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2026:UHC:322-DB
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition Misc. Bench No. 1136 of 2025
08 January, 2026
J.K. Enterprises & another.
--Petitioners
Versus
State of Uttarakhand and Others
--Respondents
-------------------------------------------------------------Presence:Mr. D.S. Patni, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Dharmendra Barthwal,
Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Pooja Banga, Brief Holder for the State of Uttarakhand/ respondent no. 1.
Mr. Lalit Miglani, Advocate for respondent nos. 2 to 4.
-------------------------------------------------------------Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
Hon’ble Subhash Upadhyay, J.
(Per: Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
JUDGMENT
Petitioner submitted bid pursuant to e-tender
notice issued by Nagar Nigam, Haridwar for supply of
manpower. According to him, rates quoted by him were
the lowest, yet contract was not awarded to him and
the tender process was cancelled and another tender
notice was issued by Nagar Nigam on 15.12.2025.
Thus, feeling aggrieved, petitioner has approached this
Court, seeking the following reliefs:“i)
Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
certiorari quashing the cancellation of e-tender
for Manpower supply (by Outsourcing) at Nagar
Nigam Haridwar vide impugned order dated
15-12-2025 issued by respondent no. 4
(contained Annexure no. 5 to this writ petition)
and this Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to
quash and set aside the re-tender of the said
tender vide re-tender notice dated 15-12-2025
(Annexure no. 6 to this Writ Petition).
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ii)
2.
Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus commanding the respondent no. 3
and 4 to forthwith execute the contract bond in
respect of the earlier Tender [viz. e-tender
dated 18.09.2025 for Manpower supply (by
Outsourcing) at Nagar Nigam Haridwar], in
which petitioner is the L-1.”
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
submits that since petitioner met all conditions of
eligibility and the rates quoted by him for supply of
manpower were found to be the lowest, therefore,
petitioner was entitled for award of contract, however,
the tender process initiated vide e-tender notice issued
on 18.9.2025, was arbitrarily cancelled by the Municipal
Commissioner, which has resulted in denial of his
vested right to the petitioner.
3.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
thus submits that the order dated 15.12.2025, whereby
the earlier tender process was cancelled is liable to be
set aside and the re-tender notice dated 15.12.2025,
issued by Municipal Corporation also deserves to be set
aside.
4.
From the submission made by learned senior
counsel for the petitioner, it is apparent that petitioner
is trying to capitalise on the fact that rates quoted by
him in his bid were found to be the lowest. The
contention raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be
accepted.
A
notice
inviting
tender
is
merely
an
invitation to offer. A bidder, who submits bid in
response to a notice inviting tender, issued by State or
an
instrumentality
of
State,
has
a
right
to
be
considered fairly and objectively in accordance with the
norms laid down by the authority, which invited
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tenders. A lowest bidder does not have vested right to
award of contract. The authority, which invites bids, is
entitled to determine as to whether the tender inquiry
should be proceeded to its logical conclusion by award
of contract or whether there are circumstances, which
would justify cancelling the tender process and inviting
fresh tenders. A tender inquiry, which is floated by
State or an instrumentality of the State, is an invitation
to offer and the bid submitted pursuant thereto is an
offer. The offer will not result into a binding contract,
till the time it is accepted.
5.
The bid submitted by petitioner in response
to the e-tender notice dated 18.9.2025 was an offer,
which would have resulted in a binding contract, only
after acceptance by the competent authority. The offer
made by petitioner was never accepted. A bidder, who
participates in the tender process, has no other right
except a right to equality and fair treatment in the
evaluation of competitive bids. The authority inviting
bids is not bound to accept the lowest bid, in case of
construction
of
road/building
etc.
or
supply
of
machines/goods, or the highest bid where the tender is
for generating revenue for the authority. A bidder
cannot insist that the authority inviting bids must
necessarily accept the lowest bid.
6.
Undoubtedly, State or an instrumentality of
State is governed by requirement of Article 14 of the
Constitution and cannot act for extraneous reasons or
motivated by arbitrariness or favouritism. However, a
public authority in public interest can decide when to
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cancel the tender process and the lowest bidder cannot
successfully challenge the decision taken by the public
authority, unless he proves that it is malafide, aimed at
causing harm to the lowest bidder or to confer undue
favour to some rival bidder. There is no averment in
the writ petition regarding malice. The authority, which
took the impugned decision, is also not before this
Court in personal capacity. Thus, the decision to cancel
the tender process cannot be interfered with.
7.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Meerut
Development Authority v. Association of Management
Studies and another, reported as (2009) 6 SCC 171,
has made the following observation regarding the
rights of a bidder who participates in the tender
process:“26. A tender is an offer. It is something which
invites and is communicated to notify acceptance.
Broadly stated it must be unconditional; must be in
the proper form, the person by whom tender is made
must be able to and willing to perform his
obligations. The terms of the invitation to tender
cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the
invitation to tender is in the realm of contract.
