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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 13th JANUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+
ARB.P. 1806/2025
JINDAL COKE LIMITED
Through:
..... Petitioner
Mr. Anirudh Krishan Gandhi, Ms.
Megha Khandelwal, Mr. Abhishek
Kurian and Mr. Hussain, Advocates
versus
HIMADRI SPECIALITY CHEMICALS LIMITED .....Respondent
Through:
Ms. Anju Thomas, Mr. Amit Nag,
Mr. Himanshu and Mr. Partha
Banerjee, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as
<Arbitration Act=) by the Petitioner seeking appointment of an Arbitrator to
adjudicate upon the disputes which have arisen between the parties under a
Memorandum of Understanding for Coal Tar dated 18.12.2024 (hereinafter
referred to as <Agreement=).
2.
Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts leading to the filing of the
present petition are as under:
a) The Petitioner is a company engaged in manufacturing coke and coke
products with facilities in Jajpur and Odisha. Whereas, the
Respondent is a company involved in manufacturing of carbon
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materials and chemicals. The parties entered into an Agreement
whereby the Respondent agreed to purchase Coal Tar from the
Petitioner's Coke Oven Plant located at Jajpur, Odisha.
b) It is the case of the Petitioner that under the Agreement, the
Respondent was contractually obligated to lift 1,200 metric tonnes (±
20% at the Seller's discretion) of Crude Coal Tar per month from
Jajpur for the period from 01.01.2025 to 30.12.2025, with pricing
determined by a specific formula. It is the case of the Petitioner that
the Respondent failed to issue the requisite purchase order as
stipulated in the Agreement. It is the case of the Petitioner that the
Respondent, for the first time on 31.01.2025, disputed the binding
nature of the Agreement, contending that it was executed only on the
mutual understanding that a definitive long-term purchase and sale
Agreement would be subsequently executed. The Petitioner
categorically refuted these assertions, emphasizing that the Agreement
constitutes a valid, binding, and enforceable contract expressly
provided in Clause 19 which reads as under:519. Entire Agreement:
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between
the Buyer and the Seller with respect to the subject
matter herein and supersedes all previous writings,
understandings, negotiations, representations or
agreements with respect thereto, except where
provided otherwise.6
c) Clause 14 of the Agreement, which is an arbitration clause, reads as
under:
<14. Arbitration
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Both parties agree to use their best efforts to amicably
resolve any claims, controversies, and disputes arising
out of this contract.
Any dispute or difference whatsoever arising between
the parties out of or relating to the construction,
meaning, scope, operation or effect of this contract or
the validity or breach thereof, which cannot be
resolved through negotiations within a period of 45
days of the notification of such claims, disputes and
controversies shall be referred to arbitration in
accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 to a sole arbitrator as per the mutual decision of
the parties. The award rendered by the arbitrator shall
be final and binding upon both the parties concerned.
Language of the arbitration would be English and
venue of Arbitration will be New Delhi.6
d) It is pertinent to note that Clause 13 of the Agreement is the
Governing law which reads as under:
<13. Governing Law
This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with Indian Law, and the courts at Jajpur
shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon
or otherwise deal with any matter under or relating to
this Agreement.6
e) The Petitioner, thereafter, issued various demand notices to the
Respondent and the last of the demand notice is dated 03.06.2025
seeking cumulative payment of Rs.1,72,29,838/-. The Respondent
replied to the said demand notice on 10.06.2025, stating that there is
no definitive long-term Agreement. On 08.07.2025, the Petitioner sent
a notice to the Respondent for negotiation in terms of Clause 14 of the
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Agreement. The Respondent replied to the said notice on 31.07.2025
denying the enforceability of the Agreement and alleging that it was
never accepted or acted upon. The Petitioner was also informed by the
Respondent regarding a Civil Suit filed by the Respondent in the City
Civil Court of Calcutta seeking a declaration that the Agreement was
not executed.
f) The Petitioner has, thereafter, approached this Court by filing the
present petition seeking appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate
upon the disputes between the parties under the Agreement.
3.
Notice was issued in the present petition on 31.10.2025.
