Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
Reserved On
: 01/04/2026
Pronounced On : 12/06/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 1685 of 2011
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
✓
==========================================================
JINABHAI LIMABHAI KAPADIA & ANR.
Versus
HIRJIBHAI MAHIRAJBHAI HINGRAJIYA (SINCE DECEASED) & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR MEHUL SURESH SHAH, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MR. ZALAK B
PIPALIA(6161) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2
MR ANSHIN H DESAI(1020) for the Appellant(s) No. 2
MR DEVEN PARIKH, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MR.BHANUKUMAR B
AGRAWAL(10031) for the Defendant(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA)
1.Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. Mehul
Shah
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
assisted
by
learned
Pipalia
for
advocate
the
Mr.
Zalak
appellants
B.
original
plaintiffs and learned Senior Advocate Mr.
Deven Parikh assisted by learned advocate Mr.
Bhanukumar
B.
Agrawal
for
the
respondents
original defendants.
2.This appeal under section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (For short “the Code”)
is
preferred
challenging
the
Judgment
and
Decree dated 11.05.2011 passed by learned 9th
Additional Senior Civil Judge, Junagadh in
Special Civil Suit No.64 of 1999 whereby the
suit
filed
by
the
appellants
original
plaintiffs is ordered to be rejected.
3.The
appeal
15.06.2011
Jayant
is
admitted
(Coram
Patel
and
:
by
Hon’ble
Hon’ble
Mr.
order
dated
Mr.
Justice
Justice
Upadhyaya, As Their Lordships were then).
J.C.
C/FA/1685/2011
4.In
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
Civil
Application
-
For
Interim
Relief
No.6225 of 2011, by order dated 15.06.2011,
it was directed that the respondents shall
maintain
status-quo
possession
in
qua
respect
the
of
title
and
property
in
question, until final disposal of the appeal
and application was disposed of accordingly.
5.For the sake of convenience, appellants and
respondents are here-in-after referred to as
the
plaintiffs
and
the
defendant
respectively.
Facts:
6.Brief
facts
of
the
case
are
that
the
plaintiffs filed Special Civil Suit No.64 of
seeking
specific
performance
of
Agreement to Sale dated 26.09.1990 (Exh.108)
and for declaration and permanent injunction
in
respect
of
land
bearing
Revenue
Survey
No.25 and Revenue Survey No.26/1 situated at
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
Village
Timbawadi,
Taluka
and
District
Junagadh.
7.The averments made in the plaint discloses
that
the
plaintiffs
were
agriculturists
residing at Morvada in Timbawadi village and
the defendant was residing at Timbawadi and
holding
land
bearing
Revenue
Survey
No.25
admeasuring 5 acres and 13 gunthas and Survey
No.26/1
admeasuring 14 gunthas in Sim of
Village
Timbawadi,
Taluka
and
District
Junagadh.
8.Father
of
farmer
of
possession
the
defendant
Mahidas
old
State
of
rights
were
given
Arjan
was
Junagadh
and
to
him
under
Bombay Land Revenue Code,1879 in 1950. The
permanent rights were entered into revenue
records for Revenue Survey No.8, 25, 26/1 and
27 of Timbawadi by Promulgation Entry No.31.
Thereafter Mahidas Arjan has entered the land
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
bearing Revenue Survey No.25 in the name of
the defendant and land bearing Revenue Survey
No.27 in the name of his second son Kantilal.
By
application
dated
18.04.1990
made
by
Mahidas Arjan, Entry No.307 was mutated in
property
record
regarding
land
bearing
Revenue Survey No.26/1 adjacent to Revenue
Survey No.25 in the name of his four sons
defendant-Hirjibhai
and
other
three
sons,
Hasmukh, Kantilal and Himmatlal.
9.It also appears that Mahidas Arjan borrowed a
loan from State Bank of Saurashtra, Juangadh
mortgaging land bearing Revenue Survey No.27
and
26/1
and
Revenue
Entries
were
mutated
regarding the same.
10.
the
It is the case of the plaintiffs that
defendant
Hirjibhai
Mahidas
agreed
to
sell the parcels of land situated at Revenue
Survey
No.25
and
Revenue
Survey
No.26/1
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
stating that Revenue Survey No.25 was of his
share and his brothers and father had taken
away their rights from that land and he would
make necessary entry pertaining to the same
in the revenue record for land situated at
Revenue Survey No. 26/1 and he was empowered
to sell the land of Revenue Survey No.26/1.
11.
an
It is the case of the plaintiffs that
acknowledgement
receipt
accepting
the
consideration of Rs. 1,90,000/- (Exh.107) was
executed by the defendant issuing a receipt
of the same to the plaintiffs and thereafter
agreement to sale dated 26.09.1990 (Exh.108)
was executed for Revenue Survey Nos. 25 and
26/1
in
favour
of
agreed
consideration
Vigha.
The
the
of
plaintiffs
plaintiffs
for
an
Rs.1,45,000/-
per
also
Rs.
paid
2,00,000/- as consideration at the time of
execution of agreement to sale.
C/FA/1685/2011
12.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
As per the terms of agreement to sale,
it was agreed that remaining consideration
was to be paid within 15 months from the date
of agreement to sale and thereafter sale deed
was to be executed and before that defendant
was to clear the title so as to empower him
to
sell
the
land
bearing
Revenue
name
No.26/1
striking
out
remaining
three
brothers
record
dues
and
of
clearing
the
the
the
Survey
of
from
the
other
charges
Government
and
his
revenue
and
cooperative
society.
13.
It appears that defendant was unable to
clear the charges on the land and was also
unable
to
strike
off
the
names
of
his
brothers from Revenue Survey No.26/1 within
15 months time limit.
14.
It is the case of the plaintiffs that
the plaintiffs were ready and willing to pay
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
the remaining amount of consideration but in
spite of repeated requests, defendant did not
clear his title and act as per the agreed
condition and instead of utilising the amount
of consideration paid for clearing the title,
it was utilised for other purposes and the
defendant further demanded remaining amount
of consideration from the plaintiffs which
was
refused
by
the
plaintiffs
and
further
showed their readiness to pay the remaining
amount
of
consideration
at
the
time
of
execution of the sale deed. Therefore, the
defendant
prayed
for
more
time
for
title
clearance and also agreed to execute writing
for
the
same.
It
plaintiffs
that
as
willing
buy
the
to
is
the
case
of
the
the
plaintiffs
were
land
in
area,
that
additional amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid
to the defendants on 21.04.1991
and writing
was executed on the stamp paper on the same
day (Exh.109)extending the time limit to 6
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
years for execution of the sale deed instead
of 15 months as agreed in the agreement to
sale dated 26.09.1990. Thus, according to the
plaintiffs amount of Rs.8,90,000/- was paid
towards consideration to the defendant in the
year 1990-1991 extending the time limit to 6
years for execution of the sale deed.
15.
It is the case of the plaintiffs that as
the time limit of six years was completing on
21.04.1997, the plaintiffs repeatedly asked
the defendant to execute the sale deed either
individually or through third party, but the
defendant failed to comply with such request.
The plaintiffs, therefore, published a public
notice in “Sandesh” Daily Newspaper, Rajkot
Edition on 27.11.1997 (Exh.104) that nobody
should
purchase
the
land
bearing
Revenue
Survey Nos. 25 and 26/1.
16.
The defendant instead of giving reply to
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
the public notice filed caveat application on
21.02.1998 (Exh.106) wherein it was admitted
that agreement to sale dated 29.09.1990 was
executed
for
sale
of
the
land
at
Revenue
Survey Nos. 25 and 26/1 by the defendants. It
is
also
averred
in
the
caveat
that
an
agreement to sale dated 05.02.1991 was also
executed for resale of the land.
17.
The
Special
plaintiffs
thereafter
preferred
Civil
No.64
17.05.1999
for
Suit
of
specific
on
performance,
declaration and permanent injunction as well
as damages in lieu of specific performance.
18.
On service of summons and notice, the
defendants filed written statement at Exh.12
denying
the
contending
averments
inter-alia
made
that
in
so
the
far
plaint
as
land
situated in Survey No.26/1 is a fragment land
under Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
Consolidation of Holdings Act,1947 and sale
or agreement of fragment land is void under
the said Act and part of Revenue Survey No.25
was acquired for by-pass road of Junagadh and
name
of
the
defendant
was
entered
into
revenue record for compensation proceedings.
It
was
were
also
doing
village
contended
the
that
the
plaintiffs
money
lending
business
in
any
license
and
the
without
as
defendant needed amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-, it
was agreed by the defendants to borrow the
amount from the plaintiffs on interest at the
rate of 10% per month and as a security, the
agreement to sale was executed and signature
of the defendant was taken on stamp paper of
Rs. 5/-. It was also contended that writing
for payment of Rs. 1,90,000/- alleged to have
been
executed
on
24.09.1990(Exh.
107)
is
concocted and defendant did no sign any such
writing
nor
therefore,
accepted
any
amount.
It
was
submitted
that
the
suit
is
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
required to be dismissed as the same is filed
after
nine
years
and
hence
Judge
framed
barred
by
limitation.
19.
Learned
issues
after
granting
the
following
temporary
injunction
below Exh.5 to maintain the status-quo till
disposal of the suit:
SR.
ISSUES
FINDINGS
NO.
1. Whether the Plaintiff proves that In Negative
Defendant has executed agreement
to sell 14 vigha of suit property
to plaintiff on Dt: 24.09.1990 and
accepted
an
amount
of
Rs.
1,90,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Niney
Thousand
only)
by
way
of
consideration?
2. Whether the plaintiff proves that Partly
in
the defendant executed agreement affirmative
to sell 14 vigha of suit property
to the plaintiff on dt:26.09.1990
and agreed to sell each vigha for
an amount of Rs.1,45,000/- and
accepted
an
amount
of
Rs.2,00,000/by
way
of
consideration
from
the
Plaintiff’s?
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
3. Whether the plaintiff proves that
as per agreement the sale deed was
to be executed within 15 months
from date of agreement to sell?
4. Whether the plaintiff proves that
the
defendant
has
executed
additional document in original
agreement
to
sell
dt.25-9-90
dt.21-4-91 on and further accepted
Rs.5,00,000/by
way
of
consideration from the plaintiff
and further extended the time
limit to six years?
5. Whether the plaintiff is ready and
willing to perform his part of
agreement to sell dtd.25/9/90?
6. Whether the plaintiff proves that
the
defendant
has
refused
to
perform his part of agreement
dt.25-9-90?
