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2026:HHC:48611
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1220 of 2026
Reserved on: 29.10.2026
Date of Decision: 04.11.2026.
Jai Raj
...Petitioner
Versus
Binta Devi
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Vinod Chauhan, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of the order dated 22.08.2026 passed by learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Shillai, District Sirmour, H.P.
(learned
Trial Court), vide which the opportunity to lead defence evidence
of the petitioner (accused before the learned Trial Court) was
closed by the order of the Court. (The parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience.)
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:48611
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the respondent/complainant filed a complaint
against the petitioner/accused for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
(NI Act). The learned trial Court took cognisance, summoned the
accused and put the notice of accusation to him. His statement
was recorded on 21.02.2026, and he opted to lead evidence. No
evidence was produced on 4.04.2026, and the matter was
adjourned to 30.05.2026. Nobody appeared on 30.05.2026; hence,
the Court issued non-bailable warrants of arrest to secure the
presence of the accused. The accused filed an application for
cancellation of non-bailable warrants of arrest, which was
allowed on 23.06.2026, and the matter was listed for recording the
statements of defence witnesses on 25.06.2026. The accused was
not present on 25.06.2026, and he filed an application for leading
additional evidence, which was allowed on 4.07.2026, and the
matter was listed for defence evidence on 25.07.2026. The accused
did not appear and also did not produce any evidence; hence, the
Court adjourned the matter to 22.08.2026 for the defence evidence
as a last opportunity. However, the accused did not appear and
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also did not produce any evidence on 22.08.2026; hence, the
learned Trial Court closed the evidence of the accused.
3.
Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the accused has filed the present petition asserting
that only two opportunities were granted after allowing the
application for leading secondary evidence. The petitioner
remained under continuous treatment because of a heart problem
and could not produce the defence evidence. No prejudice would
be caused by allowing an opportunity to the petitioner/accused.
The petitioner would be deprived of his right to produce the
evidence if the order is not set aside. Hence, it was prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned
Trial Court be set aside.
4.
Mr Vinod Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in closing the
petitioner’s right to lead the defence evidence. Adequate
opportunity was not provided to the petitioner/accused to produce
the evidence; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the order passed by learned Trial Court be set aside.
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5.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
6.
The petitioner has filed the prescription slip dated
19.09.2026 issued by Civil Hospital, Paonta Sahib, wherein some
medicines were prescribed to him and he was referred to the
Department of Cardiology. A prescription slip dated 25.09.2026,
issued by Sai Cardiac and Critical Care Centre, Paonta Sahib, has
been issued in which some medicines have been prescribed. The
report of Echo and Colour Doppler dated 3.05.2026 has also been
placed on record.
7.
It is difficult to see how the documents which came
into existence after the learned trial Court had closed the evidence
of the petitioner would help him. Only the report of the Doppler
test is dated 3.05.2026, but this report does not show that the
petitioner was incapacitated from producing the evidence.
8.
Learned Trial Court had granted the opportunity to
produce the evidence on 4.05.2026, 30.05.2026,25.06.2026 and
22.09.2026.
9.