4.
The principal contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent is
that Clause 13 of the Agreement states that the courts at Jajpur shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes and, therefore, this Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. Reliance has been placed
by the Respondent on a Judgment passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in Cravants Media (P) Ltd. v. Jharkhand State Co. Operative Milk
Producers Federation Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5350.
5.
It is further stated by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that the
Respondent has filed a Suit in Jajpur and, therefore, this Court should not
entertain the present petition.
6.
Heard learned Counsel appearing for the Parties and perused the
material on record.
7.
A perusal of Clause 14 of the Agreement, which is an arbitration
clause, clearly indicates that the parties have decided that the venue of the
arbitration shall be at New Delhi. However, Clause 13 of the Agreement,
which is a Governing Clause, gives the courts at Jajpur the exclusive
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jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the disputes.
8.
The question as to where will be the seat of the arbitration in case of
inconsistency between the jurisdiction clause and the arbitration clause is
now well settled. A Division Bench of this Court in Yassh Deep Builders
LLP v. Sushil Kumar Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1547 confronted with
the similar situation as in the present case. It would be apposite to reproduce
the jurisdiction clause and the arbitration clause involved in the said case
and the same reads as under:
<12. It would be expedient to refer to the respective clauses
in the collaboration agreement dated 15-5-2018 entered into
between appellant and Respondent 1. The respective Clauses
19 and 23 read as under:
519.Jurisdiction.4
19.1. All matters concerning these presents and the
development of the scheduled property shall be subject
to the jurisdiction of courts at Gurugram/Haryana
alone.
23.Arbitration.4
23.1. In the event any dispute or difference arises
out of or in connection with the interpretation or
implementation of this agreement, or out of or in
connection with the breach, or alleged breach of this
agreement, such dispute shall be referred to
arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 to be decided by a sole arbitrator appointed
mutually by the parties hereto. In case of any
difference between the parties on appointment of a sole
arbitrator, the Arbitration Tribunal shall consist of
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three arbitrators. The second party shall appoint one
arbitrator and the first party shall appoint the second
arbitrator. The third arbitrator shall be appointed by
the two selected arbitrators failing which such
appointment shall be done by the Arbitration Council
of India, New Delhi. The decision taken by the majority
of arbitrators shall be final and binding on the parties
hereto. The venue of the arbitration shall be at Delhi,
India.
23.1.1. All proceedings in any such arbitration shall
be conducted in English.
23.1.2. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of
arbitration.
23.1.3. The arbitration award made by the
arbitrators shall be final and binding on the parties
and the parties agree to be bound thereby and to act
accordingly.
23.1.4. The award shall be in writing.
23.1.5. The provisions of this clause shall survive
the termination of this agreement.6
(emphasis supplied)
9.
The Division Bench interpreted the aforesaid clauses in Yassh Deep
Builders LLP (supra) and held as under:
<43. Coming back to the facts of the present case,
reference has been made by the parties to two different
clauses of the collaboration agreement. One is Clause
19 (jurisdiction) which stipulates that all matters
concerning the agreement and the development of the
scheduled property shall be subject to the jurisdiction
of courts at Gurugram, Haryana alone. The other
being Clause 23 (arbitration) stipulating that 5in the
event any dispute or difference arises out of or in
connection with the interpretation or implementation of
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this agreement, or out of or in connection with the
breach, or alleged breach of this agreement, such
dispute shall be referred to arbitration under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to be decided
by a sole arbitrator appointed mutually by the parties
hereto. In case of any difference between the parties on
appointment of a sole arbitrator, the Arbitration
Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators. The second
party shall appoint one arbitrator and the first party
shall appoint the second arbitrator. The third
arbitrator shall be appointed by the two selected
arbitrators failing which such appointment shall be
done by the Arbitration Council of India, New Delhi.
The decision taken by the majority of arbitrators shall
be final and binding on the parties hereto. The venue of
the arbitration shall be at Delhi, India.
