The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
16. Since petitioner was dismissed without holding disciplinary inquiry and disciplinary inquiry was dispensed with without valid reason, therefore, the punishment of dismissal, imposed upon petitioner cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The impugned dismissal order and the order passed by the appellate authority are therefore liable to be set aside and are hereby set aside. The writ petition is allowed; petitioner shall be reinstated with continuity of service, however, he shall be entitled to arrears of salary only to the extent of 50%. The Disciplinary Authority shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings afresh and to pass appropriate order, as per law based on the findings returned by enquiry officer. Disciplinary proceedings, however, may be initiated within three months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order before the disciplinary authority. (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) Dt: 15th April, 2026 Navin
Full Judgment Text
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CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:UHC:2653
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI
Writ Petition Service Single No. 2199 of 2022
15TH April, 2026
Jagdish Nath
--Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & others
--Respondents
------------------------------------------------------------------Presence:Mr. Pankaj Goswami and Mr. Deepak Chandra, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. K.N. Joshi, Deputy Advocate General for the State of Uttarakhand.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Petitioner
was
appointed
as
Constable
in
Uttarakhand Police in the year 2012. He was dismissed
from service, vide order dated 24.05.2020, passed by
Senior Superintendent of Police, Udham Singh Nagar.
2.
The dismissal order is on record as Annexure-
2 to the writ petition. Charge against the petitioner was
that he misbehaved with a lady, whose husband was
quarantined
in
Surajmal
Engineering
College,
Pulbhatta, Kichha, during lockdown imposed in view of
Covid-19 Pandemic. It is mentioned in the dismissal
order
that
petitioner
was
subjected
to
medical
examination and he was found under influence of
liquor.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the date of the alleged incident is 24.05.2020 and
the dismissal order was also passed with undue haste,
2026:UHC:2653
the same day without holding any inquiry whatsoever.
He further submitted that petitioner was neither given
notice nor opportunity of hearing while passing the
impugned order and the punishment of dismissal is
therefore violative of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution
of India and also the provisions contained in the U.P.
Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment
and Appeal) Rules, 1991, as applicable in State of
Uttarakhand.
4.
Learned State Counsel submitted that the
dismissal order was passed against the petitioner based
on a report submitted by Circle Officer, Sitarganj, which
is enclosed as Annexure CA-2 to the counter affidavit
filed on behalf of respondent nos. 1 & 2.
5.
Perusal of Annexure CA-2, however, reveals
that Circle Officer was not appointed Inquiry officer and
he
simply
reported
a
incident
to
the
Senior
Superintendent of Police. It further reveals that alleged
incident occurred on 24.05.2020 and the report was
submitted by Circle Officer, Sitarganj on the same day.
The dismissal order was incidentally passed by the
Senior Superintendent of Police Udham Singh Nagar the
same day, i.e. on 24.05.2020.
6.
This Court finds substance in the submission
made by learned counsel for the petitioner that
petitioner was dismissed from service without holding
any inquiry.
7.
Learned State Counsel then contended that
the Disciplinary Authority was justified in invoking the
power available to him under Rule 8 (2) (b) of the U.P.
Police Officers of Subordinate Rank (Punishment and
2026:UHC:2653
Appeal) Rules, 1991, which reads as under:“8. Dismissal and removal-(1)…
(2) No police officer shall be dismissed, removed or
reduced
in
rank
except
after
proper
inquiry
and
disciplinary proceedings as contemplated by these rules:
Provided that this rule shall not apply(b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove
a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for
some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it
is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry.”
8.
This Court is not impressed by the contention
raised by learned State Counsel. Although, Rule 8(2)(b)
of
the
applicable
Rules
enables
the
Disciplinary
Authority to dispense with the disciplinary inquiry in
appropriate cases, however, it cannot be dispensed with
in a routine or casual manner. The power to dispense
with disciplinary inquiry is meant to be used in
exceptional
circumstances,
when
conducting
disciplinary inquiry is not reasonably practicable, such
as
due
to
witness
intimidation,
threats
to
the
disciplinary authority, an atmosphere of violence or
general indiscipline or when the disciplinary authority is
satisfied that holding an inquiry would be prejudicial to
the interest of the security of the State.
9.
