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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
M/s Jyoti Electricals and another
.….Petitioners
versus
Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research (PGIMER),
Chandigarh and others
..…Respondents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The date when the judgment is reserved
The date when the judgment is pronounced
The date when the judgment is uploaded on the
website
Whether only operative part of the judgment is
pronounced or whether the full judgment is
pronounced
The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full
judgment, and reasons thereof
13.02.2026
24.03.2026
27.03.2026
Full
Not
applicable
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI
Present:
Mr. Aditya Grover, Advocate and
Ms. Divya Arora, Advocate, for the petitioners.
Mr. Avinit Avasthi, Advocate
Ms. Kriti Avasthi, Advocate and
Mr. Nikhil Goyal, Advocate, for respondents No.1 and 3.
Mr. Pritpal Singh Nijjar, Advocate, for respondent No.2.
Dr. Pankaj Nanhera, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Anurag Mor, Advocate
Mr. Ashish Naik, Advocate and
Ms. Ishita Arora, Advocate, for respondent No.4.
Mr. Aman Pal, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Balraj Sharma, Advocate
Ms. Neha Rani, Advocate and
Mr. Rajender Kumar, Advocate, for respondent No.5.
GOPAL KRISHAN
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CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
DEEPAK SIBAL, J.
1.
Through the instant petition, the petitioners challenge
communication dated 23.12.2025, through which the Postgraduate Institute
of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as
the Institute) has rejected petitioner No.1’s technical bid submitted by it in
pursuance to a notice inviting tender bearing No.PGI/Engg./Elec./202526/18 (for short – the second NIT).
THE FACTS
2.
Petitioner No.1 is a sole proprietorship concern and petitioner
No. 2 is its sole proprietor. Petitioner No.1 is engaged in the execution of
electrical works in public institutions including the Institute and claims to
have an unblemished track record. In May 2025, through a notice inviting
tender bearing No.PGI/Engg./Elec./2025-26/05 (for short – the first NIT) the
Institute invited bids for installation and maintenance of a gas based fire
suppression system in all electrical panels at various locations of the Institute.
The bid, along with the supporting documents, was required to be scanned
and uploaded on the Institute’s website by 11:00 a.m. of 13.05.2025. As per
clause No.1(c) under Section-III of the first NIT, which is relevant, amongst
other documents, the bidder was required to upload an authorization
certificate/undertaking from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (for short
– the OEM) that the OEM would technically support the bidder throughout
the execution of the contract and for the comprehensive maintenance for the
useful life of the system as also that the OEM would provide all the spares
required for the healthy functioning of the firefighting equipment for at least
07 years from the date of its installation.
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CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
3.
In pursuance to the first NIT the petitioner submitted its bid
along with the required supporting documents which included a certificate
from the OEM dated 15.05.2025 which was in terms of the afore referred
clause 1(c) under Section-III of the first NIT.
4.
The first NIT, published in May 2025, lapsed.
5.
On 15.11.2025, for the same work, as above, through the second
NIT, the Institute invited fresh bids. In response to the second NIT, the last
date to submit bids was 02.12.2025 and the date for opening of eligibilitycum-technical bids was 03.12.2025. In the second NIT, clause No.1(c) under
Section III, with regard to submission of undertaking / authorization
certificate by the OEM was the same as in the first NIT.
6.
Responding to the second NIT, petitioner No.1 applied afresh.
In support of its bid, along with other documents, purportedly, in terms of
clause No.1 (c) contained in Section III of the second NIT, petitioner No.1
uploaded a copy of the OEM’s undertaking / authorization certificate dated
15.05.2025 which had earlier been uploaded by it in response to the first NIT.
7.