44. Clause 23 is the arbitration clause and it is
distinct from Clause 19. The arbitration contract is
contained in Clause 23 and it is a complete contract
between the parties relating to arbitration. When
Clause 23 is read, it clearly establishes that the parties
agreed that the venue of the entire arbitration
proceedings would be Delhi, India. Even in case of a
disagreement between the two selected arbitrators, the
appointment of the third arbitrator is to be done by the
Arbitration Council of India, New Delhi, Clause
23.1.5, which is under the main Clause 23 pertaining
to arbitration stipulates that the provisions of the
clause shall survive the termination of the agreement.
This clearly shows that Clause 23 pertaining to
arbitration is distinct from the collaboration
agreement and is to survive even the termination of the
agreement.
45. Clause 23 provides for venue of the arbitration
and thus in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court
in BGS SGS SOMA JV case [BGS SGS SOMA
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JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Civ) 606] and Bharat Aluminium Co. case [Bharat
Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
810] would amount to the juridical seat of arbitration
and thus the courts at Delhi would have the exclusive
jurisdiction over the entire arbitral process. The
arbitration clause provides that all dispute or
difference arises out of or in connection with the
interpretation or implementation of this agreement, or
out of or in connection with the breach, or alleged
breach of this agreement are to be settled through
arbitration. There are no contra indicia in the instant
case to indicate otherwise.
46. On the other hand Clause 19 provides that all
matters concerning these presents and the development
of the scheduled property shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of courts at Gurugram, Haryana.
47. Arbitration is stipulated by Clause 23 which is
distinct from Clause 19 providing for jurisdiction.
Clause 19 being a general provision would be
applicable to proceedings that may take place, other
than arbitration proceedings and would cover all
matters that are not subject-matter of arbitration.
48. Accordingly, the courts at Delhi would have the
exclusive jurisdiction to entertain all proceedings
covered by Clause 23 i.e. the arbitration clause.
10.
In another judgment, a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in
Samiah International Builders Ltd. vs. Green View-II Sahkari Awas Samiti
Ltd, 2025:AHC:70118-DB again confronted with the similar situation as in
the present case. It would be apposite to reproduce the jurisdiction clause
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and the arbitration clause involved in the said case and the same reads as
under:
513. The amended contract agreement dated
11.11.2013 under Section X pertaining to settlement of
disputes and arbitration, inter alia, provided as under:
5ix. It is also a term of the contract that the
arbitration board shall be deemed to have entered
on the reference on the date it issues to both the
parties calling them to submit their statement of
claims and counter statement of claims. The venue
of the arbitration shall be Uttar Pradesh and
language of arbitration shall be English.6
14. In the same agreement, Section XII pertaining to
law governing the contract reads as under:
5The Indian Laws shall govern this contract for
the time being in force. All disputes arising out of
or any way connected to this agreement shall be
deemed to have arisen in Noida and the courts of
Gautam Budh Nagar/ High court of Allahabad
shall have jurisdiction to determine the same.6
11.
After quoting the aforesaid two clauses, the Division Bench of
Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid judgment has observed as under:
515. The two clauses quoted hereinabove at the
relevant time clearly provided that the venue of
arbitration shall be Uttar Pradesh and that the Courts
of Gautam Buddha Nagar/High Court of Allahabad
shall have jurisdiction to determine all disputes arising
out of or any way connected to the agreement. It would
be seen from the clause pertaining to governing laws
and jurisdiction that the same did not make any
reference to arbitration proceedings.
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16. On account of the subsequent events, as noticed
hereinbefore, a novation agreement dated 15.03.2020
was entered into between the appellant and the
respondent. The said novation agreement, inter alia,
contained clauses pertaining to effect of the novation
agreement and governing law and jurisdiction as
under:
<Effect of this Novation Agreement
Except so far as amended by Clause 2 of this
Agreement and save to the extent it is
inconsistent herewith, the Business Agreements
remain in full force and every reference therein
to the Business Agreements shall be construed as
a reference to such Business Agreements as
novated and amended by this Novation
Agreement. This Novation Agreement is
supplemental to the Business Agreements.6
<Governing Law and Jurisdiction
This Novation Agreement shall be governed by,
and construed in accordance with laws of India.
