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Serial No. 01-07
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
FA No. 1 of 2022 with
CRAPPL No. 1 of 2023
FA No. 1 of 2023
FA No. 2 of 2023
FA No. 3 of 2023
FA No. 4 of 2023
FA No. 5 of 2023
Date of Decision: 07.02.2025
FA No. 1 of 2022
Collector, Ri Bhoi District, Nongpoh
:::Appellant
-Vs1.Shri. Armstrong Syiem
S/o (L) D. Kharkongor
2.Smti. Marvellous Syiem
D/o Smti. Apraianti Giri Syiem
3.Shri. Bro Lyngdoh
S/o (L) Kiar Swer
4.(Late) Herland Lyngdoh
Substituted by Smti. Riona Shabong
5.Shri. Aibiroi Lamare
S/o (L) Shri. Wel Nengnong
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 6 of 2022)
6.Shri. Thrimson Marbaniang
S/o (L) Kidon Kharryngi
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 5 of 2022)
7.Smti. Wandahun Mawrie
D/o (L) Smti. Kshiar Mawrie
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 16 of 2022)
8.Smti. Ilinda Mawrie
D/o D. Wankhar
9.Shri. Dra Lapang
S/o (L) Phili Malai
10.Shri. Mawshantieh A. Blah
S/o Shri. Dio Sing Lyngdoh
11.Smti. Twailinda Lyngdoh
D/o L. Kharthangmaw
12.Smti. Brossful Lyngdoh
D/o Justman Makri
13.Smti. Piantimontado
D/o (L) Phil Mangu
14.Smti. Annebolyne Dohtdong
Grand-daughter of (L) Smti. Soridian
Dohtdong
(Substituted vide Court’s order dated
13/10/2022 passed in MC(FA) No. 14 of 2022)
15.Smti. Apphira Lyngdoh
D/o Small Junde Nengnong
16.Smti. Phliewris Nongphud
D/o (L) Sana Syiem
17.Smti. Successful Nongphud
D/o Rolsing Marngar
18.Smti. Santimon Sohsten
D/o (L) Smti. Lina Sohsten
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 11 of 2022)
19.Smti. Larita Lyngdoh
D/o Hainmanik Kharjana
20.Smti. Elma Nongrum
D/o Swip Sohasten
21.Smti. Lidia Kurbah
D/o (L) Jrim Jana
22.Smti. Darihun Lapang
D/o Adhikari Sharma
23.Shri. Kyrshanbor Donshiew
S/o Watson Nongtrai
24.Smti. Niwan Roy Pale
D/o K. Lamare
25.Marvellous Carol Nengnong
D/o (L) Smti. Thenis Sinola Nengnong
(Substituted vide Court’s order dated
13/10/2022 passed in MC(FA) No. 17 of 2022)
26.Smti. Meranisha Sten
D/o (L) Smti. Shantimai Sohsten
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 10 of 2022)
27.Shri. Bresson Mukhim
S/o (L) Phet Suting
28.Smti. Evaniarlyne Giri Massar
Sister of (L) Shri. Kyntiew Massar
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 8 of 2022)
29.Smti. Merilian Kharhunai
D/o (L) Jwin Malyngiang
30.Smti. Easther Syiem
D/o (L) Bliantimai Syiem
31.Smti. Trasibon Kharkongor
D/o (L) Smti. Skerina Kharkongor
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 19 of 2022)
32.Smti. Phlassibon Kharkongor
D/o (L) Jwet Pyngrope
33.Smti. Evangeline S. Sutnga
D/o (L) R. Lyngdoh Mawlong
34. Smti. Sibonty Markhap
D/o J.N. Kalita
35.Smti. Steid Dkhar
D/o (L) Kmier Sing Nengnong
36.(Late) Susan M. Wahlang
Substituted by Smti. Rhoda Angela Wahlang
37.Shri. O. Kharpran
S/o (L) R. Kharpran
38.Shri. W. Thangkhiew
S/o (L) M. Nongtathiang
39.Shri. Phlanroy Kharthangmaw
S/o (L) Arbat Kurbah
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 17/11/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 25 of 2022)
40.Smti. Airihun Nongrum
D/o (L) Bren Mawthoh
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 10/05/2023 passed in
MC(FA) No. 11 of 2023)
41.Shri. Peaceful Ramshon
S/o (L) Smti. Plin Ramshon
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 18 of 2022)
42.Smti. Endris Shadap
D/o Let Shylla
43.Smti. Green Mukhim
D/o (L) Manasing Mawthoh
44.Smti. Dam Shadap
D/o (L) Wibarson Lapang
45.(Late) B.K. Jyrwa
Substituted by Smti. Sirbina Jyrwa
46. Smti. Julestinora Lyngdoh
D/o (L) Thrinlisi Lyngdoh
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 03/10/2024 passed in
MC(FA) No. 3 of 2024)
47.Smti. Larleso Susngi
D/o Rosewell Lamare
48. Smti. Kashrar Karthangmaw
D/o (L) Smti. Phian Karthangmaw
(Substituted vide Court’s order dated
13/10/2022 passed in MC(FA) No. 12 of 2022)
49. Smti. Hinsila Ramshong
50. Smti. Thrida Rynjah
D/o Kling Rynjah
51. Smti. Hiarmonlang Nongrum
D/o (L) Shri. Onder Myrboh
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 9 of 2022)
52. Smti. Ebrian Syiemlieh
S/o (L) Smti. Kril Syiemlieh
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 7 of 2022)
53. Smti. Mardis Lyngdoh
D/o (L) Ibon Lyngdoh
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 13/10/2022 passed in
MC(FA) No. 13 of 2022)
54. Smti. Teidalin Khyriemmujat
D/o (L) Smti. Mabeldalis Khyriemmujat
(Substituted vide Court’s order dated
13/10/2022 passed in MC(FA) No. 15 of 2022)
55. Smti. Ruthsila Synjri
D/o Mansing Kharlukhi
56. Smti. Rodialla Synjri
D/o Mansing Kharlukhi
57. Shri. Berington Nongspung
S/o Brik Thangkhiew
58. Smti. Bertilin Kharbuli
59.Smti. Ri Jaintia Shabong
D/o Kriam Kurbah
60. Smti. Ai Ridian Shadap
D/o Starding Jyrwa
61. Smti. Judy Dkhar
D/o (L) Sorbo Mohon Swer
::: Opposite Parties/Respondents
___________________________________________________________
CRAPPL No. 1 of 2023
1. Smti. Marvellous Syiem
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.2/
Claimant No. 2
2. Shri. Herlan Nengnong (deceased) :::Cross Objector/Respondent No.4/
Substituted by his daughter
Claimant No. 5
Smti. Riona Shabong
3. Shri. Wel Nengnong (deceased)
Substituted by his son
Shri. Aibiroy Lamare
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.5/
Claimant No. 6
4. Smti. Kshiar Mawrie (deceased)
Substituted by her daughter
Smti. Wandahun Mawrie
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.7/
Claimant No. 8
5. Shri. Dra Lapang
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.9/
Claimant No. 10
6.Smti. Twailinda Lyngdoh
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.11/
Claimant No. 12
7.Smti. Barasful Lyngdoh
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.12/
Claimant No. 13
8. Smti. Piantimon Tado
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.13/
Claimant No. 14
9. Smti. Apphira Lyngdoh
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.15/
Claimant No. 16
10. Phliwris Nongphud
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.16/
Claimant No. 17
11. Successful Nongphud
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.17/
Claimant No. 18
12. Smti. Lina Sohsten @ Lina Sten
(deceased) Substituted by her
daughter Smti. Santimon Sten
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.18/
Claimant No. 19
13. Smti. Lorita Lyngdoh
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.19/
Claimant No. 20
14. Smti. Elma Pasi
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.20/
Claimant No. 21
15. Smti. Lidia Kurbah
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.21/
Claimant No. 22
16. Smti. Darihun Lapang
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.22/
Claimant No. 23
17. Shri. Kyrshanbor Singh
Donshiaw
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.23/
Claimant No. 24
18. Smti. Thenissinola Nengnong
(deceased) Substituted by her
daughter Smti. Marvellous
Carol Nengnong
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.25/
Claimant No. 26
19. Smti. Shontimai Sohsten
(deceased) Substituted by
her daughter Smti. Meranisha
Sten
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.26/
Claimant No. 27
20. Shri. Bresson Mukhim
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.27/
Claimant No. 28
21. Shri. Kyntiewsing Giri Massar
(deceased) Substituted by his
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.28/
Claimant No. 29
sister Smti. Evaniarlyne Giri Massar
22. Smti. Merilinda Kharbujon
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.29/
Claimant No. 30
23. Smti. Esther Syiem
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.30/
Claimant No. 31
24. Smti. Skerina Kharkongor
(deceased) Substituted by her
daughter Smti. Trasibon
Kharkongor
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No. 31/
Claimant No. 33
25. Smti. Evangeline Sutnga
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.33/
Claimant No. 35
26. Smti. Stied Dkhar
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.35/
Claimant No. 38
27. Shri. Arbat Kurbah (deceased)
Substituted by his son namely
Shri. Phlanroy Kharthangmaw
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.39/
Claimant No. 43
28. Smti. Plin Ramshon (deceased)
Substituted by her son
Shri. Peaceful Ramshon
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.41/
Claimant No. 45
29. Smti. Endris Shadap
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.42/
Claimant No. 46
30. Smti. Krintina Mukhim
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.43/
Claimant No. 47
31. Smti. Diwti Shadap @
Smti. Dam Shadap
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.44/
Claimant No. 48
32. Smti. Julestinora Lyngdoh
D/o (L) Thrinlisi Lyngdoh
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.46/
Claimant No. 50
(Substituted vide Court’s order
dated 03/10/2024 passed in
MC (CRAPPL) No. 1 of 2024)
33. Smti. Iarly Susngi
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.47/
Claimant No. 51
34. Smti. Phian Kharthangmaw
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.48/
(deceased) Substituted by her
Claimant No. 52
daughter Smti. Shrar Kharthangmaw
35. Smti. Hinsila Rymshon
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.49/
Claimant No. 53
36. Smti. Cinobia Mary Shanpru
:::Cross Objector/Respondent not
D/o (L) Smti. Drimsimai Shanpru
made party/Claimant No. 54
(Substituted vide Court’s order dated
22/11/2024 passed in MC (CRAPPL) No. 2 of 2024)
37. Smti. Thrida Rynjah
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.50/
Claimant No. 55
38. Shri. Onder Marboh (deceased)
Substituted by his daughter
Smti. Hiarmon Nongrum
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.51/
Claimant No. 56
39. Smti. Kril Syiemlieh
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.52/
(now deceased) Substituted by
Claimant No. 57
her daughter Smti. Ebrian Syiemlieh
40. Smti. Ibon Lyngdoh (deceased)
Substituted by her daughter
Smti. Mardis Lyngdoh
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.53/
Claimant No. 58
41. Smti. Mebeldalis Khyriemmujat :::Cross Objector/Respondent No.54/
(deceased) Substituted by her
Claimant No. 59
daughter Smti. Teidalin Khyriemmujat
42. Smti. Ruthsila Synjri
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.55/
Claimant No. 60
43. Smti. Rodiala Synjri
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.56/
Claimant No. 61
44. Shri. Berington Nongspung
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.57/
Claimant No. 62
45. Smti. Rijaintia Shabong
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.59/
Claimant No. 66
46. Smti. Ai Ridian Shadap
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.60/
Claimant No. 67
47. Smti. Judy Dkhar
D/o (L) Sorbo Mohon Swer
:::Cross Objector/Respondent No.61/
Claimant No. 68
-VsCollector, Ri – Bhoi District,
Nongpoh, Meghalaya
::: Opposite Party/Appellant
____________________________________________________________
FA No. 1 of 2023
Smti. Bartilin Kharbuli
D/o (L) K. Kharbynepet
:::Appellant
-VsCollector, Ri – Bhoi District, Nongpoh
:::Respondent
____________________________________________________________
FA No. 2 of 2023
Smti. Susan M. Wahlang since deceased
Substituted by Smti. Rhoda Angela
Wahlang vide order dated 30/09/2011
passed by Special Judicial Officer,
Shillong
:::Appellant
-VsCollector, Ri – Bhoi District, Nongpoh
:::Respondent
FA No. 3 of 2023
Smti. Soridian Dohtdong, since deceased
Substituted by her grand-daughter Smti.
