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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
RSA No. 294/2024
Reserved on: 25.05.2026
Decided on:
Jatinder Paul
15.06.2026
…..Appellant
Versus
Kaushalaya Devi & ors.
….Respondents
______________________________________________________________
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellant:
Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Tamana Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Viplav Sharma, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Dalip Kumar, Advocate, for
respondents No. 1 and 2.
Romesh Verma, Judge
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and
decree, dated 03.09.2024, as passed by the learned Additional
District Judge, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P., whereby the
appeal filed by the present appellant/plaintiff has been
dismissed and the judgment and decree, dated 31.07.2013, as
passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Baijnath,
1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
District
Kangra,
H.P.,
dismissing
the
suit
of
the
that
the
appellant/plaintiff, has been affirmed.
Brief
facts
of
the
case
are
appellant/plaintiff, Jatinder Paul, filed a suit for declaration
and
permanent
prohibitory
injunction
against
the
respondents/defendants No. 1 to 3, namely, Kaushalya Devi,
Chander Kanta and Gujru Ram, in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr.
Div.), Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. on 11.08.2011. It was
averred in the plaint that the land bearing
Khata No. 168,
Khatauni Nos. 282 to 285, Khasra Nos. 864, 866, 867, 869,
857, 858, 859, 868, 1175/820, 832, 882, 883, Kita 12,
measuring 1-39-73 hectares, situated at Mohal Kotli, Mauza
Bir, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. is jointly owned and
possessed by the plaintiff with defendants No. 1 to 3 and
proforma defendants No. 4 to 12. The predecessor-in-interest
of defendants No. 1 and 2 had purchased the land in Khata
No. 4, specifically in Khasra Nos. 882, 832, 883 on 24.01.1974
after proper
demarcation and since then, they were in
possession. The plaintiff with other co-sharers is also recorded
as one of the co-sharers in the specific Khasra Nos. 857, 858,
859 and 868 in the suit land as per the revenue record.
It was further averred that defendants No. 1 and 2
initiated the alleged partition proceedings with respect to the
suit land, however they kept the plaintiff away from contesting
the partition proceedings with respect to the suit land before
the concerned revenue authority fraudulently, misrepresenting
and without any notice to the plaintiff or his predecessor-ininterest, as a result of which, defendants No. 1 to 3 succeeded
in getting the land mutated in their favour behind the back of
the plaintiff in connivance with the concerned revenue officials
which is in possession of the plaintiff.
sharers and proforma defendants No.
Though, other
co-
4 to 12 are having no
dispute with the plaintiff, however they have been impleaded
as party being
necessary for the purpose of the suit.
The
defendants No. 1 and 2 fraudulently and on misrepresentation
filed partition proceedings of Khata Nos. 2 and 3 of jamabandi
for the year 1991-92 and thereafter, the said Khata numbers
were incorporated
as Khata Nos. 139 and 140 in the
jamabandi for the year 2001-02, whereas defendant Nos. 1 and
2 did not apply for partition of the land, in which one Saran
was recorded as tenant i.e. Khata No. 3 of the jamabandi for the
year 1991-92, which corresponds
to Khata No. 140 of
jamabandi for the year 2001-02.
As per the plaintiff,
defendants No. 1 and 2 had
filed partial partition proceedings
as per revenue record of
2001-02 instead of 1991-92. The alleged partition and mutation
to this effect is only a
paper entry and the
plaintiff is not
bound by the alleged partition, which is prima facie, illegal,
wrong and is result of fraud, which has been committed on the
plaintiff. Therefore,
prayer was made to decree the suit,
thereby,
the
declaring
revenue
entries,
depicting
the
defendants No. 1 to 3 as owners in possession of the suit land
and mutation No. 826, dated 22.11.2010, to be wrong, null,
void and not binding on the plaintiff. Decree for injunction was
also sought, thereby restraining defendants No. 1 to 3 from
interfering over the possession of the plaintiff in any manner.
written
Defendants No.1 to 3 contested the suit by filing
statement,
wherein
preliminary
objections,
qua
maintainability, cause of action, limitation, locus standi,
estoppel, suppression of the facts etc. were raised. On merits,
it was averred that the suit land was earlier jointly owned
and possessed by the plaintiff. All the defendants and performa
defendants, but after partition, defendants No. 1 to 3 are
owners in possession of Khasra Nos. 859/1, 859/2 and 832/2
respectively.
Predecessor-in-interest
of the defendants No. 1
and 2 had not only purchased the lands mentioned in the
plaint, but defendants No. 1 and 2 are also owners of the land
in other khatas in Mohal Kotli. It was specifically stated that
predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff was having land more
than that of his share to which he was entitled. Defendants No.
1 and 2 filed partition proceedings
before the Court of
Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Baijnath on 20.1.2003, titled as
Kaushalya Devi and ors. Vs.
Rajinder Paul and ors. The
predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, namely, Rajinder Paul
was having knowledge
regarding the same and he was
proceeded ex-parte in the partition proceedings despite being
duly served. Partition application No. 14/Teh./2003 was
allowed on 16.08.2005 and defendants No. 1 to 3 were allotted
Khasra Nos. 859/1, 859/2 and 832/2 respectively and
instrument of partition was effected in that regard.