However, a limited judicial review may be available
in cases where it is established that the terms of the
invitation to tender were so tailor-made to suit the
convenience of any particular person with a view to
eliminate all others from participating in the bidding
process.
27. The bidders participating in the tender
process have no other right except the right to
equality and fair treatment in the matter of
evaluation of competitive bids offered by interested
persons in response to notice inviting tenders in a
transparent manner and free from hidden agenda.
One cannot challenge the terms and conditions of the
tender except on the abovestated ground, the reason
being the terms of the invitation to tender are in the
realm of the contract. No bidder is entitled as a
matter of right to insist the authority inviting tenders
to enter into further negotiations unless the terms
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and conditions of
negotiations.
notice
so
provided for
such
28. It is so well settled in law and needs no
restatement at our hands that disposal of the public
property by the State or its instrumentalities
partakes the character of a trust. The methods to be
adopted for disposal of public property must be fair
and transparent providing an opportunity to all the
interested persons to participate in the process.
29. The Authority has the right not to accept
the highest bid and even to prefer a tender other
than the highest bidder, if there exist good and
sufficient reasons, such as, the highest bid not
representing the market price but there cannot be
any doubt that the Authority's action in accepting or
refusing the bid must be free from arbitrariness or
favouritism.
(emphasis supplied)”
8.
Learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation
submits that under the applicable Rules, Municipal
Commissioner is entitled to cancel all or any of the
bids, received pursuant to a tender notice. He submits
that in the tender notice dated 18.9.2025 itself, there
was a stipulation that the competent authority can
reject all or any of the bids, without assigning any
reason. He further submits that merely because the
rates quoted by the bidder are found to be the lowest
will not create any right in his favour, and the offer
made by a bidder do not turn into a binding contract till
its acceptance by the competent authority.
9.
He points out that pursuant to tender notice
dated 18.9.2025, eight bids were received, out of which
one was found to be technically non-responsive. He
submits that out of remaining seven bidders, who were
found eligible, as many as six quoted the same rates.
Thus, he submits that the bidders appear to have
formed a cartel to defraud the public exchequer, as
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such the competent authority was justified in exercising
power available to him, by cancelling the tender
process. He submits that pursuant to the tender notice
issued subsequently, 196 bids were received, however,
because of the interim order passed in this writ
petition, bids could not be opened.
10.
In view of the legal position, as discussed
above, petitioner does not have any indefeasible right
to award of contract. The competent authority has
exercised the power available to him, by cancelling the
tender process initiated on 18.9.2025. Explanation
offered by learned counsel appearing for Municipal
Corporation, for the decision taken by the competent
authority, cannot be faulted. The authority inviting
bids, if has reasons to believe that the bidders have
formed a cartel to defraud public exchequer, then the
authority inviting bids is justified in cancelling the
tender process. The purpose of inviting bids is lost if
bidders form cartel, therefore, the decision to cancel
the earlier tender process by the competent authority
cannot be said to be arbitrary or actuated by malice.
11.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner then submitted that the conditions mentioned
in clause nos. 34, 35 & 36 of the re-tender notice
issued on 15.12.2025 are unsustainable. As per clause
34 of the re-tender notice, a bidder would be eligible
for participating in the tender process, only if in the last
three
years
contracts
for
he
has
supply
successfully
of
executed
manpower
to
three
Municipal
Corporation/Development Authority and value of each
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such contract is minimum `5 crores. Clause no. 35 of
the re-tender notice requires every bidder to submit a
No Dues Certificate from GST authorities that he has no
pending dues till October, 2025. Clause 36 requires the
bidder to submit ECR challans for Employees Provident
Fund and Employees State Insurance Corporation in
respect of minimum 2000 employees for the last three
months.
12.
Learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation
points out that upon award of contract, successful
bidder would be required to supply manpower to the
extent of not less than 2000 for maintaining sanitation,
hygiene
Municipal
and
other
services
Corporation,
within
therefore,
the
the
limits
of
condition
of
executing three contracts during last three years of the
value of `5 crores each, cannot be said to be
unreasonable. He submits that the said condition is
necessary to ensure that bidders with sufficient means
and experience alone participate in the tender process
and
inexperienced
bidders,
who
cannot
provide
manpower to the extent required, are not able to
vitiate the bidding process.
13.
Learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation
submits that condition no. 35 regarding No Dues
Certificate from GST authorities also cannot be faulted,
as a bidder who has defaulted in payment of Goods and
Service Tax, thereby violated relevant tax laws cannot
be permitted to participate in the bidding process. He
submits that Clause 35 has been added in deference to
the relevant tax legislation. He submits that similarly
2026:UHC:322-DB
clause 36 of the re-tender notice, which requires every
bidder to submit ECR challans for 2000 personnel for
Employees
Provident
Fund
and
Employees
State
Insurance Corporation for the past three months is
meant to ensure that the applicable labour welfare
legislations are duly complied with by the persons to
whom contract may be awarded by the Nagar Nigam.