Annebolyne Dohtdong vide order dated
13/10/2022 passed in MC (FA) No. 14 of 2022
:::Appellant
-VsCollector, Ri – Bhoi District, Nongpoh
:::Respondent
_____________________________________________________________
FA No. 4 of 2023
Shri. Armstrong Syiem
S/o (L) D. Kharkongor
:::Appellant
-VsCollector, Ri – Bhoi District, Nongpoh
:::Respondent
_____________________________________________________________
FA No. 5 of 2023
Smti. Ilinda Mawrie
D/o (L) D. Wankhar
:::Appellant
-VsCollector, Ri – Bhoi District, Nongpoh
:::Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
In FA No. 1 of 2022
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. S. Sen, GA with
Ms. R. Colney, GA.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. V.K. Jindal, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S. Rana, Adv.
Ms. B. Jyrwa, Adv.
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. V.K. Jindal, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S. Rana, Adv.
Ms. B. Jyrwa, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. S. Sen, GA with
Ms. R. Colney, GA.
Appearance:
In CRAPPL No. 1 of 2023
FA No. 1 of 2023
FA No. 2 of 2023
FA No. 3 of 2023
FA No. 4 of 2023
FA No. 5 of 2023
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
FA No. 1 of 2022, has been preferred by the appellant
Collector, Ri Bhoi District, against the judgment and order dated
17.03.2020, passed by the Court of the Special Judicial Officer, Ri Bhoi
District in (Ref.) L.A. Case No. 122 of 2015 (New) and (Ref.) L.A. Case
No. 8 of 2003 (Old), whereby, 62 individual references have been disposed
of vide in the common judgment and order enhancing the compensation in
several references and order dated 15.04.2021, passed in Misc. Case No. 2
of 2021, in L.A. Case No. 8 of 2003, whereby, the learned Ref. Court has
modified the judgment and order dated 17.03.2020, in exercise of powers
under Section 151 read with Section 152 CPC, to the extent of award of
solatium.
2.
FA Nos. 1 and 5 of 2023, has been preferred by individual land
owners namely Smti Bertilin Kharbuli, respondent No. 58/claimant No.
63, and Smti Hinda Mawrie, respondent No. 8/claimant No. 9, against the
same impugned judgment and order dated 17.03.2020, whereby the
learned Ref. Court has declined to enhance the rates of land of the
appellants, and thus are seeking reassessment of the compensation on the
basis of the oral and documentary evidence that is stated to be on record.
3.
FA No. 2 of 2023, is filed by Smti Susan M. Wahlang
(deceased), respondent No. 36/claimant No. 39, is for enhancement of the
rates and compensation for severance of land.
4.
FA No. 3 of 2023, is filed by Smti Annebolyne Dohtdong,
respondent No. 14/claimant No. 15, is for enhancement of rates and
balance compensation for damage to building/shops and severance of land.
5.
FA No. 4 of 2023, is filed by Shri Armstrong Syiem, respondent
No. 1/claimant No. 1, who has claimed for enhancement of rates and
balance compensation for hybrid tissue culture plantation, champa trees
and damage to iron fencing and iron gates.
6.
A separate Cross appeal/objection under Order 41 Rule 22 of
the CPC numbered as CRAPPL No. 1 of 2023 in FA No. 1 of 2022, has
also been filed by the respondents/claimants against the findings in a part
of the impugned judgment and order, whereby the learned Ref. Court has
declined to accept the evidence of common witness No. 69, 70 and 71, and
the sale deeds executed by them which were marked as Exhibits – 4, 5 and
6, the other findings which are under challenge is the compensation being
allowed to only 50% of the claim amount in respect of damage to the
standing structures, agricultural and horticulture products, as per valuation
certificates by ignoring the evidence of the expert witnesses and
assessment certificates issued by them.
7.
All the above noted appeals which emanate from the same
judgment and order, as they relate to the same acquisition proceedings
which had been initiated for the acquisition of land measuring 2,80,556.11
sq. mtrs. in different villages on either side of Lad Umroi, Bhoirymbong
Road, Ri Bhoi District, for the public purpose of construction of the
National Highway, Shillong By Pass Road connecting NH-40 and NH-44,
are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
8.
When FA No. 1 of 2022, had been filed by way of common or
composite appeal, from the side of the respondents, objections had been
raised
as
to
its
maintainability
on
the
contention
that
the
Collector/Appellant, should have filed individual appeals as though there
was a common judgment dated 17.03.2020, individual decrees had been
drawn up on separate claims. It was further also contended that the
Government Advocate lacked the authority to file the appeal on behalf of
the Collector, and that no authority letter had been submitted. It was also
submitted that if the Collector’s appeal was found to be not maintainable,
the Cross Appeal would be rendered redundant, but the separate appeals
filed by the individual land owners could be heard on their own merit. In
this context, several authorities had been placed by the Senior counsel for
the respondents, Mr. V.K. Jindal in support of this objection.
(i)
Shri. Gangai Vinayagar Temple & Anr. vs. Meenakshi
Ammal & Ors. reported in (2015) 3 SCC.
(ii)
Deputy Collector, Northern Sub-Division vs.
Communidade de Bamboolin, 1978 SCC OnLine GDD 6.
(iii)
Union of India & Anr. vs. Ranchod & Ors. reported in (2007)
14 SCC 326.
A.
9.
In answer to the challenge to the maintainability of the appeal,
Mr. S. Sen, learned GA has submitted that the issue requires an
examination as to how the reference proceeding was initiated. First, he
submits, the respondents against the award of the Collector had filed a
joint application dated 22.09.2003, praying for reference, and on the basis
of the joint application, a single order of reference was made by the
Collector dated 31.10.2003, which was registered initially as a single
reference being (Ref.) L.A Case No. 8 of 2003, by the Special Court at
Shillong, and later renumbered as (Ref.) L.A Case No. 122 of 2015.
Thereafter, he further submits, on the claimants filing separate claim
petitions before the Court, the matter was disposed of by the common
judgment dated 17.03.2020, but individual decrees were drawn up.
10.
Thus, it is submitted on a joint reference application, the
Collector had rightly made a single reference order under Section 19 of the
L.A. Act, 1894, and the learned Special Court had registered a single case
in respect of all the claimants. It is contended that Order 4 Rule 1 CPC,
states that a suit shall be commenced by a plaint which is the starting point
of the suit, and therefore, when a proceeding has been initiated under the
LA Act of 1894, before the Special Court on the basis of a written
application containing the objections under Section 18 thereof, it is this
objection that is to be referred to the Court for adjudication and that the
legislation does not provide for filing of any other applications. The
learned counsel has also countered the judgments relied upon by the
respondents, and has submitted that in those cases it was where multiple
suits had been filed and in view of their commonality of issues were tried
together and disposed of by a common judgment, but followed by
individual decrees. It is further submitted that even while seeking
correction of the impugned judgment dated 17.03.2020, the claimants had
filed a single application being Misc. Case No. 2 of 2021. It has also been
contended that Section 26 of the LA Act, 1984, the award of the reference
is a deemed decree and as such, there is no necessity to draw up individual
decrees. Lastly, he submits that even the respondents themselves have filed
a Cross Appeal jointly, on behalf of 47 respondents assailing the judgment
and decree dated 17.03.2020, while at the same time seeking to question
the instant First Appeal filed by the Collector.
11.
On the other question that no Vakalatnama had been filed by
the Collector, it has been simply submitted by the learned counsel that a
Collector is a Public Officer, as defined under Section 2(17) CPC, and
therefore, is entitled to be represented by a Government Pleader as defined
in Section 2(7) of the CPC. The judgment passed in the case of Sharda
Devi vs. State of Bihar reported in (2003) 3 SCC 128, has been placed by
the learned counsel, wherein it has been held that the Collector acts as a
Representative of the State, while holding proceedings under the LA Act,
1894.
12.
In the opinion of this Court, the question of maintainability
needs to be addressed first, before proceeding further to enter into the
merits of the appeals. This Court notes that in the judgment namely Shri.
Gangai Vinayagar Temple (supra) relied upon by the respondents, the
facts are dissimilar, inasmuch as, it is a case where there are multiple suits
which were clubbed together by a consolidation order, where a common
trial was held and a common judgment rendered therefrom, but individual
decrees were drawn in the respective suits. In the case of Chitivalasa Jute
Mills vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement reported in (2004) 3 SCC 85, the Supreme
Court at Para – 12 of the said judgment thereof, had directed that “as the
suits are two, the Court may, based on the common judgment, draw two
different decrees or one common decree to be placed on the record of the
two suits”. The case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Ranchod & Ors.
(supra), cited by the respondents also will be of no assistance to their case,
inasmuch as, it is a case of where a large number of land holders whose
land has been acquired, had filed separate objections under Section 9 of
the Act, and had also separately sought references under Section 18,
whereas in the instant case, a single reference application has been made
by all the land owners. With regard to the last judgment placed by the
learned Senior counsel for the respondents i.e. Deputy Collector, Northern
Sub-Division vs. A. Communidade de Bamboolin (supra), on the question
of lack of authority, the said judgment it appears has since been overruled
by the Supreme Court by its judgment between the same parties and has
been reported in (1995) 5 SCC 333 and as such, merits no further
discussion.
13.
Another aspect which is relevant is that the award has been
passed in terms of Section 26 of the L.A. Act, which as submitted, at
Section 26(2) thereof, that such award shall be deemed to be a decree. For
the sake of convenience Section 26 of the L.A. Act is reproduced herein
below.
“26. Form of awards.- [(1)Every award under this Part shall
be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the
amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1) of
section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively
awarded under each of the other clauses of the same subsection, together with the grounds of awarding each of the
said amounts.
(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the
statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment
within the meaning of section 2, clause (2) and section 2,
clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908).]”
14.
It is also noted that the respondents themselves have preferred a
Cross Appeal jointly on behalf of the 47 respondents, against the
impugned judgment dated 17.03.2020, while at the same time seeking to
maintain their objections to the common appeal filed by the
Collector/Appellant.
15.
Accordingly, in the light of discussions made herein above, F.A
No. 1 of 2022 is held to be maintainable, and as such this Court will now
proceed to examine the merits.
……………………**XXX**…………………………
ON MERITS
16.
Coming to the merits of these appeals, firstly, looking at the
challenge made by the Collector, the same has been made on the following
grounds, with the accompanying submissions which are as follows: REFERENCE COURT GRANTED UNIFORM MAXIMUM
MARKET RATE IN VIOLATION OF SETTLED PRINCIPLES
(i)
As per the Respondents claims and as recorded in the impugned
judgment dated 17.03.2020, it is submitted that the Respondents had
prayed for market value based on the following classification of lands viz.
(a) Homestead land; (b) Paddy fields; (c) Arable lands; and (d) Quarry
lands/waste land, but however, while determining the market rate the
learned Reference Court, did not award compensation as per the rates for
the different categories of land and instead awarded ‘Maximum rate’
without examining the entitlement of the individuals to get the maximum
compensation.
(ii) It is submitted that determination of market rate of land under
acquisition must be based on reasonable criteria and cannot be arbitrary
and several factors ought to be taken into consideration in determining the
value of the land such as, location of the land acquired, proximity to an
access road, main road, high way, city, town etc.
(iii) Reliance has been placed on the case of Haridwar Development
Authority v. Raghubir Singh and others reported in (2010) 11 SCC 581
(para 7), wherein while dealing with the issue of whether acquired land
had to be valued uniformly at the same rate or whether different areas in
the acquired lands have to be valued at different rates, the Supreme Court
has laid down the principles including adoption of the belting method.
