11 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 has no application to the question
who can adjudicate/arbitrate disputes
between licensees and generating
companies, and only Section 86(1)(f)
shall apply in such a situation."
We respectfully agree with the ratio of the said
judgment. Likewise, Section 3-G of the National
Highways Act is a special provision which will be
given effect insofar as the appointment of an
arbitrator is concerned.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents has, however, argued that an arbitrator
has now been appointed under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and, that,
therefore, no prejudice will be caused if he is
allowed to continue. This arguments ignores the fact
that Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act does not apply and that, under Section 3-G, the
Central Government alone can appoint an
arbitrator.
Accordingly, the impugned judgment is set aside
and the appeals are allowed.”
7.
Mr. Pathak, ld. Counsel for the LAC submits that a communication has
been written by the Petitioner directly to the Special Secretary by the
Petitioner, who is not a Competent Authority since the Special Secretary has
to himself act as the Arbitrator.
8.
The Court has considered the matter. Section 3G (5) of the National
Highways Act, 1956 provides as under:
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
“[3G. Determination of amount payable as
compensation.—...
xxxx
(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not
acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on
an application by either of the parties, be determined by
the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central
Government--”
9.
The Supreme Court in the decision in NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Co.
Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 161 while dealing with the question whether an
application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is
maintainable in view of Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956,
held as under:
“1. The moot question which arises before us is whether
the application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter being referred to as
“the 1996 Act”) is maintainable in view of Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter
being referred to as “the 1956 Act”) which provides for
appointment of an arbitrator by the Central
Government.
2. The relevant seminal facts are that the subject land
comprised in “Sayedabad Tea Estate” situated at
Mouza Purba Madati, J.L. No. 108, Police Station
Phansidewa, District Darjeeling measuring 5.08 acres
was acquired by the appellant (National Highways
Authority of India) in exercise of its powers under
Section 3-D of the 1956 Act vide Notification dated 2211-2005 under LAP Case No. 4/2004-05 for the purpose
of construction of the highways.
3. The 1956 Act is a comprehensive code in itself and a
special legislation enacted by Parliament for
acquisition and for determining compensation and its
disbursement where there are several claimants over the
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
amount deposited towards compensation determined by
the competent authority in accordance with the
mechanism provided under Section 3-G of the 1956 Act.
If the amount so determined by the competent authority
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 3-G
is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount
shall, on an application by either of the parties, be
determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the
Central Government under Section 3-G(5) of the Act.
While determining the amount of compensation under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), it is the duty of the
arbitrator to take into consideration the relevant
pointers envisaged under sub-section (7) of Section 3-G
of the 1956 Act. Where the amount determined by the
arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the
competent authority under Section 3-G of the 1956 Act,
the arbitrator may, at its discretion, award interest at
nine per cent per annum on the excess amount under
sub-section (5) of Section 3-H from the date of taking
possession under Section 3-D till the date of actual
deposit.
xxxx
15. At the very outset, we may notice that the two-Judge
Bench of this Court in the recent judgment in National
Highways & Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd.
case [National Highways & Infrastructure
Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Pradhan,
(2020) 15 SCC 533] , while dealing with the scope of
sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 3-G of the 1956 Act
with reference to Section 11 of the 1996 Act has held
that the 1956 Act being a special enactment and
Section 3-G in particular provides an inbuilt
mechanism for appointment of an arbitrator by the
Central Government. Hence, Section 11 of the 1996
Act has no application and the power is exclusively
vested with the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the 1956 Act for appointment of an arbitrator
and if the Central Government does not appoint an
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
arbitrator within a reasonable time, it is open for the
party to avail the remedy either by filing a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or a suit
for the purpose but the remedy of Section 11 of the
1996 Act is not available for appointment of an
arbitrator.
16. We are in full agreement with the legal position
stated by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in National
Highways & Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd.
case [National Highways & Infrastructure
Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Pradhan,
(2020) 15 SCC 533] but like to add further that the
1956 Act has been enacted under Entry 23 of the
Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
with the exclusive power to legislate with respect to
highways, which are declared to be national highways
by or under law by Parliament. It is a comprehensive
code and a special enactment which provides an
inbuilt mechanism not only in initiating acquisition
until culmination of the proceedings in determining
the compensation and its adjudication by the arbitrator
to be appointed by the Central Government and if still
remain dissatisfied, by the court of law.
