Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Judgment reserved on: 14.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 05.02.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 05.02.2026
+
FAO (COMM) 201/2024 and CM APPL. 78046/2025
JONES LANG LASALLE BUILDING OPERATIONS
PRIVATE LIMITED
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ankit Yadav, Ms. Gunjan
Rathore, Ms. Shivangi Gulati
and Ms. Aastha Harshwal,
Advs.
versus
TECHPARK
LIMITED
MAINTENANCE
Through:
SERVICES PRIVATE
.....Respondent
Mr. Sanjoy Ghosh, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Lokesh Bhola, Mr.
Rohan Mandal, Mr. Mohit Garg
and Mr. Abhishek Singh
Chauhan, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
1.
Through the present Appeal, the Appellant/Claimant assails the
correctness of the Judgment and Order dated 06.07.2024 [hereinafter
referred to as „Impugned Judgment‟], passed by the learned District
Judge [hereinafter referred to as „LDJ‟], whereby the petition filed by
the Respondent under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 [hereinafter referred to as „Act of 1996‟] came to be
allowed.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
2.
By way of the Impugned Judgment, the LDJ had set aside the
Arbitral Award dated 17.11.2022 [hereinafter referred to as „Arbitral
Award‟], in terms whereof the Appellant had been awarded, (i) a sum
of Rs. 68,92,133.95/- towards the outstanding payment of invoices
raised during the years 2013 and 2014; (ii) interest thereon at the rate
of 12% per annum from the end of calendar month of the respective
invoices until 27.04.2018; (iii) pendente lite interest at the rate of 12%
per annum on the awarded amount from 28.04.2018 to 17.11.2022;
(iv) post award interest at the rate of 12% per annum, if payment is
made within 30 days of the award; failing which, interest at the rate of
18% per annum shall be applicable from the date of award till the
actual date of payment; and (iv) costs quantified at Rs. 5,00,000/-.
3.
The Appellant contends that the LDJ, while passing the
Impugned Judgment, committed a jurisdictional error under Section
34 of the Act of 1996, by substituting its own reasoning for that of the
learned Arbitrator, despite having acknowledged that the Arbitral
Award was founded on the evidence on record. It is also the case of
the Appellant that the Arbitral Award reflects due application of mind,
having been arrived at, upon a consideration of the submissions made
by the parties and evidence adduced, and as such did not warrant any
interference by the LDJ.
4.
Accordingly, the issue that falls for consideration before this
Court is whether the learned Arbitrator, while passing the Arbitral
Award, has given sufficient reasons to justify the conclusion that the
Appellant is entitled to the sum awarded along with the interest
granted thereon.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
BRIEF FACTS:
5.
In order to comprehend the issues involved in the present case,
relevant facts in brief are required to be noticed.
6.
The lis between the parties has its genesis in a commercial
dispute concerning a total of 12 unpaid invoices raised by the
Appellant pursuant to Property Management Agreement dated
01.12.2011 [hereinafter referred to as „Agreement‟], executed between
the parties herein.
7.
The Appellant is a private limited company engaged in the
provision of real estate and property management services, whereas
the Respondent is also a private limited company engaged in the
business of outsourced services, operating inter alia from Gurgaon,
India. In the year 2011, the Respondent, reposing confidence in the
expertise of the Appellant, engaged its services under the Agreement
for the management of a commercial project known as Welldone IT
Park, Gurgaon.
8.
The Agreement was initially executed for a fixed tenure of two
years, spanning from 01.01.2011 to 31.12.2012, and was subsequently
extended for the year 2013 by issuance of Letter of Intent (LOI) by the
Respondent. The project site was handed over to the Respondent only
in June 2014, marking the culmination of the on-site responsibilities
of the Appellant.
9.
It has been the case of the Appellant that it faithfully discharged
its contractual obligations under the Agreement until May, 2014 and
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
raised invoices corresponding to the services rendered thereof. While
7 invoices pertaining to the year 2013 were partially paid, 5 invoices
raised for the year 2014 remained unpaid or inadequately discharged
by the Respondent. As per the Appellant, notwithstanding the
assurances held out by the Respondent that all outstanding dues would
be liquidated upon the handover of the site, the outstanding amounts
remained in arrears.
10.
Consequently, the Appellant issued reminder letters dated
29.01.2015 and 18.02.2015, followed by notices of demand dated
06.07.2015 and 18.03.2016. Despite repeated correspondences from
the Appellant, the Respondent replied only to the notice issued in
2016 and, vide its communication dated 13.05.2016, disputed the
claim of the Appellant on the ground of alleged unsatisfactory
services.
11.
Thereafter, the Appellant instituted a civil suit bearing CS No.
1190/2016, seeking recovery of the outstanding amount due and
payable by the Respondent. However, upon an application filed by the
Respondent under Section 8 of the Act of 1996, the dispute was
referred to arbitration vide order dated 17.04.2018. Following
unsuccessful attempts at amicable settlement, the Appellant invoked
arbitration under Section 21 of the Act of 1996. Since the Respondent
failed to appoint an arbitrator, the Appellant approached this Court by
way of Arb. P. No. 629/2020 under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996,
pursuant to which this Court vide order dated 14.01.2021 appointed a
Sole Arbitrator.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
12.
The Appellant filed its Statement of Claim on 05.04.2021,
seeking relief, inter alia, claiming a sum of Rs. 1,16,47,708/- along
with pendente lite and future interest therein at the rate of 18% per
annum. Additionally, an application under Section 14(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 [hereinafter referred to as „Act of 1963‟] was
also filed by the Appellant. Whereafter, on 15.06.2021, the
Respondent filed its counter claim along with an application under
Section 16 of the Act of 1996, praying for the statement of claim to be
barred by limitation. The learned Arbitrator vide its Order dated
12.10.2021, allowed the application filed by the Appellant, while
rejecting the application filed by the Respondent.
13.
Upon careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence, the
learned Arbitrator passed the Arbitral Award on 17.11.2022, allowing
the claims of the Appellant for payment of the outstanding amounts in
respect of the unpaid invoices along with interest, while rejecting the
counterclaims of the Respondent.
