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2026:UHC:2269
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition Misc. Single No.2331 of 2020
31 March, 2026
Jagdamba Samiti Evam Sevi Sanstha
--Petitioner
Versus
State Of Uttarakhand and Others
--Respondents
---------------------------------------------------------------------Presence:Mr. Jitendra Chaudhary, learned counsel for petitioner.
Mr. Tarun Lakhera, learned Brief Holder for the State of
Uttarakhand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J. (Oral)
Vide earlier order dated 13.02.2026, it was stated
by learned State Counsel that pursuant to the order dated
09.12.2024 passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court, the
instructions were called from State; however, he submits that
he would go through the instructions dated 11.02.2026. Two
weeks’ time was given to learned State Counsel to go through
the instruction, but still learned State Counsel is not in a
position to submit before this Court as to what were those
instructions.
2.
This matter relates to the permanent blacklisting
of the petitioner.
3.
In view of the aforesaid reasons and since the
matter is listed for final hearing, this Court has left with no
option but to proceed with finally on the merits of the case.
4.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
5.
This writ petition has been filed by petitioner
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assailing the
order dated 07.10.2019 passed by respondent-authorities,
whereby, petitioner has been placed under the category of
blacklisted entities and recovery of certain amounts has also
been directed.
6.
The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present writ
petition
are
that
petitioner
is
a
society
2026:UHC:2269
engaged
in
implementation of developmental schemes. In the year 2005,
respondent department initiated a scheme known as “Indira
Mahila Samekit Vikas Yojana” (IMSVY) with the objective of
promoting self-help groups and facilitating livelihood activities
in hilly regions of the State of Uttarakhand. Pursuant thereto,
petitioner was selected for implementation of the said scheme
in Bhilangana Valley, District Tehri Garhwal, and an
agreement dated 14.09.2005 was executed between the
parties, incorporating terms and conditions governing the
project. In terms of agreement, petitioner undertook various
activities including formation of self-help groups, training,
and facilitation of livelihood initiatives. It is stated that during
the course of implementation, petitioner also undertook
construction of a Collection and Grading Centre at Village
Dopardhar for the benefit of such self-help groups. Petitioner
asserts that the said construction was carried out within
financial parameters of the Scheme. Subsequently, certain
allegations came to be raised regarding irregularities in the
execution of project, particularly in relation to utilization of
an amount of Rs.50,000/-. On the basis of such allegations,
an external monitoring agency, namely Agricultural Finance
Corporation (AFC), conducted an inspection in October 2006
and submitted a report pointing out certain irregularities.
7.
Thereafter, criminal proceedings were initiated
against petitioner by registration of an FIR dated 12.11.2007
u/s 406 and 420 IPC. However, upon investigation, police
submitted a final report dated 22.11.2008 concluding that no
corroborative evidence of misutilization of funds was found
against petitioner. The said final report was accepted by the
competent court vide order dated 27.09.2012, and the
proceedings attained finality. Parallelly, administrative action
was also initiated against petitioner. An order of blacklisting
came to be passed against petitioner in the year 2007 in an
ex-parte manner. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner approached
this Court by filing Writ Petition No.2324 of 2007 (M/S),
2026:UHC:2269
which was allowed and the said order was quashed, with
liberty to respondents to pass a fresh order after affording
opportunity of hearing. Pursuant thereto, a fresh order dated
07.05.2010 was passed by respondent authorities again
placing petitioner under the category of blacklisted entities
and directing recovery. Petitioner challenged the said order by
filing Writ Petition No.1338 of 2010 (M/S), which was also
allowed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment
dated 13.12.2017, whereby, impugned order was set aside,
while granting liberty to respondents to proceed afresh in
accordance with law. Thereafter, respondents proceeded in
the matter and ultimately passed impugned order dated
07.10.2019, again placing petitioner under the category of
blacklisted entities and directing recovery of certain amounts.
It is this order which is under challenge in the present writ
petition.
8.
Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the
impugned order dated 07.10.2019 is wholly arbitrary, illegal
and unsustainable in the eyes of law, inasmuch as the same
is nothing but a mere reiteration of the earlier blacklisting
orders, which have already been set aside by this Court in
earlier rounds of litigation. It is contended that despite clear
directions issued by a Coordinate Bench of this Court while
quashing the previous orders, respondent authorities have
failed to undertake any independent consideration of the
matter and have mechanically reproduced earlier findings,
thereby rendering the impugned order vitiated on account of
non-application of mind.
9.
He further submits that very foundation of the
impugned action, namely the alleged misutilization of an
amount of Rs.50,000/-, is factually incorrect and wholly
misconceived. Elaborating upon the same, he contends that
petitioner had undertaken two distinct constructions under
two separate funding sources-one, the construction of a
Collection and Grading Centre at Village Dopardhar under the
2026:UHC:2269
IMSVY Scheme, and the other, construction of a school roof
at Village Laini from funds received from the Canadian High
Commission. It is thus urged that there has been no diversion
or misutilization of funds, and the allegation forming the
basis of blacklisting is demonstrably false.
10.
He further contends that even the Canadian High
Commission, which had released funds for the separate
project, has categorically stated that it has no complaint
whatsoever
regarding
utilization
of
the
funds
by
the
petitioner. In such circumstances, it is argued that the
respondent authorities could not have formed any adverse
opinion alleging financial impropriety, particularly when the
funding agency itself has expressed complete satisfaction. It
is also contended that the same set of allegations had earlier
formed the basis of criminal proceedings initiated against
petitioner by way of FIR dated 12.11.2007 u/s 406 and 420
IPC. However, after due investigation, police submitted a final
report dated 22.11.2008 concluding that no evidence of
misutilization of funds was found. The said final report was
accepted by competent criminal court vide order dated
27.09.2012 and has attained finality. He also submits that
once the competent criminal court has accepted the closure
report on identical allegations, it is not open for the
respondents to proceed on the same set of facts and impose
the drastic consequence of blacklisting, in absence of any
independent material.
11.
It is further contended by learned counsel for the
petitioner that the impugned order records findings which are
ex facie perverse and contrary to the material on record,
inasmuch
as
despite
the
criminal
favour
of
petitioner,
culminated
in
erroneously
referred
to
existence
proceedings
of
having
respondents
evidence
have
against
petitioner, thereby indicating non-application of mind. It is
contended that even otherwise, the action of blacklisting is
wholly disproportionate, as any alleged discrepancy pertained
2026:UHC:2269
to a limited amount and could at best warrant recovery, and
not the extreme penalty of blacklisting. It is lastly submitted
that the impugned order appears to have been passed in
haste, without genuine reconsideration of the matter.
12.
order
Learned State Counsel submits that impugned
dated
07.10.2019
has
been
passed
strictly
in
accordance with law and in compliance with the liberty
granted by this Court in earlier rounds of litigation. It is
contended that respondents were well within their right to
reconsider the matter and pass a fresh order after examining
the material on record, and merely because earlier orders
were set aside, it does not preclude the State from taking
appropriate action where irregularities are found in execution
of a government scheme.
13.
He further submits that petitioner was entrusted
with implementation of a public welfare scheme involving
utilization of government funds, and therefore, was under a
strict
obligation
to
ensure
transparency
and
proper
accounting. Learned State counsel contends that the report
submitted by monitoring agency pointed out irregularities in
execution of project, including issues relating to utilization of
funds, and the same constituted sufficient basis for initiating
action against petitioner.
14.
It is argued by learned State Counsel that the
scope of administrative action is distinct from criminal
proceedings, and mere acceptance of a final report in a
criminal
case
does
not
bar
the
State
from
taking
departmental or administrative action based on available
material. Learned State Counsel further argued that adequate
opportunity of hearing was afforded to petitioner, and replies
submitted by petitioner were duly considered before passing
the impugned order. It is contended that the explanation
furnished by petitioner was found unsatisfactory in light of
the material available on record, and the competent authority,
upon due consideration, arrived at a conscious decision to
2026:UHC:2269
blacklist petitioner. It is thus urged that no interference is
called for in exercise of writ jurisdiction, as the impugned
order
does
not
suffer
from
any
illegality
warranting
interference by this Court.