17. In compliance of the mandate of Sections 3-A to 3-F
of the 1956 Act, after the land is acquired, there shall be
paid an amount of compensation which shall be
determined by an order of the competent authority under
sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 3-G of the 1956 Act
and any person who is aggrieved by the amount so
determined by the competent authority or what being
determined is not acceptable to either of the parties, on
an application being filed by either of the parties, has to
be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the
Central Government in terms of subsection (5) of
Section 3-G of the 1956 Act.
18. After analysing the scheme, it can be assumed that
the legislature intended the 1956 Act to act as a
complete code in itself for the purpose of acquisition
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
until culmination including disbursement and for
settlement of disputes and this conclusion is further
strengthened in view of Section 3-J of the Act which
eliminates the application of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, to an acquisition under the 1956 Act.
19. It is settled principles of law that when the special
law sets out a selfcontained code, the application of
general law would impliedly be excluded. In the instant
case, the scheme of the 1956 Act being a special law
enacted for the purpose and for appointment of an
arbitrator by the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the 1956 Act and subsection (6) of Section 3-G
itself clarifies that subject to the provisions of the 1956
Act, the provisions of the 1996 Act shall apply to every
arbitration obviously to the extent where the 1956 Act
is silent, the arbitrator may take recourse in
adjudicating the dispute invoking the provisions of the
1996 Act for the limited purpose. But so far as the
appointment of an arbitrator is concerned, the power
being exclusively vested with the Central Government
as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 3-G of
the 1956 Act, Section 11 of the 1996 Act has no
application.
20. The plea of the respondents that they have rightly
taken recourse in the facts and circumstances of Section
11 of the 1996 Act cannot be accepted for the reason
that Section 3-G(6) of the 1956 Act clearly stipulates
that the provisions of the 1996 Act will apply subject to
the provisions of the 1956 Act. The usage of the
expression “subject to” clearly indicates that the
legislature intended to give overriding effect to the
provisions of the 1956 Act where it relates to the
disputes pertaining to determination of the amount of
compensation under the Act. The irresistible conclusion
is that the legislature in its wisdom intended to abrogate
the power for appointment of an arbitrator under the
provisions of the 1996 Act
21. In our considered view, the High Court of Calcutta
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
was not holding its competence to appoint an arbitrator
invoking Section 11 of the 1996 Act.
22. This very question earlier arose before this Court
whether the application under Section 11(6) of the 1996
Act is maintainable in view of statutory provisions of the
Electricity Act, 2003 adjudicating the dispute between
the licensees and the generating companies of the
special enactment and Section 86(1) of the Electricity
Act, 2003 in particular, this Court in Gujarat Urja Vikas
Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd. [Gujarat Urja Vikas
Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 755] in
para 28 observed as under: (SCC p. 765)
“28. Section 86(1)(f) is a special provision and
hence will override the general provision in
Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 for arbitration of disputes between the
licensee and generating companies. It is well
settled that the special law overrides the general
law. Hence, in our opinion, Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has no
application to the question who can
adjudicate/arbitrate disputes between licensees
and generating companies, and only Section
86(1)(f) shall apply in such a situation.”
23. We are also of the considered opinion that in view
of the power being vested exclusively with the Central
Government to appoint an arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the 1956 Act, being a special enactment, the
application filed under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act for
appointment of an arbitrator was not maintainable and
provisions of the 1996 Act could not be invoked for the
purpose.”
10.
In Bhupender Kumar Arora (HUF), Through its Karta Sh.
Bhupender Kumar Arora v. Union of India & Anr., 2025: DHC:7774 a Ld.
Single Judge of this Court, has held that the National Highways Act, 1956,
being a special enactment, provides an inbuilt mechanism for the appointment
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
of an Arbitrator by the Central Government under Section 3G(5).