Section 346 of Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(BNSS), corresponding to Section 309 of the Cr.P.C., deals with
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adjournments. It reads that every inquiry or trial shall be
concluded on a day-to-day basis unless the Court finds the
adjournment necessary for reasons to be recorded. In the present
case, no reasonable casue was assigned for adjounrmnet and the
learned trial Court was justified in closing the evidence. It was
submitted that a fair trial demands that adequate opportunities be
granted to the accused to defend himself. This submission will not
help the petitioner/accused. It was held in Asha Ranjan v. State of
Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 397: (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 376: 2017 SCC OnLine SC
140 that the accused cannot go on seeking adjournments in the
name of a fair trial. It was observed at page 435:
“63. While appreciating the concept of public interest in
such a situation, the Court is required to engage itself in
construing the process of fair trial, which ultimately
subserves the cause of justice and remains closer to
constitutional sensibility. An accused, in the name of a fair
trial, cannot go on seeking adjournments, defeating the
basic purpose behind the conducting of a trial as enshrined
under Section 309 CrPC. He cannot go on filing applications
under various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code,
whether tenable or not, and put forth a plea on each and
every occasion on the bedrock that the principle of fair trial
sanctions it. In such a situation, as has been held by this
Court, the prosecution, which represents the cause of the
collective and the victim, who fights for a remedy of his
individual grievance, is allowed to have a say, and the court
is not expected to be a silent spectator. Thus, the discord
that arises when there is intra-conflict in the same
fundamental right, especially in the context of a fair trial,
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has to be resolved with regard being had to the obtaining
fact situation. An accused who has been able to, by his sheer
presence, erode the idea of safety of a witness in court, or,
for that matter, impair and rust the faith of a victim in the
ultimate justice, and such erosion is due to fear psychosis
prevalent in the atmosphere of trial, is not to be
countenanced as it is an unconscionable situation. Such a
hazard is not to be silently suffered because the “Majesty of
Justice” does not allow such kinds of complaints to
survive.”
10.
It was submitted that the adjournment should have
been granted in the interest of justice. This submission cannot be
accepted. Delhi High Court held in Jasbir Sobti v. Surender Singh,
2008 SCC OnLine Del 845, that adjournments cannot be granted in
the interest of justice. It was observed:
6. The question that arises for consideration is whether
another opportunity is to be given to the plaintiffs under the
cloak of ‘in the interest of justice’. The answer to this
question would lie in replying to the related question,
namely, whether the interest of justice demands that the
case be decided on merits even when there are lapses galore
on the part of the plaintiffs in not prosecuting the case
diligently, thereby delaying the process endlessly. We are
afraid, in the name of justice, that no such licence can be
given to the plaintiffs. No doubt, if there is a minor
procedural lapse, that can be condoned, and the main
purpose of the Court is to see that such cases are decided on
the merits. However, that would not mean that the plaintiffs
or the defendants are allowed to drag on the proceedings
unnecessarily by taking adjournments continuously. Again,
that does not mean that the parties do not take steps in
further progress of/the case, namely, fail to file the
documents, conduct admission/denial and even fail to
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appear repeatedly. We have to keep in mind the interests of
the opposing party as well. If the matter is dragged out like
this and the opposing party is made to appear on each date
and asked to come on the next date only because nobody is
appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, it causes unnecessary
harassment to the opposite party as well. Therefore, in all
such matters, the Court is under a duty to weigh the
interests of both parties and maintain balance insofar as
these conflicting interests are concerned.
7. The problem of arrears in the Indian courts is well known.
We have 30 million cases pending in the various District
Courts and the High Courts. Many attempts are being made
to clear these arrears and to ensure that the cases are
decided speedily, and there is no unnecessary delay in the
disposal of these cases. If the proceedings in a particular
case linger until the judgment is delivered and the case is
decided after a number of years, the adverse effects of this
are well known. No doubt, if we have the dictum ‘Justice
hurried is justice buried’ on the one hand, we cannot gloss
over another equally forceful maxim ‘Justice delayed is
justice denied’. In a situation like this, callousness,
indifference and laxity on the part of the plaintiffs in
pursuing the suit cannot be tolerated. It cannot be the
privilege of the plaintiffs to file a suit and not prosecute it,
enter an appearance or keep the matter pending
indefinitely.”
11.
Similarly, it was held in Ishwarlal Mali Rathod v. Gopal,
(2021) 12 SCC 612: (2023) 2 SCC (Civ) 625: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 921
that the grant of repeated adjournments without any justification
is not proper. It was observed at page 616:
8. Grant of repeated adjournments in a routine manner and
how it ultimately affects the justice delivery system, as
such came to be considered by this Court in a catena of
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decisions, and asking/granting of repeated adjournments
have been repeatedly condemned by this Court.
