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2026:HHC:42538
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No.
17300 of 2026
Decided on: 01.10.2026
Jitender Thakur and others
…….Petitioners
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and others
Coram
… Respondents
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Yogesh Jaswal, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
_____________________________________________________
For the petitioners
:
Mr. Desh Raj Thakur, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Ravneet Kumar, Advocate.
For the respondents
:
Mr. Pushpender Jaswal, Additional
Advocate General for respondents No.
1 and 2.
:
Mr. Vikrant Thakur, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Shivani Priya, Advocate for
respondent No. 3.
Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge
(Oral)
By way of this writ petition, the petitioners have inter
alia prayed for the following reliefs:“(i) declare Rule 8(b) of the Department of Personnel,
Secretariat
Administration
Services-I
(Recruitment
and
Conditions of Service of Steno Typist, Group-C Employees)
Rules, 2026 notified on 06.07.2026, entry (b) in column (iii)
of Schedule-II, roster points 5 and 10 and the note below the
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2026:HHC:42538
roster in so far as it relates to secondment, ultra vires
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the
proviso to Article 309 and strike them down.
(ii) issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the letter
No. Per (SAS-I) A(3)-3/2025 dated 31.08.2026 ( Annexure
P-15).
(iii) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the
respondents to fill all twenty posts of Steno Typist in the
Himachal Pradesh Secretariat by direct recruitment under
Rule 8(a) of the Rules.
(iv) In the alternative and without prejudice to the above,
declare that no post of Steno Typist in the Secretariat can be
filled on secondment except as a temporary arrangement for
a fixed period pending direct recruitment and that no person
so taken shall acquire any seniority or right in the cadre.”
2.
The petitioners claim that they are unemployed youth,
who hold the requisite qualification for recruitment to the post of
Steno-Typist, Group 'C' and their grievance is that, in terms of
Notification dated 6th of July, 2026 (Annexure P-9), the Department
of Personnel, Secretariat Administration Services-I, Government of
Himachal Pradesh, has framed the rules regulating the method of
recruitment and conditions of service of Steno-Typists, Group 'C'
2026:HHC:42538
employees
of
Administration
the
Department
Services-I,
i.e.,
the
of
Personnel,
Department
of
Secretariat
Personnel,
Secretariat Administration Services-I (Recruitment and Conditions of
Service of Steno-Typist, Group 'C' Employees) Rules, 2026, which are
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as there is an
arbitrary reservation of 20% of the posts to be filled on secondment
basis, in terms of the detailed procedure as indicated in Schedule-II
appended thereto, without any rationale.
3.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners
argued that the petitioners have a right of consideration against the
posts in issue and as a result of the curtailment of the posts of Steno
Typist Group-C in the H.P. Secretariat, to be filled in by way of direct
recruitment to 80%, and further as a result of 20% posts being
offered to be filled in on secondment basis, the right of the
petitioners stands curtailed, who now will have to compete only
against 80% of the total sanctioned strength. He argued that the
mode of recruitment prescribed in the Rules, in terms whereof, 20%
of the posts are to be filled in on secondment basis, is violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India as the test of Article 14 of the
Constitution, i.e., classification being based on intelligible differentia
2026:HHC:42538
and intelligible differentia having a nexus with the object sought to
be achieved, is not fulfilled. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted
that the Schedule also is conspicuously silent how the 20% posts are
to be filled in on secondment basis. He further submitted that as
the respondents have not carved out any difference in the
qualifications, which are to be possessed/fulfilled by a person to be
recruited through direct recruitment and on secondment basis,
therefore also, it is not understood as to why 20% posts are reserved
to be filled in on secondment basis. Learned Senior Counsel also
referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The State
of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and others,
(1974) 1 Supreme Court Cases 19 to support his contentions.
4.
On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General
and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondentHimachal Pradesh Public Service Commission have submitted that
the present writ petition is completely misconceived, and the
petitioners have no locus standi to file and maintain this petition.