In
affirmative
In negative
In negative
In negative
(6A) Whether the defendant proves
that he has no right, title or
Partly
in
interest over the suit property?
affirmative
7. Whether the defendant proves that In
plaintiff
has
made
bogus
and affirmative
forged agreement to sell?
8. Whether the plaintiff's entitled In negative
to get relief as prayed for?
9. Whether
the
plaintiff's
entitled to get injunction
prayed for?
10.What order and decree?
is In negative
as
As per final
order
C/FA/1685/2011
20.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
It
appears
that
prior
to
filing
of
Special Civil Suit No.64 of 1999, defendant
had
entered
into
agreement
to
sale
dated
09.07.1998 in respect of the suit land and
possession thereof was handed over for part
consideration of Rs.15,51,000/- in favour of
one
Mr.
Parbatbhai
Jethabhai
Bhatia.
An
application was preferred by the said third
party to be joined as party defendant in the
suit which was rejected by the trial Court on
05.09.2007 by order passed below Exh.32 which
was
challenged
petition
being
before
this
Special
Court
Civil
in
writ
Application
No.27463 of 2007 which was also rejected vide
order
dated
21.07.2008
on
the
ground
that
there is no privity of contract between the
third party and the plaintiffs of the present
suit.
21.
It also appears that said third party
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
has filed Special Civil Suit No.108 of 2010
seeking specific performance of agreement to
sale dated 09.07.1998 for the suit land which
is pending in the Court of Additional Senior
Civil Judge, Junagadh wherein the plaintiffs
of the present suit made an application to be
joined as party. However, such application
was
also
Civil
rejected
and
Application
therefore,
No.9018
of
Special
was
preferred and by order dated 20.06.2012, the
writ petition is allowed and plaintiffs of
the
present
impleaded
suit
as
have
party
been
ordered
defendant
in
to
be
Special
Civil Suit No.108 of 2010. It appears that
the third party also filed Civil Application
No.2/2011 in this appeal which is rejected by
order dated 17.07.2025 on the ground of “Res
judicata”.
22.
Both
documentary
the
sides
evidence
adduced
which
oral
have
and
been
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
considered by the learned Judge in detail in
the
impugned
Judgment
and
Order
and
has
decided the issues as per the findings stated
against
each
issue
here-in-above
while
dismissing the suit.
Submissions of the appellants-plaintiffs
23.
Learned
Senior
Counsel
Mr.
Mehul
Shah
for the appellants-plaintiffs submitted that
the
learned
Trial
Court
has
failed
to
consider the most relevant aspect that the
defendant did not deny his signature on the
Agreement to Sale dated 26.09.1990 at Exh.108
but in fact it is admitted and therefore,
learned Trial Court ought to have held that
agreement to sale at Exh.108 is proved.
24.
It
was
submitted
that
as
per
the
agreement to sale, the condition was to pay
the remaining balance amount of consideration
within 15 months from the date of agreement
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
and on payment of consideration, final sale
deed was to be executed, however before that
defendant was required to clear the title in
respect
of
the
particularly,
to
suit
land
remove
the
and
names
more
of
his
brothers from the revenue record qua Survey
No. 26/1 or to take their consent to execute
the sale deed as well as to clear the dues of
the Government and co-operative society and
to make the land free from all encumbrances.
It was pointed out that during the period of
15 months, the defendant could not fulfill
his obligation to clear the title of the suit
land so as to enable the plaintiffs to pay
the remaining consideration and to execute
the
sale
deed.
It
was
submitted
that
the
plaintiffs have paid additional amount of Rs.
5,00,000/-
towards
sale
consideration
on
21.04.1991 so as to enable the defendant to
clear
the
title
and
in
exchange
written
acknowledgment (Exh.109) for receipt of Rs.
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
5,00,000/-
was
executed
by
the
defendant
extending the time limit for execution of the
sale deed by 6 years so as to enable the
defendant to pay the outstanding dues of the
bank
and
the
co-operative
society
and
to
remove the names of his brothers from revenue
record of Survey No. 26/1.
25.
It was submitted that the trial Court
has exceeded its jurisdiction by comparing
the signature of the defendant on documents
at
Exhs.
107,
and
on
its
own
to
arrive at the conclusion that the signature
of the defendant varies in these documents.
It was pointed out that the trial Court could
not have exercised such power of comparing
the signature on its own to decide the case
against the plaintiffs and even if the trial
Court chooses to do so it was bound to record
specific reasons in detail. However, in facts
of the case, no such reasons are recorded to
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
compare
the
signature
to
conclude
that
plaintiffs failed to prove document extending
time at Exh. 109.
26.
It was submitted that signatures on Exh.
108 is not disputed by the defendant whereas
trial
Court
discarded
Exh.109
whereby
the
time period of contract was extended by six
years
on
signature
the
ground
without
of
difference
assigning
any
in
cogent
reason. It was pointed out that Exh.109 is a
vital piece of evidence to prove the case of
the plaintiffs which has been discarded by
the
trial
Court
to
conclude
that
the
plaintiffs have failed to prove what exact
amount
is
paid
to
the
defendants.
It
was
submitted that plaintiffs were always ready
and willing to pay the balance amount of sale
consideration
but
the
defendant
failed
to
execute the final sale deed by not getting
the
title
clearance
of
the
suit
land
and
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
therefore, the plaintiffs were compelled to
issue
public
completion
of
notice
on
27.11.1997
in
daily
years
on
newspaper
“Sandesh”, Rajkot edition. However, defendant
instead
of
executing
replying
to
the
the
notice
sale
deed
or
published
in
the
newspaper filed a caveat application in the
Court.
It
was
therefore,
submitted
that
conduct of the defendant would demonstrate
that the defendant was never ready to perform
his part of the agreement to sale to execute
the sale deed by accepting the balance amount
of sale consideration from the plaintiffs.
27.
It
was
pointed
out
from
the
caveat
application filed by the defendant that the
defendant
has
not
denied
execution
agreement
to
sale
and
therefore,
of
the
learned
trial Court has erred in not considering such
admission on behalf of the defendant.
C/FA/1685/2011
28.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
It was further submitted that the trial
court ought to have held that documents at
Exh.
and
plaintiffs
Exh.
because
are
proved
on
combined
by
the
reading
of
both the documents, it emerges that there is
no variance between the same and both the
documents
demonstrate
willingness
their
part
of
the
of
the
readiness
plaintiffs
obligation
to
to
and
fulfill
pay
the
consideration which is corroborated by public
notice issued by the plaintiffs.
29.
It was submitted that as the document at
Exh.108 agreement to sale is admitted by the
defendant, same is required to be considered
as held by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of P.
Ramasubbamma
v.
Vijayalakshmi
reported
in
2022 (7) SCC 384, wherein it is held that
once
execution
of
agreement
to
sell
and
payment/receipt of advance substantial sale
consideration
was
admitted
by
the
vendor,
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
thereafter nothing further is required to be
proved
by
the
plaintiff-vendee.
It
was
therefore, submitted that the Trial Court was
not
justified
in
dismissing
the
suit
for
specific performance of agreement to sell as
agreement to sale (Exh.108) and part payment
made by the plaintiffs are not in dispute.
30.
It was submitted that in similar facts
the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of K. Prakash
v. B.R. Sampath Kumar reported in (2015) 1
Supreme Court Cases 597 has held that once an
agreement to sell is legal and validly proved
and further requirements for getting a decree
of specific performance is established then
the Court has to exercise its discretion in
favour of parties seeking relief for specific
performance. Reliance was placed on para nos.
13 to 16 of the said decision which read as
under:
“13.
Indisputably,
remedy
for
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
specific performance is an equitable
remedy. The Court while granting
relief
for
specific
performance
exercise discretionary jurisdiction.
Section 20 of the Act specifically
provides
that
the
court's
jurisdiction to grant decree of
specific
performance
is
discretionary
but
not
arbitrary.
Discretion must be exercised in
accordance
with
the
sound
and
reasonable judicial principles.
14. The King's Bench in Rookey's
Case [77 ER 209; (1597) 5 Co.Rep.99]
it is said :
"Discretion is a science, not to
act arbitrarily according to
men's
will
and
private
affection: so the discretion
which is exercised here, is to
be governed by rules of law and
equity, which are to oppose, but
each,
in
its
turn,
to
be
subservient to the other. This
discretion,
in
some
cases
follows the law implicitly, in
others or allays the rigour of
it, but in no case does it
contradict
or
overturn
the
grounds or principles thereof,
as has been sometimes ignorantly
imputed to this Court. That is a
discretionary
power,
which
neither
this
nor
any
other
Court, not even the highest,
acting in a judicial capacity is
by the constitution entrusted
with"
15.
The
Court
of
Chancery
in
Attorney General V/s. Wheat [(1759)
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
1 Eden 177; 28 ER 652] followed the
Rooke's case and observed :
"the law is clear and courts of
equity ought to follow it in
their
judgments
concerning
titles to equitable estates;
otherwise great uncertainty and
confusion
would
ensue.
And
though proceedings in equity are
said to be secundum discretionem
boni vin, yet when it is asked,
vir bonus est quis- The answer
is, qui consulta partum, qui
leges juraq servat. And as it is
said in Rooke's case, 5 Rep. 99
b, that discretion is a science
not to act arbitrarily according
to
men's
will
and
private
affection: so the discretion
which is exercised here, is to
be governed by rules of law and
equity, which are to oppose, but
each,
in
its
turn,
to
be
subservient to the other. This
discretion,
in
some
cases
follows the law implicitly, in
others or allays the rigour of
it, but in no case does it
contradict
or
overturn
the
grounds or principles thereof,
as has been sometimes ignorantly
imputed to this Court. That is a
discretionary
power,
which
neither
this
nor
any
other
Court, not even the highest,
acting in a judicial capacity is
by the constitution entrusted
with. This description is full
and judicious, and what ought to
be imprinted on the mind of
every judge."
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
16. The principles which can be
enunciated
is
that
where
the
plaintiff brings a suit for specific
performance of contract for sale,
the
law
insists
a
condition
precedent to the grant of decree for
specific
performance
that
the
plaintiff must show his continued
readiness and willingness to perform
his
part
of
the
contract
in
accordance with its terms from the
date of contract to the date of
hearing. Normally, when the trial
court exercises its discretion in
one way or other after appreciation
of entire evidence and materials on
record, the appellate court should
not
interfere
unless
it
is
established that the discretion has
been
exercised
perversely,
arbitrarily
or
against
judicial
principles.
The
appellate
court
should
also
not
exercise
its
discretion against the grant of
specific performance on extraneous
considerations
or
sympathetic
considerations.