(iv) In the present case it is contended, a large area of land was acquired
for the purpose of construction of a highway and while granting enhanced
compensation by awarding the maximum rate and by homogenizing all the
lands, the learned court deviated from the above settled parameters and
granted the compensation in a manner not recognized by law.
It is further submitted that the determination of the market rate was
without reference to any materials pertaining to the advantages or
disadvantages of the lands and merely premised on a ‘just’ and ‘equitable’
approach which is bereft of any legal reasoning.
(v) It is also submitted that the award of compensation based on
classification, is inherently more just and equitable for each landowner
involved in the process and this approach, ensures and promotes fairness
and balance in the distribution of compensation based on entitlement.
(vi) The Respondents/Claimants it is submitted by the Learned GA, have
defended the award of maximum market value and contended that in case
of acquisition for a single purpose, classification of land was not
necessary, whereas in their reference application dated 22.09.2003, the
Respondents have themselves prayed for compensation based on the
classification of land. Even as late as the final hearing before the Reference
Court, the Respondents claimed rates based on the following classification
of land which was recorded by the learned court below in the impugned
judgment dated 17.03.2020 (Pg. 134 Paper Book I):
a) For Homestead – Rs. 4,000/- per sq mtr.
b) For paddy field – Rs. 10,000/- per sq mtr.
c) For arable land – Rs. 4,000/- per sq mtr.
d) For Quarry land – Rs. 4,000/- per sq mtr.
(vii) It is thus submitted that by urging that acquisition for a single purpose
does not require classification, the Respondents have contradicted their
own case before the learned court below and set up a new case before this
Hon’ble Court. With regard to the cases relied upon by the Respondents on
this point which namely are:
i)
Union of India v. Harinder Pal Singh, (2005)12 SCC 564
ii)
The Land Acquisition Collector v. Shri. Roshan Lal & Ors.,
2018 SCC Online HP 928
iii)
Ranjeet Singh v. Land Acquisition Collector, 2018 SCC Online
HP 928
The learned counsel has submitted that, these decisions cannot be
treated to be an authoritative pronouncement on the Respondent’s
proposition as it does not provide a reasonable and acceptable basis for the
same. Further, the latter two decisions being rendered by a coordinate
bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, the said decisions are not
binding on this Hon’ble Court.
(viii) In Ranjeet Singh case he submits, there has been a reliance on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Harinder
Singh (supra) reported in (2005) 12 SCC 564, wherein the said case,
acquisition was undertaken for extension of the Cantonment at Amritsar
and not for a highway and the court dealt with grant of uniform rate of
compensation for 5 different villages by taking the market value adjudged
for one village as a comparative unit for determination of market value of
the other lands. A reading of para 15 and 16 of the said judgment he
submits, reveals that the court adopted the rates awarded for acquisition of
an adjoining village by examining the surrounding the attending facts and
holding that it was a comparative unit. He therefore contends that the
judgment of the case of Union of India vs. Harinder Singh (supra) will
have no application.
GRANT OF SOLATIUM IS ONLY PERMISIBLE ON THE
MARKET VALUE AND NOT ON THE ENTIRE COMPENSATION
(i)
The learned Reference Court it is submitted, granted solatium @ 30%
per annum on the entire compensation and that on the Respondent’s
application being Misc. Case No. 2 of 2021 vide order dated 15.4.2021,
the Reference Court ordered that ‘30% solatium per annum’ be read as
‘30% solatium’. The learned counsel then asserts that the expression
‘compensation’ occurring in Section 23 includes various categories of
payments which in their entirety form ‘compensation’ and that the
Reference Court wrongly granted 30% on an amount which included the
market value as well as the amount awarded for others losses suffered,
inasmuch as, grant of solatium on any other amount is impermissible.
(ii) In support of his contention reliance has been placed on the case of
State of Punjab v. Amarjit reported in (2011) 4 SCC 734 (para 11),
wherein the Supreme Court of India while dealing with this issue held that
the additional amount under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section
23(2) of the Act and not on any other amount and that Solatium and
additional amount are also not payable on the damages/expenses that may
be awarded under second to sixth factors under Section 23(1) of the Act. In
addition, it is submitted, the Reference Court did not take into account the
fact that in its Award, Collector had awarded Solatium @ 30% which
amount was withdrawn by the Respondents and as such therefore, it is
necessary to direct necessary adjustment/deduction.
However, it may be noted herein that during the course of the
hearing, the Respondents have fairly acknowledged that solatium @ 30%
is to be paid only on the market value and not on the total compensation.
COURT
GRANTED
12%
INTEREST
ON
EXCESS
COMPENSATION WHEREAS SECTION 28 ONLY PRESCRIBES
GRANT OF 9%
(i)
On this point it is submitted that Grant of interest under the Act of
1894, is governed by Section 28 and Section 34 with Section 34 pertaining
to the Collector’s power to grant interest in his award, whereas section 28,
empowers the Court to grant interest in its discretion on the excess or
enhanced compensation that it may pass in a reference proceeding under
Part III of the Act.
(ii) Under Section 28, in its discretion, it is submitted, the Court has the
authority to direct the Collector to award interest on the excess amount of
compensation that it may pass in the reference proceedings and the rate of
interest to be applied is contingent upon the two distinct periods delineated
within this section. Interest @ 9% per annum he further submits is
prescribed from the date on which the Collector took possession of the
land to the date of payment of such excess sum into Court, and in case the
excess compensation is paid into Court after the date or expiry of a period
of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest @ 15% per
annum is prescribed from the said period of one year.
(iii) The learned counsel has placed reliance on the case of the
Commissioner of Income Tax, Faridabad v. Ghanshyam reported in
(2009) 8 SCC 412 (para 30, 35), wherein he submits, it was underscored
that Section 28 embodies judicial discretion concerning its applicability
and that its invocation is contingent upon the court’s evaluation of the
pertinent circumstances. The provision he contends, does not mandate
automatic application but rather vests the judiciary with the authority to
exercise discretion in determining its applicability based on the merits of
each case presented before it.
(iv) Vide the impugned judgment, he submits, the Court below has
awarded interest of 12% on the excess compensation w.e.f. date of taking
over of the land till payment is made in Court in violation of the mandate
of Section 28, which is legally impermissible.
GRANT OF INTEREST UNDER SECTION 28 IS ONLY ON THE
EXCESS AMOUNT AWARDED BY THE COURT
(i)
From a reading of the decision rendered in CIT v. Ghanshyam
(HUF) supra (para 33, 34), it is submitted, it is clear that award of interest
under Section 28 of the Act of 1894 is only on the excess amount granted
by Court in the reference amounts and not in the original amount granted
by the Collector, and though in the impugned judgment, the learned
Reference Court awarded interest on enhanced compensation, but in
decree however, it computed interest on the entire sum for both the periods
i.e. including the award amount already paid to and withdrawn by the
Respondents under protest, which is impermissible. He therefore submits
that interest is to be applied only on the excess amount and after excluding
the amount that has already been received by the claimants.
SECTION 28 IS DISCRETIONARY AND THE COURT COULD
HAVE
CONSIDERED
EXCLUDING
APPLICATION
OF
INTEREST ON THE PERIOD WHERE THE APPELLANT WAS
BONAFIDE PURSUING THE CASE AND DURING THE COVID 19
INDUCED PANDEMIC
(i)
Grant of interest under Section 28 of the Act of 1894 it is averred, is
discretionary and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the same in the case
of CIT v. Ghanshyam (supra) at paras 33 and 34 thereof, and being a
discretionary power, the Reference Court could have considered excluding
application of interest for the period where the appellant was bonafide
pursuing the matter in court, the period during the COVID-19 induced
pandemic or at the least the period when the written argument was filed
and the matter was awaiting judgment by the learned court below.
(ii) In this context, it is submitted, it may be relevant to note that on
account of the COVID-19 induced pandemic and the resultant lockdown,
most courts were not functioning for a considerable period of time and this
was not attributable to the Appellant. As such, he contends, the learned
Reference Court could have considered excluding application of interest
during this period, especially taking into account that written arguments
were filed by the parties on 06.03.2017, matter was heard and fixed for
judgment since 25.05.2017 and thereafter heard again and reserved for
judgment on 16.12.2019 till 17.03.2020.
(iii) It is nobody’s case he submits that the delay during the entire period
of the reference proceedings is attributable to the Appellant and as such
therefore, the learned Reference Court ought to have considered excluding
application of interest for such period where the Appellant was bonafide
pursuing the matter and exclude this period as grant of interest @ 15% for
this period results in significant financial implication on the state
exchequer.
(iv) It is further submitted that since the grant of interest is discretionary,
exercise of such power has to be informed by reason, and in this regard has
referred to the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) By Lrs. vs State of A.P.
& Ors. reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 (para 29) (pg. 96-107), wherein the
Supreme Court has held that all discretionary powers, especially judicial
powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law.
The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by
reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should
not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.
LEARNED COURT GRANTED FUTURE INTEREST
(i)
A perusal of the decree dated 17.03.2020 (page 327 of Paper book I)
the learned counsel submits, would reveal that the learned Reference Court
computed interest w.e.f. 13.09.2002 till 12.12.2021without any plausible
or comprehensible reason available in the records, to explain grant of
interest till a future date and as such, the same is completely impermissible
and illegal.
(ii) As a result of the illegal grant and computation in the Decree dated
17.03.2020, across the board, he submits, all the respondents have wrongly
inflated their respective entitlements.
(iii) Order XX Rule 6 CPC provides that judgment shall agree with the
decree whereas he submits that in the instant case, the entire decree is
beyond the judgment and does not agree with the original award of
compensation in the judgment and that infact, the decrees grant reliefs not
comprehended by the judgment.
JURISDICITON OF COURT BASED ON THE REFERENCE
ORDER
(i)
It is then submitted that in the reference application dated 22.09.2003
damage to the fencing and iron gate was not pleaded in the reference
application and the plea was only on non-assessment of standing crops,
trees and cultivation pleaded.
(ii) The Reference order dated 31.10.2003 (pg. 108 / Paper book I) he
points out, only pertained to
i)
determination of measurement
ii)
classification
iii)
rate of the land
(iii) It is the Appellant’s case he contends, that the learned court’s
jurisdiction under Section 18 is determined on the basis of the terms of the
reference order issued under Section 19 of the Act and the court cannot
assume jurisdiction over an issue which is not referred to it. In the case of
Prayag Upnivesh v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran reported in (2003) 5
SCC 561 (para 7, 9, 10, 11) he submits, it has been held that a Reference
Court can only derive jurisdiction over matter or objection referred to it
and nothing further and its jurisdiction is derived from the reference and
therefore it cannot go outside the scope of the said reference else it would
suffer from a lack of inherent jurisdiction.
(iv) Similarly, he submits, any claim for compensation for loss suffered
on account of severance of land etc. was not pleaded in the application, not
part of the reference order and thus also outside the scope of the reference.
(v) In response, to the respondents arguments that the Collector was
obliged to make the reference and not referring the issue was his fault, and
the judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Harish Chunder
Neogy v. Secretary of State reported in 1907 SCC OnLine Cal 69, on this
point cited by the respondents, the learned counsel submits that the said
case pertains to a situation where the Collector has not given any grounds
for the determination whereas in the present case, vide the reference order
dated 31.10.2003 the Collector has indicated the grounds thereby
complying with the requirements of Section 19(1)(d) of the Act. It is also
submitted that the said judgment otherwise does not lay down good law
when in theories that Collector performs a quasi-judicial function and that
the Special Judge fills the position of an appellate court.
The learned counsel has gone on to argue that the observations in the
case cited by the respondents are incorrect, in view of a 3-judge bench of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kiran Tandon v. Allahabad Development
Authority reported in (2004) 10 SCC 745 (para 10) wherein it has been
held that the Collector’s award under Section 11 is nothing more than an
offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimants whose
property is acquired and that the court has to treat the reference as an
original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the
basis of the material produced before it.