On 03.12.2025, the technical bids were opened and through
communication dated 06.12.2025, the Institute sought certain clarifications
from petitioner No.1 which were duly responded to. Thereafter, on
09.12.2025 petitioner No.1 wrote to the Institute bringing to its notice that
the copy of the OEM’s undertaking dated 15.05.2025, uploaded in pursuance
to the second NIT, was for the same work for which bids had been earlier
invited by the Institute through the first NIT and that in such undertaking the
OEM had clearly undertaken to provide full technical support not only at the
time of installation of the gas based fire suppression system at various
GOPAL KRISHAN
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CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
locations in the Institute but also to provide all necessary spares for at least
07 years thereafter. The Institute then wrote to the OEM, a copy of whose
undertaking dated 15.05.2025 had been uploaded by petitioner No.1 in
support of its bid. The Institute sought to confirm from the OEM with regard
to the issuance of the undertaking submitted by petitioner No.1 on its behalf.
In response to the said communication, the OEM, through its letter dated
08.12.2025, informed the Institute that with regard to the second NIT, the
OEM had not issued any authorization or undertaking in favour of petitioner
No. 1. On 11.12.2025, a committee of experts was constituted by the Institute
to evaluate the bids submitted in response to the second NIT.
Such
committee noticed that in the light of the OEM’s response dated 08.12.2025,
petitioner No.1 was ineligible and that with regard to three other bidders,
verification of the undertakings submitted by them from their respective
OEMs be also made. Accordingly, letters were written by the institute to the
OEMs of the said three bidders and their respective OEMs acknowledged the
submission of their respective undertakings. Thereafter, on 22.12.2025 the
expert committee again met and after declaring the other three bidders to be
eligible, permitted the opening of their financial bids, which was done. Out
of the said three bidders, respondent No.4’s bid was found to be the lowest
and it was decided that respondent No.4 be allotted the tender. Through letter
dated 23.12.2025, petitioner No.1 was informed that it had been declared
ineligible and the reasons, as above, were also communicated. It is in these
circumstances that the petitioners have knocked the doors of this Court for
the grant of the aforesaid relief.
GOPAL KRISHAN
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CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in May 2025,
through the first NIT bearing No.PGI/Engg./Elec./2025-26/05, the institute
invited bids for installation and maintenance of a gas based fire suppression
system in all electrical panels at various locations of the Institute; as per
clause 1(c) under Section III of the first NIT, all bidders were required to
upload a certificate from the OEM to the effect that the OEM had authorized
the bidder to bid for the work in question and that the OEM would technically
support the tenderer not only throughout the execution of the contract but
also towards its maintenance and that the OEM would provide all the spares
required for the healthy functioning of the equipment for at least 07 years
from the date of its installation; in response to the first NIT, along with its
bid, petitioner No.1 submitted the required OEM authorization certificate
dated 15.05.2025; the first NIT lapsed and for the same work a second NIT
bearing No.PGI/Engg./Elec./2025-26/18 was published by the institute; since
the work in question in the first and the second NIT was the same, in response
to the second NIT, petitioner No.1, along with his bid uploaded a copy of the
same OEM’s authorization certificate dated 15.05.2025; through the
impugned action the institute has rejected the petitioners’ technical bid on the
ground that the OEM’s authorization certificate submitted by the petitioners
did not mention the reference number of the second NIT which rejection is
arbitrary and perverse because the requirement as per clause 1(c) under
Section III of the second NIT was for uploading the OEM’s authorization
certificate pertaining to the “work in question” irrespective of the number of
the NIT and especially when in relation to the cost of the project which was
Rs.4.88 crores, petitioner No.1 had offered to execute the same at a discount
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CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
of 45% whereas the successful bidder-respondent No.4 has offered a discount
of only 3.5%.
9.
In the light of the above, learned counsel for the petitioners
submitted that the institute had rejected the petitioners’ bid by adopting a
hyper technical approach which is legally impermissible especially when the
petitioners were willing to do the same work for a much lesser amount and
thereby saving public money.
10.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further alleged mala fides by
submitting that in July 2025, in the premises of the institute, petitioner No.2
and respondent No.2 had a scuffle leading to respondent No.2 assaulting
petitioner No.2; in this regard petitioner No.2 had approached the police but
later, though the matter was compromised, respondent No.2 continued to bear
a grudge against petitioner No.2 and orchestrated rejection of petitioner
No.1’s bid submitted in response to the second NIT.
11.
In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners
has relied on the following two judgments of the Supreme Court:1. M/s Shanti Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Odisha &
others,AIR 2025 SC 5516.