Learned Additional Advocate General argued that neither has any
process been initiated to fill up any post in terms of Annexure P-9 by
way of direct recruitment, nor the petitioners have applied for
2026:HHC:42538
appointment against the posts in issue. He submitted that simply
because the petitioners possess the qualifications, which are
otherwise mentioned in Annexure P-9 for direct recruitment to the
post in issue, this does not confer upon them any locus standi to
challenge the Recruitment and Promotion Rules in the mode and
manner, in which, the same stand assailed by way of this writ
petition. The learned Additional Advocate General further submitted
that it is well-settled law that the framing of Recruitment and
Promotion Rules, including conditions of service and qualifications,
is a matter of policy and lies within the domain of the State. Hon'ble
Supreme Court has categorically held that unless and until there is
a flagrant violation of the provisions of the Constitution, the Courts
are not to interfere with this domain of the employer. Learned
Additional Advocate General argued that the foundation of the
argument of the petitioners is totally ill-founded. He submitted that
if the contention of the petitioners is accepted, then there will be no
discretion vested with the Employer to choose more than one source
of recruitment and every time, each post will have to be prescribed
for direct recruitment only, at 100%. On the basis of these
submissions, he submitted that since the present writ petition is
2026:HHC:42538
completely misconceived and the petitioners have no locus standi to
file and maintain the present petition, the same deserves to be
dismissed.
5.
respondent-
The
learned
Public
Senior
Service
Counsel
Commission,
appearing
while
for
the
adopting
the
arguments of the learned Additional Advocate General,
further
argued that the method of recruitment prescribed in the notification
under challenge is that 80% of the posts in issue are to be filled in
by way of direct recruitment and 20% on secondment basis. By
referring to the 2nd Schedule appended to the said Rules, learned
Senior Counsel submitted that this 20% recruitment on secondment
basis is to be drawn from amongst Steno Typists having five years of
regular service, or regular combined with continuous ad hoc service,
working in H.P. Government departments, Boards, or Corporations,
failing which, by way of direct recruitment, meaning thereby that in
terms of the Rules (Annexure P-9), 20% of the posts in issue, are to
be filled in on secondment basis from amongst experienced
incumbents, who have five years of regular service or regular
combined with continuous ad hoc service. Thus, it cannot be said
that the mode of recruitment to the posts in issue by way of 20% on
2026:HHC:42538
secondment basis is either arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. He submitted that the department has the discretion
to determine the sources of recruitment and appointment on
secondment basis, is a valid source of recruitment.
6.
We have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioners as also the learned Additional Advocate General and
learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-Commission and carefully
gone though the writ petition as well as documents appended
therewith.
7.
The petitioners aver that they are unemployed youth,
holding Bachelor's degrees from a recognized University and are
trained in shorthand and typing in English and Hindi. It is further
their contention that they are eligible for direct recruitment to the
post of Steno-Typist in the Himachal Pradesh Secretariat and will
apply for the posts as and when advertised. Their grievance is with
regard to Rule 8(b) of the impugned rules, in terms whereof, the post
of Steno-Typist in the Secretariat is to be filled in 80% by way of
direct recruitment and 20% on secondment basis.
8.
The contention, as was raised by the learned Senior
Counsel on behalf of the petitioners is that the filling up of 20% of
2026:HHC:42538
the posts of Steno-Typists on secondment basis is arbitrary and that
100% of recruitment should be made by way of direct recruitment.
9.
We are of the considered view that this writ petition is
completely misconceived. The petitioners, simply on the basis of the
qualifications possessed by them, have no locus to file and maintain
this writ petition, assailing the Recruitment and Promotion Rules to
the extent that 20% of the posts prescribed therein are to be filled on
secondment basis.
10.
It is not in dispute that 80% of the posts, i.e., the post of
Steno-Typist in the H.P. Secretariat, as per the rules, are to be filled
in by way of direct recruitment. Meaning thereby that all eligible
persons, which includes the petitioners also, have a right to compete
for appointment from the open market as far as these 80% of posts
are concerned.
11.
The petitioners, however, are concentrating on this
aspect of the matter that 20% of the posts stand prescribed to be
filled in on secondment basis, which, according to the petitioners,
cannot be done by the department and the department is bound to
fill all the cadre posts by way of direct recruitment.
12.
During the course of his submissions, the learned
2026:HHC:42538
Senior Counsel for the petitioners could not point out to any law
which mandates that an Employer is under a legal obligation to fill
up a post 100% by way of direct recruitment only and it does not has
the prerogative to make recruitment against a post from more than
one source.