Reliance as also been placed on the case of Surendra Kumar Bhatia
v. Kanhaiya Lal reported in (2009) 12 SCC 184 (para 22) (230-239),
wherein it has been held that any inquiry as to the market value of property
and determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector is
administrative and not judicial in nature and that the Collector neither acts
in a judicial nor quasi-judicial capacity but purely in an administrative
capacity, exercising statutory powers as an agent and representative of the
Government/acquiring authority. It further held he submits, that the
Collector does not function as a judicial officer who is required to base his
decision only on the material placed in the enquiry in the presence of
parties, but functions as a valuer who ascertains the market value on
material collected from all sources, personal inspection and his own
knowledge and experience.
(vi) With regard to the case of Ram Kumar v. Union of India reported in
(1991) 2 SCC 247 (para - 6 and 7) relied upon by the respondents, wherein
it was held that it is the duty of the Collector to send full information to the
court, it is submitted that in the said case, as revealed by the facts in para
1, 3 and 5 there was an omission on the part of the Collector to refer the
details (khasra numbers) of all the plots acquired, whereupon learning of
the same, the claimants immediately sought alteration of the reference
order.
The present case he submits, does not deal with non-reference of all
the plots acquired and that the respondents, have never challenged the
reference order and sought alteration of the terms of reference. As for the
claims relating to iron fence and gate etc., it is contended that no such
claim was ever made in the reference application and as such therefore, in
the absence of the claim in the reference application the learned Reference
Court could not have assumed jurisdiction over the same and it is a case of
complete lack of inherent jurisdiction an issue that can be raised at any
stage.
Therefore, in the facts of the present case, he submits it is the
claimants who have failed to raise objections relating to iron fence and
gate etc. in their application.
GRANT OF COMPENSATION FOR LANDS SEVERED
A. CLAIMANT NO. 15
It is submitted that in the case of Claimant No. 15 (Smti Soridian
Dohtdong), compensation was claimed for an area of 1030 sq.mtr.
of land severed and rendered useless, and though the court found
that there was no evidence of such severance nor measurement of
land was proved by the claimant to the satisfaction of the court, it
surprisingly awarded compensation as no rebuttal came from the
Collector and proceeded to award compensation @ Rs. 100/- per
sq.mtrs. for 1030 sq.mtrs.
The learned counsel submits that such a finding cannot be
sustained in law and the learned Reference Court was in gross
error, in inferring the existence of a fact on the ground that there
was no rebuttal thereof. When the claimant failed to prove its case
as regards severance of 1030 sq. mtrs he argues, there arose no
occasion for the Collector’s rebuttal and as such the said finding
is ex-facie perverse and unsustainable.
B. CLAIMANT NO. 60
In the case of Claimant No. 60 (Smti Ruthsila Synjri), he submits,
claim was for enhancement of rates and compensation for
severance of her plot of land measuring 1880 sq. mtrs. and
wastage of 136 sq. mtrs. of land, wherein, the learned Reference
Court awarded enhancement of rates for the wasteland measuring
1880 sq. mtrs. @ Rs. 50/- per sq. mtr.
However, it id submitted, for the wastage of the balance areas of
136 sq. mtr., while the court found that there was no evidence of
such wastage nor measurement of land was proved by the
claimant to the satisfaction of the court, it surprisingly held that
such severed land must be there for no rebuttal came from the
Collector and proceeded to award compensation @ Rs. 50/- per
sq. mtrs. for 136 sq. mtrs.
It is contended that such a finding cannot be sustained in law and
that the learned Reference Court was in gross error in inferring
the existence of a fact on the ground that there was no rebuttal
thereof, and especially when the claimant failed to prove its case
as regards wastage of 136 sq.mtrs., there arose no occasion for the
Collector’s rebuttal. The said finding it is argued, is ex-facie
perverse and unsustainable.
17.
On behalf of the land owners which includes respondents,
cross-objectors and appellants, Mr. V.K. Jindal, learned Senior counsel
submits that the land owners had filed the Reference Petition dated
22.09.2003, under Section 18 of the LA Act, and had prayed for the actual
measurement of the land, demarcation of the boundaries, market price of
the land and building, standing crops, trees, cultivation etc., whereafter, the
Collector vide letter dated 31.10.2003, had sent the application to the
Special Judicial Officer for disposal. The Collector he submitted, has
stated in the Reference that the amount of compensation was determined
on the basis of fair market value, but however, did not comply with the
requirements of Section 19 in general and 19(1)(d) in particular, with
regard to the grounds on which the amount of compensation was
determined.
18.
It is asserted that though the Reference Petition under Section
18, was signed by all the owners, the Reference Court had issued separate
notices to all the land owners who filed a separate and individual claim
petitions. On the pointed issues raised, first on the justification for award
of uniform rate for difference categories of land, the learned Senior
counsel submits that the Collector in the reference order, has not spelt out
how the market value was determined, nor did he file a written statement
or adduce any evidence. There is no explanation he submits on the part of
the Collector, as to how and why different rates were given for the same
categorization of land, and it is not a case where the Court had made its
own assessment, but had relied on the assessment made by the Collector.
He therefore submits, the maximum uniform rate as awarded by the
Special Judicial Officer is totally justified, inasmuch as, in the absence of
any evidence or necessary particulars as required under Section 19 being
supplied by the Collector, a Special Judicial Officer had no alternative, but
to award maximum uniform rates. Reliance has been placed in the case of
Union of India vs. Harinder Pal Singh & Ors. reported in (2005) 12 SCC
564. It is also submitted that though it has been argued, that the initial
burden to prove that the rate assessed by the Collector was not fair or at
the market value, was on the land owners, and that as they had failed to
discharge this burden, the Collector was not required to adduce any
evidence, the learned Senior counsel has referred to the following cases,
wherein he submits, it was held that the State is duty bound to adduce
evidence and prove market value of the land. The land owners on the other
hand he contends, by examining themselves and the witnesses, and
bringing on record the customary sale deeds have discharged the initial
burden, and therefore it was duty of the Collector to adduce evidence.
With regard to solatium under Section 23(2) of the LA Act, that solatium
is to be awarded on the market value of the land, the learned Senior
counsel concedes this point, and submits that solatium is to be awarded
only on the market value of the land, as fixed by the Collector, and
enhanced by the Special Judicial Officer.
19.
With regard to the interest on the enhanced amount, it is
contended that the same is not contrary to Section 28 read with Section 34
of the LA Act, as the word ‘compensation’ on which the interest of 9% per
annum for the initial period of one year, and thereafter at 15% per annum
was awarded, in these sections speak about the award of interest on the
entire compensation. In support of his submissions, reliance has been
placed in the case of Sunder vs. Union of India reported in (2001) 7 SCC
211 and Gurpreet Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2006) 8 SCC 457.
20.
The learned Senior counsel then submits that the Court below,
has rightly exercised its discretion in awarding interest at 15% per annum
on the entire period, after expiry of one year, in view of the facts and
circumstances of the case, and no interference was called for.
21.
Coming to the Cross Appeal preferred by 47 land owners,
learned Senior counsel submits that the same is mainly on 2 grounds, that
first the Reference Court had erred in law and facts in rejecting the
customary sale deeds (Exhibits 4, 5 and 6) exhibited by Claim Witness
(CW), 69, 70 and 71 and that secondly, there was no basis or justification
to reduce the compensation to 50% from the assessment given by the
expert and qualified witnesses. It is argued that the Reference Court while
relying on Para – 14 and 22 of the judgment given in the case of The
Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. Sidappota Omance reported in
(1995) Supp. 2 SCC 168, in holding that the sale deeds were unregistered
without land classification, not executed at the relevant time, and with
regard to only a small area, did not consider Para – 13 of the said
judgment, wherein it was held that sale deed of small chunks of land can
be relied, if related to the area of acquisition. Various other judgments
have been referred to read in conjunction with Section 36 of the Stamp Act
and proviso to Section 49 of Registration Act 1908, where he submits it
has been held that, once a document has been marked as exhibit in the case
and the trial proceeded, on the footing that the said documents was an
exhibit in the case, Section 36 of the Stamp Act comes into play and the
document thereafter cannot be called in question. It is further submitted
that an unregistered document can be used for a collateral purpose and that
in the instant case, the documents relied upon by the land owners are
customary sale deeds which require no registration, and that the same are
used only for the purpose of finding the rates of the land prevailing at the
particular time.
22.
With regard to the other points i.e. the type of land or
categorization not being mentioned in the sale deeds, and that the sale
deeds related only to small area and were not executed at the relevant time,
the learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments.
23.
(i)
The Land Acquisition Collector vs. Shir. Roshan Lal &
Ors. reported in (2018) SCC OnLine HP 928
(ii)
Ranjeet Singh (since deceased) through LRs. vs. Land
Acquisition Collector reported in (2018) SCC OnLine
HP 2209
(iii)
Ranvir Singh & Anr. vs. Union of India reported in
(2005) 12 SCC 59
(iv)
Bhupal Singh & Ors. vs. State of Haryana reported in
(2015) 5 SCC 801
On another issue, it is submitted that the compensation being
fixed at 50% of the amount assessed by the expert, is without any basis or
evidence, as the assessment was done by the experts with regard to
damage to structures was as per the approved schedule of rates of PWD
(Building) for 2004-05. Similarly, it is submitted that with regard to
damage of forest products and damage to hybrid plantation, assessment
whereof had been conducted by the experts, the uniform deduction of the
assessed compensation by 50% was without any basis. The learned Senior
counsel has also asserted that the argument raised by the counsel for the
Collector that the Reference Court lacked jurisdiction to award
compensation for damage to buildings, forest and plantation, inasmuch as,
there was no reference made by the Collector under Section 18, has no
basis, inasmuch as, specific prayers are present in the reference application
itself, which allowed the Reference Court to address the same.
24.
In addition to the submissions which have been advanced, the
learned Senior counsel has put forward 2(two) suggestions to bring about a
closure to this long pending litigation i.e. to determine the market value as
per the customary sale deeds or to award maximum rate of compensation
at Rs.220/- per sq. mtr. as assessed by the Collector, in view of the fact
that when the land is acquired for a single purpose, more particularly for
construction of the highway, the classification of land into different
categories is not at all warranted. On the basis of the sale deed exhibits he
submits, as the rates of the land sold therein, was at Rs.1528, 1774 and
1332 per sq. mtr., perhaps the maximum rate of 1774 be applied to arrive
at a fixed and fair market rate for that relevant point of time, or in the
alternative, the aggregate of the 3 sale deeds, may be taken after making
suitable deductions. In support of this submission, the learned Senior
counsel has cited the case of New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority vs. Harnand Singh reported in (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1691.
25.
On another aspect of the matter, the learned Senior counsel has
maintained that the Reference Court was justified in awarding
compensation in respect of the excess land acquired by the Collector but
not assessed, inasmuch as, it is an admitted position that the Collector had
not made any physical measurement or demarcation of the boundaries of
the plots of the individual land owners. It is submitted that it is the Court
below that had directed for physical measurement to be made, a report of
which was furnished to the Court on 17.11.2006, and as there was some
discrepancies in the measurement, 11 claimants had filed an application
whereafter, the Collector though given an opportunity never replied. As
such, he submits by order dated 20.03.2007, it was decided that the
measurement of land was a matter of evidence, which was duly adduced
by the claimants and not rebutted. 3 claimants also claimed compensation
in respect of severance of their land from the plot, which had rendered part
of their land useless, and though, the same has been assailed as a ground of
appeal, the same however, was not pressed in the hearing. The learned
Senior counsel therefore submits, the award of compensation on the 2
situations mentioned herein above, is fully justified.
26.