14.
Aggrieved by the Arbitral Award, the Respondent invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, wherein
the LDJ, by the Impugned Judgment, proceeded to allow the petition
and set aside the Arbitral Award rendering a view that the Award is
non-speaking and as such contrary to the public policy of India, since
it does not meet the mandate of Section 31(3) of the Act of 1996.
15.
Dissatisfied with the Impugned Judgment, the Appellant has
preferred the present appeal.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT:
16.
Learned counsel for the Appellant, while controverting the
findings of the LDJ, and supporting the findings in the Arbitral
Award, has made the following submissions:
16.1 While relying upon the judgment of Supreme Court in
Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority1; and Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja2, it has been argued that the presence
of an alternative view cannot be a ground to set-aside the Arbitral
Award. Since, the findings arrived at in the Arbitral Award was based
on due consideration of evidence and submissions made by the parties
before the learned Arbitrator.
16.2 It is argued that the view taken by the LDJ is contradictory
inasmuch as the LDJ, while observing that the findings of the Arbitral
Award was based on evidence, supplanted its own reasoning by
stating that the learned Arbitrator has not provided an adequate
reasoning while rendering the Arbitral Award. Reliance in this regard
has been placed on Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd v. Crompton Greaves
Ltd.3, to argue that for an order to be considered a reasoned one, it
must be proper, intelligible and adequate.
16.3 Placing further reliance on Dyna Technologies (Supra), it has
been argued that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 34 of
the Act of 1996, the Court must draw a distinction between
unintelligible awards and inadequate reasoning. It has further been
(2015) 3 SCC 49
(2004) 5 SCC 109
(2019) 20 SCC 1
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
argued that a Court acting under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, must
examine the reasoning of the Arbitrator after considering the
complexity of issue, submissions made and documents submitted by
the parties thereof, so that the award with inadequate reasoning are not
set aside in a casual and cavalier manner.
16.4 Lastly, it has been argued that the Arbitral Award was passed
after application of judicial mind, thereby granting an interest at 12%
per annum, however, the Respondent has misled the DJ by falsely
claiming that the Appellant was awarded an interest at the rate of 18%
per annum.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:
17.
Per contra, learned senior counsel for the Respondent, while
supporting the findings recorded in the Impugned Judgment, has made
the following submissions:
17.1
It has been argued that the LDJ, while passing the Impugned
Judgment, adopted a nuanced and balanced approach in harmonizing
the requirements of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 with those of
Section 31(3) of the Act of 1996, remaining strictly within the
statutory contours and without venturing into a re-appreciation of the
merits of the dispute.
17.2 Referring to Paragraph No.C-1 of the Arbitral Award, it has
been argued that, although the said paragraph relies upon the
reasoning provided under Paragraph Nos.E.27 and E.30, however, a
perusal of the same reflects that the learned Arbitrator has failed to
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
furnish proper reasoning, thereby rendering the Award contrary to the
mandate of Section 31(3) of the Act of 1996.
17.3 Further reference has been made to Paragraph No.E.30 of the
Arbitral Award, to argue that, despite recording the failure of the
Appellant to prove the admitted rate of interest, the learned Arbitrator
nonetheless proceeded to grant interest at the rate of 18% per annum
under Paragraph No.E.31.
17.4 Lastly, it has been contended that, while awarding the sum of
Rs.68,92,133.95/- to the Appellant, the learned Arbitrator has failed to
appreciate and frame an issue with respect to the full and final
settlement between the parties, while disregarding the evidence
produced in this regard.
ANALYSIS AND REASONING:
18.
This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at
considerable length and has also undertaken a thorough and
comprehensive examination of the entire appeal record, including the
Impugned Judgment rendered by the LDJ as well as the Arbitral
Award passed by the learned Arbitrator.
19.
The core issue as already stated in the introductory paragraph of
this judgment, is that whether the Arbitral Award constitutes a
reasoned award in accordance with Section 31(3) of the Act of 1996,
and whether the alleged inadequacy of reasoning renders the Arbitral
Award contrary to the public policy of India.
20.
At the outset, it is pertinent to highlight that this Court, while
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
sitting in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, is conscious
about the limited scope of interference that can be exercised in such
proceedings. An appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, is narrow
in its compass and is confined to examining the legality of findings
rendered by the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996. The appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act of
1996 is akin to, and cannot travel beyond, the restrictions imposed
upon the Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996; it does not confer
a general appellate power to reassess the merits of the Arbitral Award.
21.
Both Sections 34 and 37 of the Act of 1996 are structured to
ensure minimal judicial interference with the Arbitral Awards, in
order to preserve the time-efficient and expeditious nature of
arbitration
as
an
alternative
dispute
resolution
mechanism.
Consequently, the Court is precluded from re-appreciating evidence,
re-assessing factual findings, or sitting in appeal over the Arbitrator‟s
interpretation of the contract, so long as the view adopted by the
Arbitrator is a plausible one founded on the material available on
record. Interference is permissible only on the limited grounds
statutorily enumerated in Section 34 of the Act of 1996, including
where the award is in conflict with the public policy of India or is
vitiated by patent illegality going to the root of the matter, and even
then, re-appreciation of evidence is expressly impermissible.
22.
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that a Court under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 does not sit in appeal over an Arbitral
Award, and that an appellate court under Section 37 of the Act of
1996 has an even more circumscribed jurisdiction, being confined to
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
testing whether the Court acting under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
has kept its findings within the bounds of the limited statutory power
vested in it. Consequently, this Court, in the present appeal under
Section 37 of the Act of 1996, cannot undertake an independent
reassessment of the merits of the dispute, nor can it substitute its own
view for that of the Arbitrator, merely because another view is
possible.
23.
The Supreme Court in the judgment of Punjab State Civil
Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills4, contemplated upon the
limited and supervisory nature of an appeal under Section 37 and has
observed that:
“11. Section 37 of the Act provides for a forum of appeal inter-alia
against the order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral
award under Section 34 of the Act. The scope of appeal is naturally
akin to and limited to the grounds enumerated under Section 34 of the
Act.
