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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 03rd August 2026.
Pronounced on: 05th October 2026.
Uploaded on: 06th October 2026.
#
CNR No. DLHC011772792016
+
MAC.APP. 585/2016 & CM APPL. 27416/2016 CM APPL.
5271/2019
ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD
…..Appellant
Through:
Mr. Ishaan Chhaya, Adv.
versus
SATISH CHANDRA GUPTA & ORS
Through:
…..Respondents
Mr. Naresh Gupta and Mr. Rachit
Gumber, Advs. for LRs of R-1.
Mr. Rahul Bakshi, Adv. for R-3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
INDEX
Sr No.
1.
2.
Title
Page No.
of
The Accident
Submissions
on
behalf
appellant/Insurance Company
➢ Vehicle being driven by injured
claimant
➢ No cover under the Insurance Policy
➢ Agony of the moment
➢ Quantum of compensation
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
3.
4.
Submissions made on behalf of respondent
no.1/injured claimant
➢ Vehicle not being driven by injured
claimant
➢ Injured claimant travelling as an
occupant
Analysis
5.
➢ Claimant travelling as an occupant
➢ Cover under the Insurance Policy
➢ Agony of the Moment
➢ Quantum of compensation
Conclusion
JUDGMENT
%
ANISH DAYAL, J.
1.
This appeal deals with an interesting question of law, whether the
driver of a vehicle shall be held liable for negligence, where an accident
occurred due to the sudden appearance of a stray animal on the road and
the driver being faced with a dilemma due to the ‘agony of the moment’.
2.
This appeal has been filed challenging the impugned award dated
26th May 2016 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
[‘MACT/Tribunal’], Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in MACP
No.44/2015 awarding compensation of Rs.1,70,86,530/- along with 12%
interest in relation to an accident that occurred on 28th May 2014.
The Accident
3.
Sh. Satish Chandra Gupta (hereinafter, ‘injured claimant’), was
travelling home to Chhattarpur from Dwarka and was seated on the rear
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
seat of vehicle bearing registration no. DL-1TAP-5773 (hereinafter,
‘offending vehicle’), driven by respondent no.2/Sanjay Bhati (‘driver’),
allegedly in a negligent manner. When they reached Vasant Kunj, near
Chhattarpur Metro station the driver lost control of the offending vehicle
and dashed into a divider, due to which the injured claimant sustained
grievous injuries. The vehicle was owned by respondent no.3/M/s
Centrodorstroy India Pvt. Ltd. (‘owner’).
4.
The injured claimant suffered grievous injuries and was in Coma
since the date of his accident, till his passing away on 22 nd August 2020.
Dr. Akhilesh Singh, Physician, Consultant General Medicine and Critical
Care Medicine (‘PW9’) stated that the injured claimant was a case of
severe hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy GCS ElMl VT.
Submissions on behalf of appellant/Insurance Company
5.
Mr. Ishaan Chhaya, counsel appears for appellant/Insurance
Company and challenges the award on the grounds of negligence and
compensation awarded. These are elaborated as under:
Vehicle being driven by injured claimant
6.
Case summary of the hospital dated 13th June 2014, recorded that
the injured claimant, “was driving the car and suddenly hit a roadside
pole” and there was no mention of the driver’s name in the FIR.
Moreover, if the injured claimant had been driving, he was doing so
without a driving license, therefore, principles enunciated in National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297 would apply.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
No cover under the Insurance Policy
7.
The Insurance policy, which was a Package Policy in this case,
was valid from 24th May 2014 to 25th May 2015 and was governed by
the Indian Motor Tariff, 2002. The schedule records basic third-party
premium and IMT 28 cover (for paid driver). IMT 29 alone covers
employees travelling or driving in an employer's car on premium being
paid, which had not been taken.
8.
Reliance has been placed upon the decision of Madras High Court
in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. R. Krishnan, 2020 SCC OnLine
Mad 28835, which concerned an employee travelling in the employer
company's vehicle, being driven by the driver. In that case, insurer was
exonerated and the whole liability was placed on the employer for want
of IMT-29 premium. Reliance has also been placed on Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority (‘IRDA’) circulars of 2009,
which stated that such policies do not cover employee-occupants and
there was a specific exclusion.
9.
Since, the injured claimant was the director of respondent
no.3/owner (insured), and respondent no.2/driver had been assigned by
Manager of the Company, therefore, the injured claimant would fall
within the bracket of employees, since he was commuting in an
employer-provided transport within the course of employment. Reliance
has been placed on Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1534 and General Manager, BEST Undertaking, Bombay
v. Mrs. Agnes AIR 1964 SC 193.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
10.