Mention has also been made of the individual appeals filed by
some land owners in FA Nos. 1 to 5, with regard to enhancement of
compensation, which would stand covered by the arguments already
advanced. In conclusion, the learned Senior counsel prays that the First
Appeal filed by the Collector be dismissed, to allow the Cross Appeal, to
set aside the findings of the Court below, as far it relates to the rejection of
the exhibited sale deeds and for a fresh determination of the fair and
market value of the land at the relevant time, when the notification under
Section 4 of the LA Act was issued.
27.
Mr. S. Sen, learned counsel in his argument against the Cross
Appeal, has submitted that reliance of the respondents on the case of
Periyar and Pareekanni Rubber Ltd. Vs. State Kerala reported in (1991)
4 SCC 195, is misplaced as it has not been held therein that the Collector is
duty bound to adduce evidence. In fact, he submits the burden is on the
claimants who has to adduce evidence to establish that the amount of
compensation awarded by the Collector is inadequate. Learned counsel has
referred to Para-16 of the above quoted judgment, wherein it was held that
although the Collector did not adduce evidence in rebuttal, it did not mean
that the Court was bound to accept the evidence of the appellant. Learned
counsel has also placed the following decisions, wherein it has been held
that the burden of leading evidence to establish that the rate offered by the
Collector is inadequate is squarely and always on the claimants:(i)
Kiran Tandon v. Allahabad Development Authority &
Anr. reported in (2004) 10 SCC 745
(ii)
Ramanlal Deochand Shah v. State of Maharashtra &
Anr. reported in (2013) 14 SCC 50
(iii)
Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional Officer
(1994) 4 SCC 595
(iv)
Manipur Tea Co. v. Collector Hailakandi, (1997) 9
SCC 673
28.
On the aspect of the unregistered Sale Deed (Exhibits) not being
accepted by the Court below, it is submitted that the Court below had
assigned various reasons for not accepting the said unregistered Sale Deed
as evidence and though it has been contended by the claimants that once an
unregistered Sale Deed is admitted in evidence, the same cannot be called
into question at any stage thereafter and that the same have to be accepted is
incorrect. It is contended that though the appellant has not questioned the
admission of the unregistered Sale Deed in evidence, as given in the case of
Sirikonda Madhava Rao vs. N. Hemalatha & Ors. decided on 14.11.2022,
the Supreme Court has held that the question of the effect of nonregistration of the Sale Deed in terms of the transfer of property Act 1882
and the Registration Act, 1908 would have to be left open to be decided by
the Trial Court. It is also further submitted that though vide an amendment,
Section 51-A was inserted into the Act, of 1894, permitting the Court to
accept certified copies of registered documents and dispensing with the
insistence for examination, however the amendment did not permit the
acceptance of unregistered Sale Deed in evidence. Learned counsel has also
referred to the case of V. Narasaiah on this point and submits that in the
cases relied upon by the claimants, the Courts were only considering the
presumption with regard to registered document and not unregistered
document, and that even in the case of registered document, the contents
thereof are not binding and it was upon the Court itself to consider.
29.
The learned counsel has also asserted that an unregistered Sale
Deed does not affect the property in view of their non-registration as can be
seen from Section 49 of the Registration Act itself, wherein at the proviso
thereto, the same when it affect immovable property and is required by the
Registration Act, or the Transfer of Property Act to be registered, it may be
received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as
evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a
registered document. As such, he submits even the purported unregistered
Sale Deed have been admitted in evidence, due to their non-registration they
do not affect the immovable properties comprised therein and therefore are
not required to be looked into.
30.
It is also submitted that there is no proof of passing
consideration or the circumstance of execution and nor was the seller or
purchaser examined. In the said exhibits, it is contended that they are also
visible interpolations on the area and price and the same is not
countersigned. Another argument advanced is that the said documents could
not have been looked into even for collateral purpose and in this context,
learned counsel has referred to the judgment in the case of K.B. Saha and
Sons Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Development Consultant Limited reported in (2008) 8
SCC 564, wherein he submits the ratio is that a collateral transaction must
be a transaction not itself required to be effected by registered document,
and that an important clause or term in the unregistered document which
does not constitute collateral transaction cannot be admitted in evidence.
The learned counsel has also referred to the definition of ‘sale’ as contained
in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, to advance the argument that
the price component in a sale is an intrinsic and integral part of the
transaction and a sale cannot exist without the price component and the
price component in a sale transaction cannot be independent, whereas for a
‘collateral purpose’ it should be something i.e. independent and divisible
from the main transaction. Therefore, in the Sale Deed (Exhibits), the sale
price is intrinsically connected to the sale transaction and it constitutes the
primary dispute in this case, and not a collateral incident.
31.
On the other argument raised by the claimants, such as
entitlement to cost, grant of uniform rate to end litigation, it is submitted
that Section 27 of the Act governs payment of cost only in respect of
proceedings under Part-III of the Act, and is ordinarily payable when the
award of the Collector is not upheld. In the present case, he submits the
claimants did not succeed in their claims for market value based on the rate
from the Sale Deed and the enhancement allowed was only to secure parity.
On the grant of uniform rate of Rs. 220/-, it is contended that the claimants
all through the reference proceedings have agitated for rates based on the
classification of land, but however having failed to establish market value,
they now wish to be uniformly irrespective of the classification of land. This
he submits is impermissible in the absence of minimum evidence and as
such cannot be paid compensation based on sympathetic consideration in
violation of the settled principles of determination of market value. It is also
further submitted that principles of guesstimation in estimating the value of
land in the absence of direct evidence, the learned counsel has referred to
the case of Trishala Jain vs. State of Uttaranchal, wherein it has been held
that discretion of the Court in applying guesswork to the facts of the given
case is not unfettered but has to be reasonable and should have a connection
to the data on record produced by the parties by way of evidence. He thus
submits that in the absence of any foundational evidence, this Court cannot
embark on guesswork and the principles of guesstimation therefore cannot
be resorted to. On the other heads of compensation, it is submitted that the
Court below was without jurisdiction in granting any amount to the
claimant No. 1 for fencing, gates etc. and at perusal of the assessment made
by the expert witness and an Assistant Engineer reveals that added costs of
labour and contingency were factored in, which establishes that the said
assessment was inflated and not reliable.
32.
In conclusion thereof, the learned counsel has reiterated that the
settled position of law is that in Section 18 proceedings, the claimant is a
plaintiff who has to establish that the rate offered by the Collector is
inadequate. The claimants having failed to discharge this burden as recorded
by the Court, no enhancement in the market value is permissible.
33.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
34.
As noted earlier, all the above noted appeals and Cross Appeals
emanate from the same judgment and order, as they relate to the same
acquisition proceedings which had been initiated on either side of Lad
Umroi, Bhoirymbong Road, Ri-Bhoi District, for the public purpose of
construction of the National Highway Shillong By Pass Road, connecting
NH-40 and NH-44. The question of maintainability having been answered
in the first part of this judgment culminating in Paragraph 15 thereof,
wherein the appeal has been held to be maintainable, this Court will now
proceed to examine the Appeal and Cross Appeal on merits. For a more
convenient and effective examination of the issues present in the instant
matter, the same are categorized into the following heads:i)
Grant of uniform maximum market rate
ii)
Grant of Solatium on the entire compensation
iii)
Grant of 12% interest on excess compensation
iv)
Scope of Section 28 of the LA Act in the context of the instant
case
v)
Grant of future interest
vi)
Jurisdiction of the Court vis-a-vis the reference order
vii)
Grant of compensation for severed lands
viii) Effect of Collector not adducing evidence
ix)
Admissibility of unregistered Sale Deed
x)
Entitlement to cost
xi)
Grant of uniform rate at Rs. 220/- to end litigation
xii)
Principles of Guesstimation
xiii) Other heads of compensation
35.
Grant of uniform maximum market rate
The question herein is whether the learned Lower Court had
awarded compensation at the maximum rate without examining individual
entitlement for maximum compensation. No doubt the determination of the
market rate of land under acquisition must be based on reasonable criteria,
considering factors like location, proximity to roads and other relevant
aspects. In the case of Haridwar Development Authority (supra), the
principles for determining land value have been outlined at Para-7 thereof.
For the sake of convenience the same is reproduced hereinbelow:“7. The question whether the acquired lands
have to be valued uniformly at the same rate, or
whether different areas in the acquired lands
have to be valued at different rates, depends
upon the extent of the land acquired, the
location, proximity to an access road/main
road/highway or to a city/town/village, and other
relevant circumstances. We may illustrate:
(A)
When a small and compact extent of land
is acquired and the entire area is similarly
situated, it will be appropriate to value the
acquired land at a single uniform rate.
(B)
If a large tract of land is acquired with
some lands facing a main road or a national
highway and other lands being in the interior, the
normal procedure is to value the lands adjacent
to the main road at a higher rate and the interior
lands which do not have road access, at a lesser
rate.
(C)
Where a very large tract of land on the
outskirts of a town is acquired, one end of the
acquired lands adjoining the town boundary, the
other end being two to three kilometers away,
obviously, the rate that is adopted for the land
nearest to the town cannot be adopted for the
land which is farther away from the town. In
such a situation, what is known as a belting
method is adopted and the belt or strip adjacent
to the town boundary will be given the highest
price, the remotest belt will be awarded the lowest
rate, the belts/strips of lands falling in between,
will be awarded gradually reducing rates from
the highest to the lowest.
(D) Where a very large tract of land with a
radius of one to two kilometres is acquired, but
the entire land acquired is far away from any
town or city limits, without any special main road
access, then it is logical to award the entire land,
one uniform rate. The fact that the distance
between one point to another point in the
acquired lands, may be as much as two to three
kilometres may not make any difference.”
The above quoted judgment has propagated the principle of the
belting method, when acquisition is done for a very large stretch of land. In
the present case a large area had been acquired for Highway construction
and the Lower Court had granted enhanced compensation by homogenizing
all lands by awarding the maximum market rate and as such, the materials
which were available before the learned Lower Court, in awarding such
amount will also need to be examined. It is noted that before the learned
Lower Court the lands of the claimants had been classified as Waste land,
Arable land, Paddy field and Homestead land and compensation had been
assessed and paid by the Collector for different classifications of the land of
the claimants, but different rates were also paid to several claimants for the
same category or classification of land. However, the basis on which the
assessment was done to arrive at the said rate was not available, as no
evidence or materials were adduced by the Collector to support the
assessment. The claimants therefore, vide their representation dated
16.12.2002 (Paper mark 7) exhibited by the respondent No. 1, and common
to all the claimants had prayed for enhancement for all categories or
classification of land. The learned Lower Court in the absence of any
written statement by the Collector, nor any evidence, thus had to consider
only the evidence adduced by the claimants in support of their claims for
enhancement. All the claimants were examined and it is worthwhile to
observe and record herein, that three Sale Deeds marked as Exhibits 4, 5 &
6 respectively, had been produced by the claimant No. 1, in support of the
claimed enhanced market value. However, these exhibits were disregarded
and not relied upon by the learned Lower Court in arriving at the findings,
as the said exhibits were not registered, nor executed at the relevant time of
acquisition and the lands apart from the varied rates given therein, were of
small plots without any classification as to the type of land. The learned
Lower Court therefore being unable to derive any assistance from the said
exhibits, found that the claimants were not able to establish their claim as to
the prevalent market rate on the basis of the said unregistered Sale Deeds.