12. It is pertinent to note that an arbitral award is not liable to be
interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is
erroneous in law that too upon reappraisal of the evidence adduced
before the arbitral trial. Even an award which may not be reasonable
or is non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with
by the courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible
there is no scope for the court to reappraise the evidence and to take
the different view other than that has been taken by the arbitrator. The
view taken by the arbitrator is normally acceptable and ought to be
allowed to prevail.
13. In paragraph 11 of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja, it has
been observed as under:
“11. There are limitations upon the scope of interference
in awards passed by an arbitrator. When the arbitrator
has applied his mind to the pleadings, the evidence
adduced before him and the terms of the contract, there is
no scope for the court to reappraise the matter as if this
were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the
view taken by the arbitrator would prevail. So long as an
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
award made by an arbitrator can be said to be one by a
reasonable person no interference is called for. However,
in cases where an arbitrator exceeds the terms of the
agreement or passes an award in the absence of any
evidence, which is apparent on the face of the award, the
same could be set aside.”
14. It is equally well settled that the appellate power under Section 37
of the Act is not akin to the normal appellate jurisdiction vested in the
civil courts for the reason that the scope of interference of the courts
with arbitral proceedings or award is very limited, confined to the
ambit of Section 34 of the Act only and even that power cannot be
exercised in a casual and a cavalier manner.
15. In Dyna Technology Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves
Limited, the court observed as under:
“24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds
provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We
need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards
should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier
manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the
perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter
without there being a possibility of alternative
interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award.
Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be
equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate
under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral
award and the party autonomy to get their dispute
adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the
law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award
in the usual course on factual aspects, then the
commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute
resolution would stand frustrated. 25. Moreover, umpteen
number of judgments of this Court have categorically held
that the courts should not interfere with an award merely
because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of
contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should
defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the
reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such
award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34
of the Arbitration Act.”
16. It is seen that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section
37 of the Act is restricted and subject to the same grounds on which
an award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. In other
words, the powers under Section 37 vested in the court of appeal are
not beyond the scope of interference provided under Section 34 of the
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
Act.
17. In paragraph 14 of MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited, it has
been held as under:
“14. As far as interference with an order made under
Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be
disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot
travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34.
In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent
assessment of the merits of the award, and must only
ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under
Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision.
Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been
confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court
in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be
extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent
findings.”
18. Recently a three-Judge Bench in Konkan Railway Corporation
Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking referring to MMTC
Limited (supra) held that the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34
and Section 37 of the Act is not like a normal appellate jurisdiction
and the courts should not interfere with the arbitral award lightly in a
casual and a cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative
view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle the
courts to reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal.
CONCLUSION:
20. In view of the above position in law on the subject, the scope of the
intervention of the court in arbitral matters is virtually prohibited, if
not absolutely barred and that the interference is confined only to the
extent envisaged under Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power of
Section 37 of the Act is limited within the domain of Section 34 of the
Act. It is exercisable only to find out if the court, exercising power
under Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its limits as prescribed
thereunder or has exceeded or failed to exercise the power so
conferred. The Appellate Court has no authority of law to consider the
matter in dispute before the arbitral tribunal on merits so as to find
out as to whether the decision of the arbitral tribunal is right or
wrong upon reappraisal of evidence as if it is sitting in an ordinary
court of appeal. It is only where the court exercising power under
Section 34 has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it by Section
34 or has travelled beyond its jurisdiction that the appellate court can
step in and set aside the order passed under Section 34 of the Act. Its
power is more akin to that superintendence as is vested in civil courts
while exercising revisionary powers. The arbitral award is not liable
to be interfered unless a case for interference as set out in the earlier
part of the decision, is made out. It cannot be disturbed only for the
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
reason that instead of the view taken by the arbitral tribunal, the other
view which is also a possible view is a better view according to the
appellate court.
21. It must also be remembered that proceedings under Section 34 of
the Act are summary in nature and are not like a full-fledged regular
civil suit. Therefore, the scope of Section 37 of the Act is much more
summary in nature and not like an ordinary civil appeal. The award
as such cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive
provision of law; any provision of the Act or the terms of the
agreement.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
24.
It is in this background that this Court now proceeds to
examine, whether the LDJ, has rightly set aside the Arbitral Award, on
the ground that it was in violation of Section 31(3) of the Act of 1996,
in so far as the LDJ failed to provide reasons in support of the findings
recorded therein. The central question, that would now require the
adjudication of this Court, is whether the Arbitral Award can be said
to suffer from such deficiency in reasoning, which would warrant
judicial interference within the narrow confines of Section 34 of the
Act of 1996.
25.
Before moving towards the merits of the said issue, this Court
deems it necessary to reproduce Section 31 of the Act of 1996, which
is as follows:
“31. Form and contents of arbitral award.—(1) An arbitral award
shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the members of the
arbitral tribunal.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), in arbitral proceedings with
more than one arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of all the
members of the arbitral tribunal shall be sufficient so long as the
reason for any omitted signature is stated.
(3) The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is based,
unless—
(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or
(b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
section 30.
(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place of arbitration
as determined in accordance with section 20 and the award shall be
deemed to have been made at that place.
(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered
to each party.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the arbitral
proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on any matter with
respect to which it may make a final arbitral award.
(7) (a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far as
an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral tribunal
may include in the sum for which the award is made interest, at such
rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money,
for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the
cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made.
[(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the
award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of two per cent.
higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of award,
from the date of award to the date of payment.
Explanation.—The expression “current rate of interest” shall
have the same meaning as assigned to it under clause (b) of
section 2 of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978).]
[(8) The costs of an arbitration shall be fixed by the arbitral tribunal
in accordance with section 31A.]
Explanation.—For the purpose of clause (a), “costs” means
reasonable costs relating to—
(i) the fees and expenses of the arbitrators and witnesses,
(ii) legal fees and expenses,
(iii) any administration fees of the institution supervising the
arbitration, and
(iv) any other expenses incurred in connection with the arbitral
proceedings and the arbitral award.”
26.
