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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 16.09.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010402912026
+
RC.REV. 310/2026, CM APPL. 57928/2026 (Ex.), CM APPL.
57929/2026 (Stay)
JUGAL KISHORE
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Lokesh Kumar, Advocate
through Video Conferencing.
versus
VIJAY KUMAR FARSHWL (DECEASED) THR LRS
.....Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
CM APPL. 57930/2026 (Delay of 33 days in Re-filing the Petition)
1.
The present Application, filed under Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, seeks condonation of delay of 33 days in refiling of the above-captioned Rent Revision Petition, being RC.REV.
310/2026.
2.
For the reasons as stated therein, the present Application is
allowed and, accordingly stands disposed of.
RC.REV. 310/2026
3.
The present Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 19581, seeks to assail the Order dated
27.04.20262 passed by the learned SCJ-cum-RC, Central District,
DRC Act
Impugned Order
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:06:07
RC.REV. 310/2026
Tis Hazari Court, Delhi3 in the Eviction Petition, being RC/ARC
No. 177/20224, titled “Vijay Kumar Farshwal vs. Jugal Kishore”.
4.
By way of the Impugned Order, the Application seeking leave
to defend filed by the Petitioner came to be dismissed and,
consequently, an Eviction Order came to be passed in favour of the
Respondent, with respect to the tenanted premises, being Property
No. 9340, Katra Ganga Bishan, Bagh Raoji, Gaushala Marg,
Kishan Ganj, Delhi-1100065.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
5.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner seeks to
challenge the Impugned Order on two interrelated grounds, namely,
first, that there exists no landlord-tenant relationship between the
parties since the Respondent is not the owner of the Subject Premises
and second, that the Subject Premises forms part of Nazul Land and,
therefore, the Respondent could not claim and certainly not establish
ownership thereof.
6.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner, elaborating upon the
aforesaid first ground, submits that the Respondent has failed to
establish his ownership over the Subject Premises and that no
document evidencing such ownership was placed before the learned
RC. It is, therefore, contended that, in the absence of any material
establishing
the
Respondent’s
ownership,
the
foundational
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties itself remains
unsubstantiated, and that the learned RC erroneously held otherwise,
rendering the finding against the law.
7.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner further, with respect to the
RC
Eviction Petition
Subject Premises
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 310/2026
second aspect, submits that the Subject Premises forms part of Nazul
Land and, consequently, vests in the Government. It is, therefore,
contended the character of the land as Nazul Land negates the
Respondent’s claim of ownership over the Subject Premises and, in
turn, casts a direct cloud over the finding of the learned RC that there
existed a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.
8.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the aforesaid
two objections are intrinsically connected, inasmuch as the
Respondent’s alleged ownership constitutes the foundation of his
claim as landlord, while the property being Nazul Land, militates
against such claim. It is, therefore, contended that the Respondent
lacked the requisite locus to maintain the Eviction Petition against the
Petitioner.
9.
No other submissions have been advanced by the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner.
ANALYSIS:
10.
This Court has heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and,
with his able assistance, perused the material available on record,
including the Impugned Order.
11.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
12.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.6, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
(1998) 8 SCC 119
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 310/2026
Singh7, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua8, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
13.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.9, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover10.
14.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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RC.REV. 310/2026
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
15.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
16.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Judgment
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
17.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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RC.REV. 310/2026
Petitioner against the Impugned Judgment are required to be
examined.
18.
Before adverting to the facts of the present case, for the sake of
completeness and clarity, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the
findings returned by the learned RC, regarding to the aforesaid two
aspects of challenge, sought to be raised on behalf of the Petitioner.
The relevant portions of the Impugned Order read as under:
“Ownership of tenanted premises and relationship of landlordtenant between petitioners and respondent :
11. Respondent has raised the contention that the petitioner is not
the owner of the tenanted premises. Per contra, petitioner has
averred that by virtue of registered partition deed dated 22.03.1959,
his father namely, Sh. Ganga Bishan became the owner of property
bearing no. 9321 to 9340, Katra Ganga Bishan, Bagh Raoji,
Gaushala Marg, Kishanganj, Delhi-110006, which includes the
tenanted premises, and subsequently, Sh. Ganga Bishan bequeathed
the same to his wife/Smt. Mukhtiar Kanwar @ Mukhtiar Kaur vide
registered Will dated 11.06.1963. Thereafter, Smt. Mukhtiar
Kanwar @ Mukhtiar Kaur bequeathed the aforesaid property in
favour of her son i.e. the present petitioner vide registered Will
dated 24.04.1982.