It
is
true,
as
contemplated under Section 20 of the
Specific Relief Act, that a party is
not entitled to get a decree for
specific performance merely because
it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless
once an agreement to sell is legal
and
validly
proved
and
further
requirements for getting such a
decree is established then the Court
has to exercise its discretion in
favour
of
granting
relief
for
specific performance.”
31.
It was also pointed out that the Apex
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
Court considering the period in litigation
has
also
keeping
increased
in
mind
the
the
sale
factual
consideration
position
of
increase in the price of the property in area
where it was situated.
32.
In support of his submission that the
plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform
their part of contract of agreement to sale,
reliance was placed on the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in case of A Kanthamani v.
Nasreen
Ahmed
reported
in
2017(4)
SCC
wherein Hon’ble Apex Court in para nos. 28 to
has
considered
interpretation
of
expression “readiness and willingness” which
reads as under:
“28. The expression "readiness and
willingness" has been the subject
matter of interpretation in many
cases even prior to its insertion in
Section 16 (c) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 . While examining
the question as to how and in what
manner, the plaintiff is required to
prove his financial readiness so as
to enable him to claim specific
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
performance
of
the
contract/agreement,
the
Privy
Council in a leading case which
arose
from
the
Indian
Courts
(Bombay) in Bank of India Limited &
Ors. v. Jamsetji A.H. Chinoy and
Chinoy and Company, AIR 1950 PC 90,
approved the view taken by Chagla
A.C.J., and held inter alia that "
it
is
not
necessary
for
the
plaintiff to produce the money or
vouch
a
concluded
scheme
for
financing the transaction to prove
his readiness and willingness."
29. The following observations
the Privy Council are apposite:
of
"21..............Their Lordships
agree with this conclusion and
the grounds on which it was
based. It is true that the
plaintiff 1 stated that he was
buying for himself, that he had
not sufficient ready money to
meet the price and that no
definite arrangements had been
made for finding it at the time
of repudiation. But in order to
prove himself ready and willing
a purchaser has not necessarily
to produce the money or to vouch
a concluded scheme for financing
the transaction. The question is
one of fact, and in the present
case the Appellate Court had
ample material on which to found
the
view
it
reached.
Their
Lordships would only add in this
connection
that
they
fully
concur with Chagla A.C.J. when
he says:
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
"In my opinion, on the evidence
already
on
record
it
was
sufficient for the court to come
to
the
conclusion
'
that
plaintiff
was
ready
and
willing to perform his part of
the
contract.
It
was
not
necessary for him to ' work out
actual figures and satisfy the
court what specific amount a
bank would have advanced on the
mortgage of his property and the
pledge of these shares. I do not
think that any jury--if the
matter was left to the jury in
England--would have come to the
conclusion that a man, " in the
position in which the plaintiff
was, was not ready and willing
to pay the purchase price of the
shares which he had bought from
defendants 1 and 2."
For the foregoing reasons, their
Lordships answer question(4) in
the
affirmative."(Emphasis
supplied)
30. This Court in Sukhbir Singh &
Ors. v. Brij Pal Singh & Ors., AIR
SC
2510=(1997)
SCC
followed
the
aforesaid
principle
with these words:
"5. Law is not in doubt and it
is not a condition that the
respondents should have ready
cash with them. The fact that
they
attended
the
SubRegistrar's office to have the
sale deed executed and waited
for the petitioners to attend
the office of the Sub-Registrar
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
is a positive fact to prove that
they had necessary funds to pass
on consideration and had with
them the needed money with them
for payment at the time of
registration. It is sufficient
for the respondents to establish
that they had the capacity to
pay the sale consideration. It
is
not
necessary
that
they
should always carry the money
with them from the date of the
suit till the date of the
decree. It would, therefore, be
clear that the courts below have
appropriately
exercised
their
discretion
for
granting
the
relief of specific performance
to the respondents on sound
principles of law."
33.
Reliance was also placed on the decision
of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Gaddipati
Divija v. Pathuri Samrajyam reported in 2023
(6) Scale 331 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court
considered the provision of section 16(c) of
the
Specific
particularly,
Relief
Act,
Explanation
and
(ii)
more
below
clause(c) prior to 2018 amendment to submit
that the plaintiff was entitled for specific
performance
of
contract
if
he
avers
and
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
proves that he has performed or has always
been
ready
and
obligation
willing
under
to
the
perform
contract.
his
The
explanation attached to clause (c) clarifies
that in a contract involving the payment of
money,
the
plaintiff
need
not
actually
deposit the money to the defendant, and that
he must aver that he has performed, or is
ready
and
according
willing
to
to
its
perform
the
contract
true
construction.
Reliance was placed on para nos. 22 to 24 and
30 which read as under:
“22. We have carefully considered
the rival contentions of the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the
parties
and
perused
the
entire
records. The only issue involved in
the instant appeal before us is:Whether the High Court was justified
in
allowing
Respondent
No.
1's
appeal and decreeing the suit for
specific
performance,
by
holding
that the deceased G. Venugopala Rao
and his legal heirs (including the
Appellants herein) failed to perform
their obligation with regard to
getting the property measured and
demarcated, while Respondent No. 1
herein was always ready and willing
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
to perform her part of contract by
paying
the
balance
sale
consideration23. At the outset, we would like to
mention that Section 16 (c) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 (along
with
its
explanation)
is
the
relevant provision of law which is
attracted in the present case, and
as has also been held by the High
Court. The 2018 Amendment to the
Specific Relief Act made certain
amendments to Section 16 as well.
However, it has been clarified in
the recent 3-Judge Bench judgment of
this Court in Katta Sujatha Reddy v.
Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd.
& Ors., (2023) 1 SCC 355 that the
Amendment
was
not
a
mere
procedural enactment, but it had
substantive principles built into
its working, and, as such, the said
Amendment is prospective in nature
and
cannot
apply
to
those
transactions that took place prior
to its enforcement. Therefore, in
the present case, Section 16, as it
stood prior to the 2018 Amendment,
would
be
applicable,
since
the
matter dates back to 2002. Section
16 (as it then stood) is being
reproduced hereunder:"16. Personal bars to relief.Specific
performance
of
a
contract cannot be enforced in
favour of a person(a) who would not be entitled to
recover compensation for its
breach; or
(b) who has become incapable of
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
performing,
or
violates
any
essential term of, the contract
that on his part remains to be
performed, or acts in fraud of
the contract, or wilfully acts
at
variance
with,
or
in
subversion
of,
the
relation
intended to be established by
the contract; or
(c) who fails to aver and prove
that he has performed or has
always been ready and willing to
perform the essential terms of
the contract which are to be
performed by him, other than
terms of the performance of
which has been prevented or
waived by the defendant.
Explanation.- For
of clause (c),-
the
purposes
(i) where a contract involves
the payment of money, it is not
essential for the plaintiff to
actually tender to the defendant
or to deposit in court any money
except when so directed by the
court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver
performance of, or readiness and
willingness
to
perform,
the
contract according to its true
construction."
24. On a bare perusal of the
aforementioned section, it becomes
clear
that
prior
to
the
Amendment, clause (c) of Section 16
laid down that the plaintiff is
entitled for a specific performance
of contract if he avers and proves
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
that he has performed or has always
been ready and willing to perform
his obligation under the contract.
The explanation attached to clause
(c) further clarified that in a
contract involving the payment of
money,
the
plaintiff
need
not
actually deposit the money to the
defendant, and that he must aver
that he has performed, or is ready
and willing to perform the contract
according to its true construction.”
34.
Reliance was placed on the decision of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Nadiminti
Suryanarayan
Murthy
(Dead)
Through
Legal
Representatives v. Kothurthi Krishna Bhaskara
Rao and others reported in (2017) 9 Supreme
Court Cases 622, in support of the submission
that
once
proved
by
question is
bona
the
fide
agreement
plaintiff
then
to
sale
the
is
next
whether the plaintiff was able
to prove that he was ready and willing to
perform his part of the agreement and that he
has always been ready and willing to perform
his part of the agreement and has in fact
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
performed his part and secondly, whether any
breach is committed by the defendant in not
performing his part has to be considered as
per the provisions of section 16(c) of the
Specific
Relief
Act.
It
was
therefore,
submitted that in facts of the case before
the Apex Court, it was held that once the
plaintiff was ready and willing to perform
his part of agreement, suit ought to have
been decreed in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.
35.
Reliance was placed on the decision of
Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Motilal Jain v.
Ramdasi
(2000)
Devi
(Smt)
Supreme
and
others
reported
Court
Cases
420,
in
wherein
Hon’ble Apex Court in facts of the case held
as under:
“9. That decision was relied upon by
a three Judges Bench of this Court
in Syed Dastagir's case (supra),
wherein
it
was
held
that
in
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
construing a plea in any pleading,
Courts must keep in mind that a plea
is not an expression of art and
science but an expression through
words to place fact and law of one's
case for a relief. It is pointed out
that in India most of the pleas are
drafted by counsel and hence they
inevitably differ from one to the
other; thus, to gather true spirit
behind a plea it should be read as a
whole
and
to
test
whether
the
plaintiff
has
performed
his
obligations, one has to see the pith
and substance of the plea. It was
observed,
"Unless
a
statute
specifically requires a plea to be
in any particular form, it can be in
any form. No specific phraseology or
language is required to take such a
plea. The language in Section 16(c)
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
does
not
require
any
specific
phraseology
but
only
that
the
plaintiff must aver that he has
performed or has always been and is
willing to perform his part of the
contract." So the compliance of
"readiness and willingness" has to
be in spirit and substance and not
in letter and form." It is thus
clear that an averment of readiness
and willingness in the plaint is not
a mathematical formula which should
only be in specific words. If the
averments in the plaint as a whole
do clearly indicate the readiness
and willingness of the plaintiff to
fulfil his part of the obligations
under the contract which is subjectmatter of the suit, the fact that
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
they are differently worded will not
militate against the readiness and
willingness of the plaintiff in a
suit of specific performance of
contract for sale.
10. In the instant case a perusal of
paras 6 to 11 of the plaint do
clearly indicate the readiness and
willingness of the plaintiff. The
only obligation which he had to
comply with was payment of balance
of consideration. It was stated that
he demanded the defendant to receive
the balance of consideration of Rs.
8000.00 and execute the sale deed.
The defendant was in Patna (Bihar)
at the time of notices and when he
came back to his place the plaintiff
filed the suit against him. In
support of his case, he adduced the
evidence of PW 1 and PW 2. The
plaintiff had parted with two-third
of the consideration at the time of
execution of Ext. 2. There is no
reason why he would not pay the
balance of one-third consideration
of Rs. 8,000.00 to have the property
conveyed in his favour.”