According to defendants No. 1 to 3, the plaintiff was
very much having knowledge
regarding decision of the said
partition case and allotment of Khasra Nos. 859/1, 859/2 and
832/2 in favour of defendants No.1 to 3 in the partition case,
therefore, subsequently,
he preferred
an appeal No. 2/07
against the order dated 16.08.2005 in the Court of
(Civil), Baijnath, which
S.D.O.
came to be dismissed in default on
22.7.2009. The plaintiff was also having knowledge regarding
warrant of possession, delivery of possession to defendants No.
1 to 3 on 20.10.2010 on the spot and mutation No. 826 to this
effect having been attested and sanctioned on 22.11.2010 by
the revenue authorities. Defendant No.3 was in possession and
having his house in the part of the suit land i.e. Khasra No. 832
after he purchased land from Kaushalya Devi, d/o Nihal Paul.
tenant
It was further averred that one Saran, s/o Lehnu is
in Khata No.3, Khatauni No. 16, Khasra Kita 6 land
measuring 0-23-00 hectares, situated at Mohal-Kotli vide
jamabandi for the year 1991-92, but in Khata No.2, Khatauni
Nos. 12 to 15, Khasra No. 12, measuring
1-44-87 hectares,
situated at Mohal Kotli of the same year, defendants No. 1 and
2 are co-owners with plaintiff and other co-sharers, which is
suit land. Total land mentioned in Khata No.139 is 01-39-73
hectares and the same is on account of mutation No. 360,
dated 28.05.1998 of the partition got done by Upender Paul and
others, in which Khasra No. 820/1 measuring
0-05-14
hectares has been allotted to them, which is evident from
parcha jamabandi for the year 1991-92 of Khata No.2. There
was no need to apply for the partition of Khata No. 3 of
Jamabandi for the year 1991-92 and 2001-02 as the same is in
the possession of the tenant Saran, son of Lehnu. It was also
averred that
having
the
predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff was
land more than that of his actual share and the
revenue officials carved out the excess land from the possession
of the plaintiff.
The defendants No. 1 to 3 have acquired the
share, to which they are entitled. All the averments, contrary to
the record, as raised in the plaint, were refuted by defendants
No. 1 to 3. They prayed for dismissal of the suit filed by the
plaintiff.
As regards proforma defendants No. 10, 11 and 12,
they filed separate written statement, wherein they admitted
claim of the plaintiff and prayed for decreeing the suit, as filed
by the plaintiff.
Proforma
defendant
No.8
also
filed
written
statement, wherein, he also admitted claim of the plaintiff and
prayed for decreeing the suit, as filed by the plaintiff.
The learned trial court on 28.03.2012 framed the
following issues:1. Whether the plaintiff and proforma defendant No.
12 are joint owners in possession of the suit land,
as alleged? OPP.
2. Whether mutation No. 826 dated 22.11.2010
attested and sanctioned in favour of defendants
No. 1 to 3 is wrong, illegal and is not binding upon
the plaintiff, as alleged? OPP.
3. Whether mutation No. 826 dated 22.11.2010 is
attested and sanctioned on the basis of partition
carried out fraudulently behind the back of the
plaintiff in connivance with revenue officials which
is not binding upon the plaintiff and proforma
defendant No. 12 and is liable to be declared as
null and void, as alleged ? OPP.
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for consequential
relief of permanent injunction, as prayed for? OPP.
5. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the
present form? OPD to 3.
6. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file
the present suit ? OPD 1 to 3.
7. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file
the present suit ? OPD 1 to 3.
8. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and
conduct from filing the present suit? OPD 1 to 3.
9. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the
purpose of court fee and jurisdiction ? OPD 1 to 3.
10.
Relief.
The learned trial court directed the parties to
adduce evidence in support of their contentions to corroborate
their respective case and ultimately, the learned trial court vide
its judgment and decree dated 31.07.2013 dismissed the suit of
the plaintiff/appellant.
The plaintiff/appellant, feeling dissatisfied by the
judgment and decree, dated 31.07.2013, as passed by the
learned trial court, preferred an appeal before the learned first
Appellate Court on 23.08.2013, which too came to be dismissed
vide judgment and decree dated 30.09.2024.
Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments
and decrees, the plaintiff/appellant has preferred the present
regular second appeal before this Court.
With consent of the learned counsel for the parties,
the present appeal is finally heard on the following substantial
question of law:Whether the learned Courts below have misread and
mis-appreciated pleadings of the parties as also
evidence
on
documentary
record,
both
and
account
on
oral
as
of
well
such
as
mis-
appreciation of the pleadings as also evidence on
record, findings of both the courts below are vitiated
and deserve to be set aside?