Section 31 of the Act of 1996 delineates the essential
requirement with which an Arbitral Award must comply. Amongst the
various mandates contained in the said provisions, clause 3(i)
specifically stipulates that an Arbitral Award shall disclose the
rationale that connects the material on record with the conclusions
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
reached by the Arbitrator. Such statutory requirement is subject only
to two exceptions, namely, where the parties have expressly agreed
that no reasons are to be recorded, or where the Award is made on
agreed terms in settlement of the dispute. As such the provision
underscores the legislative intent that reasoned awards are the norm in
arbitral adjudication, ensuring transparency, accountability, and the
ability of the parties as well as the Court to discern the rationale
underlying the conclusions reached by the Arbitrator.
27.
The Supreme Court in its recent judgment in OPG Power
Generation Private Limited v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions
India Private Limited and Another5, laid down the structured test for
evaluating reasons in an Arbitral Award. The relevant portion of the
judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“76.
Now, we shall examine the scope of interference with an
arbitral award on ground of insufficient, or improper/erroneous, or
lack of, reasons.
Reasons for the Award – When reasons, or lack of it, could vitiate
an arbitral award.
77. Section 31 (3) of the 1996 Act provides that an arbitral award
shall state reasons upon which it is based, unless
(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or
(b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under Section 30.
78. As to the form of a reasoned award, in Russell on Arbitration
(24th Edition, page 304) it is stated thus:
“6.032. No particular form is required for a reasoned award
although „the giving of clearly expressed reasons responsive to
the issues as they were debated before the arbitrators reduces
the scope for the making of unmeritorious challenges‟. When
giving a reasoned award the tribunal need only set out what, on
its view of the evidence, did or did not happen and explain
succinctly why, in the light of what happened, the tribunal has
reached its decision, and state what that decision is. In order to
(2025) 2 SCC 417
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
avoid being vulnerable to challenge, the tribunal‟s reasons must
deal with all the issues that were put to it. It should set out its
findings of fact and its reasoning so as to enable the parties to
understand them and state why particular points were decisive.
It should also indicate the tribunal‟s findings and reasoning on
issues argued before it but not considered decisive, so as to
enable the parties and the court to consider the position with
respect to appeal on all the issues before the tribunal. When
dealing with controversial matters, it is helpful for the tribunal
to set out not only its view of what occurred, but also to make it
clear that it has considered any alternative version and has
rejected it. Even if several reasons lead to the same result, the
tribunal should still set them out. That said, so long as the
relevant issues are addressed there is no need to deal with every
possible argument or to explain why the tribunal attached more
weight to some evidence than to other evidence. The tribunal is
not expected to recite at great length communications
exchanged or submissions made by the parties. Nor is it
required to set out each step by which it reached its conclusion
or to deal with each and every point made by the parties. It is
sufficient that the tribunal should explain what its findings are
and the evidential route by which it reached its conclusions.
79. On the requirement of recording reasons in an arbitral award and
consequences of lack of, or inadequate, reasons in an arbitral award,
this Court in Dyna Technologies held:
“34. The mandate under section 31 (3) of the Arbitration Act is
to have reasoning which is intelligible and adequate and, which
can in appropriate cases be even implied by the courts from a
fair reading of the award and documents referred to thereunder,
if need be. The aforesaid provision does not require an
elaborate judgment to be passed by the arbitrators having
regard to the speedy resolution of dispute.
35. When we consider the requirement of a reasoned order,
three characteristics of a reasoned order can be fathomed. They
are: proper, intelligible and adequate. If the reasonings in the
order are improper, they reveal a flaw in the decision-making
process. If the challenge to an award is based on impropriety or
perversity in the reasoning, then it can be challenged strictly on
the grounds provided in section 34 of the Arbitration Act. If the
challenge to an award is based on the ground that the same is
unintelligible, the same would be equivalent of providing no
reasons at all. Coming to the last aspect concerning the
challenge on adequacy of reasons, the court while exercising
jurisdiction under section 34 has to adjudicate the validity of
such an award based on the degree of particularity of reasoning
required having regard to the nature of issues falling for
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
consideration. The degree of particularity cannot be stated in a
precise manner as the same would depend on the complexity of
the issue even if the court comes to a conclusion that there were
gaps in the reasoning for the conclusions reached by the
tribunal, the court needs to have regard to the document
submitted by the parties and the contentions raised before the
tribunal so that awards with inadequate reasons are not set
aside in casual and cavalier manner. On the other hand,
ordinarily unintelligible awards are to be set aside, subject to
party autonomy to do away with the reasoned award. Therefore,
the courts are required to be careful while distinguishing
between inadequacy of reasons in an award and unintelligible
awards.”
80. We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken in Dyna
Technologies, as extracted above. Therefore, in our view, for the
purposes of addressing an application to set aside an arbitral award
on the ground of improper or inadequate reasons, or lack of reasons,
awards can broadly be placed in three categories:
(1) where no reasons are recorded, or the reasons recorded are
unintelligible;
(2) where reasons are improper, that is, they reveal a flaw in the
decision- making process; and
(3) where reasons appear inadequate.
81. Awards falling in category (1) are vulnerable as they would be in
conflict with the provisions of Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act.
Therefore, such awards are liable to be set aside under Section 34,
unless:
(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or
(b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under
Section 30.
82. Awards falling in category (2) are amenable to a challenge on
ground of impropriety or perversity, strictly in accordance with the
grounds set out in Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
83. Awards falling in category (3) require to be dealt with care. In a
challenge to such award, before taking a decision the Court must take
into consideration the nature of the issues arising between the parties
in the arbitral proceedings and the degree of reasoning required to
address them. The Court must thereafter carefully peruse the award,
and the documents referred to therein. If reasons are intelligible and
adequate on a fair-reading of the award and, in appropriate cases,
implicit in the documents referred to therein, the award is not to be set
aside for inadequacy of reasons. However, if gaps are such that they
render the reasoning in support of the award unintelligible, or
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
lacking, the Court exercising power under Section 34 may set aside
the award.
(Emphasis Supplied)
28.