36.
It was therefore submitted that once the
defendant has failed to perform his part of
the contract, the trial Court ought to have
decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.
37.
Reliance
was
placed
on
decision
of
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Beemaneni Maha
Lakshmi v. Gangumalla Appa Rao (Since Decd)
By Legal Representatives reported in (2019) 6
Supreme
Court
Cases
wherein
Hon’ble
Supreme Court in para no.10 to 12 held that
when
vendor
fails
to
perform
his
part
of
contract, failure of vendee to demonstrate
that he was having sufficient money with him
to pay the balance consideration as per the
agreement on date of his evidence is not much
of consequence.
38.
Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that
expression “date” used in Article 54 of the
Limitation
Act,
specified
date
in
is
the
suggestive
Calendar.
It
of
a
was
therefore, submitted that Article 54 of the
Limitation Act read with section 38 of the
Specific Relief Act, meaning of word “date”
and “fixed” would have to be considered to be
a specified date in the calendar and as such,
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
in facts of the case once the defendant has
not
performed
executing
the
the
agreement
sale
deed
in
to
sale
by
favour
of
the
plaintiffs on completion of 6 years as agreed
on 21.4.1991 agreement (Exh.109), the suit
was filed within three years in the year 1999
from the specified date i.e. 21.04.1997. In
support
of
his
submission,
placed
on
the
decision
court
in
case
of
(Dead)
By
of
reliance
Hon’ble
Ahmmadsahab
Proposed
Lrs.
Supreme
Abdul
Versus
was
Milla
Bibijan
reported in 2009(5) SCC 462 wherein Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as under:
“5.
According
to
Advanced
Law
Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd
Edition 2005, the word `date' means
as follows:
"Date. (As a noun) The point of
time at which a transaction or
event takes place; time given or
specified; time in some way
ascertained and fixed; in a
deed, that part of the deed or
writing which expresses the day
of the month and year in which
it was made, (2 Bl. Commn. 304;
Tomlin). In Bement V/s. Trenton
Locomotive, etc.,Mfg. Co., 32
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
NLJ 513 (515), it is said : `The
primary signification of the
word date, is not time in the
abstract,
nor
time
taken
absolutely
but,
as
its
derivation
plainly
indicates,
time given or specified time in
some way ascertained and fixed;
this is the sense in which the
word is commonly used. When we
speak of the date of a deed, we
do not mean the time when it was
actually executed but the time
of its execution, as given or
stated in the deed itself.
"Where a deed bears no date, or
an impossible date, and in the
deed reference is made to the
`date',
that
word
must
be
construed `delivery'; but if the
deed bears a sensible date, the
word `date', occurring in the
deed, means the day of the date,
and not that of the delivery"
(Elph. 123, citing Styles V/s.
Wardle, 4 B&C 908;
"Date", though sometimes used as
the shortened form of "day of
the date", is not its synonym;
but mean the particular time on
which an instrument is given,
executed, or delivered (Howard's
Case, 1 Raym. Ld 480; Armitt
V/s. Breame, 2 Raym Ld 1076;
Pewtress v Annan, 9 Dowl 828, at
pp. 834, 835).
"The word `date' is much more
commonly descriptive of a day
than of any smaller division of
time"
(per
Simpson
V/s.
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
Marshall, 37 SLR 316).
"Date" means day, so that where
a
cover
note
providing
for
temporary insurance of a motor
car expires "15 days after date
of commencement" it runs for the
full 15 days after the day on
which
it
was
to
commence
(Cartwright V/s. Mac Cormack;
Trafalgar Insurance Co. (Third
Party), 1963 1 WLR 18)."
6. `Fixed' in essence means having
final
or
crystallized
form
or
character not subject to change or
fluctuation.
7. The inevitable conclusion is that
the expression `date fixed for the
performance'
is
a
crystallized
notion. This is clear from the fact
that the second part "time from
which period begins to run" refers
to a case where no such date is
fixed. To put it differently, when
date is fixed it means that there is
a definite date fixed for doing a
particular act. Even in the second
part the stress is on `when the
plaintiff
has
notice
that
performance is refused'. Here again,
there is a definite point of time,
when
the
plaintiff
notices
the
refusal. In that sense both the
parts refer to definite dates. So,
there is no question of finding out
an
intention
from
other
circumstances. Whether the date was
fixed or not the plaintiff had
notice that performance is refused
and the date thereof are to be
established
with
reference
to
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
materials and evidence to be brought
on record. The expression `date'
used in Article 54 of the Schedule
to the Act definitely is suggestive
of a specified date in the calendar.
We answer the reference accordingly.
The matter shall now be placed
before
the
Division
Bench
for
deciding the issue on merits.”
39.
Reliance was also placed on decision of
Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Madina Begum
Versus Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey reported in
2016 (15) SCC 322, wherein the Apex Court has
held as under:
15. In coming to the conclusion that
the suit was barred by time, the
High Court considered Article 54 of
Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act,
1963 (for short, "the Act"). The
discussion thereon was brief and it
reads as follows:"Under
Article
of
the
Limitation Act, the prescribed
period of limitation for filing
a suit of specific performance
of a contract is three years and
the period of three years has to
be
calculated
based
on
two
contingencies
i.e.
the
date
fixed for performance of the
contract or if no such date is
fixed,
the
date
when
the
plaintiffs
had
notice
about
refusal of the performance by
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
the defendants. In this case,
admittedly,
a
date
for
performance is fixed i.e. six
months
from
the
date
of
execution of the contract and,
therefore, as a specific period
for performance is fixed, the
period of limitation would be
three years w.e.f. 3.03.2002
i.e. the date when the period of
six months for execution of the
sale-deed lapsed."
xxx
17. The interpretation of the first
part of Article 54 of Schedule 1 of
the Act is no longer res-integra.
Article 54 reads as follows:54.
For specific performance
of a contract
Three
years
The date fixed for the
performance, or, if no
such date is fixed,
when the plaintiff has
notice that performance
is refused.
xxx
20. Quite independently and without
reference to the aforesaid decision,
another
Bench
of
this
Court
in
Rathnavathi and Another v. Kavita
Ganashamdas, (2015) 5 SCC 223 came to
the same conclusion. It was held in
paragraph 42 of the Report that a mere
reading of Article 54 would show that
if
the
date
is
fixed
for
the
performance of an agreement, then noncompliance with the agreement on the
date would give a cause of action to
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
file a suit for specific performance
within three years from the date so
fixed. But when no such date is fixed,
the limitation of three years would
begin when the plaintiff has notice
that the defendant has refused the
performance of the agreement. It was
further held, on the facts of the case
that it did not fall in the first
category of Article 54 since no date
was fixed in the agreement for its
performance.
xxx
22. As far as the present appeal is
concerned, the agreement between Gulab
Bai and Madina Begum did not specify a
calendar date as the date fixed for
the performance of the agreement.
Consequently, the view expressed in
Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla and Rathnavathi
on the first part of Article 54
clearly applies to the facts of the
case. In taking a contrary view,
ignoring the absence of a specified
date
for
the
performance
of
the
agreement and reversing the Trial
Court, the High Court has fallen in
error.”
40.
It
situated
guntha
was
further
at
Survey
was
brothers
of
contended
No.26/1
subjected
the
to
that
admeasuring
consent
defendant
land
and
of
other
removal
of
their names from the revenue record. It was
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
submitted that with regard to the contention
raised on behalf of the defendant that the
defendant
has
no
right
to
sell
the
land
bearing Revenue Survey No.26/1 as it is hit
by section 7 of the Gujarat Prevention of
Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings
Act,1947,
it was submitted that section 20
of the Specific Relief Act confers equitable
jurisdiction
upon
the
Trial
Court
and
conditional decree could have been passed by
the trial Court on regularisation of the land
situated at Revenue Survey No.26/1 which is
adjacent
to
consolidation
Revenue
of
Survey
the
No.25
lands
and
under
on
the
provisions of the relevant Act, the defendant
ought to have been directed to execute the
sale deed.
41.
In support of his submission, reliance
was placed on the following decisions:
C/FA/1685/2011
1)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
Kartar
Singh
Versus
Harjinder
Singh
reported in 1990 (3) SCC 517, wherein it is
held as under:
“4. We are afraid that the very
foundation of the. reasoning of the
Division Bench of the High Court is
defective. It was never disputed
that the respondent and his sister
had each half share in the suit
properties. Hence a mere failure to
mention in the agreement that they
had such share in the property would
not entitle one to come to the
conclusion that they did not have
that share. When the property is
owned jointly, unless it is shown to
the contrary, it has to be held that
each one of the joint owners owns a
moiety of the property. In the
present case, there is neither a
pleading nor a contention that the
respondent and his sister did not
own the property in equal shares.
Secondly, the agreement of sale
clearly mentions that respondent was
entering into the agreement both on
behalf of himself and his sister,
and
that
he
was,
under
the
agreement, selling the whole of his
share and also the whole of the
share of his sister in the property.
Further in the agreement itself he
had stated that he was responsible
to get the sale-deed executed by his
sister and that he would pursuade
her to do so. This being the case,
the properties agreed to be sold
were clearly distinguishable by the
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
shares of the respective vendors. In
the circumstances when the absentee
vendor, for some reason or the
other,
refused
to
accept
the
agreement, there is no reason why
the agreement should not be enforced
against the vendor who had signed it
and whose property is identifiable
by his specific share.
5. We are, therefore, of the view
that this is not a case which is
covered by sec. 12 of the Act. It is
clear from sec. 12 that it relates
to the specific performance of a
part of a contract. The present is
not a case of the performance of a
part of the contract but of the
whole of the contract so far as the
contracting
party,
namely,
the
respondent is concerned. Under the
agreement, he had contracted to sale
whole of his property. The two
contracts, viz. for the sale of his
share and of his sister's share were
separate and were severable from
each
other
although
they
were
incorporated in one agreement. In
fact, there was no contract between
the appellant and the respondent's
sister and the only valid contract
was with respondent in respect of
his share in the property.”
2)
Hanumappa
Channappa
Hullur
(D)
By
Lrs.
Versus Shivamaruthappa Parappa Kalli reported
in 2015 (9) Scale 328, wherein it is held as
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
under:
“14. In Kammana Sambamurthy Vs.
Kalipatnapu Atchutamma case (supra)
this Court was concerned with a case
where vendor-husband and his wife
had each half share in the suit
property and the agreement for the
sale was executed by the vendorhusband concerning the entire suit
property. The question arose as to
whether the agreement be enforced
against the vendor-husband to the
extent of his half share in the
property. This Court relying on the
decision
in
Kartar
Singh
Vs.