2. M/s B.S.N. Joshi and Sons Ltd. Vs. Nair Coal Services Ltd.
and others, (2006) 11 SCC 548.
12.
Learned counsel for the respondent-institute submitted that in
response to the second NIT the petitioners’ bid was accompanied by OEM’s
authorization certificate dated 15.05.2025; since such certificate was about
six months old and did not pertain to the second NIT, the institute wrote to
the OEM seeking it to confirm the issuance of the authorization certificate
dated 15.05.2025; through communication dated 08.12.2025, the OEM
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CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
informed the institute that for the second NIT, the OEM had not issued any
authorization certificate to petitioner No.1; on the basis of the said
information, petitioner No.1’s technical bid was rejected; similar
verifications were also done by the Institute qua the other bidders and only
when their respective OEM authorization certificates were verified, their
financial bids were opened; respondent No.4’s bid having been found to be
the lowest was accepted and that in the light of the above, the petitioner
No.1’s technical bid was rightly rejected in terms of clause 1(c) under Section
III of the second NIT and not on account of any mala fides, as alleged,
especially when the decision to award the tender to respondent No.4 was not
taken by respondent No.2, against whom mala fides are alleged, but by an
expert group which comprised of senior doctors of the institute as also
outside experts.
13.
In support of his contentions, learned counsel for respondent-
institute has relied on the following judgments of the Supreme Court:1. Afcons Infrastructure Vs. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation
(2016) 16 SCC 818.
2. Agmatel India Private Ltd. Vs. Resoursys Telecom & Ors.
(2022) 5 SCC 362 and
3. Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Ltd. Vs.
Mandeepa Enterprises and others, 2025 SCC Online SC
1951.
14.
Learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.5 - the
OEM whose authorization certificate was uploaded by the petitioners
categorically denied the fact that respondent No.5 had permitted the
petitioners to submit any authorization certificate on its behalf in terms of
clause 1(c) under Section III of the second NIT.
GOPAL KRISHAN
2026.03.27 10:35
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CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
15.
Learned counsel for respondent No.2 vehemently denied the
allegations of mala fide raised on behalf of the petitioners; petitioner No.2
was in the habit of making vague and reckless allegations and this was clear
from its communication dated 08.12.2025 (Annexure P-7) wherein petitioner
No.2 had raised allegations of mala fide not against respondent No.2 but also
against respondent No.3 and had rather threatened him with consequences in
case petitioner No.1’s bid was rejected.
16.
Learned counsel for respondent No.2 relied on the following
judgments of the Supreme Court: 1. N. G. Projects Ltd. Vs. Vinod Kumar Jain and others –
(2022) 6 SCC 127.
2. Mutha Associates and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others – (2013) 14 SCC 304.
17.
Learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.4 adopted
the submissions made on the respondent-institute’s behalf.
18.
Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and with their
able assistance the record of the case has also been carefully examined.
19.
In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 the
Supreme Court, after scanning the entire law on the scope and ambit of
judicial review with regard to tender matters, held that ordinarily, in tender
matters, the Courts would exercise judicial restraint; Courts would not sit in
appeal over decisions taken by the authorities in tender matters but should
merely review the manner in which the decision was taken; the Courts would
not have the expertise to correct administrative decisions taken in such
matters and if a review of such decisions would be permitted it would lead to
substituting administrative decisions by the decisions of the Court without
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CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
the necessary expertise which in itself may be fallible; the terms of the
invitation to tender could ordinarily not be subjected to judicial scrutiny
because these terms are in the realm of a contract; the government must have
the freedom to enter into contracts and in this regard is expected to act fairly;
however, such decisions would have to pass the test of reasonableness and
must be free from arbitrariness, not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides;
quashing of administrative decisions by Courts pertaining to tender matters
may impose heavy administrative burden and may lead to increased and
unbudgeted expenditure.
20.
The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Tata
Cellular’s case (supra) read as under: “(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews
the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the administrative
decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision,
without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to
judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm
of contract.
Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award
the contract is reached by process of negotiations through
several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made
qualitatively by experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other
words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for
an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere
or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not
only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of
reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but
must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated
by mala fides.
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(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative
burden on the administration and lead to increased and
unbudgeted expenditure.”
21.
In B. S. N. Joshi and Sons Ltd. vs. Nair Coal Services Ltd.
(2006) 11 SCC 548 after holding that in tender matters the employer would
be the best judge and that constitutional Courts would ordinarily exercise
judicial restraint in interfering with such matters, the Supreme Court laid
down the following principles: “i) If there are essential conditions, the same must be adhered
to.
ii) If there is no power of general relaxation, ordinarily the same
shall not be exercised and the principle of strict compliance
would be applied where it is possible for all the parties to
comply with all such conditions fully.
iii) If, however, a deviation is made in relation to all the parties
in regard to any of such conditions, ordinarily again a power of
relaxation may be held to be existing.
iv) The parties who have taken the benefit of such relaxation
should not ordinarily be allowed to take a different stand in
relation to compliance of another part of tender contract,
particularly when he was also not in a position to comply with
all the conditions of tender fully, unless the court otherwise
finds relaxation of a condition which being essential in nature
could not be relaxed and thus the same was wholly illegal and
without jurisdiction.
v) When a decision is taken by the appropriate authority upon
due consideration of the tender document submitted by all the
tenderers on their own merits and if it is ultimately found that
successful bidders had in fact substantially complied with the
purport and object for which essential conditions were laid
down, the same may not ordinarily be interfered with.
(vi) The contractors cannot form a cartel. If despite the same,
their bids are considered and they are given an offer to match
with the rates quoted by the lowest tenderer, public interest
would be given priority.
(vii) Where a decision has been taken purely on public interest,
the Court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint.”
22.
In Afcons Infrastructure Limited vs. Nagpur Metro Rail
Corporation Limited and another (2016) 16 SCC 818 the Supreme Court
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held that in tender matters a mere disagreement with the decision-making
process or the decision of the authority would not be the only reason for a
constitutional Court to interfere and that the threshold of mala fides, intention
to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met
before a constitutional Court interferes with such decision-making process or
the decision itself. The Supreme Court further went on to hold that the
employer of the project having authored the tender documents would be best
suited to understand its requirements and interpret such documents. A
constitutional Court must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the
tender documents unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding
or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tendered conditions.
In this regard paragraphs 13 and 15 of the judgment are reproduced below
for ready reference: “13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the decisionmaking process or the decision of the administrative authority
is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The threshold
of mala fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness,
irrationality or perversity must be met before the constitutional
court interferes with the decision-making process or the
decision.
14. xx xx xx xx xx
15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project,
having authored the tender documents, is the best person to
understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its
documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this
understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless
there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or
appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender
conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project
may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not
acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a
reason for interfering with the interpretation given.”
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23.
In Silppi Constructions Contractors vs. Union of India and
another (2020) 16 SCC 489 the Supreme Court held that constitutional
Courts should exercise restraint and caution while dealing with tender
matters and that the Courts should give way to the opinion of the experts
unless such decision is perverse because in such matters the Court does not
sit as a Court of appeal and that the authority floating the tender is the best
judge of its requirements. In this regard, the following paragraph of the
judgment may usefully be referred to: “20. The essence of the law laid down in the judgments
referred to above is the exercise of restraint and caution; the
need for overwhelming public interest to justify judicial
intervention in matters of contract involving the State
instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the opinion of
the experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or
unreasonable; the court does not sit like a court of appeal over
the appropriate authority; the court must realise that the
authority floating the tender is the best judge of its requirements
and, therefore, the court’s interference should be minimal. The
authority which floats the contract or tender, and has authored
the tender documents is the best judge as to how the documents
have to be interpreted. If two interpretations are possible then
the interpretation of the author must be accepted. The courts
will only interfere to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias,
mala fides or perversity. With this approach in mind we shall
deal with the present case.”
24.