The courts of New Delhi shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide any suit, action
or proceedings, and to settle any disputes, which
may arise out of or in connection with this
Novation Agreement.6
17. A perusal of above clauses of the novation
agreement would reveal that while the clause
governing the law and jurisdiction, which in the
agreement dated 11.11.2013 was Section XII, had a
change, whereby instead of Courts at Gautam Buddha
Nagar/High Court at Allahabad, the same was
substituted with the Courts at New Delhi, the clause
pertaining to the 7settlement of disputes and
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arbitration8 containing venue of arbitration was not
altered. Once the venue of arbitration, as contained in
the amended construction agreement dated 11.11.2013
remained unaltered, in view of the judgment of Hon8ble
Supreme Court in BGS SGS Soma JV Vs. NHPC Ltd. :
(2020) 4 SCC 234 the arbitral venue, as identified in
the agreement, would be deemed to be the arbitral
seat, in absence of any other identified arbitral seat.
18. Once the arbitral seat stands fixed in the State of
Uttar Pradesh, the law laid down by Hon8ble Supreme
Court pertaining to exclusive jurisdiction for the
purpose of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out
of the agreement between the parties, as laid down in
the case of Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited
(supra) would kick in, which reads as under:
520. A conspectus of all the aforesaid
provisions shows that the moment the seat is
designated, it is akin to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present
case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is
Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes itUnder
the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil
Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts,
a reference to 5seat6 is a concept by which a
neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to
an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may
not in the classical sense have jurisdiction 3
that is, no part of the cause of action may have
arisen at the neutral venue and neither would
any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the
CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however,
as has been held above, the moment 5seat6 is
determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai
would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive
jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral
proceedings arising out of the agreement
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between the parties.6
19. The issue pertaining to clauses providing for
exclusive jurisdiction and a clause designating a
different seat/venue of arbitration has been dealt with
by various Courts. In Cable Corporation of India Ltd.
Vs. Jay Pee Sports International Ltd. : 2018 SCC
OnLine Del 10340, wherein the dispute resolution and
arbitration clause stipulated the venue of arbitration as
New Delhi but the governing laws and jurisdiction
clause stipulated that District Court of Gautam
Buddha Nagar and High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters arising out of or relating to the said contract.
It was laid down, referring to the decision in the case
of Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited (supra),
that the clause pertaining to the governing laws and
jurisdiction did not deal with the arbitration clause
and as the arbitration proceeding were to be held in
Delhi, the Court in Delhi would exercise jurisdiction
over the arbitration process and the seat of arbitration
would be at Delhi and clause pertaining to governing
laws and jurisdiction, being a general provision, would
be applicable to proceedings that may take place other
than arbitration proceedings.
20. Recently, in the case of Yassh Deep Builders LLP
Vs. Sushil Kumar Singh (supra), a Division Bench of
Delhi High Court in similar circumstances laid down
as under:
557. Even, if the objection of jurisdiction could
be raised before the appellate court, since the
venue has been held to be thejuridical seat of
arbitration in terms of the arbitration
agreement Clause 23, the Courts at Delhi had
the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
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Clause 23 expressly designates Delhi at the
venue for arbitration and there is no
designation of an alternative place as the
5seat6 the inexorable conclusion is that the
stated venue i.e. Delhi is the juridical seat of
the arbitral proceedings. Clause 19 would be
relevant only if by an agreement both parties
decided not to settle their disputes through
arbitration but by approaching a Court of law,
in which case the exclusive jurisdiction would
be of the Courts at Gurugram, Haryana.6
21. In view of the above factual and legal position, it
cannot be said that in relation to the arbitral
proceedings including proceedings under Section 9, 11
and 34, the jurisdiction would lie before the Courts at
New Delhi and in those circumstances, the impugned
determination made by the Commercial Court cannot
be sustained.6
12.
