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2026:HHC:48608
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CrMP(M) No. 2032 of 2026
Reserved on: 30.10.2026
Decided on: 04.11.2026
Jinder Pal
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Prikshit Rathour, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
M
Ajit
Sharma,
Advocate General.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 229 of 2026, dated 24.07.2026, registered at
Police Station Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 15 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police had received secret information on 24.07.2026, at about
2:35 PM, that Sehajpreet Singh was selling poppy straw from his
house, which could be recovered by search. The information was
reduced to writing and was sent to the Supervisory Officer. The
police joined Nirmal Kaur and Harminder Singh and went to the
house of Sehajpreet Singh. The police searched the petitioner’s
house in the presence of the witnesses and recovered 58.212
kilograms of poppy straw. The police arrested Sehajpreet Singh,
who disclosed that the petitioner was also involved with him and
had taken 10 kilograms of poppy husk from Sehajpreet. The police
searched the petitioner's room on 05.08.2026 in the presence of
Paramjit Singh and the petitioner and recovered 91 grams of poppy
straw. The police arrested the petitioner. The allegations against
the petitioner are false. The petitioner is being implicated based on
the statement made by the co-accused, which is inadmissible. The
petitioner is the sole earner of the family. His parents are suffering
from various diseases related to old age; there is no one to look
after them. The police have completed the investigation and filed
the charge-sheet before the court. No fruitful purpose would be
served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, it was prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released
on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that ASI Inder Kumar had received secret information on
24th July 2026 at about 2:10 p.m. that Sehajpreet Singh had
concealed a huge quantity of opium poppy straw in his house,
which could be recovered by searching the house. The information
was credible, and any delay in procuring the search warrant would
have led to the destruction of opium poppy straw. Hence, the
information was reduced to writing and was sent to the SubDivisional Police Officer (SDPO), Nalagarh. The police joined
Nirmal Kaur and Harminder Singh and proceeded towards the
house of Sehajpreet. Sehajpreet was present in the house. The
police searched the house in his presence and in the presence of
the witnesses, and recovered one plastic bag containing 38
polythene packets having 19.420 kilograms of opium poppy husk,
one plastic bag containing 38 polythene packets having 19.372
kilograms of poppy husk, and one plastic bag containing 38
polythene packets having 19.420 kilograms of poppy husk. The
police arrested Sehajpreet Singh and seized the poppy husk.
Accused Sehajpreet Singh disclosed during interrogation that
Jinder Pal (the present petitioner) was also involved in the
commission of the crime. Sehajpreet had purchased 70 kilograms
of poppy straw and 2 kilograms of uncut poppy plants, out of
which 20 kilograms of poppy straw and 2 kilograms of uncut
opium poppy plants belonged to the petitioner. The petitioner had
sent ₹43,000/- to the account of Lucky. The co-accused had
brought the articles, and the petitioner had taken 10 kg of poppy
straw and 2 kg of uncut opium poppy plants with him. The police
obtained the bank account statements and found the financial
transactions. Subsequently, the police went to the petitioner's
house and searched it in the presence of Paramjit Singh. One
packet containing 91 grams of opium poppy was found in the
petitioner’s house. The police seized the opium poppy and arrested
the petitioner. The opium poppy was sent to the FSL. The
petitioner would indulge in the commission of the crime if
released on bail. No other FIR has been registered against the
petitioner. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Prikshit Rathore, learned counsel for
the petitioner, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General for the respondent-State.
5.
Mr Prikshit Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated based on the statement made by the co-accused, which
is inadmissible in evidence. The police have completed the
investigation and filed the charge-sheet before the court. No
fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in
custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for
the respondent-State, submitted that the co-accused was found in
possession of a commercial quantity of opium poppy straw. He had
disclosed the petitioner's name, and the police had recovered 91
grams of opium poppy straw from the petitioner. The offence
alleged against the petitioner is heinous, and he would indulge in
the commission of a crime if released on bail. Hence, he prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals,
it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail
order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to
inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail
discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record
of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted
as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature
of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the
severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the
character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused,
circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable
possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial,
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered
with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar
other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for
the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of
bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the
charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in
matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for
bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to
case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it
may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the
matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled
with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The
nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for
the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the
greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though,
however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.”
(emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an
elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court
is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the
grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to
have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been
detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting
bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon
the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously,
cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic
principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court
on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of
the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of
discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and
Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of
the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while
considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious
in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on
record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion.