Mr. Chhaya, submitted that an occupant of private car is not a
statutory third party and if, he had been driving or was in control, he
would step in shoes of the owner. Reliance in this regard was placed on
Ningamma & Anr. vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd (2009) 13 SCC
710 and Manjusha v. United India Assurance Company Limited,
2025:INSC:896. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority
of India (‘IRDAI’) circular dated 18th October 2023, issued pursuant to
the directions of Madras High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd
vs Ilakkiyamathi CMA 2166/2019 provided that compulsory cover of
IMT-29 shall be provided as an inbuilt coverage in the package policy.
Agony of the moment
11.
Mr. Chhaya, states that the injured claimant was unable to prove
rash and negligent driving of respondent no.2/driver, which is essential
for a claim filed under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles, Act, 1988 (‘MV
Act’). There were no eyewitnesses to the accident and it had been
admitted by PW1, PW3 and PW8 that they had not witnessed the
accident.
12.
No evidence had been placed on record with reference to the
speed, skid or mechanical condition of the offending vehicle. Both
respondent no.2/driver and PW3 testified that a dog had suddenly come
in front of the car, which then dashed against the divider while trying to
save the dog. It was submitted that having faced the ‘sudden danger’, not
of his own making and having acted as a prudent person, it was not his
negligence.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
13.
Reliance in this regard has been placed on decision of Supreme
Court in Manjusha (supra) where, in case of a tyre bust, the driver was
held to not be negligent. Further reliance has been placed on Syed Akbar
v. State of Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30, where, the vehicle had swerved
in order to avoid collision with a child. Reliance has been placed on
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lakshman Iyer & Anr.
(2003) 8 SCC, 731 to state that negligence is the want of care demanded
by the circumstances.
14.
It was submitted that, respondent no.2/driver would not be
considered rash and negligent, if the plea of the accident having taken
place due to the dog is accepted. Further, preponderance of probability
does not dispense with evidence, therefore, filing of charge-sheet will
not prove the manner of accident. Reliance has been placed on Bimla
Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 and National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 1700.
Quantum of compensation
15.
Mr. Chhaya, submitted that attendant charges had been awarded
twice; and the Tribunal in paragraph 44 of the impugned award had
noted that an amount of Rs. 33,00,000/- towards future medical
treatment and attendant charges for 6 months with effect from 1st March
2016, was directed to be refunded, in case, the injured claimant expired
during the said period. Further, the affidavit of the wife of injured
claimant/Smt. Neena Chandra Gupta as regards the amounts withdrawn
by her was contrary to the testimony given as PW8.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
Submissions made on behalf of respondent no.1/injured claimant
16.
Mr. Naresh Gupta, counsel appears on behalf of respondent
no.1/injured claimant, countered the submissions made by Mr. Chhaya.
These are elaborated as under:
Vehicle not being driven by injured claimant
17.
Mr. Gupta, contends that the plea raised by appellant/insurance
company that the offending vehicle was being driven by the injured
claimant and not by driver, is self-assumed and pure imagination,
contrary to record.
18.
Vinay Tiwari (‘PW3’), an independent witness, was driver of the
ambulance, who had discovered the injured claimant at the scene of
accident and had taken him to the hospital. He had stated that the injured
claimant was lying unconscious in rear seat of the car and had been taken
out of the car and transferred to the ambulance. Respondent no.2/driverSanjay Bhati (‘R1W1’) had stated that he was the driver of offending
vehicle, which also resonates with the Detailed Accident Report (‘DAR’)
filed by the Investigating Officer (‘IO’), confirming the same.
19.
Naveen
Kumar
(‘R3W3’),
witness
of
appellant/Insurance
Company, stated that the injured claimant had been taken to hospital in a
PCR Van, however, the same had been falsified by evidence on record.
20.
The statement of Surinder Singh Yadav, Manager of respondent
no.3/Company, was recorded by the police and filed along with DAR,
noted that the offending vehicle was under use and control of respondent
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
no.2/driver- Sanjay Bhati. For assessment on preponderance of
probabilities, MACT relied upon testimonies of PW3, R1W1 and PW1.
Injured claimant travelling as an occupant
21.
The Insurance policy in question is a ‘Comprehensive/Package
Policy’ and not an ‘Act Only Policy’ and therefore, covered the injured
claimant who was travelling as an occupant in the car. No evidence was
filed by appellant/Insurance Company that respondent no.1/injured
claimant was an employee of respondent no.3/owner. The testimony of
Manager, Insurance Company (‘R3W2’), in this regard, could easily be
ignored since no relationship of employer and employee has been
established between respondent no.3/owner and respondent no.1/injured
claimant.