It is contended by Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned
Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Tamana Sharma, Advocate,
appearing for the plaintiff/appellant that
the impugned
judgments and decrees, as passed by the learned Courts below,
are erroneous, wrong and, thus, liable to be quashed and set
aside. He has submitted that the learned Courts below have not
rightly determined point in controversy and has failed to
appreciate the dispute inter se the parties. He has further
submitted that after accepting the instant appeal, the suit, as
instituted by the plaintiff/appellant, may be decreed.
On the other hand, Mr. Viplav Sharma, learned
Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Dalip Kumar, Advocate,
appearing for respondents/defendants No. 1 and 2, has
defended the impugned judgments and decrees, as passed by
the learned Courts below.
He has submitted that there are
concurrent findings of fact, which do not call for any
interference
in
the instant
proceedings.
He has further
submitted that the suit, as filed by the plaintiff/appellant, is
not maintainable since he has not approached the Court with
clean hands and has misrepresented the facts, which have been
rightly adjudicated by the learned Courts below.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
have perused the record carefully.
As observed above, the plaintiff instituted the suit
before the learned trial court on the ground that the land
bearing
Khata No. 168, Khatauni Nos. 282 to 285,
Khasra
Nos. 864, 866, 867, 869, 857, 858, 859, 868, 1175/820, 832,
882, 883, Kita 12, measuring 1-39-73 hectares, situated at
Mohal Kotli, Mauza Bir, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. is
jointly owned and possessed by him along with defendants No.
1 to 3 and proforma defendants No. 4 to 12. The predecessorin-interest of defendants No. 1 and 2 had purchased the land
in Khata No. 4, specifically in Khasra Nos. 882, 832, 883 on
24.01.1974 after proper demarcation and since then, they were
in possession. It is the case of the plaintiff that he is one of the
co-sharers over the specific Khasra Nos. 857, 858, 859, 868 in
the suit land as per the revenue record. The defendants No. 1
and 2 initiated the alleged partition proceedings with respect
to the suit land, however the plaintiff was never associated by
means of fraud, misrepresentation and without any notice to
the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest. Defendants No. 1 to
3 succeeded in getting the land mutated in their favour at the
back of the plaintiff. The defendants No. 1 and 2 cleverly and
fraudulently filed the partition proceedings of Khata Nos. 2 and
3 of jamabandi for the year 1991-92, whereas defendant Nos. 1
and 2 did not apply for partition of the land, in which, Saran
was recorded as tenant. The alleged partition and mutation to
this effect is only a paper entry and the same is not binding on
the rights of the
plaintiff which is
illegal, wrong, and
as a
result of fraud.
The precise contention, which has been raised by
the learned Senior counsel for the appellant, is that the
partition proceedings, which were initiated by defendants No. 1
and 2, are result of fraud and misrepresentation and no
reliance can be
placed on the same since the partition
proceedings were effected at the back of the plaintiff and his
predecessor-in-interest that too without issuance of any notice
to them. It is the case of the plaintiff that the entire partition
process is a sham transaction as neither the plainitff or his
predecessor-in-interest was associated in the proceedings nor
an opportunity of being heard was given to anyone of them.
Since the entire proceedings were effected at the back of the
plaintiff, therefore, the same are not binding on rights, title and
interest of the plaintiff or his predecessor-in- interest and the
same is result of fraud.
On the other hand, learned senior counsel for
respondents No. 1 and 2 has vehemently contended that the
plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands and
has suppressed the
material facts not only from
the trial
court, but also from first appellate court as well as this Court.
He has submitted that defendants No. 1 and 2 filed the
partition proceedings before the
Court of Assistant Collector,
1st Grade, Baijnath on 20.1.2003, titled as Kaushalya Devi and
ors. Vs. Rajinder Paul and ors. The predecessor-in-interest of
the plaintiff, Rajinder Paul, was having knowledge regarding
the said proceedings inasmuch as despite valid service, he did
not put in appearance and was proceeded ex-parte in the
partition proceedings. Partition application No. 14/Teh./2003
was allowed on 16.08.2005 and in pursuance to that,
defendants No. 1 to 3 were allotted Khasra Nos. 859/1, 859/2
and 832/2 respectively. Instrument of partition was also
framed by the revenue authority in that regard.
It has been further contended by the learned senior
counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 that the matter does not
rest here. The plaintiff was very much having the knowledge
regarding decision of the partition case, therefore, he filed an
appeal No. 2/2007 against the order of partition dated
16.8.2005 in the Court of
S.D.O. (Civil), Baijnath, on
10.11.2006, however, the same came to be dismissed in default
on 22.7.2009.
It is the case of respondents No.1 and 2 that the
plaintiff was having express knowledge regarding the partition
proceedings and allotment of Khasra Nos. 859/1, 859/2 and
832/2 in favour of defendants No.1 to 3 in the partition case.
The plaintiff was also having knowledge regarding warrant of
possession, delivery of possession to defendants No. 1 to 3 on
20.10.2010 on the spot and thereafter mutation to this effect
having been
attested and sanctioned on 22.11.2010 in their
favour by the revenue authorities. Defendant No.3 was in
possession and having his house over a part of the suit land i.e.
Khasra No. 832 after he purchased the land from Kaushalya
Devi, d/o Nihal Paul.
