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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: August 20th, 2026
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CNR No. DLHC010709232005
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W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & CM APPL. 3927/2005
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INST.OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR & ALLI .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Tushar Sannu and Mr.
Parvin Bansal, Advs.
versus
RAMESHWAR & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Hanu Bhaskar and Ms.
Anmol Bhaskar, Advs.
Mr. Abhinav Singh and Ms.
Pearl Khurana, Advs. for
GNCTD.
CNR No. DLHC010667882005
+
W.P.(C) 18083/2005 & CM APPL. 11696/2005
INSTITUTE OF HUMAN BEHAVIROUR .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Tushar Sannu and Mr.
Parvin Bansal, Advs.
versus
RAVINDER KUMAR SARASWATI & ANR.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Hanu Bhaskar and Ms.
Anmol Bhaskar, Advs.
Mr. Abhinav Singh and Ms.
Pearl Khurana, Advs. for
GNCTD.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
1.
The present petitions are filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India assailing awards dated 02.09.2004 passed by the
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W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
learned Labour Court in I.D. No. 37/1998 and 38/1998 whereby the
workmen were awarded reinstatement with continuity of services
alongwith full back wages.
2.
Briefly stated, the respondent workman in W.P.(C)18083/2005,
was engaged as a peon, by the petitioner, by virtue of office order
dated 22.05.1995 for a period of 89 days. After the expiry of the
aforesaid period, the workman was once again appointed to the said
post for a period of 89 days vide letter dated 16.08.1995. The same
pattern was subsequently followed repeatedly by the petitioner till
22.02.1997 with the following letters:
i.
Letter dated 23.11.1995 (from 22.11.1995 to 18.02.1996),
ii.
Letter dated 23.02.1996 (from 21.02.1996 to 20.05.1996),
iii.
Letter dated 16.05.1996 (from 23.05.1996 to 19.08.1996),
iv.
Letter dated 27.08.1996 (from 24.08.1996 to 20.11.1996) and
v.
Letter dated 28.11.1996 (from 26.11.1996 to 22.02.1997)
3.
Similarly, the respondent workman in W.P.(C) 5362/2005 was
engaged as a peon vide office order dated 27.09.1994 for a period of
89 days. Thereafter, the workman was similarly issued different
appointment letters for 89 days till 21.12.1996. The letters issued to
the said workman are as follows:
i.
Letter dated 28.12.1994 (w.e.f 19.12.1994 for 89 days)
ii.
Letter dated 16.3.1995 (for the period w.e.f. 22.3.1995),
iii.
Letter dated 14.09.1995 (for the period w.e.f. 22.9.1995 to
19.12.1995),
iv.
Letter dated 28.12.1995 (for the period w.e.f. 23.12.1995 to
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W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
20.3.1996),
v.
Letter dated 20.03.1996 (for the period w.e.f. 23.03.1996 to
19.06.1996),
vi.
Letter dated 27.06.1996 (for the period w.e.f. 23.06.1996 to
19.9.1996) and
vii.
Letter dated 25.09.1996 (for the period w.e.f. 24.09.1996 to
21.12.1996).
4.
It is alleged that when the workmen reported for duty after the
expiry of the period of engagement in their last appointment letter,
they were not allowed to resume duty. Thereafter, the workmen issued
demand notices to the petitioner alleging that they had been working
continuously with the petitioner for a period of two years before being
terminated without following the procedure under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (‘I.D. Act’). Conciliation proceedings were held,
which did not yield any result and thereafter, references were made to
the learned Labour Court in each of the workmen’s cases.
5.
The learned Labour Court observed that the petitioners had
terminated the services of the workmen without following the
procedure established under Section 25F of the I.D. Act. Thus, the
learned Labour Court awarded reinstatement with continuity of
services alongwith full back wages to the workmen.
6.
Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been filed.
7.
The workman in W.P(C) 5362/2005 expired during the
pendency of the present petition and LRs of the workman were
impleaded vide order dated 21.03.2011.