22.
Appellant/Insurance company failed to rebut the statement of PW3
and R1W1 and the theory that respondent no.1/injured claimant was
driving the car was highly improbable, particularly, since there was a
driver in the car.
Analysis
23.
The issues which have been raised by appellant/Insurance
Company can primarily be categorized as: firstly, whether respondent
no.1/injured claimant was travelling as a passenger in the backseat or
driving the car; secondly, if he was travelling in the backseat as an
occupant, will he be considered as a third party, and therefore, be
covered under third-party liability; thirdly, if he was travelling as an
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
occupant, but was a director of respondent no.3/Company who owned
the car, then would he come within the ambit of being an employee, and
therefore be excluded in the Comprehensive/Package Policy; fourthly,
whether negligence at all can be established of the alleged driver of the
vehicle, taking into account that the accident occurred due to the driver’s
attempt to save a dog, which was crossing the road.
24.
These issues can only be examined on the basis of evidence on
record.
Claimant travelling as an occupant
25.
The claim petition filed before the MACT notes at serial no.11,
that the injured claimant was sitting in the backseat of the offending
vehicle and was travelling to his home in Chhattapur, Delhi from
Dwarka, Delhi. It further notes that respondent no.2/driver-Sanjay Bhati
was driving the said vehicle.
26.
Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) Rohtash Singh, P.S. Vasant Kunj
(South) (‘PW1’), who was the Investigating Officer (IO) in the matter,
stated that he had prepared the site plan and seized the offending vehicle.
Driver of the offending vehicle was respondent no.2/Sanjay Bhati and he
had been arrested and released on bail. He denied the suggestion that
respondent no.2/Sanjay Bhati was not the driver of offending vehicle, or
that he had falsely implicated the driver in order to help respondent
no.1/injured claimant get compensation.
27.
Roop Chand (‘PW2’) was a summoned witness from Medical
Record Office, Max Health Centre, who testified as regards discharge
summary of injured claimant, which had been exhibited as PW 2/2.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
28.
Vinay Tiwari (‘PW3’) was driver of the ambulance, who stated
that he was coming back after dropping a patient at Vasant Kunj and
when he reached Andheriya Mor, 2 to 3 persons standing nearby waved
at him to stop the vehicle. He saw one Mercedes car standing there in an
accidental condition and an injured person was lying unconscious at
“rear seat of the car”. He stated that he took the injured person out and
transferred him to the ambulance and got him admitted. Respondent
no.2/Sanjay Bhati also accompanied him to the hospital and stated that
he was the driver of the offending vehicle. He further stated that he was
driving the car and in order to save a dog, he swerved the car, which
struck against a divider and respondent no.1/Satish Chandra sustained
injuries.
29.
DAR which had been filed also noted at serial no. 6 that the driver
of offending vehicle was respondent no.2/Sanjay Bhati and noted at
serial no.10 that the victim was respondent no.1/Satish Chandra.
Respondent no.2/Sanjay Bhati (‘R1W1’) himself, in his evidence by way
of affidavit, stated that he was driving the offending vehicle, though,
with care and due caution and the accident occurred only because a dog
came in front of the car and swerved the car into the divider in order to
save the dog. There is nothing in the cross-examination to suggest
otherwise or to suggest anything contrary to the above.
30.
Appellant/Insurance Company relied upon the hospital discharge
summary prepared by Max Healthcare [Ex. PW2/2 (Colly)], which
recorded that it was evident that before the incident, injured claimant
was driving the car that suddenly hit the roadside pole after which he
became unconscious.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
31.
A perusal of the MLC dated 28th May 2014, which noted the
arrival of injured claimant at 17:15 hours, time of accident at 16:30
hours, notes the accompanying person as ‘Sanjay’, with the mobile
number ‘9810004100’. It further notes that the patient was found in an
unconscious state by a passing ambulance.
32.
This corroborates with the testimony of PW3, driver of the
ambulance, who had stated that he had stopped his ambulance when he
saw one Mercedes car standing in an accidental condition and the injured
claimant was lying unconscious in the rear seat of the car. He took the
injured claimant in the ambulance and got him admitted in Max
Hospital, Saket. Further, another person named ‘Sanjay Bhati’ had also
accompanied him to the hospital, who stated that he was the driver. MLC
in question, to which, counsel for respondent no.1/injured claimant has
drawn attention to, would therefore corroborate that the patient was
found unconscious by a passing ambulance and the person who had
accompanied him was ‘Sanjay’ having the same address and phone
number.