The main grievance of the plaintiff before the learned
trial court, the first appellate court and this Court is that
partition proceedings having been conducted by the revenue
authorities at the back of plaintiff and his predecessor-ininterest are result of misrepresentation, fabrication and fraud.
It would be apt to first reproduce relevant provisions
of Order VI of CPC, which read as under:2. Pleading to state material facts and not evidence.—
(1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a
statement in a concise form of the material facts on which
the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the
case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be
proved.
(2) Every pleading shall, when necessary, be divided into
paragraphs, numbered consecutively, each allegation
being, so far as is convenient, contained in a separate
paragraph.
(3) Dates, sums and numbers shall be expressed in a
pleading in figures as well as in words.
4. Particulars to be given where necessary.—In all cases
in
which
the
party
pleading
relies
on
any
misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or
undue influence, and in all other cases in which
particulars may be necessary beyond such as are
exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates
and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.
From the perusal of Order VI Rule 2 of CPC, it is
specifically clear that every pleading shall contain and contain
only a statement in a concise form of all the material facts, on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the
case may be. Order VI Rule 4 of CPC requires party to state
specific particulars to support their claim of fraud and
misrepresentation. Failure to do so leads to passing of adverse
order. General allegation that fraud has been committed does
not meet the legal requirement. The party, who alleges fraud,
has the burden of proving its existence.
It would be clear from the perusal of the plaint, as
filed by the plaintiff/appellant, the only ground, which has been
taken in the plaint, is that the partition proceedings have been
effected behind back of the plaintiff and his predecessor- ininterest. Neither they were heard in the matter nor any
opportunity was given to them to contest the proceedings. No
specific allegation pertaining to the fraud, mis-representation
and fabrication has been leveled in the plaint and pleadings
with respect to same are cryptic and vague and, thus,
no
reliance can be placed on the same.
It is well settled principle of law that in order to
prove plea of fraud, specific material, pleading and evidence has
to be placed on record and in the absence of doing so adverse
inference has to be drawn against the party.
In Canara Bank vs. P Selathal,
2020 (13) SCC
143, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:11. Relying upon and following the decision of this Court
in the case of O.C. Krishnan and others (supra), thereafter
the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of
M/s Cambridge Solutions Limited (supra), has rejected the
plaint in which the order passed by the DRT was
challenged, in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11
(d) of the CPC. It is required to be noted that in the said
case also there were allegations of fraud in the plaint and
considering the averments in the plaint, it was found that
the allegations of fraud are illusory. It is observed by the
Division Bench in the said decision that specific instances
and acts of fraud with evidence have to be pleaded in the
plaint. It is further observed that mere statements are not
enough. It is further observed that it is not sufficient if just
fraud is pleaded and there must be material to show that
the fraud is committed.
10. Having considered the pleadings and the averments in
the suits, more particularly the allegations of fraud, we
find that the allegations of fraud are with respect to the
partnership deed and there are no allegations at all with
respect to mortgage created by the Guarantor – Shri
Kallikutty and that too with respect to the deed of
guarantee executed by the Guarantor. Much reliance is
placed upon the judgment and order passed by the
learned Magistrate holding the partners of the firm guilty.
However, it is required to be noted that even in the said
judgment passed by the learned Magistrate there is no
reference to the deed of guarantee and/or the mortgage
created by the Guarantor. Even the bank is not a party to
the said proceedings. It is reported that against the
judgment and order passed by the learned Magistrate,
further appeal is pending. Be that as it may, considering
the pleadings/averments in the suits and the allegations
of fraud, we are of the opinion that the allegations of fraud
are illusory and only with a view to get out of the
judgment and decree passed by the DRT. We are of the
opinion that therefore the suits are vexatious and are filed
with a mala fide intention to get out of the judgment and
decree passed by the DRT.
In H. S. Goutham vs. Rama Murthy, 2021 (5) SCC
241, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
32. Before the learned Principal City Civil Judge, the
judgment debtors led the evidence in support of their claim
that the judgment and decree was obtained by fraud and
mis-representation, which evidence was not led by them
before the Executing Court when they submitted the
objections and contended that the decree was obtained by
fraud. That, thereafter, the learned Principal City Civil
Judge submitted the report that the decree was obtained
by fraud and on the basis of the report submitted by
learned Principal City Civil Judge mainly, the High Court
has set aside the judgment and decree by the impugned
judgment and order. Thus, from the aforesaid it is crystal
clear that all through-out there was a delay and
negligence on the part of the judgment debtors in not
initiating the appropriate proceedings at appropriate
stage.
35. Now, so far as the procedure adopted by the High
Court calling for the report from the learned Principal City
Civil Judge on whether the decree was obtained by fraud
or not is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted
that at the time when the High Court passed such an
order, there was already an order passed by the learned
Executing
Court
dated
03.03.1998
overruling
the
objections raised by the judgment debtors that the decree
was obtained by fraud and mis-representation. As
observed by the learned Executing Court in the order
dated 03.03.1998, the judgment debtors except the
averments that the decree was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, neither any further submissions were
made on that nor even the judgment debtors led any
evidence in support of the same. Therefore, as such,
learned Executing Court was justified in overruling the
objection that the decree was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation etc.