In M/s Shanti Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Odisha and
others (2025) SCC Online SC 2368 the Supreme Court held that the heart
beat of fair play in tender matters would be non-arbitrariness and fairness in
State’s action and that the Court’s interference would be limited to cases
where the decision making process or the decision itself is arbitrary,
irrational, mala fide or contrary to public interest. The Supreme Court further
held that a public tender was not a private bargain. It was an instrument of
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governance and in such matters the State discharges its solemn duty of a
trustee of public wealth. In tender matters the State’s purpose would not
merely be procedural compliance but maximization of public value through
a fair, transparent and competitive process. The obligation of the tendering
authority was held to be two-fold namely to interpret its own terms with
consistency and to ensure that such interpretation advances the object behind
the tenders. It was still further held that in tender matters constitutional
Courts would interfere only in case the tendered conditions had been
interpreted irrationally which were affecting public interest. Paragraphs 9
and 10 of the judgment, which are relevant, read as follows: 9. We have considered rival submissions and have
perused the record. The contours of judicial review in
contractual matters are settled by a long line of authority. The
‘heart beat of fair play’ in tender matters is non-arbitrariness
and fairness in State action. The court’s interference is limited
to cases where the decision making process is shown to be
arbitrary, irrational, mala fide or contrary to public interest.
(See: Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka &
Others, (2012) 8 SCC 216). The same principle resonates in
Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.
& Others, (2024) 10 SCC 273 wherein this Court reiterated that
decisions of the Government must be free from arbitrariness
and guided by the constitutional mandate contained in Article
14 of the Constitution of India. The principle of restraint
enunciated in TATA Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC
651 that Courts do not interfere in contractual matters of the
State, is accompanied by an equally strong duty to intervene in
decision making process if the same is irrational, perverse or
against public interest.
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10. A public tender is not a private bargain. It is
instrument of governance, a mechanism through which the State
discharges its solemn duty as trustee of public wealth. Its
purpose is not merely procedural compliance, but maximisation
of public value through a process i.e. fair, transparent and
competitive. The obligation of the Tendering Authority is
therefore twofold, namely, to interpret its own terms with
consistency and to ensure that such interpretation advances, not
defeats, the object of tender. The court must intervene in a case
of demonstrable misconstruction of a tender condition or
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irrationality which affects the public interest. When an
interpretation of a tender condition narrows competition and
excludes the highest bidder on a ground unsupported by law,
the decision making process is vitiated. The interpretation of the
terms of tender must, therefore, serve the object and purpose of
the tender mainly to maximise the revenue to the State, when it
deals with a natural resource.”
25.
Similarly, in Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India)
Ltd. vs. Mandeep Enterprises and others (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1959
the Supreme Court held that in tender matters a mere possibility of more
money in the public coffers would not by itself serve public interest and that
maintenance of sanctity of tenders in governmental procurement processes
was of a great importance. Even if for a moment it is assumed that there was
a technical fault in the tender, which if rectified, could generate more revenue
that by itself would not be a reason enough for the Court to interfere. In this
regard, paragraphs 39 and 40 of the judgment are extracted below:“39. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in CIDCO v. Shishir
Realty Private Limited, observed that when a contract is being
evaluated, the mere possibility of more money in the public
coffers does not in itself serve public interest. This Court held
as follows:
61. When a contract is being evaluated, the mere
possibility of more money in the public coffers, does not
in itself serve public interest. A blanket claim by the State
claiming loss of public money cannot be used to forego
contractual obligations, especially when it is not based
on any evidence or examination. The larger public
interest of upholding contracts and the fairness of public
authorities is also in play. The courts need to have a
broader understanding of public interest, while
reviewing such contracts.
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40. The above proposition has been followed by another threeJudge Bench of this Court in the recent case of Subodh Kumar
Singh Rathore v. Chief Executive Officer, when it examined the
concept of public interest in administrative decisions relating to
award of contracts. This Court held that even assuming for a
moment that there was technical fault in the tender, which if
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rectified had the possibility of generating more revenue, the
same by no stretch could be said to be a cogent reason for
concealing an already existing tender. This Court highlighted
the importance of maintaining the sanctity of tenders in
governmental procurement processes. Public tenders are the
cornerstone of governmental procurement processes, being
competitive and ensuring fairness and transparency in the
allocation of public resources. Public tenders are designed to
provide a level playing field for all potential bidders, fostering
an environment where competition thrives. The integrity of this
process ensures that public projects and resources are
delivered efficiently and effectively, benefiting the society at
large. Therefore, sanctity of public tenders and contract is a
fundamental principle that underpins the stability and
predictability of legal and commercial relationships. Infact this
Court put in a word of caution that considerations of public
interest should not be narrowly confined to financial aspect
only.”