In light of the principles laid down in OPG Power Generation
(Supra) and the arguments raised by the Respondent coupled with the
finding of the LDJ, it becomes evident that in the present case, the
challenge against the Arbitral Award, as per the Impugned Judgment,
falls squarely within the third category, enlisted therein, namely,
awards where the reasons appear inadequate.
29.
It is with the above caveat that this Court would advert to the
examination of the Arbitral Award.
30.
At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to the relevant part of the
Arbitral Award, which is reproduced hereunder:
“E.8 Pleadings consist of Statement of Claim, Statement of Defence,
Counter Claim and Reply to Counter Claim. Jones Lang filed
documents along with its Statement of Claim; Techpark filed
documents along with its Statement of Defence; and during the course
of examination of its witness, certain documents were also filed by
Techpark. Jones Long led in evidence Mr. Ajit Singh (CW-1) its then
Property Manager at Spazedge Commercial Complex, Gurugram; and
Techpark led in evidence Mr. Amit Kumar (RW-1) its Authorised
Representative. Both witnesses tendered their respective examinationin-chief by way of affidavits and submitted themselves to cross
examination. Cross-examinations were conducted ensuring fidelity of
the process, (enabling the party cross-examining the witness to have
its nominated observer physically present along with the witness
under cross examination). This process was devised with mutual
consultation and consent of Ld. Counsel for parties.
E.9 The case of Jones Lang, stated in brief, is a claim for recovery of
money towards unpaid invoices together with interest accrued thereon
for services rendered to Techpark.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
E.15 Contentions of Jones Lang in brief can be bulleted as under:
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
1. Principal amount claimed towards Table-A is Rs.21,09,327.95
and that towards Table-B is Rs. 47,82,806.00 aggregating to
Rs.68,92,133.95;
2. Deductions made by Techpark from Jones Lang‟s invoices are
Rs.21,09,327.95;
3. If Jones Lang were justified in making deductions, such
justifications ought to have been proved by ocular witnesses,
none of whom were adduced in evidence;
4. Several documents relied upon by Techpark such as R-6, 8, 10,
17, 20, 22 and 23 do not come to the aid of Techpark. Such
documents at best, could in conjunction with appropriate
testimony add to the defence of Techpark, and failure to lead
such evidence did not give any advantage to Techpark. Reliance
in this behalf was placed on Judgments of Takhaji Hiraji vs.
Thakore Kubersing Chamansing and Ors [AIR 2001 SC 2328,
Para 79]; Iqbal Basith vs N Subbalaxmi [(2021) 2 SCC 718,
Para 9]; and Seth Maganmal vs. Darbarilal Chowdhry [7928
(30) BOMLR 296, Paras 19 & 20];
5. Bank documents (at pages 57, 60, 63, 66, 67, 70, 72, 75 - 78, 83
- 85, 88 - 91 etc.) could not be proved in the manner sought by
Techpark, particularly in view of the fact that none of the said
documents were certificated in accordance with law and many
of them had physical markings, which demonstrated that they
could not be downloads; electronic records; secondary evidence
etc.;
6. The testimony of RW-1 was unreliable, particularly in relation
to downloading of documents/ mail of which he was neither the
originator nor a recipient. Since these mails were exchanged
between/ amongst functionaries of the accounts department and/
or senior management of Techpark, it was most unlikely that
those persons may have shared their email IDs with RW-1 (Mr.
Amit Kumar), who was a mere authorised representative of
Techpark and who (during his cross examinations) revealed that
he was appointed by Techpark as a Facility Manager;
7. Other documents produced by Techpark were not proved in
accordance with law;
8. In view of the fact that no protest was laid to invoices (subject
matter of Table-A or Table-B) till Techpark‟s email dated
28.05.2014 (Annexure R-39), Techpark‟s defence to the same
was not justified;
9. Techpark not having escalated the disputes, [as envisioned
under the Principal Agreement (particularly Clauses 8.5 and 23
thereof)], the justification of Techpark in not paying withheld
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
amounts towards Table-A invoices or Table-B invoices in
entirety, was not made out in law; and
10.
By virtue of Clause 8.7 of the Principal Agreement, Jone
Lang were entitled to levy late payment interest charges,
which they have done as outlined in their notice dated
06.07.2015, wherein they have demanded interest at the rate
of 18% p.a. and in their subsequent notice dated 18.03.201.6,
wherein Jones Lang have demanded interest in the sum of
Rs.20,67,640.00 ( computed at the rate of 18% p .a . for the
period ending March 2016 ).
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
E.18 Taking up the case of Counter Claim, it would be noticed that
each head of Counter Claim has its foundational pleadings
specifically centric to events of 2013 and 2014. It may be useful to
notice that:
1. Counter Claim No.1 (in the sum of Rs. 12,17,283.00) is claimed
towards 'losses accrued to the Respondent by paying on behalf
of the Claimant and for repair costs of various equipments that
were neglected by the Claimant.
2. Counter Claim No.2 is in the sum of Rs.43,35,730.00 and is
claimed 'towards the losses accrued to the Respondent due to
early vacation of tenants on account of deficient maintenance
services provided by the Claimant.'
3. Counter Claim No. 3 is in the sum of Rs. 11,60,615.00 and is
claimed 'towards the loss of its reputation and goodwill.'. This
claim of goodwill is founded on an allegation of providing
deficient and degraded services' by Jones Lang.
E.19 Each of these Claims can rightly be dealt under Article 55 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act that provides a three year period of
limitation, beginning from the date or time when the contract is
broken or breached, or where the breach is continuing, the date when
the breach ceases.
E.20 Allegations in support of the defence of Techpark as also its
Counter Claim unmistakably point out to the period between 2013 and
2014, and lastly ending on 13.06.2014 (the date on which the property
was handed over and vacated by Jones Lang).
E.21 Both the Statement of Defence and the Counter Claim have been
filed on 15.06.2021. Ld. Counsel for Techpark places strong reliance
on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case entitled 'Voltas
Ltd. Vs. Rolta India Limited' [(2014) 4 SCC 516] and contends that its
Counter Claim is within time and Ld. Counsel relies on Paras 36, 21,
22 and 24 of the said Judgement that opines that a counter claim must
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
be filed within three years of receipt of a notice issued under Section
21 of the Arbitration Act.