Thus, he submits that condition mentioned in the
clause 36 also cannot be faulted.
14.
This Count finds substance in the submission
made by learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Directorate of
Education & others Vs. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. &
others reported as (2004) 4 SCC 19 has held that
terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial
scrutiny, as the same are in the realm of contract. Para
12 of the said judgment is reproduced below:“12. It has clearly been held in these decisions
that the terms of the invitation to tender are not
open to judicial scrutiny, the same being in the realm
of contract. That the Government must have a free
hand in setting the terms of the tender. It must have
reasonable play in its joints as a necessary
concomitant for an administrative body in an
administrative sphere. The courts would interfere
with the administrative policy decision only if it is
arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by
bias. It is entitled to pragmatic adjustments which
may be called for by the particular circumstances.
The courts cannot strike down the terms of the
tender prescribed by the Government because it
feels that some other terms in the tender would have
been fair, wiser or logical. The courts can interfere
only if the policy decision is arbitrary, discriminatory
or mala fide.”
15.
In the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka, reported as (2012) 8 SCC 216,
Hon’ble Supreme Court summarised the law regarding
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Government contracts in paragraph nos. 23, 24 & 35 of
the judgment, which are extracted below:23. From the above decisions, the following
principles emerge:
(a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness
in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in
essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play.
These actions are amenable to the judicial review
only to the extent that the State must act validly for
a discernible reason and not whimsically for any
ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds
of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into
consideration the national priorities;
(b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely
within the purview of the executive and the courts
hardly have any role to play in this process except
for striking down such action of the executive as is
proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the
Government acts in conformity with certain healthy
standards and norms such as awarding of contracts
by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the
interference by courts is very limited;
(c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a
tender document and awarding a contract, greater
latitude is required to be conceded to the State
authorities unless the action of the tendering
authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its
statutory powers, interference by courts is not
warranted;
(d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for
tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the
contractor has the capacity and the resources to
successfully execute the work; and
(e) If the State or its instrumentalities act
reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding
contract, here again, interference by court is very
restrictive since no person can claim a fundamental
right to carry on business with the Government.
24. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender
or contractual matters, in exercise of power of
judicial review, should pose to itself the following
questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made
by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour
someone; or whether the process adopted or
decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the
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court can say: “the decision is such that no
responsible authority acting reasonably and in
accordance with relevant law could have reached”?
and
(ii) Whether the public interest is affected?
If the answers to the above questions are in the
negative, then there should be no interference under
Article 226.
35. As observed earlier, the Court would not
normally interfere with the policy decision and in
matters challenging the award of contract by the
State or public authorities. In view of the above, the
appellant has failed to establish that the same was
contrary to public interest and beyond the pale of
discrimination or unreasonable. We are satisfied that
to have the best of the equipment for the vehicles,
which ply on road carrying passengers, the 2nd
respondent thought it fit that the criteria for applying
for tender for procuring tyres should be at a high
standard and thought it fit that only those
manufacturers who satisfy the eligibility criteria
should be permitted to participate in the tender. As
noted in various decisions, the Government and their
undertakings must have a free hand in setting terms
of the tender and only if it is arbitrary,
discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias, the
courts would interfere. The courts cannot interfere
with the terms of the tender prescribed by the
Government because it feels that some other terms
in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical.
In the case on hand, we have already noted that
taking into account various aspects including the
safety of the passengers and public interest, CMG
consisting of experienced persons, revised the tender
conditions. We are satisfied that the said Committee
had discussed the subject in detail and for specifying
these two conditions regarding pre-qualification
criteria and the evaluation criteria. On perusal of all
the materials, we are satisfied that the impugned
conditions do not, in any way, could be classified as
arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide.”
16.
In view of the settled law on the point,
challenge thrown by the petitioner to conditions in the
tender notice cannot be entertained. The conditions
cannot be said to be tailor made to suit some rival
bidder. Since every bidder would have to meet the
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requirement of those conditions, therefore, there is no
scope for interference.
17.
Learned counsel for Municipal Corporation
points out that in the relief clause of the writ petition,
petitioner has not thrown challenge to any of the
conditions mentioned in the re-tender notice. In such
view of the matter also, there is no scope for
interference with the conditions mentioned in the
clause nos. 34, 35 & 36 of the re-tender notice. The
writ petition thus fails and is dismissed.
(Subhash Upadhyay, J.)
Navin
NAVEEN
CHANDRA
(Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
08.01.2026
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH
COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=3be23325146e76a0642bdf4943fb9046f487df00
6da82a131bb4e4403d3c0a15, postalCode=263001,
st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=18167EEFB5CA8CFFD421A103819DA8756
43AF56D653D095C6ED9A86DAAB21CE5, cn=NAVEEN
CHANDRA
Date: 2026.01.15 16:45:26 +05'30'
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