26.
In Surguja Bricks Industries Company vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and others (2025) SCC OnLine SC 2916 the Supreme Court,
while following the law laid down in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd.’s case
(supra) held that the tender inviting authority would be the best judge to
appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents as also that ordinarily
a constitutional Court would defer to the understanding of the tender inviting
authority. However, if the interpretation by the tender inviting authority is
found to be mala fide or perverse then the constitutional Court should
intervene. Likewise, if the interpretation of the tender inviting authority is
irrational or absurd leading to arbitrary consequences, it would be duty of a
constitutional Court to interfere with such a decision because to hold
otherwise would render the very object of judicial review an empty formality.
The relevant extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Surguja
Bricks Industries Company’s case (supra) reads as under: -
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“27. There is no dispute to the proposition that the tender
inviting authority is the best judge to understand and appreciate
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its requirements and interpret its documents. In Afcons
Infrastructure Ltd. and in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. as well as in
subsequent decisions, this Court has upheld this principle
observing that ordinarily constitutional courts should defer to
the understanding of the tender inviting authority of the tender
documents. However, this principle has its own limitations. If
the interpretation of the tender inviting authority or its
understanding of the tender conditions is vitiated by mala fides
or perversity, there is no question of a constitutional court
showing deference to such understanding. Likewise, if the
interpretation of the tender inviting authority of a particular
condition of tender, such as, an eligibility criteria as in the
present case is irrational or absurd leading to arbitrary
consequences, it would be the duty of a constitutional court to
interdict such a decision making process. To hold otherwise
would render the very object of judicial review otiose.”
27.
In Kimberley Club Pvt. Ltd. vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Parishad and others (2025) SCC OnLine SC 2323 the Supreme Court
reiterated that in tender matters the Court exercising judicial review does not
sit in appeal over the decision of a tendering authority regarding
disqualification of a bid and only in cases where such decision is dehors the
terms of the notice inviting tender or is perverse would the Court not only
interfere but also set aside such a decision. In this regard, the following
observations of the Supreme Court may be usefully extracted: 11. In tender matters, the court exercising judicial review does
not sit in appeal over the decision of a tendering authority
regarding disqualification of bid. Only in cases where such
decision is dehors the terms of the NIT or is patently arbitrary
would the Court exercise powers of judicial review and set aside
such decision.”
28.
On a harmonious reading of the afore referred judgments of the
Supreme Court, the law settled by the Supreme Court that can be culled out
is that in tender matters Constitutional Courts would ordinarily exercise
judicial restraint; the Court does not sit in appeal over administrative
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decisions taken in tender matters because the Court does not possess the
required expertise; the essential terms of the NIT must be given effect to but
these terms and the administrative decisions taken in pursuance thereof as
also the process followed to arrive at such decisions have to pass the test of
reasonableness, must be free from arbitrariness, are not to be affected by bias
or actuated by mala fides and should further public interest; the author of the
tender documents is best suited to appreciate its requirements unless there is
mala fide or perversity in such understanding; a mere disagreement with the
decision making process or the decision of the administrative authority in
tender matters will not be a reason enough for the constitutional Courts to
interfere unless such process or decision does not cross the threshold of
perversity or arbitrariness or is against public interest; when the State has
issued the NIT or taken the administrative decision, while doing so, it
discharges its solemn duty as a trustee of public wealth but at the same time
in these matters a mere possibility of more money entering public coffers will
not by itself be held to serve the larger public interest and that maintenance
of sanctity of tenders in governmental procurement process would be of a
greater importance.
29.
Now let us apply the afore principles to the facts of the instant
case.