E.22 Aid may be taken from Section 43 of the Arbitration Act. Section
43(1) provides that the Limitation Act shall apply to arbitrations as it
applies to proceedings in Court. A co-read of the Judgments in the
cases of Voltas (supra) as well as Praveen Enterprises (AIR 2011 SC
3814) clearly elucidates this position. None of the documents referred
to in the communications of Techpark; Techpark's Statement of
Defence, Techpark's Counter Claim; evidence of Mr. Amit Kumar
(RW-1) or any suggestions given to Mr. Ajit Singh (CW-1) seem to
suggest any desire of Techpark to refer disputes to Arbitration or to
seek to resort to Arbitration for resolution of rival claims. Indeed it
may be useful to notice that whilst Techpark filed the Section 8
Application, it referred to the Principal Agreement and contended
inter alia that the claims of Jones Lang cannot be adjudicated by
means of the Civil Suit, which, according to Techpark was barred by
Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. Proceedings of the Civil Suit ended
with the Section 8 Order, whereby the Gurgaon Court was of the view
that the Claim of Jones Lang could not be agitated in the Civil Suit
and directed Jones Lang to seek remedy in Arbitration. Those
proceedings do not reflect any indication or inclination of Techpark to
seek resolution of their claims through arbitration.
E.23 The matter was thereafter taken up by means of a notice of Jones
Lang dated 28.04.2010, whereby Techpark was called upon to
participate in the arbitration process by nominating its arbitrator, so
that the nominated two arbitrators could nominate the presiding
arbitrator and constitute the Tribunal. In response to this notice. vide
reply dated 30.05.2018 Techpark contended that Jones Lang claim for
Arbitration was without any cause. Techpark also contended that
Jones Lang claim was time barred and in the circumstances called
upon Jones Lang to withdraw its notice dated 28.04.2018. Even at this
stage, Techpark evinced no intention to arbitrate for resolution of its
claims, as it considered Jones Lang's invocation of arbitration to be
misconceived and also chose not to constitute any arbitral tribunal.
The matter was then taken by Jones Lang to the Hon'ble Delhi High
Court by means of Section 11(6) Petition, that came to be disposed of
vide Judgment dated 14.01.2021. The Hon'ble High Court in its
Judgment noticed the filing of the Civil Suit, the Section 8 Order,
Jones Lang's notice dated 28.04.2018; and Techpark's Reply dated
30.05.2018. Techpark principally contested the petition before the
Hon'ble Delhi High Court on the ground of dolay and being barred by
time. The Hon'ble High Court noticed the undisputed Arbitration
Clause (Clause 23 of the Principal Agreement) and being
unpersuaded by the plea of limitation, allowed the Section 11(6)
Petition and referred the matter to the DIAC to appoint a sole
Arbitrator in accordance with its rules. It would be useful to know that
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
right throughout including up to the proceedings before the Delhi
High Court, Techpark never evinced any inclination to seek any
resolution of their claims through arbitration.
E.24 This now leaves me to examine whether the Counter Claim of
Techpark is within time. A perusal of Article 55 of the Limitation Act
referred to by me earlier required Techpark to file its Counter Claim
within three years of 2013-2014 or at the latest within three years
from 14.06.2014. Counter Claims of Techpark have admittedly been
filed on 15.06.2021. Techpark have failed to disclose any ground for
enlargement of period of limitation or exclusion of time whether under
Part 2 or Part 3 of the Limitation Act. In these circumstances, am
constrained to note that the Counter Claims of Techpark are barred
by time and are hence rejected
E.25 Counter Claim No.1 in the sum of Rs. 12,17,283.00. Is also
pressed into aid in opposing the claim of Jones Lang. A perusal of the
record reveals the stand of Techpark to be a case of Counter Claim in
the said sum and not a defence of set off.
E.26 Coming now to the Claim of Jones Lang, I find that on the basis
of documents on record and respective position of parties, the
issuance of invoices (as per Table-A and Table-B) is not in dispute. It
is also not in dispute that certain deductions were made by Techpark
towards Table-A invoices. However, the sum of Rs.12,17,283.00 is a
figure, which according to Techpark, is the aggregate sums of the
excess payments made by Techpark between June 2013 and May 2014
towards the said invoices. In this behalf, Techpark relies upon
Annexure R-40. Ld. Counsel for Jones Lang strenuously denied the
existence of R-40 or of its contents. Mode and method of proof of R-40
was also disputed by Ld. Counsel for Jones Lang. During the course
of submissions made before the Tribunal, Ld. Counsel for Techpark
demonstrated (on their laptop ) the digital copy of the cover email
appearing at R-39. In my opinion, the existence of R-39 and R-40 is
accordingly probable and possible. However, in view of the
compilation in R -40, the aggregate of Rs.12,17,283.00 is shown to be
an excess payment made to Jones Lang, and as the same was
demonstrably made during the period 2013-2014. Any claim made in
that behalf on 15.06.2021, is in my view barred by time.
E.27 Both parties lead evidence by producing their respective
witnesses. However, recording of evidence of both witnesses did not
inspire much confidence in either of them. In any event, for
determination of issues other material on record is sufficient to enable
me to return findings on issues.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
E.29 Clause 8.7 of the Principal Agreement conferred Jones Lang the
right to levy late payment interest charges at a rate calculated on
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
daily outstanding fees and expenses basis. This claim had to be
supported with vouchers. Jones Lang do not appear to have either
pleaded or proved any rate of interest calculated on “daily
outstanding Fees and Expenses". Jones Lang has also not furnished
any vouchers in that behalf. Claim of Jones Lang of interest at the rate
of 18% p.a. is unsubstantiated.
E.30 Whilst the Tribunal is conscious that it could award interest at
18% p.a., however, a claim for interest needs to be substantiated and
established on the basis of material on record and accordingly
proved. Jones Lang has failed to prove the contractual rate of interest
agreed between parties.