8.1. In Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast (P) Ltd. [Shiv Cotex v.
Tirgun Auto Plast (P) Ltd., (2011) 9 SCC 678 : (2011) 4 SCC
(Civ) 817], it is observed and held in paras 14 to 17 as under
: (SCC pp. 682-83)
“14. … Is the court obliged to give adjournment after
adjournment merely because the stakes are high in
the dispute? Should the court be a silent spectator and
leave control of the case to a party to the case who has
decided not to take the case forward?
15. It is sad, but true, that the litigants seek—and the
courts grant—adjournments at the drop of a hat. In
the cases where the Judges are a little proactive and
refuse to accede to the requests for unnecessary
adjournments, the litigants deploy all sorts of
methods to protract the litigation. It is not surprising
that civil disputes drag on and on. The misplaced
sympathy and indulgence by the appellate and
revisional courts compound the malady further. The
case in hand is a case of such misplaced sympathy. It
is high time that courts become sensitive to delays in
the justice delivery system and realise that
adjournments do dent the efficacy of the judicial
process, and if this menace is not controlled
adequately, the litigant public may lose faith in the
system sooner or later. The courts, particularly trial
courts, must ensure that on every date of hearing,
effective progress takes place in the suit.
16. No litigant has a right to abuse the procedure
provided in CPC. Adjournments have grown like
cancer, corroding the entire body of the justice
delivery system.…
17. … A party to the suit is not at liberty to proceed
with the trial at its leisure and pleasure and has no
right to determine when the evidence would be let in
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by it or the matter should be heard. The parties to a
suit—whether the plaintiff or the defendant—must
cooperate with the court in ensuring the effective
work on the date of the hearing for which the matter
has been fixed. If they do not, they do so at their own
peril.”
8.2. Commenting on the delay in the justice delivery
system, although in respect of the criminal trial, Krishna
Iyer, J. in Babu Singh v. State of U.P. [Babu Singh v. State of
U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579: 1978 SCC (Cri) 133] has observed in
para 4 as under : (SCC p. 581)
“4. … Our justice system, even in grave cases, suffers
from slow motion syndrome, which is lethal to “fair
trial”, whatever the ultimate decision. Speedy justice is a
component of social justice since the community, as a
whole, is concerned in the criminal being condignly and
finally punished within a reasonable time and the
innocent being absolved from the inordinate ordeal of
criminal proceedings.”
8.3. In Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand [Noor Mohammed v.
Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 754], using
very harsh words and condemning the repeated
adjournments sought by the lawyers and granted by the
courts, this Court has observed in paras 1, 12, 13, 27 and 28
as under : (SCC pp. 206-07, 209-10 & 215-16)
“1. In a democratic body politic which is governed by a
written Constitution and where the Rule of Law is
paramount, the judiciary is regarded as a sentinel on the
qui vive not only to protect the fundamental rights of the
citizens but also to see that the democratic values as
enshrined in the Constitution are respected and the faith
and hope of the people in the constitutional system are
not atrophied. The sacrosanctity of the Rule of Law
neither recognises a master and a slave nor does it
conceive of a ruler and a subject, but, in
quintessentiality, encapsulates and sings in the glory of
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the values of liberty, equality and justice in accordance
with the law, requiring the present generation to have
the responsibility to sustain them with all fairness for
the posterity, ostracising all affectations. To maintain
the sacredness of democracy, sacrifice in the continuum
by every member of the collective is a categorical
imperative. The fundamental conception of democracy
can only be preserved as a colossal and priceless treasure
where virtue and values of justice rule supreme and
intellectual anaemia is kept at bay by constant patience,
consistent perseverance, and argus-eyed vigilance. The
foundation of justice, apart from other things, rests on
the speedy delineation of the lis pending in courts. It
would not be an exaggeration to state that it is the
primary morality of justice and the ethical fulcrum of the
judiciary. Its profundity lies in not allowing anything to
cripple it or to do any act which would freeze it or make
it suffer from impotence. Delayed delineation of a
controversy in a court of law creates a dent in the
normative dispensation of justice, and in the ultimate
event, the Bench and the Bar gradually lose their
reverence, for the sense of divinity and nobility really
flows from the institutional serviceability. Therefore,
historically, emphasis has been laid on individual
institutionalism and collective institutionalism of an
adjudicator while administering justice. It can be stated
without any fear of contradiction that collective
collegiality can never be regarded as an alien concept to
the speedy dispensation of justice. That is the hallmark
of duty, and that is the real measure.