36. As per the settled principle of law, when the fraud is
alleged
the
same
is
required
to
be
pleaded
and
established by leading evidence. Mere allegation that
there was a fraud is not sufficient. Therefore, subsequent
order passed by the High Court calling for the report from
the learned Principal City Civil Judge on the question
whether the decree was obtained by fraud or not, can be
said to be giving an opportunity to the judgment debtors to
fill in the lacuna. Therefore, the course adopted by the
High Court calling for the report from the learned Principal
City Civil Judge cannot be approved.
steel
To the similar effect, the Apex Court in Electrosteel
Castings
Limited
vs.
UV
Asset
Reconstruction
Company Limited & ors., 2022 (2) SCC 573 has observed as
under:
“7.2. However, it is required to be noted that except the
words used "fraud"/"fraudulent" there are no specific
particulars pleaded with respect to the "fraud". It appears
that
by
a
clever
drafting
and
using
the
words
"fraud"/"fraudulent" without any specific particulars with
respect to the "fraud", the plaintiff-appellant herein
intends to get out of the bar under e Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act and wants the suit to be maintainable. As
per the settled proposition of law mere mentioning and
using the word "fraud"/"fraudulent" is not sufficient to
satisfy the test of "fraud". As per the settled proposition of
law such a pleading/using the word "fraud"/"fraudulent"
without any material particulars would not tantamount to
pleading of "fraud
8. In Bishundeo Narain in para 22, it is observed and held
as under: (SCC p. 454)
22. Now if there is one rule which is better established
than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue
influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set
forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on
the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from
them in evidence. g General allegations are insufficient
even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any
court ought to take notice however strong the language in
which they are couched may be, and the same applies to
undue influence and coercion. See Order 6 Rule 4, Civil
Procedure Code.
8.1. Similar view has been expressed in Ladli Parshad
Jaiswal and after considering the decision of the Privy
Council in Bharat Dharma Syndicate Ltd. v. Harish
Chandra, it is held that a litigant who prefers allegation of
fraud or other improper conduct must place on record
precise and specific details b of these charges. Even as
per Order VI Rule 4 in all cases in which the party
pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of
trust, wilful default, or undue influence, particulars shall
be stated in the pleading. Similarly in K.C. Sharma & Co.
it is held that "fraud" has to be pleaded with necessary
particulars. In Ram Singh, it is observed and held by this
Court that when the suit is barred by any law, the
plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent that provision by
means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those
circumstances by which the suit is barred by law of
limitation.
8.2. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal¹¹, it is observed
and held in para 5 as under: (SCC p. 470)
5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the
petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court
repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the
statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High
Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before
the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of
the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned
Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful-not formalreading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and
meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to
sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein
is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion
of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing
by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.
An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits.
The principle, as enunciated by exposition of law, as
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, clearly demonstrates that
it is cardinal principle of law that fraud has to be pleaded and
proved. It is law of land that fraud unravels everything. The
Court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded
and proved, but once it is proved, it vitiates the judgments
contracts and all transactions whatsoever. From the multiple
decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court on ‘fraud’, what follows is
that fraud and justice cannot dwell together, the legislature
never intends to guard fraud, the question of limitation to
exercise power does not arise, if fraud is proved, and even
finality of litigation cannot be pressed into service to absurd
limits when a fraud is unravelled.
The plaintiff in order to substantiate his case
entered the witness box as PW1. In his deposition, he deposed
that defendants No. 1 to 3 instituted
partition proceedings
against his father before the revenue authorities and in the
same, his father did not receive any notice. He further stated
that no notice or information with respect to the partition case
was received either by him
or his predecessor-in-interest. In
his cross-examination, he admitted that his father expired on
2.6.2006, i.e. after passing of the order of partition by Assistant
Collector, 1st Grade, Baijnath. He admitted that the partition
case was instituted on 20.1.2003 and
the final order was
passed by the revenue officer on 16.8.2005. When the partition
was conducted, his father was
alive. He denied that he was
aware about pendency of the partition proceedings. There is
categorical admission on the part of the plaintiff that in order
to assail the partition proceedings, he had preferred an appeal
in the Court of SDO (Civil), Baijnath. He admitted that the said
appeal was preferred by him on 8.11.2006. He further admitted
that on account of non-appearance, the appeal, as instituted
by him before the
SDO (Civil),
Baijnath was dismissed in
default on 22.7.2009.