Consequently, Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is
inapplicable, and the authority to appoint an Arbitrator is exclusively vested
in the Central Government. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as
under:
“12. Insofar as the argument with respect to extent of
acquisition of the land in question and/or percentage
allocation in favour of the Petitioner is concerned, this
touches upon the merits of the case and is not required
to be decided in the present petition. Clearly, this is a
matter within the domain and remit of the Arbitrator.
Coming to the question of validity of appointment of
the Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of NH Act. This
issue need not detain this Court as the same stands
decided by the Supreme Court in Sayedabad Tea
Company (supra), wherein the Supreme Court
referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court given
earlier in General Manager (Project), National
Highways
and
Infrastructure
Development
Corporation v. Prakash Chand Pradhan and Others,
(2020) 15 SCC 533, where it was held that NH Act is a
special enactment and under Section 3G in particular,
it provides inbuilt mechanism for appointment of an
Arbitrator by the Central Government. Hence, Section
11 of 1996 Act has no application and the power is
exclusively vested with the Central Government.
Where the Central Government does not appoint the
Arbitrator within a reasonable time, it is open to the
party to either file a writ petition or a suit but remedy
of Section 11 is not available. Agreeing with legal
position stated in this judgment in Sayedabad Tea
Company (supra), the Supreme Court observed that
NH Act is enacted under Entry 23 of Union List of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution with exclusive
power to legislate with respect to highways, which are
declared as National Highways by or under the law of
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
Parliament. It is a comprehensive Code and a special
enactment which provides an inbuilt mechanism not
only in initiating acquisition until culmination of the
proceedings in determining compensation and its
adjudication by the Arbitrator to be appointed by the
Central Government and if it still remains dissatisfied,
by the Court of law. It was observed that after analysing
the scheme of the Act, it can be assumed that Legislature
intended NH Act to act as a complete Code for
acquisition as also settlement of disputes in this regard
and this conclusion is strengthened by Section 3J of NH
Act, which eliminates application of Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 to an acquisition under NH Act. Relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are as follows:“15. At the very outset, we may notice that the twoJudge Bench of this Court in the recent judgment
in National Highways & Infrastructure
Development Corpn. Ltd. case [National
Highways & Infrastructure Development Corpn.
Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Pradhan, (2020) 15 SCC
533] , while dealing with the scope of sub-sections
(5) and (6) of Section 3-G of the 1956 Act with
reference to Section 11 of the 1996 Act has held
that the 1956 Act being a special enactment and
Section 3-G in particular provides an inbuilt
mechanism for appointment of an arbitrator by the
Central Government. Hence, Section 11 of the
1996 Act has no application and the power is
exclusively vested with the Central Government
under Section 3-G(5) of the 1956 Act for
appointment of an arbitrator and if the Central
Government does not appoint an arbitrator within
a reasonable time, it is open for the party to avail
the remedy either by filing a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India or a suit for
the purpose but the remedy of Section 11 of the
1996 Act is not available for appointment of an
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
arbitrator.
16. We are in full agreement with the legal position
stated by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in
National Highways & Infrastructure Development
Corpn. Ltd. case [National Highways &
Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Prakash
Chand Pradhan, (2020) 15 SCC 533] but like to
add further that the 1956 Act has been enacted
under Entry 23 of the Union List of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution with the exclusive
power to legislate with respect to highways, which
are declared to be national highways by or under
law by Parliament. It is a comprehensive code and
a special enactment which provides an inbuilt
mechanism not only in initiating acquisition until
culmination of the proceedings in determining the
compensation and its adjudication by the
arbitrator to be appointed by the Central
Government and if still remain dissatisfied, by the
court of law.
17. In compliance of the mandate of Sections 3-A
to 3-F of the 1956 Act, after the land is acquired,
there shall be paid an amount of compensation
which shall be determined by an order of the
competent authority under sub-sections (1) or (2)
of Section 3-G of the 1956 Act and any person who
is aggrieved by the amount so determined by the
competent authority or what being determined is
not acceptable to either of the parties, on an
application being filed by either of the parties, has
to be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed
by the Central Government in terms of subsection
(5) of Section 3-G of the 1956 Act.