***
12. The proceedings in the second appeal before the High
Court, if we allow ourselves to say so, epitomise the
corrosive effect that adjournments can have on litigation
and how a lis can get entangled in the tentacles of an
octopus. The philosophy of justice, the role of a lawyer
and the court, the obligation of a litigant and all
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legislative commands, the nobility of the Bench and the
Bar, the ability and efficiency of all concerned and
ultimately the divinity of law are likely to make way for
apathy and indifference when delay of the present nature
takes place, for procrastination on the part of anyone
destroys the values of life and creates a catastrophic
turbulence in the sanctity of law. The virtues of
adjudication cannot be allowed to be paralysed by
adjournments and non-demonstration of due diligence
to deal with the matter. One cannot be oblivious to the
necessities of the time. No one can afford to sit in an
ivory tower. Neither a Judge nor a lawyer can ignore “the
total push and pressure of the cosmos”. It is devastating
to expect infinite patience. Change of attitude is the
warrant and command of the day. We may recall with
profit what Justice Cardozo had said:
“It is true, I think, today in every department of the
law that the social value of a rule has become a test of
growing power and importance.” [Benjamin N.
Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process (Cosimo Inc.,
2009) 73]
13. It has to be kept in mind that the time of leisure has to
be given a decent burial. The sooner it takes place, the
better it is. It is the obligation of the present generation
to march with the times and remind oneself every
moment that the rule of law is the centripodal concern,
and delay in the delineation and disposal of cases injects
an artificial virus and becomes a vitiating element. The
unfortunate characteristics of endemic delays have to be
avoided at any cost. One has to bear in mind that this is
the day, this is the hour, and this is the moment when all
soldiers of law fight on the path. One has to remind
oneself of the great saying, “Awake, Arise, ‘O’ Partha”.
***
27. The anguish expressed in the past, and the role
ascribed to the Judges, the lawyers and the litigants, is a
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matter of perpetual concern, and the same has to be
reflected upon every moment. An attitude of indifference
can neither be appreciated nor tolerated. Therefore, the
serviceability of the institution gains significance. That
is the command of the Majesty of Law, and none should
make any maladroit effort to create a concavity in the
same. Procrastination, whether at the individual or
institutional level, is a systemic disorder. Its corrosive
effect and impact are like a disorderly state of the
physical frame of a man suffering from an incurable and
fast progressive malignancy. Delay either by the
functionaries of the court or the members of the Bar
significantly exhibits indolence, and one can
aphoristically say, borrowing a line from Southwell,
“creeping snails have the weakest force [Robert
Southwell, “Loss in Delay”, in William B. Turnbull (Ed.),
The Poetical Works of the Rev. Robert Southwell (John
Russell Smith, London 1856), p. 60] ”. Slightly more
than five decades back, talking about the responsibility
of the lawyers, Nizer Louis had put it thus:
‘I consider it a lawyer's task to bring calm and
confidence to the distressed client. Almost everyone
who comes to a law office is emotionally affected by a
problem. It is only a matter of degree and of the
client's inner resources to withstand the pressure [
Nizer Louis, My Life in Court (Doubleday & Co. Inc.,
New York 1961), p. 213] .’