The Apex Court in Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries
Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 462 has observed as under:
<10. As per Section 2(2) of the Act, arbitrations
which take place in India are governed by Part I of the
Act. The 5court6 which will have jurisdiction to decide
the questions forming the subject-matter of arbitration
is the 5court6 as defined by Section 2(1)(e) of the Act
which reads as under:
52. Definitions.4(1) In this Part, unless the
context otherwise requires,4
***
(e) 5court6 means4
(i) in the case of an arbitration other than
international commercial arbitration, the Principal
Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and
includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary
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original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to
decide the questions forming the subject-matter of
the arbitration if the same had been the subjectmatter of a suit, but does not include any civil court
of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or
any Court of Small Causes;
(ii) in the case of international commercial
arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its
ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the
subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had
been the subject-matter of a suit, and in other cases,
a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals
from decree or courts subordinate to that High
Court.6
11. As per Section 2(2) of the Act, Part I would
apply to all arbitration where the place of arbitration
is in India. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines 5court6
with reference to Part I of the Act and would govern
the place of arbitration.
12. In BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 810] , the issue that arose before the
Constitution Bench was as to whether in international
commercial arbitrations whose juridical or legal seat
of arbitration was outside India whether the provisions
of Part I of the Act would be applicable for grant of
relief as held in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading
S.A. [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002)
SCC
105]
The
Constitution
Bench
in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium
Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
810] held that : (SCC p. 553)
5if the legal or juridical seat of arbitration is outside
India, then Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation
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Act, 1996 shall be inapplicable to such arbitrations;
and even in case a clause in the arbitration
agreement purports to apply Part I of the 1996 Act
to an arbitration where the juridical seat of
arbitration is outside India, Part I shall be
inapplicable to the extent inconsistent with the
arbitration law of the seat of arbitration.6
13. In BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 810] , the Court highlighted the distinction
between the 5seat6 and 5venue6 in the context of
Section 20(3) of the Act. Section 20(3) of the Act allows
the parties to hold meetings, proceedings and hearings
at
any
place
agreed
by
the
parties.
In BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium
Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
810] , the Court has held that in an international
commercial arbitration 5seated6 in India, parties may
by mutual agreement, hold arbitral proceedings
outside India. This, however, would not have the effect
of changing the seat of arbitration which would
continue to remain in India. The Court then envisages
a situation where the arbitration agreement designates
a foreign seat and also selects the Arbitration Act,
1996 as the law applicable to the conduct of
arbitration proceedings and in such circumstances,
hearing of the arbitration conducted at the venue fixed
by the parties would not have the effect of changing the
seat of arbitration which would remain in India. In
para 100, the Supreme Court held as under : (SCC pp.
607-08)
5100. True, that in an international commercial
arbitration, having a seat in India, hearings may be
necessitated outside India. In such circumstances,
the hearing of the arbitration will be conducted at
the venue fixed by the parties, but it would not have
the effect of changing the seat of arbitration which
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would remain in India. The legal position in this
regard is summed up by Redfern and Hunter, The
Law and Practice of International Commercial
Arbitration (1986) at p. 69 in the following passage
under the heading 5The Place of Arbitration6:
***
This, in our view, is the correct depiction of the
practical considerations and the distinction between
5seat6 [Sections 20(1) and 20(2)] and 5venue6
[Section 20(3)]. We may point out here that the
distinction between 5seat6 and 5venue6 would be
quite crucial in the event, the arbitration agreement
designates a foreign country as the 5seat6/5place6
of the arbitration and also selects the Arbitration
Act, 1996 as the curial law/law governing the
arbitration proceedings. It would be a matter of
construction of the individual agreement to decide
whether:
(i) the designated foreign 5seat6 would be read
as in fact only providing for a 5venue6/5place6
where the hearings would be held, in view of the
choice of the Arbitration Act, 1996 as being
the curial law, OR
(ii) the specific designation of a foreign seat,
necessarily carrying with it the choice of that
country's arbitration/curial law, would prevail over
and subsume the conflicting selection choice by the
parties of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
Only if the agreement of the parties is construed to
provide for the 5seat6/5place6 of arbitration being
in India 4 would Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996
be applicable. If the agreement is held to provide for
a 5seat6/5place6 outside India, Part I would be
inapplicable to the extent inconsistent with the
arbitration law of the seat, even if the agreement
purports to provide that the Arbitration Act, 1996
shall govern the arbitration proceedings.6
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(emphasis in original)
14. As pointed out earlier, Section 2(1)(e) of the Act
defines the 5court6 with reference to the term
5subject-matter of the suit6. As per Section 2(1)(e) of
the Act, if the 5subject-matter of the suit6 is situated
within the arbitral jurisdiction of two or more courts,
the parties can agree to confine the jurisdiction in one
of
the
competent
courts.
