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2026:HHC:3338
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2679 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.1.2026
Date of Decision: 23.1.2026.
Jitender Thakur
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Loveneesh
Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Thakur,
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 233 of 2024, dated 19.10.2024,
registered at Police Station, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20, 25
and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (NDPS Act).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3338
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police intercepted a vehicle based on secret information on
18.10.2024 and recovered seven packets containing 3.575 Kg of
charas. Bhupinder and Jitender (the present petitioner) were
found to be occupying the vehicle at the time of the search.
These allegations are false. The petitioner was arrested based on
the statement made by the co-accused. The investigation is
complete, and the police have filed the charge sheet before the
Court. The matter was listed before the learned Additional
Sessions Judge-I, Dharamshala, on 1.12.2025. The petitioner had
no financial transaction with the co-accused. The petitioner has
been in custody for more than one year, and his right to a speedy
trial is being violated. The petitioner would abide by the terms
and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were on a patrolling duty on 18.10.2024.
They received secret information at 12:30 am that a vehicle was
transporting a commercial quantity of charas, and a huge
quantity of charas could be recovered by its search. The police
2026:HHC:3338
reduced the information to writing and sent it to the Supervisory
Officer. The police went to 24 miles near Jonta and found that a
car bearing registration No. TO424CH6911A was parked on the
road. The police checked the car in the presence of Mahinder
Singh Up Pradhan. The driver revealed his name as Bhupinder
Thakur, and the person sitting beside the driver revealed his
name as Jitender Thakur (the present petitioner). The police
recovered 7 packets containing black sticks wrapped in
transparent polythene. The police checked the sticks and found
them to be charas. The police weighed the packets and found
their weight to be 3.575 kg. The police seized the charas and
arrested the occupants of the vehicle. As per the report of
analysis, the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of
charas. Bhupinder Thakur revealed during the interrogation that
Desh Raj had handed over the charas to him on Katola Batheri
road with a direction to deliver it to Sonu. The charge sheet was
prepared
and
filed
before
the
Court
on
09.04.2025.
Supplementary challan was filed before the Court on 31.10.2025;
hence, the status report.
2026:HHC:3338
4.
I have heard Mr Lovneesh Thakur, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5.
Mr Lovneesh Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated based on a statement made by the co-accused.
Mere presence in the vehicle is not sufficient to connect the
petitioner with the commission of a crime. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
6.
Mr Lokender Kuthelria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner
had earlier filed a bail petition which was dismissed by the Court.
A subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the
circumstances. There is no change in the circumstances in the
present case. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
2026:HHC:3338
8.
It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a bail
petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 804 of 2025 and
was dismissed on 4.6.2025. It was held in the State of
Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC
605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a
subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a
change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question
of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of
little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was
a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during
these two days, drastic changes had taken place,
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial
discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the
impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all
earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J.,
only a couple of days before, in the absence of any
substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is
necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that
the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an
impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either
successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure
an order which had hitherto eluded him.
9.
Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
2026:HHC:3338
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then
the said court will have to give specific reasons why in
spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail
application should be granted.”
10.
A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of
course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of
circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”
11.
This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant
Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was
observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for
2026:HHC:3338
the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent
bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”
12.
It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive
bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the
existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine
qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a
material change in circumstances. A material change in
circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact
situation or law that requires the earlier view to be
interfered with or where the earlier finding has become
obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no
bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that
successive bail application needs to be decided by the
same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of
sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a
judge to consider the application and a person's right
based on a material change in circumstances. A material
change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an
offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the
power to decide such a subsequent application operates in
a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts
of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and
judicially recognized principle that if successive bail
applications on the same subject are permitted to be
disposed of by different Judges, there would be
2026:HHC:3338
conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering
every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in
the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other
side being put in issue and there would be wastage of
Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such
matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is
available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change
in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same
Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore,
the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a
change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant,
which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”
13.
Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and
it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
14.
The Court had held in the earlier petition that the
petitioner was travelling in the vehicle from which a commercial
quantity of charas was effected. The petitioner was prima facie in
possession of the charas, and he has failed to satisfy the twin
conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. All these
circumstances have not changed.
15.
It was submitted that a charge sheet has been filed,
and this is a change in circumstance. This submission cannot be
accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406:
(2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 542: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 295 that the filing of a
2026:HHC:3338
charge sheet does not amount to a change in circumstances. It
was observed:
“12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial
Judge, we find that he has been swayed by the fact that
when a charge sheet is filed, it amounts to a change of
circumstance. Needless to say, the filing of the charge
sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made
by the prosecution. On the contrary, filing of the charge
sheet establishes that after due investigation, the
investigating agency, having found materials, has placed
the charge sheet for the trial of the accused persons.”
16.
It was submitted that the petitioner was arrested on
19.10.2024. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence,
and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. This
submission will not help the petitioner. The petitioner has not
filed the copies of the order sheets to demonstrate that the delay
is attributable to the prosecution or the Court. Further, it was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs.
Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on
the prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin
conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
observed: “17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
2026:HHC:3338
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A
conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing
the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and
antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the
discretion exercised by the High Court while considering
the grant of bail. However, offences involving a
commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct
statutory footing. Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on
the grant of bail and obligates the Court to record
satisfaction on the twin requirements noticed above, in
addition to the ordinary tests under the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
17.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
2026:HHC:3338
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious since not only is the recovery
much in excess of the commercial quantity, but the
Respondent-accused
allegedly
got
the
cavities
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the
contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.”
18.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim to be entitled
to bail because of the violation of his right to a speedy trial.
19.
No other point was urged.
20.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
21.
The observations made here-in-above are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case's merits.
23rd January, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
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