E.31 In the circumstances, this Tribunal considers it prudent to award
interest for the pre-suit period at the rate of 12% p.a. Interest shall
accrue on the invoices (as per Table-A and Table-B) from the end of
the calendar month of the date of the respective invoice till
27.04.2018. Pendente lite interest on Rs.68,92,133.95 is also awarded
at the rate of 12% p.a. from 28.04.2018 till the date of this Award.
Costs, as provided hereinafter are also awarded to Jones Lang. In
case the awarded amount (that includes the aggregate sums of
Rs.68,92,133.95 together with interest and costs as awarded above), is
paid within 30 days of making of this Award, interest till the date of
such payment shall be calculated at the rate of 12% per annum on the
awarded amount. In case the full awarded amount is not paid within
the period of 30 days from the making of this Award, the awarded
amount shall carry interest @ 18% per annum from the making of this
Award till the date of payment. It is reiterated that (for the purposes of
computation of future interest), the awarded amount includes
Rs.68,92,133.95 as also accrued interest (as above) till the date of
making this Award, but does not include the costs awarded.
E.32 In view of the tortuous trajectory of this case, I am also inclined
to award costs in the sum of Rs. 5,00,000 (Rupees Five Lakhs, only) in
favour of Jones Lang.”
31.
At this stage, it becomes pertinent to highlight that the issue
raised before the learned Arbitrator was confined to a singular and
narrow issue, namely, the non-payment of invoices raised by the
Appellant for services rendered to the Respondent in respect of the
Agreement. Therefore, the scope of adjudication before the learned
Arbitrator was, limited and did not extend beyond this specific
dispute.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
32.
Having regard to the aforesaid, it also becomes imperative to
note that, in order to qualify the threshold of a reasoned/adequate
award, an Arbitral Award is not required to set out an elaborative or
prolix discussion running into numerous pages. The law with respect
to the aspect of reasoning provided under an Award, has been settled,
which requires the Arbitrator to mandatorily indicate in a concise and
intelligible manner, the reasons which form the link between the
issues framed, the evidence led, the contractual provisions relied upon,
and the conclusions ultimately reached.
33.
As long as the Arbitral Award discloses a rationale nexus
between the material on record and the finding returned thereon, the
reasoning provided can neither be considered as unintelligible nor
perverse, since the requirement of a reasoned Award stands satisfied.
34.
It is pertinent to note that, an Arbitral Award is not to be
subjected to a hyper-technical or pedantic scrutiny merely because the
reasoning is brief or not articulated with judicial nicety; what becomes
essential is that whether upon the bare reading of the Arbitral Award,
the parties can discern why they have succeeded or failed on particular
claims, and that there has been an application of mind through which
the Arbitrator has arrived at the conclusion. Accordingly, the
adequacy of reasons is a matter of substance rather than length, and a
succinct, coherent and logically structured award fully meets the
statutory and jurisprudential standard of a well-reasoned arbitral
determination.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
35.
Turning now to examination of the Arbitral Award, a bare
perusal of which, makes it manifestly clear that, having regard to the
limited issue raised before and adjudicated upon by the learned
Arbitrator, the conclusions arrived at are based on a due and proper
consideration of the submissions advanced by the respective parties,
as well as the evidence on record and the contractual terms governing
the parties.
36.
In this regard, a reference may be made to the Paragraph
Nos.E.18 to E.31 of the Arbitral Award, wherein the learned
Arbitrator dealt with the claims and counter-claims made by the
parties separately. While adjudicating the Counter Claims filed by the
Respondent, the learned Arbitrator under Paragraph Nos.E.18 to E.24,
identified the factual substratum based on which each of the counterclaims were raised, i.e. the alleged breach that occurred during period
between 2013 and 2014, culminating into the handover of the property
in June 2014.
37.
Having identified, the duration of the alleged breach, the
learned Arbitrator, while applying Article 55 of the Act of 1963 read
with Section 43 of the Act of 1996, concluded that the counterclaims
filed by the Respondent is time-barred since the same have been filed
beyond a period of 03 years of the date of alleged breach or its
cessation thereof. The rejection of the counterclaims on the ground of
limitation is supported by a clear and cogent reasoning, rooted in the
undisputed chronology of events and the admitted date of institution
of the counterclaims on 15.06.2021.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
38.
Further, the learned Arbitrator also took note of the consistent
conduct of Respondent in resisting the arbitration and thereby failing
to invoke the arbitral mechanism for the adjudication of its claim.
Accordingly, the findings reached by the learned Arbitrator could
neither be considered speculative nor extraneous, rather the Arbitral
Award, as far as the counter-claims raised by the Respondent is
concerned, flows from an examination of the contemporaneous
correspondence,
pleadings,
and
procedural
history,
including
proceedings under Sections 8 and 11(6) of the Act of 1996. In the
considered view of this Court, such appreciation of conduct finds its
place in the arena of the adjudication of the dispute, thereby rendering
the reasons accorded by the learned Arbitrator adequate, while
rejecting the counter claim of the Respondent.
39.
Coming now to the adjudication of the claims raised by the
Appellant, it is pertinent to note that the learned Arbitrator, in
Paragraph No.E.26, has recorded that the issuance and the factum of
partial payments were not disputed by either of the parties. While
taking into consideration the documents adduced before him with
respect to the alleged excess payment made by the Respondent, the
learned Arbitrator observed that although the evidence relied upon by
the Respondent is probable and possible, nevertheless, the
computation provided therein, merely indicates an excess payment
made in sum of Rs.12,17,283/-, a counter claim which had already
been rejected by the learned Arbitrator, on the ground of being timebarred.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
40.
Therefore, applying the principles laid down in OPG Power
Generation (Supra) and in the event that the reasoning provided by
the learned Arbitrator is adequate, this Court does not find the Arbitral
Award to be unintelligible. The conclusion arrived at by the learned
Arbitrator is clear and categorical. Learned Arbitrator has not only
briefly dealt with the evidence produced by the parties but has also
distinguished the judgments relied upon. Accordingly, the requirement
of Section 31(3) of the Act of 1996, namely, the obligation to state the
reasons, stands satisfied. As already discussed in the preceeding
paragraphs of this judgment, said provision merely mandates the
stating of reasons and not furnishing of elaborate or detailed reasons.