While considering an application for the grant of bail, a
prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and
must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to
facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail,
except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating
other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or
intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who
seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend
to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
The status report mentions that the co-accused,
Sehajpreet, made a statement that he had brought the opium
poppy straw and poppy plants for himself and the petitioner. The
police searched the petitioner's house and recovered 91 grams of
opium poppy straw from the house. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan, (2016)
14 SCC 640: (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 412: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1043, that the
information given by the accused, leading to the discovery of
another accused from whom forged currency
notes were
recovered, is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act. It was observed at page 646: “15. It is apparent that on the basis of the information
furnished by accused Mehboob Ali and Firoz, and other
accused, Anju Ali was arrested. The fact that Anju Ali was
dealing with forged currency notes was not known to the
police. The statements of both the accused have led to the
discovery of the fact and arrest of the co-accused, which
was not known to the police. They identified him, and
ultimately, the statements have led to unearthing the racket
of the use of fake currency notes. Thus, the information
furnished by the aforesaid accused persons vide
information memos is clearly admissible, which has led to
the identification and arrest of accused Anju Ali, and as
already stated, from possession of Anju Ali's fake currency
notes had been recovered. As per information furnished by
the accused Mehboob and Firoz vide memos Exts. P-41 and
P-42, the fact has been discovered by the police as to the
involvement of the accused Anju Ali, which was not known
to the knowledge of the police. The police were not aware of
the accused Anju Ali, as well as the fact that he was dealing
with fake currency notes, which were recovered from him.
Thus, the statement of the aforesaid accused Mehboob and
Firoz is clearly saved by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The
embargo put by Section 27 of the Evidence Act was clearly
lifted in the instant case. The statement of the accused
persons has led to the discovery of facts proving complicity
of the other accused persons, and the entire chain of
circumstances clearly makes out that the accused acted in
conspiracy, as found by the trial court as well as the High
Court.
xxxxxxx
20. Considering the aforesaid dictums, it is apparent that
there was a discovery of a fact as per the statement of
Mehmood Ali and Mohd. Firoz. The co-accused was nabbed
on the basis of an identification made by the accused
Mehboob and Firoz. That he was dealing with fake currency
notes came to the knowledge of the police through them.
Recovery of forged currency notes was also made from Anju
Ali. Thus, the aforesaid accused had knowledge about coaccused Anju Ali, who was nabbed at their instance and on
the basis of their identification. These facts were not to the
knowledge of the police; hence the statements of the
accused persons leading to the discovery of the fact are
clearly admissible as per the provisions contained in Section
27 of the Evidence Act, which carves out an exception to the
general provisions about inadmissibility of confession made
under police custody contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the
Evidence Act.”
12.
In the present case, the statement made by Sehajpreet
Singh led the police to the petitioner, and the petitioner was found
in possession of opium poppy straw. Therefore, the statement
made by Sehajpreet would be admissible, and the submission that
the statement made by Sehajpreet is inadmissible is not
acceptable.
13.
The police had recovered a commercial quantity of
opium poppy straw from the co-accused and a small quantity from
the present petitioner. The police have also found financial
transactions. All these circumstances, taken together, prima facie,
show the petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime.
14.
The petitioner was involved in abetting the commercial
quantity of the contraband. Hence, the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act apply to the present case. Section 37 of the NDPS Act
provides that in an offence involving a commercial quantity, the
Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the
commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. It reads as follows:
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A
and also for offences involving commercial quantity,
shall be released on bail or his own bond unless–
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such an offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force, on granting of
bail.”
15.
This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an
offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was
observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) offences involving a commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it
may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for
bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court proposes to
grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be
mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal
requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any
other enactment.
(1)
The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that the person is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.”
16.
This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In
Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it
has been elaborated as under: "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder
case, the accused commits the murder of one or two
persons, while those persons who are dealing in
narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in
inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young
victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious
effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a
hazard to the society; even if they are released
temporarily, in all probability, they would continue
their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing
in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the
large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court,
dealing with the contention with regard to
punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly
observed about the adverse effect of such activities in
Durand Didier vs Chief Secy. Union Territory of Goa,
(1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld and
the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction among a
sizeable section of the public, particularly the
adolescents and students of both sexes and the
menace has assumed serious and alarming
proportions in recent years. Therefore, in order
to effectively control and eradicate this
proliferating and booming devastating menace,
causing deleterious effects and a deadly impact
on society as a whole, Parliament, in its
wisdom, has made effective provisions by
introducing the NDPS Act 81 of 1985 specifying
mandatory minimum imprisonment and fines.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the person
accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be
released on bail during trial unless the mandatory
conditions provided in Section 37, namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not abiding
by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the
release of the respondent accused on bail.
Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of
the harmful socio-economic consequences and
health hazards which would accompany
trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the
court should implement the law in the spirit
with which Parliament, after due deliberation,
has amended."
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject
to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences
with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said
section is in the negative form, prescribing the enlargement
of bail to any person accused of the commission of an
offence under the Act unless the two conditions are
satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the
second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such
an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied,
the ban on granting bail operates.
21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something
more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated
in the provision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. In the case at hand, the High Court seems to have
completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37
that, in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC,
or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the
grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under
the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
17.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant
of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A
and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to
oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe”
that (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence,
and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the person is not guilty
of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable
grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv
Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7
SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02,
paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means something
more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief
contemplated, in turn, points to the existence of such facts
and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not
guilty of the offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning
which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like
the jingling of a child's toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para 7
and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique
Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd.,
(1989) 1 SCC 532]]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question
of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not,
which depends on the circumstances in a given
situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v.
Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v.
Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for
the limited purpose essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail that the
court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal
and recording a finding of not guilty.” (emphasis
supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High
Court and this Court are required to apply while granting
bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is
likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the
seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and
in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the
country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the
NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
18.
It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without complying
with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
observed:
4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing
the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person
accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall
be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down
therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has
been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application;
and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence
and that he is not likely to commit any such offence while
on bail.
15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced
hereinbelow: —
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)-
in
the
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19 or section 24 or section
27A, and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or on his own
bond unless(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.”
16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no
person accused of an offence involving trade in a
commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on
bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
19.
It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without considering
Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was observed:
“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position
that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of narcotic
drugs or psychotropic substances, while considering the
application for bail, the Court is bound to ensure the
satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus: —
“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and
that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.”
6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one
cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing
the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws
relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in
the Act itself read thus:—
“An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control
and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of
property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the
provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected
therewith.”
In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the three-judge
bench of this Court considered the provisions under Section
37(1)(b) as well as 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with regard
to the expression “reasonable grounds” used therein. This
Court held that it means something more than the prima
facie grounds and that it contemplates substantial and
probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would
require the existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.
As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii)
of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail, it was held therein that they are cumulative
and not alternative. Satisfaction of the existence of those
twin conditions had to be based on the ‘reasonable
grounds’, as referred to above.
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by this
Court to be followed while considering an application for
bail moved by an accused involved in offences under the
NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the
scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the
exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only
subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the
limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act. Further,
it was held that in case one of the two conditions thereunder
is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would operate.
8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the
consistent view of this Court that while considering the
application for bail made by an accused involved in an
offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring the
mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible.
Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, which is a sine qua non for granting bail to an accused
under the NDPS Act, cannot be avoided while passing orders
on such applications.”
20.
In the present case, the prosecution has collected
sufficient material to prima facie connect the petitioner with the
commission of the crime. There is nothing on record to show that
the petitioner would not indulge in the commission of an offence if
released on bail. Hence, he has not satisfied the twin conditions
laid down in Section 37 of the ND&PS Act.
21.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of
the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the delay.
This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese
2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of
prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions
laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: “17. The High Court then, on the strength of those premises,
recorded a finding that there exist reasonable grounds to
believe that the applicant is not guilty of the alleged offence,
treating prolonged incarceration and likely delay as the
justification for bail. Such a finding is not a casual
observation. It is the statutory threshold under Section
37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the discretionary relief
and grant of bail must necessarily rest on careful appraisal
of the material available. A conclusion of this nature, if
returned without addressing the prosecution’s assertions of
operative control and antecedent involvement, risks
trenching upon the appreciation of evidence which would be
in the domain of the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing. Section
37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail and
obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors bears
directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by Section
37(1)(b).”
22.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year and four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious since not only is the recovery much
in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondentaccused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated
below the trailer to conceal the contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is made out in the present matter.”
23.
Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the
ground of delay alone when the petitioner has not satisfied the
requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
24.
No other point was urged.
25.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
dismissed.
26.
The observation made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
04th November, 2026
(Ravinder)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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