18. After analysing the scheme, it can be assumed
that the legislature intended the 1956 Act to act as
a complete code in itself for the purpose of
acquisition
until
culmination
including
disbursement and for settlement of disputes and
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
this conclusion is further strengthened in view of
Section 3-J of the Act which eliminates the
application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to
an acquisition under the 1956 Act.
19. It is settled principles of law that when the
special law sets out a selfcontained code, the
application of general law would impliedly be
excluded. In the instant case, the scheme of the
1956 Act being a special law enacted for the
purpose and for appointment of an arbitrator by
the Central Government under Section 3-G(5) of
the 1956 Act and subsection (6) of Section 3-G
itself clarifies that subject to the provisions of the
1956 Act, the provisions of the 1996 Act shall apply
to every arbitration obviously to the extent where
the 1956 Act is silent, the arbitrator may take
recourse in adjudicating the dispute invoking the
provisions of the 1996 Act for the limited purpose.
But so far as the appointment of an arbitrator is
concerned, the power being exclusively vested with
the Central Government as envisaged under subsection (5) of Section 3-G of the 1956 Act, Section
11 of the 1996 Act has no application.
20. The plea of the respondents that they have
rightly taken recourse in the facts and
circumstances of Section 11 of the 1996 Act cannot
be accepted for the reason that Section 3-G(6) of
the 1956 Act clearly stipulates that the provisions
of the 1996 Act will apply subject to the provisions
of the 1956 Act. The usage of the expression
“subject to” clearly indicates that the legislature
intended to give overriding effect to the provisions
of the 1956 Act where it relates to the disputes
pertaining to determination of the amount of
compensation under the Act. The irresistible
conclusion is that the legislature in its wisdom
intended to abrogate the power for appointment of
an arbitrator under the provisions of the 1996 Act
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
21. In our considered view, the High Court of
Calcutta was not holding its competence to appoint
an arbitrator invoking Section 11 of the 1996 Act.
22. This very question earlier arose before this
Court whether the application under Section 11(6)
of the 1996 Act is maintainable in view of statutory
provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 adjudicating
the dispute between the licensees and the
generating companies of the special enactment and
Section 86(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003 in
particular, this Court in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam
Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd. [Gujarat Urja Vikas
Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 755]
in para 28 observed as under: (SCC p. 765)
“28. Section 86(1)(f) is a special provision and
hence will override the general provision in
Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 for arbitration of disputes between
the licensee and generating companies. It is
well settled that the special law overrides the
general law. Hence, in our opinion, Section 11
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
has no application to the question who can
adjudicate/arbitrate
disputes
between
licensees and generating companies, and only
Section 86(1)(f) shall apply in such a
situation.”
23. We are also of the considered opinion that in
view of the power being vested exclusively with the
Central Government to appoint an arbitrator
under Section 3-G(5) of the 1956 Act, being a
special enactment, the application filed under
Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act for appointment of an
arbitrator was not maintainable and provisions of
the 1996 Act could not be invoked for the
purpose.””
11.
On a query from the Court, the ld. Counsel have informed that the
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
question as to whether the appointment of the Special Secretary would be hit
by Section 12(5) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is also presently
pending consideration in some cases before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Ld.
Counsel further submit that as of now arbitrations are being conducted by the
Special Secretary as per the provision.
12.
In view thereof, the Respondent No. 2 - Competent Authority (Land
Acquisition)/CALA shall make the reference to arbitration within a period of
30 days in accordance with law.
13.
A copy of this order be communicated to Respondent No. 2 -
Competent Authority (Land Acquisition)/CALA formally by the Petitioner
within a period of one week. The reference shall be made by the said
Respondent No. 2 within 30 days thereafter.
14.
The Court has been assured by Mr. Pathak, ld. Counsel for the LAC
that the post of the Special Secretary, who has to act as an Arbitrator has now
been filled up.
15.
No further orders are called for in the present petition.
16.
The petition is disposed of in the above terms. Pending applications, if
any, are also disposed of.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
MADHU JAIN
JUDGE
FEBRUARY 13, 2026/ys/ck
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
17:11:52
W.P.(C) 15198/2025
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review