Harjinder Singh [(1990) 3 SCC 517]
and the decision in A. Abdul Rashid
Khan's case (supra) held that the
vendee is not entitled to seek
specific
performance
of
the
agreement to the extent of half
share of the vendor's wife and there
is no impediment for enforcement of
the agreement against the vendorhusband to the extent of his half
share in the property.”
3)
Kammana Sambamurthy (D) By Lrs. Versus
Kalipatnapu Atchutamma (D) reported in 2011
(11) SCC 153, wherein it is held as under:
“19. The crucial question in the
case is whether the agreement could
be enforced against the vendor to
the extent of his half share in the
property. The terms of the agreement
show that the vendor represented to
the vendee that he was absolute
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
owner of the property that fell to
his share in the partition effected
with his brothers and he did not
have any male child. The vendor
assured the vendee that excepting
him none has got any right over the
property and he would obtain the
witness signatures of his daughters
and get their voluntary consent
letters in his favour. It is clear
from the evidence that the vendee
had no knowledge that vendor's wife
has half share in the property which
devolved upon her on the death of
her son intestate.
21. Section 12 prohibits specific
performance of a part of a contract
except in the circumstances under
sub-sections (2), (3) and (4). The
circumstances
mentioned
in
these
sub-sections
are
exhaustive.
Is
Section 12 attracted in the facts
and circumstances of the present
case- We do not think so. The
present case is not a case of the
performance
of
a
part
of
the
contract
but
the
whole
of
the
contract insofar as the vendor is
concerned since he had agreed to
sell the property in its entirety
but it later turned out that vendor
had only half share in the property
and his wife held the remaining
half. The agreement is binding on
the vendor as it is without being
fractured. As regards him, there is
neither segregation or separation of
contract nor creation of a new
contract.
In
Kartar
Singh
V/s.
Harjinder Singh & Ors.1, this Court
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
was concerned with a case where
vendor--brother and a sister had
each
half
share
in
the
suit
properties. The agreement for the
sale was executed by the brother
concerning the suit properties in
which the sister had half share. The
sister was not executant to the
agreement; rather she refused to
accept the agreement. The question
for consideration before this Court
was
whether
agreement
could
be
enforced against the vendor--brother
to the extent of his half share.
This Court considered Section 12 and
held as under :
"5. We are, therefore, of the
view that this is not a case
which is covered by Section 12
of the Act. It is clear from
Section 12 that it relates to
the specific performance of a
part of a contract. The present
is not a case of the performance
of a part of the contract but of
the whole of the contract so far
as
the
contracting
party,
namely,
the
respondent
is
concerned. Under the agreement,
he had contracted to sell whole
of
his
property.
The
two
contracts, viz. for the sale of
his share and of his sister's
share were separate and were
severable
from
each
other
although they were incorporated
in one agreement. In fact, there
was no contract between the
appellant and the respondent's
sister
and
the
only
valid
contract was with respondent in
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
respect of
property.
his
share
in
the
6. As regards the difficulty
pointed out by the High Court,
namely,
that
the
decree
of
specific performance cannot be
granted since the property will
have to be partitioned, we are
of the view that this is not a
legal difficulty. Whenever a
share in the property is sold
the vendee has a right to apply
for
the
partition
of
the
property
and
get
the
share
demarcated. We also do not see
any
difficulty
in
granting
specific
performance
merely
because
the
properties
are
scattered at different places.
There
is
no
law
that
the
properties to be sold must be
situated
at
one
place.
As
regards the apportionment of
consideration, since admittedly
the appellant and respondent's
sister each have half share in
the
properties,
the
consideration
can
easily
be
reduced by 50 per cent which is
what the first appellate court
has rightly done."
22. Kartar Singh has been followed
by this Court in Manzoor Ahmed
Magray V/s. Ghulam Hassan Aram &
Ors. In Manzoor Ahmed Magray, this
Court considered the matter in the
context of Section 15 of J & K
Specific Relief Act, 1977 which is
pari
materia
to
Section
of
Specific Relief Act, 1963 . This
Court said :
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
".......Hence, there is no bar
for
passing
the
decree
for
specific relief with regard to
1/3rd or 2/3rds share owned by
the contracting party for which
he can execute the sale deed.
For the share of Ghulam Rasool
(brother
of
Defendant
1)
admittedly, no decree is passed
by the High Court. Dealing with
the similar contention where
agreement
was
for
sale
of
property belonging to a brother
and sister each having a half
share, the Court in Kartar Singh
V/s. Harjinder Singh held that
when the absentee vendor, for
some reason or the other refused
to accept the agreement, there
is no reason why the agreement
should not be enforced against
the vendor who had signed and
his property is identifiable by
specific
share.
The
Court
further held that such case is
not covered by Section 12 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 which
relates to specific performance
of a part of a contract. Such
type of case would be the case
of specific performance of the
whole of the contract so far as
the
contracting
party
is
concerned. Further, whenever a
share in the property is sold
the vendee has the right to
apply for the partition of the
property
and
get
the
share
demarcated. Hence there would
not
be
any
difficulty
in
granting specific performance of
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
the contract to the extent to
which it is binding between the
parties."
23. In the case of A. Abdul Rashid
Khan (Dead) & Ors. V/s. P.A.K.A.
Shahul Hamid & Ors.3, this Court
held that even where any property is
held jointly and once any party to
the contract has agreed to sell such
joint property by agreement, then,
even if the other co-sharer has not
joined, at least to the extent of
his share, the party to the contract
is bound to execute the sale deed.
In that case, the suit property
originally belonged to one Aziz
Khan. On his death, his heirs under
the Muslim law--nine sons and two
daughters inherited that property.
The
sons
agreed
to
sell
that
property to the first respondent
therein. However, some dispute arose
between
the
parties
and
that
necessitated the first respondent
therein
to
file
the
suit
for
specific performance in which the
executants of the agreement as well
as the two daughters of Aziz Khan
were impleaded as defendants. It was
admitted case that the daughters of
Aziz Khan had not joined in the
agreement of sale. The trial court
dismissed the suit by holding that
the agreement was indivisible and
could
only
be
enforced
if
the
daughters of Aziz Khan agreed. The
first respondent therein preferred
an appeal before the High Court
against the judgment and decree of
the trial court. The High Court held
that he had not pleaded and proved
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
that the daughters of Aziz Khan had
agreed to sell the suit property and
hence, it cannot be held that the
said agreement was by all the heirs
of Aziz Khan. The two daughters of
Aziz Khan were held not bound by the
agreement. However, the High Court
held that insofar as the executants
of the agreement (sons of Aziz Khan)
were concerned they were bound by it
and valid and enforceable contract
existed between the first respondent
and the sons of Aziz Khan. The High
Court, accordingly, granted decree
for specific performance to the
extent of 5/6th shares which Aziz
Khan's sons had in the property.
This Court affirmed the decree of
the High Court and it was held that
plaintiff's
suit
for
specific
performance to the extent of 5/6th
share was rightly decreed by the
High
Court
warranting
no
interference. While holding so, this
Court relied upon earlier decision
in the case of Manzoor Ahmed Magray.
24. In view of the above decisions
of this Court and the facts and
circumstances
which
have
already
been noticed by us, in our opinion,
there
is
no
impediment
for
enforcement of the agreement against
the vendor to the extent of his half
share in the property. However, Mr.
A.T.M. Sampath, learned counsel for
the
vendor's
wife
placed
great
reliance upon HPA International V/s.
Bhagwandas Fateh Chand Daswani &
Ors.,
(2004)
SCC
and,
particularly,
the
following
paragraphs of the report.
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
"67. If the vendee intended to
seek conveyance separately of
the life interest of the vendor,
the earliest opportunity for him
was when he had received notice
dated 11-9-1979 sent through the
lawyer by the vendor cancelling
the contract. Assuming that at
that time he could not opt for
lesser relief as the suit for
sanction was pending, he could
have, in any case, opted for
conveyance of life interest of
the vendor soon after he came to
know of the negotiations for
sale with Bob Daswani, which
took place in the presence of
one of the partners of the
plaintiff vendee. Even after
deriving the knowledge of the
execution of the sale deed dated
29- 12-1979 Ext. D-1, the option
to
obtain
lesser
relief
of
transfer of life interest was
not exercised. It was exercised
as late as on 25-11-1986 by
filing an affidavit and at the
time
when
pleadings
of
the
parties were completed and the
joint trial in the two suits had
already commenced. During long
pendency of the suits between
to
1986,
the
parties
interested
in
the
property
changed their positions. The
vendor by executing a registered
sale deed in favour of the
subsequent vendee got his public
dues
paid
to
relieve
the
pressure on the property and
obtained market price of the
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
property.
After
obtaining
possession
of
the
property
pursuant to the sale deed, the
subsequent vendee has raised
construction
and
inducted
tenants. Accepting the legal
stand based on Sections 90, 91
and 92 of the Indian Trusts Act
that
the
subsequent
vendee,
being a purchaser with knowledge
of prior agreement, is holding
the property as a trustee for
the benefit of the prior vendee,
the vendor, who changed his
position
by
effecting
a
subsequent
sale
cannot
be
compelled to convey his life
interest when such lesser relief
was not claimed at the earliest
opportunity and the terms of the
contract did not contemplate
transfer
of
life
interest
alone."
98. The above argument has no
merit and the aforesaid decision
is hardly of any help to the
vendee. This is not a case where
the vendor had only right of
spes
successionis
and
after
execution of agreement of sale,
he subsequently acquired full
interest in the property to be
held bound by Section 43 of the
Transfer of Property Act. In the
case before us, the reversioners
were
not
parties
to
the
agreement of sale. When in the
suit for sanction to transfer
their interest they were made
parties and were noticed, they
expressly
objected
to
the
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
proposed transfer. No principle
of estoppel or provisions of
Section 43 of the Transfer of
Property Act can, therefore,
operate against them. So far as
the
subsequent
vendee
is
concerned, in the course of
suit,
he
was
pushed
to
a
position in which he could not
take a stand that he had no
knowledge of the prior agreement
with the vendee but he has
separately
purchased
life
interest from the vendor and
obtained separate release deeds,
on payment of consideration,
from
the
reversioners.
The
reversioners being not parties
to the sale agreement, Ext. P-1
entered into with the vendee,
the latter could not enforce the
contract, Ext. P-1 against the
former."