13.
An Employer has the prerogative to fill posts available
with it either by way of direct recruitment or by way of promotion, or
both by way of direct recruitment and promotion. Similarly, an
Employer also has the prerogative to fill up the posts on secondment
basis, provided the Rules so provide.
14.
It is not the case of the petitioners that the Employer
herein does not has any right in law to fill up the posts on
secondment basis. Therefore, in light of this fact, in our considered
view, the act of the respondent-department, of not offering 100% of
the posts of Steno-Typists by way of direct recruitment, on this very
count alone, is not amenable to any challenge. However, we may add
a caveat here that if any rule is framed by the Government or the
Employer whereby it introduces a mode of appointment to a post
which is completely arbitrary, or which pricks the judicial conscious
of the Court, then obviously, the Court can look into the matter and
2026:HHC:42538
quash such a rule. For example, if there is a rule that deals with the
appointment of Doctors in the Health Department of the State and
for that, the Government prescribes the qualification of L.L.B., then,
obviously, the Court can intervene in the matter, because, by no
stretch of imagination, a degree holder in law can be recruited
against a post requiring a degree of MBBS.
15.
Be that as it may, it is not the case here. In the present
case, in terms of the Rules under challenge, 80% of the posts are to
be filled in by way of direct recruitment as per Schedule-II, i.e., from
amongst those who have a Bachelor’s degree from a recognized
University and possess the prescribed speed in shorthand and
typing on Computer.
16.
Incidentally, in terms of this rule, the posts to be filled
on secondment basis, are to be filled in from amongst Steno-Typists,
having five years of regular service, or regular combined with
continuous
ad-hoc
service,
working
in
H.P.
Government
Departments, Boards, and Corporations, who also possess the
requisite qualifications. This means that the intent of the Employer
is to have at least 20% of the posts to be filled from amongst persons
who already have experience of five years of regular service or
2026:HHC:42538
regular combined with continuous ad-hoc service rendered as a
Steno-Typist in Government Departments, Boards, or Corporations.
17.
We do not find any arbitrariness or illegality in this act
of the Government, as the rationale behind this 20% quota meant to
be filled on secondment basis is amply clear and the intent and
rationale is that the Government wants at least 20% of the posts to
be manned by experienced hands.
18.
This satisfies the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India because there is an intelligible differentia between those who
are recruited by way of direct recruitment and those who are
appointed on secondment basis. The intelligible differentia is that
whereas persons from the open market may be raw and without
experience, the persons coming on secondment basis, will be having
experience of
working against the post in issue. Obviously, this
intelligible differentia has a rationale and nexus with the object
sought to be achieved, which is to have at least some staff in the
office with prior experience.
19.
Now, coming to the judgment relied upon by the learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner, i.e., The State of Jammu and
Kashmir vs. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and others, (1974) 1 Supreme
2026:HHC:42538
Court Cases 19. Learned Senior Counsel referred to paragraphs 31
to 33 thereof to substantiate his contentions. The basic premise of
the arguments learned Senior Counsel was that because the
educational
qualifications
both
for
direct
recruitment
and
appointment on secondment basis are the same, therefore, there is
no intelligible differentia between these two sources of recruitment.
20.
Paras 31 to 33 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court (supra) are being quoted herein below:“31.
Classification, however, is fraught with the danger that it
may produce artificial inequalities and therefore, the right to
classify is hedged in with salient restraints; or else, the guarantee
of equality will be submerged in class legislation masquerading as
laws meant to govern well-marked classes characterized by
different and distinct attainments. Classification, therefore, must be
truly founded on substantial differences which distinguish person
persons grouped together from those left out of the group and such
differential attributes must bear a just and rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved.
32.
Judicial
scrutiny
can
therefore
extend
only
to
the
consideration whether the classification rests on a reasonable basis
and whether it bears nexus with the object in view. It cannot extend
to embarking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis
of classification, for were such an inquiry permissible it would be
2026:HHC:42538
open to the Courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the
legislature or the rule-making authority on the need to classify or
the desirability of achieving a particular object.
33.
Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible to
accept the respondents' submission that the classification of
Assistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma-holders rests
on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification, according
to
the
appellants,
was
made
with
a
view
to
achieving
administrative efficiency in the Engineering services. If this be the
object, the classification is clearly co-related to it, for higher
educational qualifications are at least presumptive evidence of a
higher mental equipment. This is not to suggest that administrative
efficiency can be achieved only through the medium of those
possessing comparatively higher educational qualifications but that
is beside the point. What is relevant is that the object to be
achieved here is not a mere pretence for an indiscriminate
imposition
of
inequalities
and
the
classification
cannot
be
characterized as arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest that
judicial scrutiny can extend.”
21.
As far as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in the judgment relied upon by learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioners is concerned, there is no dispute at all.
However, we are afraid that the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the judgment being relied upon by learned Senior
2026:HHC:42538
Counsel for the petitioners does not come to the rescue of the
petitioners.
22.
In this case, 20% of the posts are not reserved to be
filled in by way of promotion etc.. They are reserved to be filled in on
secondment basis and that too from other departments, Boards and
Corporations and obviously, until and unless, the qualifications
being possessed by those who are to be appointed by way of direct
recruitment and those who are to be appointed on secondment basis
is not the same, there will be a qualitative difference in educational
qualifications of said two categories, which
otherwise would be
violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
23.
Here, as we have already observed herein above and was
also submitted on behalf of the respondents, as the intent behind
filling 20% of posts on secondment basis is to ensure that at least
some of the posts are manned by persons with prior experience,
therefore, this 20% quota, which is to be filled in on secondment
basis, is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
24.
Before parting, we refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in P.U. Joshi and Others vs. Accountant General,
Ahmedabad and others reported in (2003) 2 SCC 632, In said
2026:HHC:42538
judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has, inter alia, held that
questions relating to the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of
posts, cadre, category, their creation, abolition, prescription of
qualifications and other conditions of service, including avenues of
promotion and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotion, pertain to
the domain of policy. These fall within the exclusive discretion and
jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to the limitations or
restrictions envisaged in the Constitution of India. It is not for
statutory Tribunals to direct the State Government to adopt a
particular method of recruitment, eligibility criteria, or avenues of
promotion, nor to impose themselves by substituting their view for
that of the State. Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that it is well
open to and within the competence of the State to change the rules
relating to service and to alter, amend, or vary by addition or
subtraction the qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions
of service, including avenues of promotion, from time to time as
administrative exigencies may need or necessitate.
25.
In Chandigarh Administration through the Director Public
Instructions (Colleges) Chandigarh vs. Usha Kheterpal Wale and others
(2011) 9 SCC 645), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
2026:HHC:42538
“22. It is now well settled that it is for the rulemaking authority or
the appointing authority to prescribe the mode of selection and
minimum qualification for any recruitment. The courts and
tribunals can neither prescribe the qualifications nor entrench upon
the power of the authority concerned so long as the qualifications
prescribed by the employer is reasonably relevant and has a
rational nexus with the functions and duties attached to the post
and are not violative of any provision of the Constitution, statute
and rules. (See J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of A.P. and P.U. Joshi v.
Accountant General). In the absence of any rules, under Article 309
or statute, the appellant had the power to appoint under its general
power of administration and prescribe such eligibility criteria as it
is considered to be necessary and reasonable. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the prescription of PhD is unreasonable.”
26.
Thus, it is evident from the said judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that the framing of rules and their alteration
etc. falls within the exclusive domain of the State and it is not for the
Courts ordinarily to interfere with the domain of the State and
unless the Court comes to the conclusion that a policy framed by the
State in this regard is ultra vires.
27.
In the present case, as already observed herein above,
we do not find the Rule under challenge to be ultra vires or violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. According to us, the Rules
2026:HHC:42538
are self speaking and self explanatory with regard to the justification
for filling up 20% of the posts in issue on secondment basis. We
reiterate that according to us, otherwise also, the petitioners do not
have any locus to file and maintain the present writ petition.
Accordingly, in light of the above discussion, we do not
find any merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed.
Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of
accordingly.
(Ajay Mohan Goel)
Judge
(Yogesh Jaswal)
Judge
October 01, 2026
(narender)
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