This Court on this finding, and on appreciating the evidence tendered and
also the examination of these exhibits, concurs with the decision of the
learned Lower Court on this aspect. Though a decision of the case of
Sirikonda Madhava Rao vs. N. Hemalatha & Ors. rendered in SLP (C)
No. 14882-14883/2022 has been pressed into service by the respondents to
support their contention that once a document has been admitted in
evidence, such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the
suit or proceedings on the ground that the instrument has not been duly
stamped and that objection as to admissibility on the ground of sufficiency
of stamp has to be raised when the document is tendered in evidence, this
proposition however will not be of assistance, as in the said judgment itself,
the effect of non-registration of the Sale Deed was left open to be decided
by the Trial Court. Moreover, Section 51-A of the LA Act allows the Court
to accept certified copies of documents registered under the Registration
Act, 1908, which may be accepted as evidence, but the words ‘may be
accepted as evidence’ as held in the case of V. Narasaiah (supra) indicates
that there is no compulsion on the Court to accept such transaction as
evidence, but it is open to the Court to treat them as evidence. Para-14,
which is relevant is reproduced hereinbelow:“14. The words ‘may be accepted as evidence” in
the section indicate that there is no compulsion
on the court to accept such transaction as
evidence, but it is open to the court to treat them
as evidence. Merely accepting them as evidence
does not mean that the court is bound to treat
them as reliable evidence. What is sought to be
achieved is that the transactions recorded in the
documents may be treated as evidence, just like
any other evidence, and it is for the court to
weigh all the pros and cons to decide whether
such transaction can be relied on for
understanding the real price of the land
concerned.”
36.
The scope of Section 51-A of the LA Act was then considered
again in the case of Cement Corporation of India vs. Purya & Ors.
reported in (2004) 8 SCC 270 on which reliance has been placed upon by
the respondents and the Supreme Court then exhaustively examined the
entire issue and from paragraphs 28 to 40, held as follows :“28. Section 51-A of the LA Act may be read literally
and having regard to the ordinary meaning which can
be attributed to the term “acceptance of evidence”
relating to transaction evidenced by a sale deed, its
admissibility in evidence would be beyond any
question. We are not oblivious of the fact that only by
bringing a documentary evidence in the record it is not
automatically brought on the record. For bringing
documentary evidence on the record, the same must not
only be admissible but the contents thereof must be
proved in accordance with law. But when the statute
enables a court to accept a sale deed on the records
evidencing a transaction, nothing further is required to
be done. The admissibility of a certified copy of sale
deed by itself could not be held to be inadmissible as
thereby secondary evidence has been brought on record
without proving the absence of primary evidence. Even
the vendor or vendee thereof is not required to examine
themselves for proving the contents thereof. This,
however, would not mean that the contents of the
transaction as evidenced by the registered sale deed
would automatically be accepted. The legislature
advisedly has used the word “may”. A discretion,
therefore, has been conferred upon a court to be
exercise judicially i.e. upon taking into consideration
the relevant factors.
29. In V. Narasaiah case this Court correctly
understood the said scope and object of insertion of
Section 51-A in the LA Act when it held thus: (SCC p.
535, para 13)
“It was in the wake of the aforesaid
practical difficulties that the new Section 51-A
was introduced in the LA Act. When the section
says that certified copy of a registered document
‘may be accepted as evidence of the transaction
recorded in such document’ it enables the court
to treat what is recorded in the document, in
respect of the transactions referred to therein, as
evidence.”
30. While coming to the above conclusion in Narasaiah
case, this Court found support from similar provisions
in the other statutes like Section 293 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which enables the court to use
report of a government scientific expert as evidence in
any enquiry, trial or proceeding under the said Code,
even without examining any person as a witness in a
court for that purpose. Notice was also taken of Section
13(5) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
pertaining to the report of a Public Analyst which says
that any document purporting to be a report signed by
a Public Analyst may be used as evidence of the fact
stated therein in any proceeding under the said Act. In
Narasaiah case, this Court (at SCC p. 536, para 15)
also relied on a judgment of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel v. State of
Maharashtra which held thus:
“[T]hat the sub-section clearly makes the
contents of the report of Public Analyst
admissible in evidence and the prosecution
cannot fail solely on the ground that the Public
Analyst had not been examined in the case, but
what value is to be attached to such report must
necessarily be for the court to consider and
decide”
31. Thus, the reasoning of this Court in Narasaiah
case that Section 51-A enables the party producing the
certified copy of a sale transaction to rely on the
contents of the document without having to examine
the vendee or the vendor of that document, is the
correct position in law. This finding in Narasaiah case
is also supported by the decision of this Court in the
case of Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel .
32. Therefore, we have no hesitation in accepting this
view of the Court in the Narasaiah case as the correct
view.
33. The submission of Mr. G. Chandrashekhar to the
effect that the contents of a sale deed should be a
conclusive proof as regards the transaction contained
therein or the court must raise a mandatory
presumption in relation thereto in terms of Section 51A of the Act cannot be accepted as the court may or
may not receive a certified copy of sale deed in
evidence. It is discretionary in nature. Only because a
document is admissible in evidence, as would appear
from the discussions made hereinbefore, the same by
itself would not mean that the contents thereof stand
proved. Secondly, having regard to the other materials
brought on record, the court may not accept the
evidence contained in a deed of sale. When materials
are brought on record by the parties to the lis, the court
in entitled to appreciate the evidence brought on record
for determining the issues raised before it and in the
said process, may accept one piece of evidence and
reject the other.
34. In M.S. Madhusoodhanan v. Kerala Kaumudi (P)
Ltd. it is stated: (SCC p. 240, para 119)
“119. … They are rules of evidence which
attempt to assist the judicial mind in the matter
of weighing the probative or persuasive force of
certain facts proved in relation to other facts
presumed or inferred (ibid.). Sometimes a
discretion is left with the court either to raise a
presumption or not as in Section 114 of the
Evidence Act. On other occasions, no such
discretion is given to the court so that when a
certain set of facts is proved, the court is bound
to raise the prescribed presumption. But that is
all. The presumption may be rebutted.”
35. A registered document in terms of Section 51-A of
the Act may carry therewith a presumption of
genuineness. Such a presumption, therefore, is
rebuttable. Raising a presumption, therefore, does not
amount to proof; it only shifts the burden of proof
against whom the presumption operates for disproving
it. Only if the presumption is not rebutted by
discharging the burden, the court may act on the basis
of such presumption. Even when in terms of the
Evidence Act, a provision has been made that the court
shall presume a fact, the same by itself would not be
irrebuttable or conclusive. The genuineness of a
transaction can always fall for adjudication, if any
question is raised in this behalf.
36. Similar is the view taken by this Court in V.
Narasaiah case wherein this Court held thus: (SCC p.
535, para 14)
“14. The words ‘may be accepted as evidence’ in
the section indicate that there is no compulsion on the
court to accept such transaction as evidence, but it is
open to the court to treat them as evidence. Merely
accepting them as evidence does not mean that the
court is bound to treat them as reliable evidence. What
is sought to be achieved is that the transactions
recorded in the documents may be treated as evidence,
just like any other evidence, and it is for the court to
weigh all the pros and cons to decide whether such
transaction can be relied on for understanding the real
price of the land concerned.”
37. Having noticed the scope of Section 51-A of the LA
Act as understood by this Court in V. Narasaiah case to
be the correct interpretation, we will now consider
whether such evidence is mandatory binding on the
authority or the court concerned or it is only an
enabling provision.
38. In relation to the argument pertaining to Section
13(5) of the Food Adulteration Act a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel
and another v. State of Maharashtra stated as follows:
“[T]hat the sub-section clearly makes the
contents of the report of Public Analyst admissible
in evidence and the prosecution cannot fail solely on
the ground that the Public Analyst had not been
examined in the case, but what value is to be
attached to such report must necessarily be for the
court to consider and decide.”
(Emphasis supplied)
39.
While it is clear that under Section 51-A of the
LA Act a presumption as to the genuineness of the
contents of the document is permitted to be raised, the
same can be relied upon only if the said presumption is
not rebutted by other evidence. In the said view of the
matter we are of the opinion that the decision of this
Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer &
Mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah lays down the
correct law.
40.
Having settled the scope of Section 51-A of the
LA Act as stated hereinabove, we will consider the facts
in Civil Appeal No. 6986 of 1999. In this appeal
originally the Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs
3707 per acre for the acquired land. On reference being
made by the claimant, the Reference Court enhanced
the said compensation to Rs 8000 per acre which was
challenged by the beneficiary of the acquisition before
the High Court in a writ petition which was allowed
and the matter was remanded back for fresh disposal to
the Reference Court. Before the Reference Court, the
respondent herein produced two certified copies of two
sale transactions which were marked as Exts. P-1 and
P-2. The Reference Court, however, refused to place
reliance on the said documents on the ground that the
contents of the said documents were not proved. Hence,
it rejected the reference. Being aggrieved by the said
order, the respondent claimants preferred an appeal
before the High Court, the High Court disagreeing with
the Reference Court relied on the contents of Exts. P-1
and P-2 and enhanced the compensation to Rs 15,000
per acre. While doing so, the High Court proceeded
merely on the contents of Exts. P-1 and P-2 and did not
take into consideration the other evidence available on
record in regard to the comparative nature of the land,
location of the land, the market potentiality of the land,
etc. and fixed the compensation on an arithmetic
calculation based on the value found in Exts. P-2 and
P-2. We do not think this is the correct approach. While
it is true the contents of Exts. P-1 and P-2 should be
looked into as evidence produced by a party the
evaluation of such evidence should be made taking into
consideration other evidence if available on record like
other sale transactions that may be produced, the
comparative
nature
of
the
location,
suitability,
marketability, etc. to fix the market value of the land
acquired. Since such a comparative examination of
evidence has not been made by the High Court in the
above appeal, even though there was material available
on record, we think it proper that the impugned
judgment in the above appeal be set aside and the
matter
be
remanded
to
the
High
Court
for
consideration in accordance with law laid down and the
directions given in this case. Accordingly, this appeal
succeeds to the extent stated herein above.”
The above quoted case it is thus seen however, also does not
come to the aid of the respondents as the Courts considered only the
presumption with regard to registered documents and not un-registered
documents.
37.
This Court also finds force in the arguments advanced by the
counsel for the appellant on the point that the un-registered Sale Deeds
though admitted in evidence would have no legal value as it does not effect
the properties mentioned therein as mandated by Section 49 (c) of the
Registration Act, 1908, wherein it is provided as follows:“49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be
registered.- No document required by section 17 or by any
provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to
be registered shall(a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or
(b) confer any power to adopt, or
(c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting
such property or conferring such power, unless it has
been registered.”
Provided that an unregistered document affecting
immovable property and required by this Act or the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be
registered may be received as evidence of a contract in
a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the
Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of 1877), or as evidence of
any collateral transaction not required to be effected by
registered instrument.”
Further, it is also important to note that the Sellers and
Purchasers were not examined as to the veracity of the Sale Deeds exhibits
and the only person examined was the Village Head. The Sale Deed exhibit
No. 4 also has visible interpolations on the area and price which has not
been re-authenticated or countersigned and therefore, the said exhibit cannot
be taken to be a reliable piece of evidence.
38.
The un-registered documents as held in the case of K.B. Saha &
Sons Private Limited vs. Development Consultant Limited reported in
(2008) 8 SCC 564 can be looked into only for collateral purpose and in Para
- 34 of the judgment, such principles have been crystalized as follows:-
“34. From the principles laid down in the various decisions of this
Court and the High Courts, as referred to hereinabove, it is evident
that:
1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered is not
admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the Registration
Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an
evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the proviso
to Section 49 of the Registration Act.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or
divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law
required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself
required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a
transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in
immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and
upwards.
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of
registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence
and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an
important clause would not be using it as a collateral
purpose.”
39.
Therefore, as can been seen from the discussions and judicial
pronouncements quoted above, the exhibits were rightly not relied upon by
the learned Lower Court to determine the market value.
40.
Grant of Solatium on the entire compensation
The learned Court below granted solatium @ 30% per annum
on the entire compensation, which is not permissible, inasmuch as, solatium
under Section 23 of the LA Act to be awarded only on the market value of
the land as fixed by the Collector or enhanced by the Special Judicial
Officer. This point having been conceded by the learned Senior counsel for
the respondents claimants, therefore needs no further discussion and this
part of the judgment and decree granting solatium at 30% per annum on the
entire compensation is accordingly set aside and it is held that grant of
solatium will be only on the market value as determined.
41.