12. It is well-settled that for the purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act, a landlord is not required to establish absolute ownership
in the manner contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act. It
is sufficient for the landlord to demonstrate that his title is superior
to that of the tenant. In Shanti Sharma & Ors. v. Ved Prabha &
Ors.,(1987) 4 SCC 193, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
term “owner” in this context is to be understood vis-à-vis the
tenant, meaning thereby that the landlord must show himself to be
“something more than the tenant.’ Reliance may also be placed on
Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Leela Wati & Ors., 155(2008)
DLT 383, wherein the same principle was reiterated. In the present
matter, petitioner has supported his claim of ownership by filing
partition deed dated 22.03.1959 as well as Will dated 11.06.1963 &
Will dated 24.04.1982 executed by Sh. Ganga Bishan and Smt.
Mukhtiar Kanwar @ Mukhtiar Kaur respectively. The registered
Will dated 24.04.1982 of Smt. Mukhtiar Kaur records that property
bearing no. 9321 to 9340, Katra Ganga Bishan, Bagh Raoji, Delhi
fell in the share of Sh. Ganga Bishan vide partition deed dated
22.03.1959 and that same was bequeathed to her by him vide Will
dated 11.06.1963. The entire chain of documents filed by the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:06:07
RC.REV. 310/2026
petitioner corroborates the averments of the petitioner and same are
also registered documents. Respondent, on the other hand, has
neither filed any document either to counter the documents relied
upon by the petitioner, nor has he filed any document to establish
himself as the owner of the tenanted premises. Thus, court has no
reason to doubt the genuineness of the documents filed by the
petitioner. By way of filing aforesaid documents, petitioner has
established that his title qua the tenanted premises is more than that
of a tenant.
13. Respondent claims ownership over the tenanted premises by
way of adverse possession stating that he is in continuous,
uninterrupted and settled possession of the tenanted premises for
about last 70 years. In order to successfully claim title by adverse
possession, one is first required to admit title of the true owner and
then must claim possession adverse and hostile to such owner. In
the present matter, the respondent has merely stated that the
tenanted premises is owned by the Government and not by the
petitioner but he has not brought any material to substantiate the
same. In absence of any material to corroborate the same, the
aforesaid plea of respondent comes across as a mere convenient
plea, raising no triable issue.
14. Further, respondent was required to disclose the month and year
from which his alleged adverse possession had commenced.
However, respondent has failed to disclose the same. The bald
claim of the respondent that he is in possession of the tenanted
premises since 70 years, without specifying the date, month or year
when his alleged adverse possession commenced, raises no triable
issue. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Hansraj V/s
Jagminder Singh & Ors. 2017 (8) AD (Delhi) 483 wherein Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi has held as under :“9. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that
the courts look with disfavour at the claim of adverse
possession. Adverse possession is looked upon with
disfavour because adverse possession commences in a
wrong i.e. act of wrongful possession and is maintained
against a right i.e. right, title and interest of the true
owner. Adverse possession has to be proved by clear cut
evidence showing when the adverse possession
commences i.e. the date, month and year or at least the
month and year and adverse possession has to be proved
to be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Wrong possession is
not automatically an adverse possession. Also for
commencement of adverse possession, it should be
brought to the notice of the true owner the claim of
adverse possession so that the true owner can take all
steps in accordance with law.”
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:06:07
RC.REV. 310/2026
15. It is now to be ascertained whether there exists relationship of
landlord and tenant between the parties. The Court is of the opinion
that the petitioner is not required to prove a perfect and absolute
title over the premises for the purpose of establishing his locus to
file eviction petition against the tenant. In the present case,
petitioner has filed various rent receipts issued by him, wherein Sh.