A few lines from the illustrious Justice Frankfurter are
fruitful to recapitulate:
‘I think a person who throughout his life is nothing
but a practising lawyer fulfils a very great and
essential function in the life of society. Think of the
responsibilities on the one hand, and the satisfaction
on the other, to be a lawyer in the true sense [ Felix
Frankfurter, “Proceedings in Honour of Mr Justice
Frankfurter and Distinguished Alumni, Occasional
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Pamphlet No. 3” (Harvard Law School, Cambridge,
1960), pp. 45] .’
28. In a democratic set-up, intrinsic and embedded faith
in the adjudicatory system is of seminal and pivotal
concern. Delay gradually declines the citizenry's faith in
the system. It is faith and faith alone that keep the
system
alive.
It
provides
oxygen
constantly.
Fragmentation of faith has the potential to bring about a
state of cataclysm where justice may become a casualty.
A litigant expects a reasoned verdict from a temperate
Judge but does not intend to, and, rightly so, to
guillotine much of the time at the altar of reason. Timely
delivery of justice keeps the faith ingrained and
establishes sustained stability. Access to speedy justice is
regarded as a human right that is deeply rooted in the
foundational concept of democracy, and such a right is
not only the creation of law but also a natural right. This
right can be fully ripened by the requisite commitment
of all concerned with the system. It cannot be regarded
as a facet of Utopianism because such a thought is likely
to make the right a mirage, losing the centrality of
purpose. Therefore, whoever has a role to play in the
justice-dispensation system cannot be allowed to
remotely conceive of a casual approach.”
8.4. In the aforesaid decision [Noor Mohammed v.
Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202: (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 754], this
Court also considered the role of the advocate in the justice
delivery system and considered the earlier decisions in
paras 17 to 22 which read as under: (Noor Mohammed case
[Noor Mohammedv. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202: (2013) 2 SCC
(Civ) 754], SCC pp. 212-14)
“17. In Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor [Ramon
Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor, (2001) 1 SCC 118: 2001
SCC (Cri) 3: 2001 SCC (L&S) 152], after referring to a
passage from Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation (P)
Ltd. [Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation (P) Ltd.,
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(1999) 1 SCC 37], the Court cautioned thus : (Ramon
Services case [Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor,
(2001) 1 SCC 118: 2001 SCC (Cri) 3: 2001 SCC (L&S) 152],
SCC p. 126, para 15)
‘15. … Nonetheless, we put the profession on notice
that in future the advocate would also be answerable
for the consequences suffered by the party if the nonappearance was solely on the ground of a strike call. It
is unjust and inequitable to cause the party alone to
suffer for the self-imposed dereliction of its advocate.
We may further add that the litigant who suffers
entirely on account of his advocate's non-appearance
in court has also the remedy to sue the advocate for
damages, but that remedy would remain unaffected
by the course adopted in this case. Even so, in
situations like this, when the court mulcts the party
with costs for the failure of his advocate to appear, we
make it clear that the same court has the power to
permit the party to realise the costs from the
advocate concerned. However, such a direction can be
passed only after affording an opportunity to the
advocate. If he has any justifiable cause, the court can
certainly absolve him from such a liability.’
Be it noted, though the said passage was stated in the
context of a strike by the lawyers, it has its accent on
non-appearance by a counsel in the court.
18. In this context, we may refer to the pronouncement
in P.D. Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra [P.D.
Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, (1984) 2 SCC
556: 1984 SCC (Cri) 335], wherein the Court observed that
: (SCC p. 563, para 9)
‘9. … An advocate stands in a loco parentis towards
the litigants, and it therefore follows that the client is
entitled to receive disinterested, sincere and honest
treatment, especially where the client approaches the
advocate for succour in times of need.’