Grant of 12% interest on excess compensation and Scope of
Section 28 of the LA Act in the context of the instant case
Grant of interest under the Act of 1894 is governed by Section
28 and Section 34. In the instant case, the Court below has awarded interest
of 12% on the excess compensation w.e.f. the date of taking over of the land
till the payment was made in Court. This Court is therefore to examine the
scope of Section 28 and whether the learned Lower Court was correct in
awarding the said interest of 12%. In the case of Commissioner of Income
Tax, Faridabad vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) reported in (2009) 8 SCC 412,
Section 28 of the LA Act has been discussed in its manner of application
and the circumstances thereof. At Paras – 33-36, it has been held as follows:
“33. The award of interest under Section 28 of the 1894 Act is
discretionary. Section 28 applies when the amount originally
awarded has been paid or deposited and when the court
awards excess amount. In such cases interest on that excess
alone is payable. Section 28 empowers the court to award
interest on the excess amount of compensation awarded by it
over the amount awarded by the Collector. The compensation
awarded by the court includes the additional compensation
awarded
under Section
23(1-A) and
the
solatium
under Section 23(2) of the said Act. This award of interest is
not mandatory but is left to the discretion of the court.
34. Section 28 is applicable only in respect of the excess
amount, which is determined by the Court after a reference
under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. Section 28 does not apply to
cases of undue delay in making award for compensation (see
Ram Chand v. Union of India). In Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil
Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat this Court has held that interest
is different from compensation.
35. To sum up, interest is different from compensation.
However, interest paid on the excess amount under Section
28 of the 1894 Act depends upon a claim by the person whose
land is acquired whereas interest under Section 34 is for the
delay in making payment. This vital difference needs to be
kept in mind in deciding this matter. Interest under Section
28 is part of the amount of compensation whereas interest
under Section 34 is only for delay in making payment after
the
compensation
amount
is
determined.
Interest
under Section 28 is a part of enhanced value of the land
which is not the case in the matter of payment of interest
under Section 34.
36. It is clear from a reading of Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) as
also Section 28 of the 1894 Act that additional benefits are
available on the market value of the acquired lands
under Section
23(1-A) and 23(2) whereas Section
28 is
available in respect of the entire compensation.”
A plain reading of the above quoted paragraphs, highlights the
fact that judicial discretion is to be exercised with regard to the application
and invocation of the said provision. Further, it is also clear that award of
interest under Section 28 of the LA Act is only on the excess amount
granted by the Court and not in the original amount granted by the
Collector. Though it has been contended by the learned Senior counsel on
behalf of the respondents/claimants that Section 28 and 34 of the LA Act
uses the word ‘compensation’ and that this word would encompass the
award of interest on the entire compensation, this argument is not accepted
by this Court, in view of the fact in the judgment of the Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sunder vs. Union of India
reported in (2001) 7 SCC 211, it has been held that interest awardable under
Section 28 would include within its ambit, both the market value and the
statutory solatium.
42.
In this context, it would also be beneficial to refer to the case
of Mehrawal Khewaji Trust (Registered), Faridkot & Ors. vs. State of
Punjab & Ors. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 432, wherein at paragraphs 25 and
26, the position with regard to award of interest under Section 28 has been
elaborated.
“25. This aspect has been considered and answered by the
Constitution Bench in Sunder vs. Union of India. While
considering various decisions of the High Courts and
approving the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court rendered in State of Haryana v. Kailashwati, this
Court held that the interest awardable under Section
28 would include within its ambit both the market value
and the statutory solatium. In view of the same, it is clear
that the person entitled to the compensation awarded is
also entitled to get interest on the aggregate amount
including solatium.
26. The above position has been further clarified by a
subsequent Constitution Bench judgment in Gurpreet
Singh v. Union of India. Based on the earlier Constitution
Bench decision in Sunder, the present Constitution Bench
held that the claimants would be entitled to interest on
solatium and additional market value if the award of the
Reference Court or that of the appellate court does not
specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium
and additional market value or where the claim had not
been rejected either expressly or impliedly.”
Thus, the grant of interest under Section 28 can only be on the
enhanced compensation, and cannot be allowed on the entire sum which
includes the award amount already paid and withdrawn by the
respondents/claimants under protest. To reiterate, the interest to be applied
therefore, would be only on the excess amount and on the solatium,
excluding the amount that had already been received by the claimants.
43.
On another aspect raised by the appellant that Section 28 being
discretionary and the Court below having failed to consider excluding the
application of interest on the period where the appellant was bona fide
pursuing the case and also the COVID – 19 pandemic, wherein most Courts
were not functioning, this Court in Appeal is not inclined to interfere with
the said exercise of discretionary power in this regard, and this contention
stands rejected.
44.
Grant of future interest
Under this caption, wherein challenge has been made by the
appellant with regard to the computation of interest w.e.f. 13.09.2002 till
12.12.2021, in the decree dated 17.03.2020, this Court finds force in the
contention raised by the appellant, inasmuch as, there is no finding or
material to support the same. Further, it is also noted that the decree has
travelled beyond the judgment and order of the Lower Court and is at odds
with the original award of compensation in the judgment. To illustrate this
fact, a perusal of one of the decrees passed in the case of claimant No. 1
(page – 327 of Paperbook I) would go to show the following
discrepancies:(i)
Claimant No. 1, had already drawn compensation
awarded by the Collector under protest on 19.08.2003,
for an amount of Rs.2,55,685/- (rate of Rs.80 per sq
mtr).
(ii)
Compensation was enhanced including rates for damage
to trees and fencing to Rs.15,61,100/- (rate of Rs.160 per
sq mtr of land).
(iii)
Solatium at the rate of 30% or enhanced award that is
30% of Rs.15,61,100/- amounting to Rs.4,68,330/- was
granted instead of being confined to market value.
(iv)
Rs.1,87,332/-
was
granted
at
12%
interest
on
Rs.15,61,100/- under Section 28 for first period that is
w.e.f. 13.09.2001 till 12.09.2002, that is one year from
the date of taking over possession.
(v)
Enhanced compensation plus solatium at the rate of 30%
plus interest at the rate of 12% was fixed at
Rs.22,16,762/-
(vi)
Amount already drawn of Rs.2,55,685/- then deducted
from the enhanced rate, leaving the amount of
Rs.19,61,077/-.
(vii) Additional interest at the rate of 15% on the net
compensation granted w.e.f. 13.09.2002 till 12.12.2021,
amounting
to
Rs.55,89,069.45/-
at
the
rate
of
Rs.2,94,161.55/- per year for 19 years.
(viii) Total enhanced compensation that is 30% solatium plus
interest at 12% for 1 year plus interest at the rate of 15%
thereafter total amounting to Rs.76,23,687/-.
The discrepancy that is present is that firstly, the amount of
Rs.2,55,685/- awarded under Section 11 and accepted by the claimant No. 1
under protest on 19.08.2003, should have been deducted in the beginning
itself and not at the fag end of the computation, which has inflated the
award. The solatium of 30% granted was also on the entire compensation
which resulted in the same being granted on the market value as well as
other amounts awarded for other losses. This defective formula was
uniformly applied by the learned Lower Court in all the cases, therefore the
decrees of all the claimants will necessarily have to be re-examined and
recomputed. The grant of future interest from the date of the decree i.e.
17.03.2020 till 12.12.2021, will also have to be factored out and not taken
into account.
45.
Jurisdiction of the Court vis-a-vis the reference order
It is noted that in the instant case, reference was made by the
Collector under Section 18 of the Act, on the basis of a single petition dated
22.09.2003 (page – 96 of Paperbook I), wherein all the claimants had
appended their signatures. In the said application, the claimants had prayed
for determination of the actual measurement of the land, classification,
demarcation or boundaries, market price of the land and buildings, standing
crops, trees, and cultivation etc. The reference order dated 31.10.2003 (page
– 108 of Paperbook I), however, shows that the reference was made only on
the determination of measurement, classification and rate of land. It is the
appellant’s case that Courts jurisdiction under Section 18 is to be
determined on the basis of the terms of the reference order issued under
Section 19 of the Act and the Court cannot assume jurisdiction over an issue
which is not referred to, and therefore, the Reference Court can only derive
jurisdiction over a matter, or objection referred to it and nothing further. It
has been thus contended by the appellant that the Lower Court having
travelled beyond the terms of reference the award suffers from a lack of
inherent jurisdiction. On this point, it is noted that the appellant had never
raised this issue before the Lower Court, but has now sought to advance the
same at the appellate stage. It is no doubt necessary that at the time of
reference under Section 19 of the Act, the Collector specify exactly the
terms of reference, but however, as has been seen in the instant case, the
terms of reference are vague and is only for determination of measurement,
classification and rate of land, without any further details being specified.
This was inspite of the fact that in the joint application for reference by the
claimants, damage to land and crops had been mentioned, as also the prayer
which should have been considered by the Collector at the time of making
the reference. Further, no justification had been provided by the Collector as
to the grounds on which the compensation had been determined, or as to
why different rates had also been valued for similar grades of land. As held
in the case of Harish Chunder Neogy vs. The Secretary of State for India
in Council reported in (1907) SCC OnLine Cal 69, cited by the Senior
counsel for the respondents, it is also incumbent on the Collector to justify
the award before the Special Judge, and further as held in the case of Ram
Kumar & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1991) 2 SCC 247, it
is the duty of the Collector to send full information to the Court. Though,
these two cases may be in slight variance on facts with the present case,
what they underline is the duty of the Collector as contained in Section 19
of the LA Act must be fulfilled. The reference by the Collector in the instant
matter not being in consonance with or as per the mandate of the LA Act,
the Reference Court therefore, in the absence of any objection thereto, had
thus proceeded with the materials available and had arrived at the awarded
amounts. Moreover, it is pertinent to observe herein that the jurisdiction
exercised by the Lower Court in dealing with the reference, is well within
the set parameters of Section 19 itself, and the impugned judgment and
order on this count not being perverse and in the absence of any challenge
on the issue of jurisdiction at the trial stage, it is found that there is no lack
of inherent jurisdiction in answering the reference.
46.
Grant of compensation for severed lands
A contention has also been raised on the grant of compensation
to claimant No. 15 and claimant No. 60, for severed lands, on the ground
that the claimants could not substantiate the same, but that the Reference
Court only on the absence of a rebuttal had allowed compensation. Though,
on perusal of the judgment, the contention of the appellant is correct,
looking into the two pieces of land and the amount of compensation granted
for which Rs.100/- per sq mtr for 1030 sq mtrs was granted to claimant No.
15 and Rs.50/- per sq mtr for 136 sq mtr was granted to claimant No. 60, it
would be futile to remand this aspect for reconsideration, and as such, the
said award for these two pieces of land for the ends of justice is not
interfered with.
47.
Effect of Collector not adducing evidence
The appellant/Collector, neither filed a written statement nor
was any evidence led on his behalf, and the claimants therefore, have
contended that the Collector being bound to adduce evidence, on his failure
thereof, the rates furnished by them should be accepted. The
respondents/claimants had placed reliance in the case of Periyar and
Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd.(supra) on this point, but however, a perusal of
the same, especially Paras - 15 and 16 thereof, speak otherwise and are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“15. In the light of these principles, the further contention
that having rejected the documents produced by the State, the
High Court ought to have relied upon the documents
produced by the appellant as comparable sale and would have
confirmed the compensation awarded by the civil court does
not impress us as well founded. It is well settled law that the
amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector forms an
offer and that it is for the claimants to adduce relevant and
material evidence to establish that the acquired lands are
capable of fetching higher market value and the amount
offered by the Land Acquisition Collector was inadequate
and he proceeded on a wrong premise or principle. In Ezra v.