It is sufficient to say that the
agreement of sale and the facts
which
their
Lordships
had
to
consider
in
the
case
of
HPA
International were in many respects
different from the agreement in the
present case. In that case vide
agreement
of
sale
(Exhibit
P1)
therein,
full
interest
in
the
property, i.e. life interest of the
vendor and spes successionis of
reversioners with sanction of the
court was agreed to be sold. The
reversioners were not parties to the
sale agreement that was entered with
the vendee therein. The parties were
conscious that the vendor had only
life interest in the property and he
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
could not convey more than his own
interest.
The
court
found
that
vendee entered into a speculative
deal for obtaining full interest in
the property depending upon the
sanction to be granted by the court.
In the backdrop of these facts, this
Court observed in paragraphs 68, 69
and 70 of the report thus :
"68. On duly appreciating the
evidence on record, construing
specific terms of the contract
and considering the conduct of
the parties, we have arrived at
the
conclusion
that
the
rescission of the contract, due
to non-grant of sanction by the
Court within two years after
execution of the contract and
filing of the suit for sanction,
was not an act of breach of
contract on the part of the
vendor
to
justify
grant
of
relief of specific performance
of the contract to the prior
vendee.
69. We are also of the view that
the plaintiff vendee, by his own
act in the pending suits, was
responsible for rendering the
suit
for
sanction
as
infructuous. He was guilty of
lapse in not seeking conveyance
of life interest of the vendor
at the earliest opportunity when
notice of rescission of the
contract was received by him and
later
when
he
derived
the
knowledge
of
execution
of
registered sale deed in favour
of the subsequent vendee. The
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
option
was
exercised
conditionally in the midst of
the joint trial of the two
suits.
70. There was one integrated and
indivisible
contract
by
the
vendor to convey full interest
in the property i.e. his own
life interest and the interest
of
the
reversioners
with
sanction of the Court. As the
Court
had
not
granted
the
sanction, the contract could not
be specifically enforced. The
lesser relief of transfer of
life interest was not claimed
within a reasonable time after
the vendor had intimated that
the contract, as agreed for full
interest, was not possible of
performance.
We
find
that
neither equity nor law is in
favour of the plaintiff vendee."
The
Court
further
observed
paragraph 100 of the report
follows :
in
as
"100. In the case before us, we
have not found that the vendor
was guilty of rendering the suit
for sanction infructuous. It did
terminate the contract pending
the suit for sanction but never
withdrew that suit. The vendee
himself
prosecuted
it
and
rendered it infructuous by his
own
filing
of
an
affidavit
giving up his claim for the
interest of reversioners. In
such
a
situation
where
the
vendor was not in any manner
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
guilty of not obtaining the
sanction and the clause of the
contract requiring the Court's
sanction for conveyance of full
interest, being for the benefit
of
both
the
parties,
the
contract
had
been
rendered
unenforceable with the dismissal
of the sanction suit."
HPA International, thus, have no
considerable bearing on the case in
hand.”
4) Van Vibhag Karamchari Griha Nirman Sahkari
Sanstha
Maryadit
(Regd.)
Versus
Ramesh
Chander
reported in 2011 (0) AIR(SC) 41,
wherein it is held as under:
“31. In fact, a suit for Specific
Performance could have been easily
filed subject to the provision of
Section 20 of the Ceiling Act.
Similar
questions
came
up
for
consideration before a Full Bench of
Gujarat High Court in the case of
Shah Jitendra Nanalal V/s. Patel
Lallubhai Ishverbhai [AIR 1984 Guj
145]. The Full Bench held that a
suit for Specific Performance could
be filed despite the provisions of
the Ceiling Act. A suit for Specific
Performance in respect of vacant
land in excess of ceiling limit can
be filed and a conditional decree
can
be
passed
for
Specific
Performance, subject to exemption
being obtained under Section 20 of
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
the Act. (Paras 11- 13)
32. We are in respectful agreement
with the views of the Full Bench in
the abovementioned decision and the
principles
decided
therein
are
attracted here.”
42.
Referring to the above decisions, it was
submitted that out of total consideration as
agreed upon between the parties at the time
of
execution
of
agreement
to
sale
for
purchase of the suit land at the rate of
Rs.1,45,000/- per vigha, the plaintiffs have
already
paid
Rs.8,90,000/-
consideration
of
than
the
43%
of
consideration
out
of
total
i.e.
more
of
sale
shows
the
Rs.20,30,000/total
which
amount
clearly
readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs
to perform their part of agreement to sale.
43.
It was submitted that the Trial Court
has wrongly placed reliance on the photocopy
of
document
05.02.1991
at
temporary
whereby
amount
Exh.130
of
dated
Rs.2,00,000/-
C/FA/1685/2011
was
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
paid
back
to
the
plaintiffs
by
the
defendant. It was submitted that no original
proof
or
document
was
produced
before
the
trial Court to show the same and therefore,
the trial Court could not have referred to
and relied upon such documents.
44.
It
was
further
submitted
that
the
defendant in caveat application has admitted
the fact of execution of agreement to sale
between the parties and even if the document
at
temporary
Exh.130
is
to
be
considered
without the original being produced alleging
the returning of amount by the defendant to
the
plaintiffs,
it
clearly
shows
that
consideration was paid by the plaintiffs to
the defendant, part of which is alleged to
have
been
returned.
It
was
therefore,
submitted that the trial Court has committed
an error in coming to the conclusion that
agreement
to
sale
is
not
proved
by
the
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
plaintiffs.
45.
Learned
Senior
Advocate
Mr.Mehul
Shah
submitted that the trial Court has answered
issue nos. 2 and 3 in the affirmative to the
effect
that
agreement
26.09.1990
to
there
was
sale
between
for
a
an
execution
the
parties
consideration
of
of
on
Rs.
1,45,000/- per vigha for the suit land and as
such, the trial Court could not have answered
the
same
issue
by
giving
two
separate
findings when the signature is proved at Exh.
108 and the trial Court has held that the
defendant has executed the sale deed and on
the other hand, the trial Court has arrived
at finding that payment of part consideration
by
the
plaintiffs
is
not
proved.
It
was
therefore, submitted that in view of settled
legal position unless and until when contrary
is proved, the Court shall presume in favour
of the plaintiffs and breach of contract to
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
transfer
immovable
property
cannot
be
adequately removed by compensation in terms
of money.
46.
It was submitted that decree of specific
performance
ought
to
have
been
passed
in
favour of the plaintiff as per the provisions
of section 10 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963.
47.
It was submitted that the trial Court
has wrongly placed reliance on section 17 of
the Specific Relief Act which provides that a
contract to sell or let out any immovable
property cannot be specifically enforced in
favour of a vendor or lessor who knowing not
to
have
any
title
to
the
property,
has
contracted to sell or let the property or who
though
entered into the contract believing
that he had a good title to the property,
cannot at the time fixed by the parties or by
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
the Court for the completion of the sale or
letting, give the purchaser or lessee a title
free from reasonable doubt. It was submitted
that agreement to sale was for two pieces of
suit land and the defendant has not taken any
defence regarding his efforts for making a
clear title and ownership of the suit land.
Submissions of the Respondent-defendant
48.
On
the
other
hand,
learned
Senior
Advocate Mr. Deven Parikh submitted that the
plaintiffs have made averment in the plaint
that
a
(Exh.107)
cash
receipt
dated
was
executed
in
24.09.1990
his
favour.
However, same was denied by the defendant in
the written statement and also the signature
on
such
cash
receipt
is
denied
and
the
plaintiffs
have
failed
to
prove
these
documents
through
any
oral
or
written
evidence and in the cross examination also
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
admitted that the signature of the defendant
on the cash receipt (Exh.107) and agreement
to
sale
dated
26.06.1990
(Exh.108)
were
different. It was further submitted that name
of the person in whose favour cash receipt
was issued was not mentioned. Hence such cash
receipt
is
concocted
document
as
the
defendant has never received Rs. 1,90,000/as alleged by the plaintiffs.
49.
It
was
agreement
submitted
to
sale
that
dated
though
the
26.09.1990
was
executed by the defendant and was admitted in
the written statement as well as caveat filed
by
the
defendant,
however
terms
and
conditions of the execution of the sale deed
was for 15 months from the date of execution
of
the
agreement
to
sale
which
was
not
adhered to by the plaintiffs and no steps
were
taken
to
perform
the
part
of
the
agreement to sale by the plaintiffs and after
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
years
issued
on
a
27.11.1997
public
the
notice
plaintiffs
(Exh.106)
have
with
no
particulars such as name of owners of the
land
in
question
or
reference
to
the
agreement to sale dated 26.09.1990.
50.
It was further submitted that the Trial
Court
has
therefore,
rightly
compared
the
signatures of the defendant in Exh.107 and
Exh.109
and
has
come
to
just
and
proper
conclusion that signatures are different so
as to hold that the plaintiffs have failed to
prove
Exh.109
for
extension
of
time
of
years for execution of the sale deed.
51.
It was submitted that main contention of
the plaintiffs that agreement to sale dated
26.09.1990 (Exh.108) was further extended by
6 years by subsequent agreement on 21.04.1991
(Exh.109)
has been denied by the defendant
and the plaintiffs have failed to prove the
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
same through oral or documentary evidence. It
was submitted that witness of the plaintiffs
Mansukh Chhaganbhai Tank (Exh.103), (Exh.104)
(Exh.105) who according to the plaintiffs had
signed
as
witness
in
such
agreement
for
extension and who was alleged to have been
present
at
the
time
of
execution
of
the
agreement for extension, has not supported
the case of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs
has
not
hostile
sought
and
reexamined
permission
accordingly,
by
the
to
he
declare
him
was
not
even
plaintiffs.
It
was
submitted that the plaintiffs in his cross
examination
execution
at
of
Exh.115
any
other
has
also
denied
document
except
agreement to sale dated 26.09.1990 (Exh.108)
and
therefore,
the
contention
of
the
plaintiffs regarding subsequent execution of
agreement
for
extension
of
time
dated
21.04.1991 is not tenable. It was submitted
that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid to the
defendant on 21.04.1991.
52.
It
was
submitted
by
learned
Senior
Advocate Mr. Parikh that reason assigned by
the plaintiffs for execution of the agreement
for extension of time on 21.04.1991 that the
loan amount was due on property in question
and
hence
the
amount
of
Rs.5,00,000/-
was
paid to clear the title of the property, is
also
incorrect
as
the
plaintiffs
before
creating such concocted document to bring the
suit
within
the
limitation
have
failed
to
check the revenue entries of the property in
question because as per Entry No.2113 dated
04.02.1991 (Exh.98), no dues on the property
in question at the time of alleged execution
of the agreement to sale was outstanding. It
was therefore, submitted that the averments
made
in
agreement
the
pleadings
for
as
well
extension
are
as
Exh.109
concocted
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
documents. It was therefore, submitted that
the
Trial
Court
has
rightly
come
to
the
conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed to
prove
Exh.109
agreement
for
extension
of
time.