Satpal/father of respondent is mentioned as a tenant. Now,
respondent has merely alleged that the rent receipts filed by the
petitioner are forged and fabricated. The respondent has not
brought any document bearing the genuine signature of Sh. Satpal
to show that his signatures appearing on said rent receipts are
forged ones. The said contention of respondent is only a bald selfserving ipse dixit averment. It is not the case of the respondent that
he has filed any criminal case against the petitioner for
forging/fabricating said documents. Thus, court has no reason to
doubt the genuineness of aforesaid rent receipts. Pertinently, if
respondent’s father was a tenant in the tenanted premises,
respondent cannot claim a better title than that of a tenant qua the
same. Thus, no triable issue is raised in this regard. It may be
mentioned here that the respondent has relied upon case titled
Ashish Bharti @ Rocky Jha Vs. State of Bihar in support of his
argument that issuance of rent receipt does not establish ownership.
However, said citation lends no support to the respondent as the
provision of Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act was not involved in
aforesaid matter. Thus, no triable issue is raised in this regard.
16. Respondent’s contention that the partition deed and Wills relied
upon by the petitioner were not properly executed/not signed by
executant/witness is not tenable as respondent, who has been found
to be a tenant, has no locus to dispute or find flaws in the
documents of the landlord/petitioner.
17. It may be mentioned here that during the course of arguments,
it was argued on behalf of the respondent that the tenanted
premises is not owned by the petitioner rather the same is situated
in a Nazul land, belonging to the Government. The above
contention fails to raise any triable issue for the simple reason that
above contention has not been taken in the leave to defend
application of the respondent but same was raised only during the
course of arguments. It is not open to the respondent to take any
additional ground after filing of the leave defend application.
Respondent has filed certain documents in support of his aforesaid
contention at the stage of filing of written synopsis. It would suffice
to say that aforesaid documents filed subsequent to filing of leave
to defend application cannot be considered for deciding the present
application. However, even if said documents are considered, they
fail to raise any triable issue. Two such documents are letters
written by Tehsildar, Civil Lines whereby he seeks confirmation if
certain Khasras are Nazul land. Apparently, said letters merely seek
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:06:07
RC.REV. 310/2026
confirmation but do not declare or record any land as Nazul land. A
list of Nazul land is also attached with the written synopsis of
respondent but same does not mention any notification etc. which
may have declared such land as Nazul land and hence, it is of no
aid to the respondent. Having said that, even if it is assumed that
the tenanted premises is situated in Nazul land, no ground is made
out to grant the respondent leave to defend the present petition.
This is because the present matter is not a suit for adjudication of
title but is an eviction petition, wherein petitioner need not prove
absolute title but has to merely show that he is more than a tenant
in the tenanted premises. In discussion made above, court has
already reached the finding that petitioner has established himself
as the landlord of the respondent qua the tenanted premises. Now,
it is settled law that as per the doctrine of tenant’s estoppel, a tenant
is precluded from denying the title of the landlord during the
continuance of the tenancy. Thus, it is not open to the respondent
herein to question the title of the petitioner in the present
proceedings and he is estopped from questioning the same. In view
of above, aforesaid contention of respondent is not tenable and
same raises no triable issue.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19.
Adverting to the facts of the present case, insofar as the first
contention urged on behalf of the Petitioner is concerned, a perusal of
the Impugned Order makes it apparent that the learned RC has
returned a finding on the question of ownership as well as the
relationship of landlord and tenant after duly considering the material
placed on record. The learned RC notes that the Respondent has traced
his claim over the Subject Premises through a chain of registered
documents, commencing from the registered partition deed dated
22.03.1959, followed by the registered Will dated 11.06.1963 and the
subsequent registered Will dated 24.04.1982 and, therefore, held that
these documents, taken cumulatively, support the Respondent’s claim
of ownership in respect of the Subject Premises.
20.
The learned RC has rightly held that for the purposes of an
Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the
Respondent was not required to establish a title in the manner in
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:06:07
RC.REV. 310/2026
which the same would be required to be established in an independent
suit for declaration of title. The relevant enquiry, in the context of the
said Eviction Petition, was whether the Respondent had demonstrated
a title or interest in the Subject Premises superior to that of the
Petitioner. The learned RC, relying upon the settled position in this
regard, has returned a categorical finding that the Respondent had
established a title over the Subject Premises superior to that of the
Petitioner.
21.