15.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
having perused the entire material available on record, this
Court finds that controversy in the present case lies within a
narrow compass, namely, whether impugned order dated
07.10.2019 satisfies requirement of a fresh and independent
consideration in terms of the liberty granted by Coordinate
Bench of this Court in earlier rounds of litigation. At the
outset, it is not in dispute that earlier orders of blacklisting
passed against petitioner had been set aside by this Court,
lastly vide judgment dated 13.12.2017, while granting liberty
to respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law.
Such liberty, in the considered view of this Court, necessarily
obligated respondents to undertake an independent and
objective
evaluation
of
the
material
on
record,
duly
considering the explanation furnished by petitioner. However,
from a perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the
findings recorded therein substantially reiterate conclusions
drawn in earlier proceedings, without demonstrating any
fresh application of mind. The impugned action, therefore,
bears the imprint of a mechanical exercise rather than a
genuine reconsideration, which cannot be sustained in law.
16.
This Court further finds that the foundational
allegation against petitioner pertains to alleged misutilization
of a sum of Rs.50,000/-. In this regard, it is an admitted
position that criminal proceedings were initiated on identical
allegations, which culminated in submission of a final report
by the investigating agency, concluding absence of any
corroborative evidence against petitioner. The said report was
accepted by competent criminal court vide order dated
27.09.2012 and has attained finality. While it is true that the
standard of proof in criminal proceedings differs from that
applicable
in
administrative
action,
2026:UHC:2269
respondents
were
nevertheless required to demonstrate some independent
material justifying the conclusion of misconduct. In absence
of any such material, and particularly in the face of closure of
criminal proceedings on the same set of facts, adverse
findings recorded in impugned order cannot be said to rest on
a sound evidentiary basis.
17.
It is also of significance that the allegation of
diversion of funds from the Canadian High Commission has
not been substantiated by any cogent material. On the
contrary, record indicates that the said funding agency itself
has expressed no grievance with regard to utilization of the
funds released to petitioner. This aspect, which goes to the
root of matter, has not been meaningfully dealt with in the
impugned order, thereby rendering decision-making process
deficient.
18.
Equally, this Court finds merit in the submission
of learned counsel of petitioner that the replies furnished
pursuant to earlier directions of this Court have not been
duly considered. The impugned order merely records that the
replies were found unsatisfactory, without adverting to the
specific explanations offered by petitioner, particularly with
regard to separate utilization of funds and the outcome of
criminal proceedings. Such a cursory treatment of petitioner’s
response falls short of the requirement of a reasoned decision
and is indicative of non-application of mind. In this context, it
would be apposite to refer to the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief
General Manager, W.T. Project, BSNL, (2014) 4 SCC 731,
wherein, it has been held that every action of the State must
be informed by reason and is subject to judicial review on the
touchstone of fairness, non-arbitrariness and adherence to
principles of natural justice. The impugned order, viewed in
light of the aforesaid principle, clearly fails to meet the said
standard.
19.
2026:UHC:2269
Further, even assuming that some discrepancy
could be attributed to petitioner, action of blacklisting, which
entails serious civil consequences and affects petitioner’s
right to participate in future engagements, appears to be
disproportionate to the nature of allegations. The impugned
order does not reflect any consideration of proportionality,
which is an essential facet of administrative decision-making.
20.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the impugned order dated
07.10.2019 suffers from non-application of mind, is based on
unsubstantiated findings, and has been passed without due
consideration
of
the
petitioner’s
explanation.
The
very
foundation of action being unsustainable, order cannot be
upheld even to a limited extent.
21.
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The
impugned order dated 07.10.2019 passed by the respondent
authorities is hereby set aside.
(Pankaj Purohit, J.)
31.03.2026
PN
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