8.
The learned counsel of the petitioner submits that the workmen
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W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
were engaged as daily wagers for a fixed period for 89 days and their
services were, thereafter, taken from time to time as per the
requirement. He submits that the workmen were only terminated
pursuant to expiry of the said period and would thus fall under the
exception contained under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act.
9.
He submits that since the termination of the workmen would
fall under the exception contained under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID
Act, the petitioner did not have to follow the procedure prescribed
under Section 25F of the ID Act before terminating the workmen.
10.
He further submits that the workmen did not complete 240 days
of continuous service in a year with the management since there were
multiple breaks between different appointment letters issued to each
of the workmen.
11.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently
opposes the present petition. He submits that no grounds have been
raised by the petitioner to warrant interference of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
12.
I have heard the arguments and perused the record.
13.
At the outset, it is necessary to note that the scope of
interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
with an Award passed by the Labour Court is limited. Interference is
warranted only where the Award suffers from patent illegality,
perversity or an error apparent on the face of the record. The present
Petition does not invite this Court to re-appreciate the evidence or
disturb findings of fact but is confined to examining the legality and
propriety of the relief granted by the Labour Court.
Signed By:DEEPANSHU
20:41:22
W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
14.
Though it has been contended by the petitioner that the
employment of the workmen in the present case was purely
contractual and the same would fall within the exception contained
under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act, the said contention is
untenable.
15.
Under Section 2(oo) of the ID Act, retrenchment has been
defined to mean as under:
““retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the
service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as
a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not
include—
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of
superannuation if the contract of employment between the
employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in
that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the
non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer
and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract
being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained
therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of
continued ill-health”
16.
It is well settled that where the management pleads that the
exception contained under Section 2 (oo)(bb) of the ID Act is attracted
in a particular case, the burden of proof to establish the same would be
upon the management. Further, the management would have to prove
that the workmen had been appointed for a specified work which is of
a temporary nature and only required for a specified period. Reliance
in this regard is placed upon the judgment in S.M Nilajkar v. Telecom
District Manager : (2003) 4 SCC 27 where the Hon’ble Apex Court
observed as under:
13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme
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W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of
sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:
(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of
temporary duration;
(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager
simpliciter, which provided inter alia that the employment shall
come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project;
(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the
termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the
terms of the contract; and
(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of
the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of
employment.
14. The engagement of a workman as a daily-wager does not by
itself amount to putting the workman on notice that he was being
engaged in a scheme or project which was to last only for a
particular length of time or up to the occurrence of some event,
and therefore, the workman ought to know that his employment
was short-lived. The contract of employment consciously entered
into by the workman with the employer would result in a notice to
the workman on the date of the commencement of the employment
itself that his employment was short-lived and as per the terms of
the contract the same was liable to termination on the expiry of the
contract and the scheme or project coming to an end. The
workman may not therefore complain that by the act of the
employer his employment was coming to an abrupt termination. To
exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the
definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the
abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of subclause (bb) abovesaid. In the case at hand, the respondent
employer has failed in alleging and proving the ingredients of subclause (bb), as stated hereinabove. All that has been proved is that
the appellants were engaged as casual workers or daily-wagers in
a project. For want of proof attracting applicability of sub-clause
(bb), it has to be held that the termination of the services of the
appellants amounted to retrenchment.
17.
In the opinion of this Court, the learned Labour Court rightly
reached the conclusion that the petitioner had not been able to prove
that the employment of the workmen was for work which was of
temporary nature and only required for a specified period, so as to fall
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W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
within the definition of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act.
18.
It is pertinent to note that in the present case, the workmen were
engaged to work as Peons with the petitioner, such work undisputedly
cannot be termed to be one of temporary or irregular nature which is
only required for a specified period. Further, it is relevant to note that
the services of the workmen were extended from time to time through
various appointment letters with only intermittent breaks of a few
days. The repeated extensions of the workmen’s employment itself
establishes that the work for which they were engaged was not only
required for a specific period.