The aforesaid conclusion is further fortified by the rent receipts
placed on record by the Respondent, which record the father of the
Petitioner, namely, Sh. Satpal, as the tenant in the Subject Premises.
The Petitioner has merely alleged that the said rent receipts are forged
and fabricated, without placing on record any material to substantiate
such allegation. In these circumstances, the learned RC was justified
in treating the said objection as a bald assertion. Once the Respondent
had placed on record material indicating the tenancy of the
Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, the mere denial of the same,
unsupported by any cogent material, could not, in the facts of the
present case, constitute a triable issue.
22.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that the learned RC has duly considered the question
of ownership as also the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship
between the parties. The finding returned on these aspects, therefore,
cannot be said to be perverse, contrary to law, or so unreasonable as to
warrant interference in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction of
this Court. The first ground of challenge, accordingly, does not merit
any interference.
23.
Moving to the second limb of the challenge, which rests upon
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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RC.REV. 310/2026
the assertion that the Subject Premises forms part of Nazul Land and,
consequently, that the Respondent could not claim ownership thereof
and lacked the locus to maintain the Eviction Petition, this Court is of
the considered view that the said contention is equally devoid of merit.
24.
This Court takes note of the fact that the aforesaid contention
was not raised by the Petitioner in the Application seeking leave to
defend filed before the learned RC. The said contention was sought to
be raised for the first time during the course of arguments before the
learned RC, when the Petitioner sought to rely upon certain
documents, which were subsequently placed on record along with the
Written Submissions. The learned RC, therefore, rightly declined to
consider the said contention, having regard to the fact that the same
did not form part of the pleadings or the grounds raised in the
Application seeking leave to defend.
25.
There is yet another fundamental difficulty in the submission
advanced by the Petitioner. The Eviction Petition under the DRC Act
are not concerned with adjudication of an absolute title to the Subject
Premises. The limited question before the learned RC, while
considering the Application for leave to defend, was whether the
Respondent had established the requisite relationship of landlord and
tenant and whether the Petitioner had disclosed a triable issue
warranting a trial. Having regard to the registered documents relied
upon by the Respondent and the rent receipts evidencing the tenancy
of the Petitioner’s father, the learned RC concluded that the
Respondent had demonstrated a title superior to that of the Petitioner.
26.
Thus, even if the contention regarding the alleged Nazul
character of the land were to be considered, the same would not, in the
facts of the present case, ipso facto displace the Respondent’s status as
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:06:07
RC.REV. 310/2026
landlord for the purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The
Petitioner had also not placed any material before the learned RC
demonstrating that the Government had asserted a competing title in
respect of the Subject Premises or that the Respondent’s status as
landlord vis-à-vis the Petitioner stood extinguished or otherwise
rendered incapable of enforcement. The contention, therefore, does
not disclose any such prima facie defence as would warrant grant of
leave to defend.
27.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that permitting the Petitioner to introduce such a
factual controversy for the first time in revision, having not been
articulated in their Application seeking leave to defend, would
necessarily require this Court to undertake an enquiry into facts and
documents which were not placed before the learned RC at the
appropriate stage. Such an exercise would be contrary to the limited
scope of revisional scrutiny under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of
the DRC Act.
28.
The Impugned Order, therefore, does not suffer from any
absence of adjudication. The learned RC has considered each of the
objections raised before it and has furnished reasons for concluding
that they did not give rise to any triable issue. The grounds urged
before this Court essentially seek a re-examination of the material
already considered by the learned RC, and do not demonstrate any
jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity or manifest
illegality in the decision-making process.
DECISION:
29.
This Court is of the considered view that the Petitioner has
failed to demonstrate any infirmity in the manner in which the learned
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:06:07
RC.REV. 310/2026
RC considered the objections concerning the Respondent’s ownership
and the relationship of landlord and tenant. The findings returned by
the learned RC are founded upon the material available on record and
cannot be said to be either perverse or so unreasonable as to warrant
interference in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction of this
Court. The Impugned Order, therefore, does not warrant any
interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Act.
30.
Consequently, the present Petition, being sans merit, is
dismissed.
31.
The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in aforementioned terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 16, 2026/nd/DJ
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:06:07
RC.REV. 310/2026
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