To
ensure
that
power
to
dispense
with
disciplinary inquiry is invoked for legally defensible
reason and not arbitrarily, the following conditions have
to be satisfied:- (i) disciplinary authority has to
explicitly record the reasons for dispensing with the
inquiry in the final order; (ii) the decision to dispense
with the disciplinary inquiry must be based on objective
facts e.g. intelligence reports, witness statements etc.
rather than mere suspicion, surmises or speculation;
2026:UHC:2653
(iii) the penalty imposed must not be grossly excessive
or disproportionate to the misconduct; and (iv) courts
can review the decision to ensure that it was not made
malafide or in bad faith or based on irrelevant
considerations.
10.
In the present case, the only reason assigned
for dispensing with disciplinary inquiry is that there is
information/evidence that while on duty in a quarantine
center at Pulbhatta, petitioner misbehaved with a lady,
and it is not reasonably practicable to hold disciplinary
inquiry in the matter. The reason is neither plausible
nor satisfactory and it is a ploy to use the power under
Rule 8 (2) (b) of the applicable Punishment and Appeal
Rules, 1991.
11.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph no. 130
of the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India
v. Tulsi Ram Patel reported as (1985) 3 SCC 398, has
held that a disciplinary authority is not expected to
dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily
or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid
the holding of an inquiry or because the department's
case against the government servant is weak and must
fail. Paragraph no. 134 of the said judgment is
reproduced below:“134. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the
reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the
order imposing the penalty. The reason for dispensing
with the inquiry need not, therefore, find a place in the
final order. It would be usual to record the reason
separately and then consider the question of the penalty
to be imposed and pass the order imposing the penalty. It
would, however, be better to record the reason in the final
order in order to avoid the allegation that the reason was
not recorded in writing before passing the final order but
was subsequently fabricated. The reason for dispensing
with the inquiry need not contain detailed particulars, but
the reason must not be vague or just a repetition of the
language of clause (b) of the second proviso. For
2026:UHC:2653
instance, it would be no compliance with the requirement
of clause (b) for the disciplinary authority simply to state
that he was satisfied that it was not reasonably
practicable to hold any inquiry. Sometimes a situation
may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to give
detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This
would not, however, per se invalidate the order. Each case
must be judged on its own merits and in the light of its
own facts and circumstances.”
12.
There is nothing on record which may justify
invocation of power available under Rule 8 (2) (b) of
the applicable Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1991.
Availability of a power in itself cannot be a valid
justification for use of that power, especially when such
power curtails the legal/ constitutional right available to
a citizen and there must be valid reason for use of such
extraordinary power. The disciplinary authority, in the
present case, has merely reproduced the wordings of
Rule 8(2) (b) and has not indicated any valid reason for
dispensing with the enquiry.
13.
Even otherwise also, here, the disciplinary
authority straightaway came to the conclusion that
enquiry is not practicable, without making any effort for
holding disciplinary inquiry. This is evidenced from the
fact that the dismissal order was passed on the date of
the alleged incident and reason for dispensing with
disciplinary inquiry is mentioned not on the file but only
on the dismissal order. This reveals that the impugned
decision was taken mechanically, without application of
mind to relevant aspects.
14.
Learned counsel for the petitioner is therefore
right in submitting that the disciplinary authority did
not examine the feasibility of holding disciplinary
inquiry and he invoked the power available under Rule
8(2) (b) of the Rules without considering whether
2026:UHC:2653
disciplinary inquiry is practicable in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
15.
In the absence of valid reason for dispensing
with the disciplinary inquiry, the power available under
Rule 8 (2) (b) could not have been invoked by the
Disciplinary Authority.
16.
Since
petitioner
was
dismissed
without
holding disciplinary inquiry and disciplinary inquiry was
dispensed with without valid reason, therefore, the
punishment of dismissal, imposed upon petitioner
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The impugned
dismissal order and the order passed by the appellate
authority are therefore liable to be set aside and are
hereby set aside. The writ petition is allowed; petitioner
shall be reinstated with continuity of service, however,
he shall be entitled to arrears of salary only to the
extent of 50%. The Disciplinary Authority shall be at
liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings afresh and to
pass appropriate order, as per law based on the
findings
returned
by
enquiry
officer.
Disciplinary
proceedings, however, may be initiated within three
months from the date of presentation of certified copy
of this order before the disciplinary authority.
(Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
Dt: 15th April, 2026
Navin
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