30.
In May 2025, through the first NIT, the Institute invited bids for
setting up a gas based fire suppression system in all electrical panels at
various locations of the Institute. As per clause 1(c) under Section III of the
first NIT, along with its application, the bidder was required to upload an
undertaking from the manufacturer whose equipment it intended to supply
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and install. Such undertaking was for unconditional support to the tenderer
by the equipment manufacturer towards not only the execution of the contract
and its maintenance but also to provide spares for at least seven years from
the date of installation.
31.
Clause 1(c) under Section III contained in the first NIT is
extracted below for ready reference:“c)
The Agency should upload an undertaking from the OEM as
defined in “List of approved make” regarding following:. (Scanned copy
of all the following to be uploaded).:
(i)
Authorization certificate from OEM for this specific work.
(ii)
The OEM is unconditionally support the tenderer technically
throughout the execution of contract as well as for
Maintenance/Comprehensive Maintenance Contract for the useful life of
the system.
(iii) OEM provides all the spares required for healthy functioning of the
equipment for at least seven years from the date of supply of equipment.”
32.
The object behind submission of the undertaking/authorization
certificate by the OEM, in terms of the afore quoted clause was important
because none of the bidders were manufacturers of the equipment they
intended to supply and install.
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33.
In response to the first NIT, petitioner No.1 submitted its bid
and along with its application the OEM’s authorization certificate dated
15.05.2025, was also uploaded.
34.
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By efflux of time, the first NIT lapsed.
CWP-39639-2025 (O&M)
35.
For the same work, as above, the Institute, through the second
NIT, published in November 2025, invited fresh bids. The second NIT also
contained the afore quoted clause 1(c) under Section III. Petitioner No.1
responded to the second NIT as well. Along with its application, petitioner
No.1 appended a copy of the OEM’s certificate dated 15.05.2025 which it
had earlier uploaded in response to the first NIT. No fresh OEM certificate
was obtained or uploaded.
36.
Though the first and the second NIT pertained to the same work,
their processes were independent of each other. These NITs were also about
six months apart and during this period, the record reveals that the
manufacturer, whose equipment petitioner No.1 intended to supply had
withdrawn its authorization given to petitioner No.1 earlier because after
petitioner No.1 had responded to the second NIT, the Institute has written to
petitioner No.1’s OEM to verify as to whether it backed petitioner No.1’s bid
submitted by it in response to the second NIT. Through letter dated
08.12.2025, petitioner No.1’s OEM clearly responded in the negative.
37.
Even before us it is the categoric stand of respondent No.5, who
petitioner No.1 claims to be its OEM that it does not back petitioner No.1’s
bid made in response to the second NIT.
38.
In the light of the above, in response to the second NIT,
petitioner No.1 is clearly ineligible as it does not meet the mandatory
conditions laid down in the second NIT. In fact, acceptance of petitioner
No.1’s bid would lead to a situation wherein it would be virtually impossible
for petitioner No.1 to execute the work in question.
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39.
In the light of the fact that petitioner No.1’s bid, submitted in
response to the second NIT is not backed by its OEM and keeping in view,
in the facts of the present case, the importance of submission of the OEM’s
authorization certificate, the rejection of petitioner No.1’s bid by the Institute
is found to be justified and not on account of any oversight on the Institute’s
part as sought to be projected by learned counsel for the petitioners. Equally
so, such stand of the respondent-Institute was not hyper technical which
could have been overlooked keeping in view only financial considerations.
40.
We also find that the Institute adopted a fair and transparent
approach by writing to the OEMs of all the bidders and considered them to
be technically qualified only after their respective OEMs backed their bids.
41.
In the light of the above discussion, the allegations of mala fide
raised by the petitioners against respondent No.2 also do not entitle them to
the grant of any relief especially when, out of the eligible bidders, respondent
No.4 quoted the best price and that the decision to allot the tender to
respondent No.4 is found by us to have been taken by a Committee of experts
which included senior doctors of the Institute and outside experts as also that
such process was applied to all bidders alike and thus was fair and just.
42.
Dismissed.
43.
No costs.
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