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19. In S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi Admn.) [S.J. Chaudhary
v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1984) 1 SCC 722: 1984 SCC (Cri)
163], a three-Judge Bench, while dealing with the role of
an advocate in a criminal trial, has observed as follows :
(SCC pp. 723-24, para 3)
“3. We are unable to appreciate the difficulty said to
be experienced by the petitioner. It is stated that his
advocate is finding it difficult to attend court from
day to day. It is the duty of every advocate who
accepts the brief in a criminal case to attend the trial
from day to day. We cannot over-stress the duty of
the advocate to attend to the trial from day to day.
Having accepted the brief, he will be committing a
breach of his professional duty if he so fails to
attend.”
20. In Mahabir Prasad Singh [Mahabir Prasad Singh v.
Jacks Aviation (P) Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 37], the Bench,
emphasising the obligation of a lawyer in his duty
towards the Court and the duty of the Court to the Bar,
has ruled as under: (SCC p. 44, paras 17-18)
‘17. … “A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that
shall detract from the dignity of the court of which he
is himself a sworn officer and assistant. He should at
all times pay deferential respect to the Judge, and
scrupulously observe the decorum of the courtroom.”
(Warevelle's Legal Ethics, p. 182)
18. Of course, it is not a unilateral affair. There is a
reciprocal duty for the court also to be courteous to the
members of the Bar and to make every endeavour for
maintaining and protecting the respect which members
of the Bar are entitled to have from their clients as well
as from the litigant public. Both the Bench and the Bar
are the two inextricable wings of the judicial forum, and
therefore, the aforesaid mutual respect is sine qua non
for the efficient functioning of the solemn work carried
on in courts of law. But that does not mean that any
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advocate or a group of them can boycott the courts or
any particular court and ask the court to desist from
discharging judicial functions. At any rate, no advocate
can ask the court to avoid a case on the ground that he
does not want to appear in that court.’
21. While recapitulating the duties of a lawyer towards
the court and society, being a member of the legal
profession, this Court in O.P. Sharma v. High Court of P&H
[O.P. Sharma v. High Court of P&H, (2011) 6 SCC 86: (2011)
3 SCC (Civ) 218: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 821: (2011) 2 SCC (L&S)
11] has observed that: (SCC p. 92, para 17)
‘17. The role and status of lawyers at the beginning of
sovereign and democratic India is accounted as
extremely vital in deciding that the nation's
administration was to be governed by the rule of law.’
The Bench emphasised the role of eminent lawyers in the
framing of the Constitution. The emphasis was also laid
on the concept that lawyers are the officers of the court
in the administration of justice.
22. In R.K. Garg v. State of H.P. [R.K. Garg v. State of H.P.,
(1981) 3 SCC 166: 1981 SCC (Cri) 663], Chandrachud, C.J.,
speaking for the Court pertaining to the relationship
between the Bench and the Bar, opined thus: (SCC p. 170,
para 9)
‘9. … the Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the
same mechanism which administers justice to the
people. Many members of the Bench are drawn from
the Bar, and their past association is a source of
inspiration and pride to them. It ought to be a matter
of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestionably true
that courtesy breeds courtesy, and just as charity has
to begin at home, courtesy must begin with the Judge.
A discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned instrument
in the setting of a courtroom. But members of the Bar
will do well to remember that such flagrant violations
of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only
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result in the ultimate destruction of a system without
which no democracy can survive.’ ”
9. Today, the judiciary and the justice delivery system are
facing the acute problem of delay, which ultimately affects
the right of the litigant to access to justice and the speedy
trial. Arrears are mounting because of such delay and
dilatory tactics, and repeated adjournments by advocates
and mechanically and in a routine manner granted by the
courts. It cannot be disputed that due to the delay in access
to justice and not getting timely justice, it may shake the
trust and confidence of the litigants in the justice delivery
system. Many a time, the task of adjournments is used to
kill justice. Repeated adjournments break the back of the
litigants. The courts are enjoined to perform their duties
with the object of strengthening the confidence of the
common man in the institution entrusted with the
administration of justice. Any effort that weakens the
system and shakes the faith of the common man in the
justice dispensation has to be discouraged. Therefore, the
courts shall not grant adjournments in a routine manner
and mechanically, and shall not be a party to the cause for
delay in dispensing justice. The courts have to be diligent
and take timely action in order to usher in an efficient
justice dispensation system and maintain faith in the rule of
law.