19.
Further, the petitioner repeatedly engaged the workmen,
through various appointment letters, for 89 days, with intermittent
breaks of a few days for a period of 2 years. The learned Labour Court
rightly observed that engagement of the workmen was continued for a
continuous period of almost two years and intermittent breaks were
imposed in between by the petitioner in colourful exercise of its power
of appointment, merely to try and portray that engagement of the
workmen was not continuous.
20.
Thus, the contention of the petitioner that the workmen did not
complete 240 days of continuous service on account of the breaks
between their appointment letters also holds no water.
21.
In view of the above, the findings of the learned Labour Court
with regard the illegal termination of the workmen are well reasoned
and do not warrant interference of this Court.
22.
However, be that as it may, this Court cannot lose sight of the
fact that mere finding of wrongful termination/discontinuation does
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W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
not by itself grant a right of reinstatement or back wages to the
aggrieved employee.
23.
It is trite law that a finding of illegality in termination does not,
by itself, mandate reinstatement in every case. The Hon’ble Apex
Court has repeatedly held that reinstatement is not an automatic or
mechanical consequence of an order of termination being held illegal
and that the relief must be moulded having regard to the nature of
employment, length of service and the surrounding circumstances of
the case. In Allahabad Bank v. Krishan Pal Singh : (2021) 19 SCC
227, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that reinstatement with full
back wages is not automatic in every case where termination or
dismissal is found to be not in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under law and that the relief can be moulded depending
upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The relevant extract of
the same is reproduced hereinbelow:
“8. The directions issued by the High Court of Allahabad for
reinstatement were stayed by this Court on 23-8-2019 [Allahabad
Bank v. Krishan Pal Singh, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2061] . During
the pendency of these proceedings, the respondent workman had
attained age of superannuation. Though, there was strong
suspicion, there was no acceptable evidence on record for
dismissal of the workman. However, as the workman has worked
only for a period of about six years and he has already attained the
age of superannuation, it is a fit case for modification of the relief
granted by the High Court. The reinstatement with full back wages
is not automatic in every case, where termination/dismissal is
found to be not in accordance with procedure prescribed under
law. Considering that the respondent was in effective service of the
Bank only for about six years and he is out of service since 1991,
and in the meantime, respondent had attained age of
superannuation, we deem it appropriate that ends of justice would
be met by awarding lump sum monetary compensation. We
accordingly direct payment of lump sum compensation of Rs 15
lakhs to the respondent, within a period of eight weeks from today.
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W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
Failing to pay the same within the aforesaid period, the respondent
is entitled for interest @ 6% p.a., till payment.”
24.
Hence, it is well crystallised that where the facts so warrant, the
Court is empowered to award monetary compensation in lieu of
reinstatement, in such cases where reinstatement is not feasible, and
where such relief of compensation would better serve the ends of
justice.
25.
This Court though upholds the finding of the learned Tribunal
that the termination of services, of the workmen, was illegal, however,
it remains undisputed that the respondent workmen only worked for
about two years between 1994 to 1997 and almost three decades have
elapsed thereafter.
26.
Therefore, the ends of justice would be served if the award of
lumpsum compensation of ₹3,00,000/- each is given to the workmen
(workman in W.P.(C) 18083/2005 and LRs of the workman in
W.P.(C) 5362/2005). The compensation shall be paid within a period
of eight weeks, failing which the petitioner shall be liable to pay penal
interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
27.
The workmen shall not be entitled to any other amount in the
form of compensation / allowance.
28.
The impugned orders are modified and the present petitions are
disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
29.
Pending applications also stand disposed of.
30.
A copy of this order be placed in both the matters.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
AUGUST 20, 2026/‘KDK’
Signed By:DEEPANSHU
20:41:22
W.P.(C) 5362/2005 & W.P.(C) 18083/2005
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