In
para
of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium
Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
810] , the Supreme Court held that the term 5subjectmatter6 in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act is to identify the
court having supervisory control over the arbitral
proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the
provisions in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act have to be read
in conjunction with Section 20 of the Act which give
recognition to the autonomy of the parties as to 5place
of arbitration6. The observations in para 96
in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium
Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
810] pertaining to arbitrations governed by Part I of
the Act i.e. where the 5place of arbitration6 in India
read as under : (SCC pp. 605-06)
<96. … We are of the opinion, the term
<subject-matter of the arbitration= cannot be
confused with <subject-matter of the suit=. The
term <subject-matter= in Section 2(1)(e) is confined
to Part I. It has a reference and connection with
the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to
identify the courts having supervisory control over
the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a
court which would essentially be a court of the seat
of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the
provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed
keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which
give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the
narrow construction as projected by the learned
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counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render
Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature
has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts
i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where
the cause of action is located and the courts where
the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as
on many occasions the agreement may provide for
a seat of arbitration at a place which would be
neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts
where the arbitration takes place would be required
to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral
process. For example, if the arbitration is held in
Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi
(Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as
between a party from Mumbai and the other from
Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an
interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order
under Section 37 must lie to the courts of Delhi
being the courts having supervisory jurisdiction
over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal.
This would be irrespective of the fact that the
obligations to be performed under the contract
were to be performed either at Mumbai or at
Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in
Delhi. In such circumstances, both the courts
would have jurisdiction i.e. the court within whose
jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situated
and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the
dispute resolution i.e. arbitration is located.=
(emphasis in original)
The
above
observations
in
para
in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] are in the context that on many
occasions, agreement may provide for a seat of
arbitration at a place which would be neutral to
both the parties. In such circumstances, it was
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observed that the two courts would have
jurisdiction that is the court within whose
jurisdiction <subject-matter= of the suit is situated
and the court within the jurisdiction of which the
dispute resolution i.e. the <venue= of arbitration is
located.
15. As per Section 20 of the Act, parties are free to
agree on the place of arbitration. Party autonomy has
to be construed in the context of parties choosing a
court which has jurisdiction out of two or more
competent courts having jurisdiction. This has been
made clear in the three-Judge Bench decision
in Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd. [Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
(2013) 9 SCC 32 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 157]
15.1. In the said case, respondent Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. appointed M/s Swastik Gases (P) Ltd.
situated at Jaipur, Rajasthan as their consignment
agent. The dispute arose between the parties as huge
quantity of stock of lubricants could not be sold by the
applicant and they could not be resolved amicably. In
the said matter, Clause 18 of the agreement between
the parties provided that the agreement shall be subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata.
15.2. The appellant Swastik invoked Clause 18 4
arbitration clause and filed application under Section
11(6) of the Act before the Rajasthan High Court for
appointment of arbitrator. The respondent contested
the application made by Swastik inter alia by raising
the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the
Rajasthan High Court in the matter. The plea of Indian
Oil Corporation was that the agreement has been
made subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata
and the Rajasthan High Court lacks the territorial
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ARB.P. 1806/2025
jurisdiction in dealing with the application under
Section 11(6) of the Act.
15.3. The Designated Judge held [Swastik Gases
(P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine
Raj 2758 : (2012) 3 RLW 2241] that the Rajasthan
High Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the application under Section 11(6) of the Act
and gave liberty to Swastik to file the arbitration
application in the Calcutta High Court which order
came to be challenged before the Supreme Court.