In order to
No.1 Kaushalya Devi,
rebut the case of plaintiff,
defendant
entered the witness-box as DW2 and
stated in her testimony that the suit land is situated in Mohal
Kotli, which is about more than 5 kanals. Earlier the suit land
was joint amongst the parties. She along with her sister namely
Chander Kanta got the land by virtue of the inheritance from
her father, which is about more than 5 kanals. She stated that
her father purchased the land from Prem Pal. This land was
duly partitioned by instituting the application in January 2003
before the competent authority. She stated that the partition
proceedings were instituted by her and defendant No.2 as they
were having less land on the spot. The application for partition
is Ext. DW2/A and the same is duly signed by her and her
sister Chander Kanta at points A and B. She stated that the
factum of partition was very much in the knowledge of father of
the plainitff and in that regard, summon Ext. DW2/B was also
served upon him. She stated that the plaintiff and his father
and others on 20.3.2003 remained present in the Tehsil Office
and thereafter, they did not turn up. Some of the parties used
to come and some of them did not turn up. Thereafter, they
were proceeded ex-parte. She further stated that at the time of
partition, father of the plaintiff was alive. After the order in the
partition proceedings, an application for delivery of the
possession was filed, however the same could not be done as
the present plaintiff instituted an appeal before the SDO (Civil),
Baijnath. Thereafter, the appeal, which was filed by the
plaintiff, was dismissed in default on 22.7.2009 and after the
dismissal of the same, they filed an application for warrant of
possession in 2010. Thereafter, they got the possession on the
spot. When the possession was handed over to the defendants,
Surinder Kumar was also present on the spot. She stated that
defendant No.3 is in possession of Khasra No. 832/2 and he
has constructed a house over the same and the possession of
the said defendant is prior to the partition proceedings.
The
partition effected between the parties is legally valid and correct
and the mutation has been attested in favour of the defendants
No. 1 to 3. She stated that the plaintiff and his predecessor-ininterest were well aware of partition proceedings that is why
they preferred an appeal before the SDO Civil.
She deposed
that the instant suit has been filed by the plainitff just to
harass them so that he can take forcible possession of the land
which has been allotted to them in the partition proceedings. In
her cross-examination, the plaintiff could not extract anything
favourable from this witness.
Defendants No. 1 to 3 examined Tilak Raj, Reader to
SDM Office Baijnath, who while appearing in the witness box as
DW1, stated in his testimony that he has brought the
summoned record. He testified that the appeal, which was filed
against the order of partition dated 16.8.2005, certified copy
whereof is Ext. DW1/A and the same is correct as per their
record. He stated that the appeal Ext. DW1/A was
instituted
on 9.11.2006 by Jitender Paul, the present plaintiff. He
deposed that Zimini orders of the appeal, Ext. DW1/B are
correct as per the record. He further stated that the aforesaid
appeal on account of non-appearance of the appellant/counsel
was dismissed in default on 22.4.2009.
DW3, Jeet Kumar, deposed that he has seen suit
land, which is situated at Mohal Kotli and defendants No. 1 and
2 are having 5 kanals of land, which is in their possession.
Earlier the suit land was joint amongst the parties, however
defendants No. 1 and 2 filed the
partition application in the
year 2003 and thereafter, the same is in their possession. He
stated that the suit has been instituted by the plaintiff just to
pressurize and harass defendants No. 1 to 3.
He was
thoroughly cross-examined by the plaintiff, but nothing could
be extracted from this witness.
It would be noticed that though the entire edifice of
the case, as set up by the plaintiff/appellant, is that the
partition proceedings were initiated by defendants No. 1 and 2
at the back of the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest and
the entire partition process is a sham transaction as neither
plaintiff nor his predecessor-in- interest was heard in the
matter and the entire proceedings were conducted at their
back, however, as observed above, in view of the categorical
admission as made by the plaintiff while appearing in the
witness box as PW1 that on 09.11.2006 he had instituted an
appeal before the SDO (Civil), Baijnath against the partition
order, dated 16.08.2005 as passed by the Assistant Collector,
1st Grade, Baijnath and the same was dismissed in default, it is
crystal clear that the case as set up by the plaintiff is based on
the falsehood and stands belied. Though a suggestion was put
to defendant No.3 by the plaintiff with respect to the fact that
the plaintiff is in possession of Khasra No. 832, 882 and 883,
however, the same is in contrast to his own assertion that
defendants No.1 to 3 are in possession of the aforesaid Khasra
numbers.
Defendants No. 1 to 3 in order to falsify the case of
the plaintiff, have placed on record copy of the application for
partition of the suit land, Ext. DW2/A, having been filed by
Kaushalya Devi, Chander Kanta against Rajinder Paul, s/o Sh.
Prithi Pal, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, Raj Rani,
Brinder Pal, Kulvinder Pal, Subhadra Devi, Kanta Devi,
Ajudhya Devi, Gujru Ram, Sarju Ram and Surinder Pal in the
Court of Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Baijnath, in the year
2003.
The
said
application
was
duly
served
upon
the
defendants including predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff,
namely, Rajinder Paul, however predecessor-in-interest of the
plaintiff did not put in appearance and was accordingly
proceeded against ex parte by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade
and vide its order dated 16.8.2005 allowed the application for
partition.