Secretary of State for India, it was held that the amount
awarded by the Collector forms an offer. It was reiterated by
this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land
Acquisition Officer, Khorshed Shapoor Chenai v. Assistant
Controller of Estate Duty and Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of
Bihar. In Dr Harisingh case, A.P. Sen, J. held (and majority
did not disagree) at p. 191 C to E that: (SCC p. 244, para 16)
"In a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the
burden of proving that the amount of compensation
awarded by the Collector is inadequate lies upon the
claimant, and he must show affirmatively that the
Collector had proceeded upon a wrong basis. The
nature and the burden of establishing that he was
wrong, depends on the nature of the enquiry held by
him .... It is equally well settled that where the claimant
leads no evidence to show that the conclusions reached
in the award were inadequate, or, that it offered
unsatisfactory compensation, the award has to be
confirmed."
In that case it was held that the evidence produced was
untrustworthy. Same is the view of Bombay High Court in
Asstt. Development Officer v. Tayaballi Allibhoy Bohori and
of A.P. High Court in Narasingh Rao case and T.W. Higginsclaimant v. Secretary of State, Naresh Chandra Bose v. State
of West Bengal, Smt. Kusumgauri Ramray Munshi
v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad, and Maharao
Shri Madansinhji v. State of Gujarat. It is also the duty of the
State to adduce evidence in rebuttal.
16. This Court in Chaturbhuj Panda & Ors. v. Collector,
Raigarh, has rightly pointed out that: (SCR p. 414 G)
"It is true that the witnesses examined on behalf of the
appellants have not been effectively cross-examined. It is also
true that the Collector had not adduced any evidence in
rebuttal; but that does not mean that the court is bound to
accept their evidence. The judges are not computers. In
assessing the value to be attached to oral evidence, they are
bound to call into aid their experience of life. As judges of
fact, it was open to the appellate judges to test the evidence
placed before them on the basis of probabilities."
[Emphasis supplied]
48.
Another judgment relied upon by the respondents/claimants
that is Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal Revenue Officer(supra), which
however, in the considered opinion of this Court was rendered in the context
of Section 51-A of the LA Act, and deals with the aspect of proving the
market value of lands depending upon the prices of lands similarly situated
which were sold or transacted in the neighbouring areas, and it has not held
that the Collector is bound to adduce evidence.
49.
On the other hand, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case cited
by the appellant that is Kiran Tandon(supra), at Para – 10 has held as
follows.
“10. Before examining the merits of the contentions
raised, it will be useful to bear in mind the legal
principle
in
the
matter
of
determination
of
compensation. The Collector's award under Section
11 is nothing more than an offer of compensation
made by the Government to the claimants whose
property is acquired. The burden of proving that the
amount of compensation awarded by the Collector is
inadequate lies upon the claimant and he is in the
position of a plaintiff. The court has to treat the
reference as an original proceeding before it and
determine the market value afresh on the basis of the
material produced before it. The claimant is in the
position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price
offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the
basis of the materials produced in the court. The
material produced and proved by the other side will
also be taken into account for this purpose.”
[Emphasis supplied]
50.
What emerges therefore is that the burden or the duty is on the
claimants to adduce evidence to establish that the acquired lands were
capable of fetching a higher market value and that the amount awarded by
the Collector was inadequate. As held in series of other judgments, the
burden lies upon the claimant as he is in position of a plaintiff and that
courts have to treat references, as original proceedings for determination of
the market value on the basis of the materials produced before it. The nonadducing of evidence by the Collector therefore, or the non-rebuttal of the
materials, in the instant case Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 (Sale Deeds) cannot be a
ground that the rates as suggested by the claimants for the different
categories of land be accepted in toto, inasmuch as, a reference court has to
arrive at its own findings in this regard.
51.
Admissibility of unregistered Sale Deed
The above captioned point having been substantially discussed
at Paragraphs – 35-39, hereinabove, no further discussion of the same is
deemed necessary. Further, as observed earlier, though the unregistered Sale
Deeds had been admitted in evidence, due to their non-registration they do
not affect the immovable properties comprised therein, and as such, were
not required to be looked into.
52.
Grant of uniform rate at Rs. 220/- to end litigation and use of
the principles of guesstimation to arrive at the market rate
The claimants have also advanced a proposition that in order to
put an end to the litigation, they should be paid a uniform rate of Rs. 220/for their lands irrespective of its classification. It is noted that all along
through the reference proceedings, the claimants have sought for rates based
on the classification of the land, and in hindsight due to the fact that not
enough materials could or were produced, on which they could establish
their claim of market value have now resorted to such prayer. The prayer in
the considered view of this Court lacks merit and as such, is disregarded.
This Court will also not hazard an exercise of guesstimation to arrive at the
market value, moreso, with the passage of time, especially in the backdrop
of the sketchy materials and evidence that had been tendered before the
Reference Court. In this context, the case relied upon by the claimants that
is New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh & Ors.
reported in (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1691, to urge this Court to resort to the
principles of guesstimation is also in the view of this Court of no assistance,
as the claimants in the instant case have not brought on record any
substantial or reliable evidence that can be utilized for the purposes of
arriving at the correct market rate.
53.
Other heads of compensation
With regard to the other heads of compensation granted by the
reference court, the same having been arrived at, after due consideration had
also on the opinion of experts, the same is not interfered with and the
contention of the appellant that the same was without jurisdiction especially
in the case of claimant No. 1, for fencing, gates etc. is rejected.
54.
Having traversed all the relevant aspects of the matter, this
Court though sitting in appeal to examine the fairness of the award and
whether the impugned judgment suffered from any illegality or had been
passed without a balanced consideration and due appreciation to the facts
and materials before it, apart from the findings at Paragraphs – 42 and 44,
given hereinbefore, wherein, the awards need correction, cannot but arrive
at a conclusion that the award does not require any substantial interference.
This is primarily due to the fact that there is a total absence of materials on
record or any evidence that would weigh in favour of the appellant, to hold
that the rates decreed by the reference court was in excess of fair market
value. One of the most important causes which led the Reference Court to
award uniform rates of compensation for the respective categories of lands
at the maximum rate computed by the Collector, it is clearly seen, is due to
the non-filing of a written statement and the non-adducing of evidence by
the Collector to justify or explain as to how different rates had been
awarded to the various claimants for the same category of acquired land.
55.
Even from the side of the respondents, apart from the
unregistered Sale Deeds, which were found not to be reliable or relevant, no
cogent evidence was produced before the reference court to substantiate
their claim as to the rates prayed for the different categories of land. Apart
from the expert evidence, which has been given due consideration by the
reference court, no tangible or reliable material was placed by the claimants,
to allow the reference court to embark upon an exercise that may be would
have yielded a correct finding on the prevalent market rate, at the time of
acquisition.
56.
Further, the terms of reference being very sketchy, the
Reference Court was indeed handicapped in dealing with the various issues
raised by the claimants, added with the fact that no evidence had been
brought on record by the claimants to show any perversity in the award of
the Collector, in granting different rates of compensation for the same
category of land to individual land owners/claimants. This Court therefore,
finds no illegality in the homogenization of all claims for each category of
land and awarding the maximum rate as given by the Collector for that
category of land, due to the absence of evidence or materials that would go
to prove the contrary. Therefore, the reason given by the Reference Court
that the rates allowed that is the maximum rate for every category of land as
fixed by the Collector being fair, just and adequate is also accepted.
57.
In the other connected appeals i.e. FA Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
2023, the findings of the Reference Court in FA Nos. 3 and 4 of 2023 have
already been dealt with in this judgment. As regards FA Nos. 1, 2 and 5 of
2023 on the same premise of the main judgment, the order of Reference
Court is upheld.
58.
The findings recorded in this judgment with regard to the
testimony of common witnesses i.e. PW 69, 70 and 71 and the veracity of
the unregistered Sale Deeds which though produced in evidence, but not
accepted by the Reference Court, has also answered the grounds raised in
Cross Appeal No. 1 of 2023, and as such, the Cross Appeal stands
dismissed.
59.
In all fairness, to ensure that justice is substantially done to all
the parties, the instant case is a case fit for remand, inasmuch as, as
observed earlier, there was no benchmark or indicator available in the form
of evidence to allow the Reference Court to gauge or fix the correct market
value, nor any reason given by the Collector for fixation of the rates as
awarded. Severe other lapses and laches such as the non-filing of written
statement or the adducing of any evidence, with regard to the other details
such as size of plots acquired, the terrain, proximity to the then existing or
proposed highway (by-pass), commercial centers or establishments by the
Collector has thwarted any further attempt by this Court to arrive at any
other finding, as regards the market value of the land at the relevant time,
when the notification under Section 4 of the LA Act was issued.
60.
Appeal is a valuable right of the parties conferred by prevalent
law or statute, wherein there is a hierarchical or tiered structure made in the
law, to conclusively decide the controversy of the parties litigating so as to
avoid any further litigation. The First Appellate Court, is a very important
link in the hierarchical chain because the First Appellate Court is the last
court of the fact finding. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the First Appellate
Court being the final court of fact finding to meet with the reasonings of the
Trial Court and to indicate its own reasons for the conclusion which it might
arrive at. In the instant case, though as remarked earlier, that though the
same is a case for remand, however, considering the fact that the
proceedings of land acquisition had commenced since 28.08.2001, and has
been under litigation till date, it would be unfair to subject the claimants to
another round of litigation. Further, it is not a case where the appellant or
the claimants were prevented from adducing evidence in the reference
proceedings, and on this ground also, perhaps this appeal can be closed to
put an end to the controversy. In this context, it would be apposite to refer to
judgment in the case of K. Krishna Reddy & Ors. vs. Special Deputy
Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh
reported in (1988) 4 SCC 163, wherein at Para – 12, it had been given as
follows:
“12. We can very well appreciate the anxiety and need
of claimants to get compensation here and now. No
matter what it is. The lands were acquired as far back
in 1977. One decade has already passed. Now the
remand means another round of litigation. There
would be further delay in getting the compensation.
After all money is what money buys. What the
claimants could have bought with the compensation in
1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of
it. It is a common experience that the purchasing
power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the
delayed payment may lose all charms and utility of the
compensation. In some cases, the delay may be
detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian
agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally
depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find
themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They
have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall
back upon. They know no other work. They may even
face starvation unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it
is of utmost importance that the award should be made
without delay. The enhanced compensation must be
determined without loss of time. The appellate power of
remand, at any rate ought not to be exercised lightly. It
shall not be resorted to unless the award is wholly
unintelligible. It shall not be exercised unless there is
total lack of evidence. If remand is imperative, and if
the claim for enhanced compensation is tenable, it
would be proper for the appellate court to do modest
best to mitigate hardships. The appellate court may
direct some interim payment to claimants subject to
adjustment in the eventual award.”
[Emphasis supplied]
61.
In the result, the award of the maximum uniform rate for the
categories of lands by the Reference Court, as assessed by the Collector is
upheld, however, the award or decrees shall stand modified, as per the
findings of this judgment recorded in Paragraphs – 42 and 44 thereof, with
regard to the grant of interest under Section 28, to be only on the enhanced
compensation, and not on the entire sum which includes the award, and
further, to correct the discrepancies with regard to grant of future interest,
the deduction of the awarded amount under Section 11, and the correction
on the grant of solatium on the entire compensation.
62.
This judgment along with the records shall be transmitted back
to the Reference Court for drawing up the corrected award and decrees in
terms of this judgment, and for recalibration of the balance amount payable
by the appellant to the claimants, in each case. On such exercise being
completed, the appellant shall deposit the amount within 3(three) months
thereafter.
63.
With regard to entitlement to cost, though Section 27 of the LA
Act mandates that when the award of the Collector is not upheld, the cost
shall ordinarily be paid by the Collector, in the instant case, due to the
peculiar facts, there shall be no order as to costs.
64.
Accordingly, FA No. 1 of 2022, FA No. 1 of 2023, FA No. 2
of 2023, FA No. 3 of 2023, FA No. 4 of 2023, FA No. 5 of 2023 and also
the Cross Appeal No. 1 of 2023 stand closed and disposed of.
Judge
Meghalaya
07.02.2025
“D.Thabah-PS”
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