Therefore, upon a holistic reading of the Arbitral Award it is manifest
that the learned Arbitrator could not have reached to a conclusion that
he did, if he would have failed to appreciate the factual matrix and the
contention raised by the parties in the limited issue pertaining to the
payment and/or settlement of the partially as well as fully unpaid
invoices raised by the Appellant.
41.
In view of the aforesaid, the arguments raised by the
Respondent before this Court shall also be examined hereinafter.
42.
It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the Respondent
that the LDJ, has rightly set-aside the Arbitral Award, since the
learned Arbitrator failed to frame specific issue on the plea of the
Respondent that the payment made was in full and final settlement. In
this regard, a reliance is placed on Paragraph No.B.1 of the Arbitral
Award, wherein, it has been recorded by the learned Arbitrator that
the claims and counter-claims themselves would constitute the issues.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
The extract is reproduced hereinbelow“B
Issues
B.1
Vide Order dated 01.09.2021, with consent of parties,
pleadings in claim and counter claim were to constitute the issues.”
43.
In the aforesaid circumstances, and in particular since the
question of full and final payment was specifically raised by the
Respondent in its counter-claim, the Respondent cannot now be
permitted to assail the award on the ground of non-framing of a
separate issue. Having expressly consented before the learned
Arbitrator that the pleadings in the claim and counter-claim would
themselves constitute the issues, the Respondent is estopped from
contending, at this stage, that the absence of an independently framed
issue on full and final settlement vitiates the arbitral proceedings.
44.
With respect to the argument raised regarding the grant of
interest given by the learned Arbitrator, this Court deems it
appropriate to refer to Section 31(7) of the Act of 1996, which
empowers the Arbitral Tribunal, to exercise a discretionary power
while awarding interest for pre-suit period, pendente lite and post
award or future interest, in cases where the contract is silent on
interest, at a rate that appears reasonable on the basis of material on
record and prevailing commercial conditions.
45.
A perusal of the Paragraph Nos.E.29 to E.32 of the Arbitral
Award demonstrates that, the learned Arbitrator while taking into
consideration Clause 8.7 of the Agreement and upon the failure on
account of the Appellant to plead or prove the detailed rate and
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
vouchers, has exercised its discretionary power under Section 31(7)(a)
of the Act of 1996.
46.
Therefore, the learned Arbitrator while consciously recording
the contractual clause, recorded the evidentiary deficiency in respect
of the interest and awarded a uniform interest at the rate of 12% per
annum for the pre-suit and pendente lite period, coupled with a
calibrated post-award structure. In such circumstances, the interest
component of the Arbitral Award cannot be said to be perverse,
unconscionable, or contrary to the public policy of India, and therefore
does not warrant interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act of
1996.
47.
As far as the grant of 18% interest is concerned, the same has
been granted as a post-default simple interest, which stands recognised
in commercial matters as a reasonable and legally sustainable
mechanism to secure the timely enforcement of monetary awards and
decrees, particularly in cases alike, where a lower rate of interest is
provided for an initial grace period, followed by a higher rate of
interest applicable upon failure to pay within that time. In the present
case, the award of interest at the rate of 12% per annum for a limited
period of 30 days was intended to afford the Respondent a reasonable
opportunity to comply with the Arbitral Award and expedite such
payment. Whereas the escalation to simple interest at the rate of 18%
per annum upon default, constituted a legitimate and proportionate
consequence of delayed compliance rather than a penal measure.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
48.
Therefore, the rate of interest awarded by the learned Arbitrator
falls squarely within the discretionary domain of the Tribunal in
commercial disputes, as such the rate is consistent with prevailing
commercial practices and serves to adequately balance fair
compensation to the Appellant against the conduct of the Respondent,
as well as the need to discourage dilatory tactics in the enforcement of
the Arbitral Award.
49.
Before parting ways, we deem it appropriate to state that we
have also gone through the objections raised by the Respondent
(Petitioner before the LDJ). It is pertinent to highlight that by and
large the objections raised by the Respondent were that the learned
Arbitrator has failed to provide any reasons for the conclusion reached
by it, thereby allowing the entire claim in a mechanical manner.
Further, it was also argued by the Respondent before the LDJ, that the
Arbitral Award was passed while ignoring its core defence that a full
and final settlement has already been concluded and acted upon
thereby extinguishing all claims.
50.
In respect of the aforesaid objections, this Court notes that such
objections raised by the Respondent before the LDJ falls devoid of
merit, since as enumerated in the preceeding paragraphs, the Arbitral
Award is found to be adequate. As far as the defence of full and final
settlement is concerned, the same is equally without merit, in
particular, since the issue of full and final settlement was taken up by
the Respondent in its counter-claim, which has already been construed
as time barred as elaborated under paragraph nos. 42 and 43 of this
judgment.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
51.
Moreover, it is also well settled that the interpretation of
contractual documents and assessment of whether a settlement has
been validly concluded falls squarely within the domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal. Unless the view taken by the learned Arbitrator is
perverse, or in direct contravention of the express terms of the
contract, interference is impermissible. In the present case, this Court
has found no such infirmity in the view taken by the learned
Arbitrator.
CONCLUSION:
52.
Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
opinion that the Arbitral Award rendered by the learned Arbitrator
was well-reasoned and did not warrant any interference of the Court
acting under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
53.
Accordingly, the present Appeal is allowed. The Impugned
Judgment passed by the learned District Judge is hereby set aside.
54.
The Appellant is entitled to receive the amount of
Rs.68,92,133.95/- towards the outstanding payment of invoices raised
during the years 2013 and 2014, along with an interest at the rate of
12% per annum from the end of calendar month of the respective
invoices until 27.04.2018 and pendente lite interest at the rate of 12%
per annum on the awarded amount from 28.04.2018 to 17.11.2022.
55.
Needless to mention, that the post-award interest will be
applicable in accordance with the findings of the learned Arbitrator
and the Appellant will be entitled to Rs.5,00,000/- as costs.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
56.
The present Appeal, along with the pending application, stands
disposed of.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
FEBRUARY 05, 2026
jai/hr
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
15:39:29
FAO (COMM) 201/2024
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review