10. We are also aware that whenever the trial courts refuse
to grant unnecessary adjournments, many times they are
accused of being strict, and they may face the displeasure of
the Bar. However, the judicial officers shall not worry about
that if their conscience is clear, and they, as judicial officers,
have to bear in mind his duties to the litigants who are
before the courts and who have come for justice and for
whom the courts are meant, and all efforts shall be made by
the courts to provide timely justice to the litigants.
12.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod
Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 226:
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(2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 712: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 53 that adjournments in
criminal trials have become a malignancy. It was observed at page
226:
“If one is asked a question, what afflicts the legally requisite
criminal trial in its conceptual eventuality in this country
the two reasons that may earn the status of phenomenal
signification are, first, procrastination of trial due to nonavailability of witnesses when the trial is in progress and
second, unwarranted adjournments sought by the counsel
conducting the trial and the unfathomable reasons for
acceptation of such prayers for adjournments by the trial
courts, despite a statutory command under Section 309 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and series of
pronouncements by this Court. What was a malady at one
time, with the efflux of time, has metamorphosed into
malignancy. What was a mere disturbance once has become
a disorder, a diseased one, at present.”
13.
It was held in Bablu Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2015) 8 SCC
787: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 862: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 632 that the Court
must see that neither the defence nor the prosecution takes
unnecessary adjournments. It was observed at page 798:
“22 Keeping in view the concept of a fair trial, the obligation
of the prosecution, the interest of the community and the
duty of the court, it can irrefragably be stated that the court
cannot be a silent spectator or a mute observer when it
presides over a trial. It is the duty of the court to see that
neither the prosecution nor the accused plays truant with
the criminal trial nor corrodes the sanctity of the
proceeding. They cannot expropriate or hijack the
community interest by conducting themselves in such a
manner as a consequence of which the trial becomes a
farcical one. The law does not countenance a “mock trial”. It
2026:HHC:48611
is a serious concern for society. Every member of the
collective has an inherent interest in such a trial. No one can
be allowed to create a dent in the same. The court is dutybound to see that neither the prosecution nor the defence
takes unnecessary adjournments and takes the trial under
their control. The court is under the legal obligation to see
that the witnesses who have been cited by the prosecution
are produced by it, or if summons are issued, they are
actually served on the witnesses. If the court is of the
opinion that the material witnesses have not been
examined, it should not allow the prosecution to close the
evidence. There can be no doubt that the prosecution may
not examine all the material witnesses, but that does not
necessarily mean that the prosecution can choose not to
examine any witness and convey to the court that it does not
intend to call the witnesses. The Public Prosecutor who
conducts the trial has a statutory duty to perform. He
cannot afford to take things in a light manner. The court is
also not expected to accept the version of the prosecution as
if it were sacred. It has to apply its mind on every occasion.
Non-application of mind by the trial court has the potential
to lead to the paralysis of the conception of a fair trial.”
14.
Therefore, no party can be permitted to drag on the
litigation by taking frequent adjournments.
15.
In the present case, the petitioner has failed to show
any reasonable cause for not producing the evidence and the
learned Trial Court was justified in closing the evidence by the
order of the Court.
16.
The present petition has been filed under Section 528
of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. The
jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 528 of BNSS is
2026:HHC:48611
extraordinary and is to be exercised to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. In the present
case, the circumstances do not justify the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction.
17.
No other point was urged.
18.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
dismissed.
19.
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
04th November, 2026
(Ravinder)
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