15.4. Pointing out that the words like 5alone6,
5only6, 5exclusive6 or 5exclusive jurisdiction6 have
not been used in the agreement and use of such words
is not decisive and non-use of such words does not
make any material difference as to the intention of the
parties by having Clause 18 of the agreement that the
courts at Kolkata shall have the jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court held as under : [Swastik Gases (P) Ltd.
case [Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
(2013) 9 SCC 32 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 157] , SCC pp.
47-48, paras 31-33]
531. In the instant case, the appellant does not
dispute that part of cause of action has arisen in
Kolkata. What the appellant says is that part of
cause of action has also arisen in Jaipur and,
therefore, the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High
Court or the designate Judge has jurisdiction to
consider the application made by the appellant for
the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11.
Having regard to Section 11(12)(b) and Section 2(e)
of the 1996 Act read with Section 20(c) of the Code,
there remains no doubt that the Chief Justice or the
designate Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has
jurisdiction in the matter. The question is, whether
parties by virtue of Clause 18 of the agreement have
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ARB.P. 1806/2025
agreed to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts at
Jaipur or, in other words, whether in view of Clause
18 of the agreement, the jurisdiction of the Chief
Justice of the Rajasthan High Court has been
excluded?
32. For answer to the above question, we have to
see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the
agreement which provides that the agreement shall
be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It
is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause
in the agreement the words like 5alone6, 5only6,
5exclusive6 or 5exclusive jurisdiction6 have not
been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and
does not make any material difference. The intention
of the parties4by having Clause 18 in the
agreement4 is clear and unambiguous that the
courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which
means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have
jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of
jurisdiction clause, like Clause 18 in the agreement,
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the
contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of
one is the exclusion of another. By making a
provision that the agreement is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have
impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts.
Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the
courts at a particular place and such courts have
jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an
inference may be drawn that parties intended to
exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit
by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause
is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the
public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the
Contract Act in any manner.
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33. The above view finds support from the
decisions of this Court in Hakam Singh v. Gammon
(India) Ltd. [Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd.,
(1971) 1 SCC 286] , A.B.C. Laminart (P)
Ltd. v. A.P.
Agencies [A.B.C.
Laminart
(P)
Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163] , R.S.D.V.
Finance Co. (P) Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works
Ltd. [R.S.D.V. Finance Co. (P) Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh
Glass Works Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 130] , Angile
Insulations v. Davy Ashmore (India) Ltd. [Angile
Insulations v. Davy Ashmore (India) Ltd., (1995) 4
SCC 153] , Shriram City Union Finance Corpn.
Ltd. v. Rama Mishra [Shriram City Union Finance
Corpn. Ltd. v. Rama Mishra, (2002) 9 SCC 613]
, Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P)
Ltd. [Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters
(P) Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 671] and Balaji Coke
Industry (P) Ltd. v. Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat (P)
Ltd. [Balaji Coke Industry (P) Ltd. v. Maa Bhagwati
Coke Gujarat (P) Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 403 : (2009) 3
SCC (Civ) 770] .6
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Swastik [Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 32 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ)
157] , the Supreme Court held that clause like Clause
18 of the agreement will not be hit by Section 23 of the
Contract Act and it is not forbidden by law nor it is
against public policy. It was so held that as per Section
20 of the Act, parties are free to choose the place of
arbitration. This 5party autonomy6 has to be
construed in the context of choosing a court out of two
or more courts having competent jurisdiction under
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.
17. The interplay between 5seat6 and 5place of
arbitration6 came up for consideration in Indus
Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations
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ARB.P. 1806/2025
(P)
Ltd. [Indus
Mobile
Distribution
(P)
Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC
678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] After referring
to Balco [Balco v. Kaiser
Aluminium
Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
810]
, Enercon
(India)
Ltd. v. Enercon
GmbH [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014)
5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] and Reliance
Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [Reliance Industries
Ltd. v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603 : (2014) 3
SCC (Civ) 737] and also amendment to the Act
pursuant to the Law Commission Report, speaking for
the Bench Nariman, J. held as under : [Indus Mobile
Distribution (P) Ltd. case [Indus Mobile Distribution
(P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7
SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] , SCC pp. 692-93,
paras 18-20]
518. The amended Act, does not, however, contain
the aforesaid amendments, presumably because
the Balco [Balco v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] judgment in no uncertain terms has
referred to 5place6 as 5juridical seat6 for the
purpose of Section 2(2) of the Act. It further made it
clear that Sections 20(1) and 20(2) where the word
5place6 is used, refers to 5juridical seat6, whereas
in Section 20(3), the word 5place6 is equivalent to
5venue6. This being the settled law, it was found
unnecessary to expressly incorporate what the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has
already done by way of construction of the Act.
19. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions
shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is
akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts
of the present case, it is clear that the seat of
arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes
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ARB.P. 1806/2025
it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the
Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration,
unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to
suits filed in courts, a reference to 5seat6 is a
concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by
the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral
venue may not in the classical sense have
jurisdiction 4 that is, no part of the cause of action
may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither
would any of the provisions of Sections 16 to 21
CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as
has been held above, the moment 5seat6 is
determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai
would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive
jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral
proceedings arising out of the agreement between
the parties.
20. It is well settled that where more than one court
has jurisdiction, it is open for the parties to exclude
all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the
case law, see Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd. [Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 32 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ)
157] This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E.
Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal v. Chhattisgarh
Investment Ltd. [B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg
Niedenthal v. Chhattisgarh Investment Ltd., (2015)
12 SCC 225 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 427] Having
regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts
alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts in the country, as the juridical seat of
arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the
impugned judgment [Datawind Innovations (P)
Ltd. v. Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC
OnLine Del 3744 : (2016) 158 DRJ 391] is set
aside.6
(emphasis supplied)
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ARB.P. 1806/2025
18. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the
court at a particular place, only such court will have
the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties
intended to exclude all other courts. In the present
case, the parties have agreed that the <venue= of
arbitration shall be at Bhubaneswar. Considering the
agreement of the parties having Bhubaneswar as the
venue of arbitration, the intention of the parties is to
exclude all other courts. As held in Swastik [Swastik
Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 9
SCC 32 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 157] , non-use of words
like <exclusive jurisdiction=, <only=, <exclusive=,
<alone= is not decisive and does not make any
material difference.
19. When the parties have agreed to have the <venue=
of arbitration at Bhubaneswar, the Madras High
Court erred [Kamchi Industries Ltd. v. Brahmin
River Pellets Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 13127] in
assuming the jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the
Act. Since only the Orissa High Court will have the
jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed under
Section 11(6) of the Act, the impugned order [Kamchi
Industries Ltd. v. Brahmin River Pellets Ltd., 2018
SCC OnLine Mad 13127] is liable to be set aside.
20. In the result, the impugned order of the Madras
High Court in Kamchi Industries Ltd. v. Brahmin
River Pellets Ltd. [Kamchi Industries Ltd. v. Brahmin
River Pellets Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 13127]
dated 2-11-2018 is set aside and this appeal is
allowed. The parties are at liberty to approach the
Orissa High Court seeking for appointment of the
arbitrator.
(emphasis supplied)
13.
In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court and the
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Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, with which
this Court is also in agreement, this Court is of the opinion that this Court
has the jurisdiction to entertain the present petition.
14.
In view of the fact that disputes have arisen between the parties and
the Agreement contains an arbitration clause, this Court is inclined to
appoint an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties.
15.
Accordingly, Ms. V. Mohana, Senior Advocate (Mob. No:
9868110575) is appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the
disputes between the parties.
16.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the Delhi
International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) and would abide by its rules and
regulations. The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees as per the
Schedule of Fees maintained by the DIAC.
17.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite disclosure
under Section 12(2) of the 1996 Act within two weeks of entering on
reference.
18.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned Arbitrator
on their merits, in accordance with law.
19.
Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of this Court on the merits of the contentions of the parties.
20.
The petition stands disposed of in the above terms, along with
pending application(s), if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
JANUARY 13, 2026
S. Zakir
Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
19:16:18
ARB.P. 1806/2025
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