Defendants No. 1 to 3 have also placed on record,
copy of the grounds of appeal, Ext. DW1/A, which was
preferred by the present plaintiff Jitender Paul in the Court of
SDO (Civil), Baijnath on 9.11.2006. Perusal of the aforesaid
grounds of appeal reveal that a stand was taken by the present
appellant/plaintiff that order, which was passed by the
Assistant Collector, 1st Grade came to his knowledge only on
6.11.2006 when he was asked by the Halqa Patwari to appear
before him for the implementation of partition order through
his servant as he was out of station and thereafter after coming
to
his native village, he immediately applied for
copy of the
partition order and after obtaining the same, preferred the
aforesaid appeal. The said appeal continued till 22.7.2009, on
which date, when none appeared for the appellant, the appeal
as preferred by them was dismissed in default and the case file,
after due completion, was consigned to General Record Room.
Copy of order dated 22.7.2009 has been placed on record as
Ext. DW1/C.
The entry of mutation No. 826, dated 22.11.2010
which was effected pursuant to the partition order, is being
reflected in the revenue record i.e. Ext. P-1, which clearly
reveals that pursuant to order of partition, possession of the
suit land was duly handed over to defendants No.1 to 3 on the
spot.
It is a matter of record and even otherwise, as has
been fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the parties, that
after dismissal of the appeal against the partition order, dated
16.08.2005 in default, no action was taken by the plaintiff in
order to revive the said proceedings or to challenge the orders
as passed by the revenue authorities in the higher/superior
authority, thus, the same have become final.
The documentary evidence, having been placed and
proved on record by defendants No. 1 to 3, also clearly belies
and shatters the claim of the plaintiff/appellant, which
primarily based on the ground
is
that a fraud has been
committed by the revenue authorities as neither the plainitff
nor his predecessor-in-interest
was involved or joined in the
partition proceedings and the entire proceedings have been
conducted at their back and establishes the defence as taken
by defendants No. 1 to 3 that the factum
of institution of
partition proceedings was very much in the knowledge of the
plaintiff, who is appellant in the present case and his
predecessor-in-interest, because he himself preferred an appeal
against the order as passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st
Grade, dated 16.8.2005 in the Court of SDO (Civil) Baijnath in
the year 2006, which remained pending for about more than 3
years and
finally when none appeared on behalf of the
appellant on 22.7.2009, the SDO (Civil), Baijnath, had no other
option, but to dismiss the appeal in default.
It has been rightly pointed by the learned senior
counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 that the instant
proceedings have been initiated just to drag defendants No. 1 to
3 in an uncalled for litigation and to deprive them from the
fruits of the partition proceedings which took place about more
than 21 years ago.
The
oral
evidence
in
conjunction
with
the
documentary evidence as placed on record leaves no iota of
doubt that the partition proceedings, which were initiated by
the defendants, were very much in the knowledge of the
plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest as when the matter was
pending before the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Baijnath,
despite valid service, father of the plaintiff did not appear
before the revenue authority and consequently, he along with
other parties were proceeded ex parte. The grounds of appeal
which was instituted by the present plaintiff falsify the case set
up before this Court that the entire proceedings were initiated
at the back of the plaintiff and his predecessor in interest. The
plaintiff duly preferred an appeal before the SDO (Civil)
Baijnath against the order of partition dated 16.08.2005
therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the plaintiff that
everything was got done at their back and they were not aware
about those proceedings.
As has been observed earlier, neither the order of
dismissal in default was recalled nor
against the said order,
any appeal was instituted by the plaintiff before the higher
authority. After availing the remedy before the appropriate
revenue authorities, now the plaintiff cannot be permitted to
drag the defendants No. 1 to 3 in litigation for infinity. The
partition order was passed in 2005 and despite passing of more
than 21 years, the plaintiff has been successful in dragging the
defendants No.1 to 3 in uncalled for litigation. It is, thus, clear
that everything was within the knowledge of the plaintiff. The
allegations of fraud, mis-representation and fabrication, which
have been tried to be leveled in the present proceedings, are
totally unsubstantiated or uncorroborated and have not been
proved to the hilt of the facts of the case.
The
concurrently
learned
decided
courts
the
below
have
rightly
and
controversy
after
taking
into
consideration the oral as well as documentary evidence placed
on record. There is no infirmity or illegality in the same and the
courts below have rightly dismissed the suit which
was
affirmed by the first appellate court.
The first appellate court has rightly rejected the
application which was filed by the plaintiff under provisions of
Order 41 Rule 27 as the plaintiff failed to establish and prove
that why the documents as intended to be placed on record
were not produced earlier by the present appellant during the
trial.
The plaintiff has not been able to establish his case
within corners of parameters as laid down in the provisions of
order 41 Rule 27 CPC.
As a matter of fact, the plaintiff intended to place on
record copies of file of partition case No. 14/Teh./03, titled as
Kaushal Devi vs Rajinder Pal, decided on 16.8.2005 by the
Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Baijnath, copy of mutation No.
360, dated 28.5.1998, 402, copy of tatima and sale deed.
The
plaintiff
has
failed
to
establish
that
notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, the evidence
which he intended to place on record, was not within his
knowledge and the same could not be produced by him at the
time when the decree in appeal was passed.