53.
It was further submitted that the suit
property was re-conveyed to the defendant by
separate agreement dated 05.02.1991 (Exh.130)
and signature on the same was admitted by
both the plaintiffs in the cross examination
at Exh.76 and Exh.115 respectively and the
same is also admitted by the witness of the
plaintiffs
namely
Mansukh
Chhaganbhai
Tank
(Exh.103)
in his cross examination. It was
therefore, submitted that the suit was filed
only
on
basis
of
agreement
for
extension
(Exh.109) concocted by the plaintiffs.
54.
It was submitted that the plaintiffs
have failed to bring on record any document
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
which suggest that the plaintiffs were ready
and
willing
and
to
perform
part
of
their
agreement which was basic requirement before
decree
for
specific
passed.
It
was
performance
therefore,
can
submitted
be
that
appeal being devoid of any merit is liable to
be dismissed.
55.
Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Parikh for
the respondent placed reliance on decision in
case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since deceased)
thr.
Lrs.
dated
v.
A.M.
Krishnamurthy
(Judgment
July,
12,
in
rendered
Civil
Appeal No.4703 of 2022 arising out of SLP(C)
No.19463 of 2018) to submit that it is well
settled
that
in
a
suit
for
Specific
Performance of an agreement, it is for the
plaintiff
to
prove
his
readiness
and
willingness to perform his obligations under
the agreement. It was pointed out that where
a certain amount has been paid in advance and
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
the balance is required to be paid within a
stipulated time, it is for the plaintiff to
show that he was in a position to pay the
balance money and the plaintiff has to prove
that he has the money or has alternatively
made necessary arrangements to get the money
for
payment
of
consideration.
The
Hon’ble
Apex Court has held as under:
“21. It is well settled that, in a
suit for Specific Performance of an
agreement, it is for the Plaintiff
to
prove
his
readiness
and
willingness
to
perform
his
obligations
under
the
agreement.
Where a certain amount has been paid
in
advance
and
the
balance
is
required
to
be
paid
within
a
stipulated time, it is for the
Plaintiff to show that he was in a
position to pay the balance money.
The Plaintiff has to prove that he
has the money or has alternatively
made necessary arrangements to get
the
money.
In
this
case,
the
Original Defendant/Appellants have
all
along
contended
that
the
Plaintiff Respondent neither offered
to pay nor was in a position to pay
the
balance
consideration
of
Rs.15,00,000/-.
xxx
25. To aver and prove readiness and
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
willingness to perform an obligation
to
pay
money,
in
terms
of
a
contract, the plaintiff would have
to make specific statements in the
plaint and adduce evidence to show
availability
of
funds
to
make
payment in terms of the contract in
time. In other words, the plaintiff
would
have
to
plead
that
the
plaintiff had sufficient funds or
was in a position to raise funds in
time to discharge his obligation
under the contract. If the plaintiff
does not have sufficient funds with
him to discharge his obligations in
terms of a contract, which requires
payment of money, the plaintiff
would have to specifically plead how
the funds would be available to him.
To cite an example, the plaintiff
may aver and prove, by adducing
evidence, an arrangement with a
financier
for
disbursement
of
adequate funds for timely compliance
with the terms and conditions of a
contract
involving
payment
of
money.”
56.
It
was
therefore,
submitted
that
in
facts of the case, the plaintiffs have failed
to prove that they were ready and willing to
perform their part of contract by payment of
balance amount of sale consideration to the
defendant within the time period of 15 months
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
from the date of execution of agreement to
sale.
57.
Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Parikh also
placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of Shehbagam and ors.v.
K.K. Rathinavel (Judgment dated January 20,
2022),
rendered
wherein
in
Civil
Hon’ble
Appeal
Apex
No.150
Court
of
after
considering the settled legal position has
held as under:
“29 We shall now advert to the
respondent’s conduct throughout the
sale transaction. The respondent has
failed to provide any documents or
communication which would indicate
that he called upon the appellants
to perform their obligations or
discharge the mortgage within the
time
period
stipulated
in
the
contract. Even after the expiry of
the six months, the respondent did
not reach out to the appellants. It
is
only
in
response
to
the
appellant’s legal notice that the
respondent demanded performance of
their obligations. Merely averring
that he was waiting with the balance
consideration and believed that the
appellants
would
clear
the
encumbrance is insufficient to prove
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
that the respondent-plaintiff was
willing to perform his obligations
under the contract.
xxx
31 The “readiness” of the respondent
to perform his obligations refers to
whether he was financially capable
of paying the balance consideration.
Both thetrial court and the first
appellate court have observed that
the respondent was ready to pay the
balance consideration as (i) he was
paying income tax since 1988 and
(ii) his bank passbooks indicate
that he had sufficient funds. The
payment of income tax by itself does
not show that the respondent had
sufficient resources to pay for the
suit property. Moreover, the bank
passbooks submitted in evidence by
the respondent were for accounts
opened on 11 March 1992 and 22 July
1994, that is, after the expiry of
the period written in the contract.
The first appellate court despite
noting this, has chosen to hold that
the respondent was ready and willing
to
perform
the
agreement.
The
respondent however did not lead any
evidence to indicate that in the
year 1990 he had the money to pay
the balance consideration. The first
appellate court shifted the burden
on the appellants to prove that the
respondent-plaintiff was incapable
of paying the balance consideration.
It is an established principle of
law that the plaintiff must prove
that he is ready and willing to
perform the contract. The burden
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
lies
on
the
plaintiff.
The
respondent has not led any evidence
that he was ready or willing to
perform his obligations under the
agreement.
32.
Even
assuming
that
the
respondent was willing to perform
his obligations under the contract,
we must decide whether it would be
appropriate to direct the specific
performance of the contract in this
case. In Zarina Siddiqui v. A.
Ramalingam [(2015) 1 SCC 705], a
two-judge Bench of this Court while
dealing with a suit for specific
performance of a contract regarding
the
sale
of
immovable
property
observed
that
the
remedy
for
specific performance is an equitable
remedy
and
Section
of
the
Specific
Relief
Act
confers
a
discretion on the Court. The Court
held:
“24. It is well settled that remedy
for
specific
performance
is
an
equitable remedy. The court while
granting
decree
of
specific
performance
exercises
its
discretionary jurisdiction. Section
of
the
Specific
Relief
Act
specifically
provides
that
the
Court's discretion to grant decree
of
specific
performance
is
discretionary
but
not
arbitrary.
Discretion must be exercised in
accordance with sound and reasonable
judicial principles.”
xxx
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
36. True enough, generally speaking,
time is not of the essence in an
agreement for the sale of immoveable
property. In deciding whether to
grant
the
remedy
of
specific
performance, specifically in suits
relating
to
sale
of
immovable
property,
the
courts
must
be
cognizant of the conduct of the
parties, the escalation of the price
of the suit property, and whether
one party will unfairly benefit from
the decree. The remedy provided must
not cause injustice to a party,
specifically when they are not at
fault. In the present case, three
decades
have
passed
since
the
agreement to sell was entered into
between the parties. The price of
the suit property would undoubtedly
have escalated. Given the blemished
conduct of the respondent-plaintiff
in indicating his willingness to
perform the contract, we decline in
any event to grant the remedy of
specific
performance
of
the
contract. However, we order a refund
of the consideration together with
interest at 6% per annum.”
58.
Reliance was also placed on the decision
in case of Sukhwinder Singh v. Jagroop Singh
&
anr
rendered
(Judgment
in
Civil
dated
January
28,
No.760
of
2020)
Appeal
wherein it is held as under:
“9.
The
suit
being
the
one
for
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
specific performance of the contract
on payment of the balance sale
consideration,
the
readiness
and
willingness
was
required
to
be
proved by the plaintiff and was to
be considered by the Courts below as
a basic requirement if a decree for
specific
performance
is
to
be
granted. In the instant case though
the defendant No.2 had denied the
agreement as also the receipt of the
earnest money, the same would not be
of consequence as the agreement
claimed by the plaintiff is with the
defendant No.1 and the contention of
the defendant No.2 to deny the same
is without personal knowledge on
that aspect. However, even in the
absence of the defence put forth,
the plaintiff was required to prove
his readiness and willingness and
that aspect of the matter was to be
considered by the Courts below. In
the
present
case
though
the
plaintiff examined himself as PW1,
as also PW2 and PW3, the document
writer, and the witness to the
agreement who stated with regard to
the execution of the agreement, the
evidence to prove the readiness and
willingness
with
regard
to
the
resources to pay the balance sale
consideration is insufficient. In
the
absence
of
denial
by
the
defendant No.1, even if the payment
of Rs.69,500/ and the claim by the
plaintiff of having gone to the
office
of
Sub
Registrar
on
15.06.2004 is accepted, the fact as
to
whether
the
plaintiff
had
notified the defendant No.1 about he
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
being ready with the balance sale
consideration and calling upon the
plaintiff to appear before the SubRegistrar and execute the Sale Deed
was required to be proved. From
among the documents produced and
marked as Exhibit P1 to P9 there is
no document to that effect, more
particularly
to
indicate
the
availability of the balance sale
consideration as on 15.06.2004 and
as on the date of filing the suit.
Despite the same, merely based on
the oral testimony of PW1, the
Courts below have accepted the case
put forth by the plaintiff to be
ready and willing to complete the
transaction.”
Points for Determination:
1)
Whether
the
Trial
Court
has
correctly
held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove
that defendant had executed agreement to sell
14 Vigha of suit property to the plaintiffs
on
24.09.1990
and
accepted
the
amount
of
Rs.1,90,000/-?
2)
Whether the Trial Court was justified in
arriving at a conclusion that signature of
C/FA/1685/2011
the
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
defendant
at
Exh.107
and
Exh.108
is
different?
3)
Whether the Trial Court was justified in
holding that the plaintiffs have failed to
prove that the plaintiffs have executed the
additional document dated 21.04.1991 and have
paid further amount of Rs.5,00,000/- by way
of consideration by extending the time limit
to 6 years?
4)
Whether the Trial Court was right in
holding that the plaintiffs were not ready
and
wiling
to
perform
their
part
of
the
Court
was
right
in
agreement to sale?
5)
Whether
the
Trial
holding that the plaintiffs have proved that
the defendant had no right, title or interest
over the suit land?