The
Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that
the parties are not entitled to produce additional evidence at an
appellate stage, unless it is shown that inspite of due diligence,
they could not produce the same and such documents are
required to enable the Court to pronounce the proper judgment.
As rightly held by the learned first appellate court that the
documents as sought to be placed on record were prepared in
favour of the defendants during the trial, therefore, the plaintiff
was fully aware of the same and existence of such documents
was within his knowledge. The entire case of the plainitff hinges
around the partition proceedings and it cannot be believed that
the entire partition proceedings file, which he intends to place
on record by means of order 41 Rule 27 was not within his
knowledge.
As plaintiff himself preferred an appeal before the
Court SDO Civil, therefore, it cannot be inferred that nothing
was within his knowledge. The application
as filed is an
afterthought and it does not meet requirement as envisaged
under Order 41 Rule 27.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments
has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No
doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under
Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on
limited grounds such as - (a) where the finding is based on
inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the
relevant
admissible
evidence;
(c)
where
it
is
based
on
misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not
case in hand.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope
of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.
Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:
18. It has been noted time and again that without
insisting for the statement of such a substantial question
of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the
same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been
issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals
without adhering to the procedure prescribed under
Section 100 of the CPC. It has further been found in a
number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish
between a question of law and a substantial question of
law. In exercise of the powers under this section in
several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate
court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept
in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an
inherent
right
attached
to
the
litigation.
Being
a
substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in
accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The
conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly
fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no
court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds.
The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable
grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be
disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers
under this section. Further, a substantial question of law
has to be distinguished from a substantial question of
fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v.
Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held
that :
"The proper test for determining whether a question of law
raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be
whether it is of general public importance or whether it
directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties
and if so whether it is either an open question in the
sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the
Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from
difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the
question is settled by the highest court or the general
principles to be applied in determining the question are
well settled and there is a mere question of applying those
principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the
question would not be a substantial question of law."
19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were
arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first
appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court
should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the
trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has
rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the
same is no ground for interference in second appeal when
it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory
reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of
circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one
drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered
by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other
approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however,
interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by
the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to
the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled
position on the basis of pronouncements made by the
Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or
arrived at by ignoring material evidence.
20. to 22
xx xx xx xx
23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be
debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a
binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on
the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar
as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a
question of law "involving in the case" there must be first
a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question
should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact
arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to
decide that question of law for a just and proper decision
of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time
before the High Court is not a question involved in the
case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,
therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each
case whether a question of law is a substantial one and
involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall
consideration being the need for striking a judicious
balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice
at
all
stages and
impelling
necessity
of
avoiding
prolongation in the life of any lis.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.
Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be
determined by a court of fact after appreciating the
evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate
court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a second
appellate court exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC
can interfere with a finding of fact on limited grounds,
such as, (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible
evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of relevant
admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading
of evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that is not
the case here.
17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in
paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement
(Exb. A-2) made on the back of a registered document
(Exb. A-1) after considering the oral evidence led by the
plaintiff-appellant
and
signature(s)/thumbmark
of
the
circumstance
that
D-1
and
not
D-2
were
disputed, though claimed as one obtained on a blank
paper. The reasoning of the first appellate court in
paragraph 29 of its judgment was not addressed by the
High Court. In fact, the High Court, in one line, on a
flimsy defense of use of a signed blank paper, observed
that genuineness of Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our view,
the High Court fell in error here. While exercising powers
under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to have interfered
with the finding of fact returned by the first appellate
court on this aspect; more so, when the first appellate
court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the
evidence available on record as also the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document
(Exb.A-2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while
disturbing the finding of the first appellate court, the High
Court did not hold that the finding returned by the first
appellate court is based on a misreading of evidence, or is
in ignorance of relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus,
there existed no occasion for the High Court, exercising
power under Section 100 CPC, to interfere with the finding
of
the
first
appellate
court
regarding
payment
of
additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above
the sale consideration fixed for the transaction.
18. Once the finding regarding payment of additional sum
of Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first
appellate court is sustained, there appears no logical
reason to hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not
ready and willing to perform its part under the contract
particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of total consideration
of Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and, over and above
that, additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of
demand made by D-1 & D-2. This we say so, because an
opinion regarding plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to
perform its part under the contract is to be formed on the
entirety of proven facts and circumstances of a case
including conduct of the parties. The test is that the
person claiming performance must satisfy conscience of
the court that he has treated the contract subsisting with
preparedness
to
fulfil
his
obligation
and
accept
performance when the time for performance arrives.”
As observed above, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has
repeatedly held that the scope of interference under Section 100
CPC is limited and the interference will be in those cases where
the judgments are perverse and based on no evidence. On
perusal of the impugned judgments and decrees, this court is of
the opinion that the same are valid, legal and sustainable in the
eyes of law and there is no infirmity and illegality in the same.
and no interference of any kind is required in the same. The
substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
In view of aforesaid discussions and for the reasons
stated hereinabove, there is no merit in this appeal and the
same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their
own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
15th June, 2026
(pankaj)
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
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