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
6) Whether the Trial Court was justified in
holding that the defendant has proved that
agreement to sale dated 26.09.1990 was bogus
and false?
7) Whether the Trial Court was justified in
holding
land
that
and
Survey
therefore,
No.26/1
no
is
a
fragment
decree
of
specific
performance can be granted in favour of the
plaintiffs?
8) Whether the Judgment and Decree of the
Trial Court suffer from any error of law or
fact?
9) Whether the appellants are entitled to the
relief sought in appeal?
Analysis
59.
Having
considered
the
submissions
made
by the learned advocates of both sides and
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
having
perused
the
oral
and
documentary
evidence
led
before
the
Trial
Court,
it
emerges from the record that there was an
agreement to sale dated 26.09.1990 (Exh.108)
executed between the parties.
60.
However,
made
in
receipt
with
the
was
regard
plaint
issued
24.09.1990(Exh.107)
to
the
that
averments
acknowledgment
by
the
defendant
on
for
an
amount
of
Rs.1,90,000/- towards sale consideration, the
Trial Court is justified in holding that the
same
is
because,
not
proved
Dhirajlal
by
the
plaintiffs,
Gordhanbhai
Hadwani
–
plaintiff no.2 in his cross examination at
Exh.77
has
referred
to
the
document
dated
13.09.1990 which has been produced on record
wherein it is agreed between the parties to
give token money and
sale
which
was
execute an agreement to
thereafter
executed
on
26.09.1990. It is further deposed by him that
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
no agreement was executed between 13.09.1990
and
26.09.1990.
The
plaintiffs
have
therefore, failed to prove the execution of
acknowledgment
receipt
dated
24.09.1990
at
Exh.107.
61.
There
is
also
inconsistency
in
the
pleadings and documentary evidence led by the
plaintiffs
regarding
consideration
referred
to
payment
amounting
in
to
Exh.108
of
part
Rs.2,00,000/-
agreement
to
sale
dated 26.09.1990 and acknowledgment receipt
of
Rs.1,90,000/-
rightly
defendant
found
on
as
the
that
both
Trial
Court
signatures
the
has
of
the
documents
are
different. The plaintiffs have also failed to
rebut the same in cross examination of the
defendant
(Exh.125)
as
no
question
is
put
with regard to the difference in signature
and therefore, the Trial Court has rightly
come
to
the
conclusion
that
there
is
a
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
difference
in
signature
documents.
Moreover,
in
the
both
the
plaintiff
no.1
Jinabhai Kapadiya has also not stated that on
which date he had paid Rs. 1,90,000/- to the
defendant Hijibhai in spite of mentioning the
fact of payment in his examination-in-chief
at Exh.115. Even the witness of the defendant
Kantilal Mahidas brother of the defendant has
also denied that any consent was given for
sale
of
No.26/1.
land
situated
at
Revenue
Survey
In his cross examination, the said
witness has reiterated that no consent was
given
for
sale
of
land
of
Revenue
Survey
No.26/1 which is a fragment land and the said
land was never mortgaged.
62.
Learned
appreciated
Trial
Court
Exh.108
has
which
also
rightly
contains
no
reference to payment of Rs.1,90,000/- nor the
plaintiffs in cross examination have stated
what amount was paid by them as reflected in
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
agreement to sale (Exh.108).
There is no
mention as to how much amount was paid by
which plaintiff to the defendant in Exh.108
agreement to sale. Therefore, the Trial Court
was justified in partly affirming with regard
to extension of agreement to sale as it was
admitted by the defendant in his affidavit in
chief at Exh.125 that agreement at Exh.108
bears his signature and that sale deed was to
be executed within 15 months.
63.
With regard to the extension agreement
dated
21.04.1991
(Exh.109)
and
further
payment of Rs.5,00,000/- by the plaintiffs to
the
defendant
and
extension
of
time
limit
upto 6 years is concerned, the Trial Court
has
on comparison of the signature of the
defendant
on
document
at
Exh.109
with
the
signature at document at Exh.107 and Exh.108
rightly held that the defendant has denied
his
signature
on
Exh.109
which
is
not
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
rebutted by the plaintiffs during the cross
examination of the defendant.
64.
It also appears from the pleadings and
perusal
of
the
documents
placed
on
record
that in order to bridge the gap between the
execution
of
the
agreement
to
sale
on
26.09.1990 and filing of the suit in 1999,
the plaintiffs have created the writing at
Exh.109 without proving the same by leading
documentary and oral evidence. The plaintiffs
have
tried
to
show
continuation
of
transaction till the suit was filed as no
prudent person would agree for extension of
six years of time to execute the sale deed
and making further payment of Rs.5,00,000/without possession of land.
65.
It also appears that the defendant has
agreed to sell the property to a third party
for which a separate suit is also pending
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
before the trial court being Special Civil
Suit No.108 of 2010, wherein the plaintiffs
are arraigned as defendants.
66.
It
appears
that
the
plaintiffs
have
filed suit after one year in the year 1999
from the date of issuing public notice in
Sandesh daily newspaper in 1997.
67.
The
arriving
Trial
Court
at
conclusion
tentative
a
Exh.130,
is
the
also
justified
that
as
per
plaintiffs
in
the
have
accepted Rs. 2,10,000/- from the defendant on
05.02.1991
which
for
was
plaintiffs
not
and
re-conveying
the
suit
land
clearly
denied
by
the
signature
on
the
tentative
Exh.130- Mark 14/2 is admitted in the cross
examination. Even in cross examination of the
plaintiff
at
Exh.77,
it
is
admitted
that
plaintiffs did not send any draft or cheque
pertaining to the balance sale consideration
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
during
months
period
agreement
to
and
towards
sale
sale
from
no
the
date
amount
consideration
of
was
paid
during
the
pendency of the suit. The Trial Court has
therefore,
rightly
come
to
the
conclusion
that plaintiffs were not ready and willing to
perform their part of the contract. The Trial
Court has also considered the fact that there
was a charge of State Bank of Saurashtra on
the
suit
land
which
was
cleared
by
the
defendant on 06.12.1990 and thereafter Entry
No.
(Exh.98)
was
mutated
in
revenue
record which was corroborated by the witness
of the defendant- Kantilal, brother of the
defendant
examination
at
Exh.133
it
was
and
even
in
cross
reiterated
that
land
bearing Survey No.25 and 26/1 are adjacent to
each other and since land of survey no.26/1
is fragment land, same were not partitioned
between the brothers and no consent to sell
said parcel of land was given by him to the
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
defendant
and
therefore,
no
decree
of
specific performance could have been granted
by the Trial Court as there was no clear
title in the name of the defendant.
68.
It
also
appears
that
averment
in
the
plaint is silent about the date of execution
of
the
agreement
to
sale
at
Exh.108
and
though the defendant has admitted signature
on the agreement to sale at Exh.108, has not
denied
the
same
and
only
the
aspect
of
payment of Rs.2,00,000/- by the plaintiffs
was not admitted.
69.
On appreciation of evidence on record,
the Trial Court has therefore, rightly come
to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have
failed to prove satisfactorily the execution
of the agreement to sale at Exh.108.
70.
In
view
of
above
analysis
of
the
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
evidence on record, it would be necessary to
refer to the various decisions cited at bar
to find out whether same would be applicable
to the facts of the case or not.
71.
Reliance was placed by learned advocate
for the plaintiffs on the decision of Hon’ble
Apex Court in cases of
(i) P. Ramasubbamma
v. Vijayalakshmi (supra) (ii) K. Prakash v.
B.R. Sampath Kumar
v.
Pathuri
Suryanarayan
(iii)
Samrajyam
Murthy
Gaddipati Divija
(iv)
(Dead)
Nadiminti
Through
Legal
Representatives v. Kothurthi Krishna Bhaskara
Rao
and
others
and
(v)
Motilal
Jain
v.
Ramdasi Devi (Smt) and others and reliance
placed on decisions with regard to “date” as
per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963
would also not be applicable in facts of the
case
as
on
appreciation
of
evidence
on
record, the plaintiffs have failed to prove
the
agreement
to
sale
at
Exh.108
and
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
agreement for extension of time at Exh.109.
Admittedly, the suit is filed in 1999 for
specific
performance
of
agreement
to
sale
dated 26.09.1990 on pretext of extension of
time
for
agreement
further
dated
six
years
21.04.1991.
by
extension
Therefore,
the
Trial Court has rightly not raised the issue
with regard to limitation but on considering
the
facts
of
the
case,
Trial
Court
has
rightly arrived at the conclusion that the
plaintiffs have failed to prove the execution
of the agreement to sale whereby time period
is
extended
for
further
six
years
by
the
was
a
loan
document at Exh.109.
72.
It
appears
that
there
transaction between the plaintiffs and the
defendant and as a security for repayment of
loan,
defendant
would
have
executed
the
agreement to sale dated 26.09.1990. In such
circumstances, the Trial Court was justified
C/FA/1685/2011
in
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
dismissing
the
suit
for
specific
performance as the plaintiffs was never ready
and
willing
to
perform
his
part
of
the
contract within the stipulated period of 15
months. Moreover, the plaintiffs have also
failed
to
demonstrate
as
to
payment
of
Rs.1,90,000/- on the basis of acknowledgment
receipt
at
Rs.5,00,000/dated
Exh.107
and
payment
of
as
in
extension
deed
21.04.1991
stated
at
Exh.109
by
any
oral
rebuttal during the cross examination or by
leading any other corroborative evidence.
73.
The Trial Court has therefore, rightly
dismissed the suit for specific performance
as no decree could have been passed in favour
of
the
plaintiffs
for
directing
the
defendants to execute the sale deed of the
suit
land
on
the
basis
of
oral
and
documentary evidence led by the plaintiffs
and
the
defendants
during
the
course
of
C/FA/1685/2011
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 12/06/2026
trial.
74.
Appeal
therefore,
being
devoid
of
any
merit, is accordingly dismissed. No order as
to costs.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J)
(L. S. PIRZADA, J)
FURTHER ORDER
At this stage, learned Senior Advocate Mr.
Mehul Shah submitted that the interim relief of
maintaining
status-quo
qua
the
title
and
possession in respect of the property in question
granted
by
the
trial
Court
which
has
been
continued by this Court, may continue for some
time.
Considering the fact that the interim relief
of
maintaining
status-quo
qua
the
and
property
in
possession
with
respect
to
question
is
in
operation
since
1999,
in
the
interest
of
justice,
is
ordered
to
be
same
the
title
continued for a further period of 8 weeks from
today.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J)
(L. S. PIRZADA, J)
RAGHUNATH R NAIR
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review