33.
Counsel for appellant/Insurance Company, submitted that Sanjay
Bhati had disowned the mobile number provided in the MLC, as he
stated that mobile number was ‘9910167383’ and he did not know as to
whom, the mobile number ‘981000400’ belonged. Appellant/Insurance
Company’s case, therefore, rests merely on the discrepancy of the phone
number which cannot be determinative considering that it should be a
recording error by the hospital staff. Rest of the details of Sanjay Bhati
as recorded in the MLC, i.e. the injured claimant being brought in an
ambulance, testimony of PW3, R1W1 are otherwise aligned.
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
34.
Considering that this is being examined in the rubric of
preponderance of probability, the Court has no reason to reject the
injured claimant’s version that he was sitting in the rear seat of the car
and respondent no.2/Sanjay Bhati was driving the vehicle.
35.
In light of the above testimonies on record and DAR, the plea of
appellant/Insurance Company that since there were no eyewitnesses who
saw him driving the vehicle, it cannot be presumed that respondent
no.2/Sanjay Bhati was indeed driving a vehicle, is hereby rejected.
Cover under the Insurance Policy
36.
On the second issue of whether he would classify as a third party
and would not be excluded on account of being director of the company,
nature of the Insurance Policy will have to be considered.
37.
A perusal of the Insurance Policy shows that Company is the
insurer and covers third-party liability and paid driver (IMT 28), as also
unnamed personal accident (‘PA’) cover for seven persons of
Rs.1,50,000/- each. Appellant/Insurance Company has sought to assert
that, since he was an employee of the Company, the insurance policy
ought to have included an additional cover under IMT 29. The said
clause is extracted as under:
“IMT. 29. Legal liability to employees of the insured
other than paid driver and/or conductor and/or
cleaner who may be travelling or driving in the
employer’s car
{Private Cars only/Motorised two wheelers (not for
hire or reward)}
In consideration of the payment of an additional
premium @ Rs.25/- per employee insured
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
the policy it is hereby understood and agreed that the
insurer will indemnify the insured against the insured’s
liability at Common Law and Statutory Liability
under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 for compensation
(including legal costs of any claimant) for death of or
bodily injury to any employee (other than paid drivers)
of the within named insured being carried in or upon
or entering in or getting on to or alighting from or
driving the vehicle insured.
Provided that in the event of an accident whilst the
vehicle insured is carrying more than .....* employees
of the insured (including the driver) the insured shall
repay to the insurer a rateable proportion of the total
amount payable by the insurer by the reason of this
endorsement in respect of accident in connection with
such vehicle insured.
Subject otherwise to the terms, conditions limitations
and exceptions of this Policy.
NB. * To insert the number of employees for which the
premium has been paid.”
(emphasis added)
38.
MACT has covered this issue in paragraph 49 of impugned
award. It had been contended by the claimant that he was merely an
Independent Director and not a whole-time Director, nor was he drawing
salary from the Company.
39.
In the claim petition, it has been mentioned that he was drawing a
monthly salary of Rs.20,000/- from M/s. O.P. Gupta and Sons Private
Ltd. MACT had noted that no evidence had been led by
appellant/Insurance Company to the effect that the injured claimant was
drawing salary from respondent no.3/Company or that he was engaged
as a full-time Director of the Company. Injured claimant also showed
Form 32, which showed the date of appointment as an additional director
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
on 3rd December 2009. Considering that there was no evidence by
appellant/Insurance Company, in this regard, to show that he was an
employee of the Company, MACT's view in rejecting the plea is
therefore not amiss and the Court approves of the same.
40.
Counsel for respondent no.1/injured claimant, further pointed out
to the statement given by
Surendra Singh Yadav, Manager
(Administration) of the Company, who in a statement given on 28 th
August 2014, stated that he was doing the work of assigning various
company cars and that the offending vehicle was being driven by Sanjay
Bhati and he was assigned to drive the School Chairman Satish Chandra
from school to his residence at Chhattarpur.
41.
Therefore, there is nothing on record to show that the injured
claimant was an employee of the company. Moreover, respondent
no.1/injured claimant submitted that Rule 7 of the Delhi Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal Rules, 2008 provides that there is a presumption about
DAR, until the contrary is proved, since no witness was produced by
appellant/Insurance Company to rebut the presumption.
42.
Therefore, considering that respondent no.1/injured claimant was
not an employee and was an occupant of the car, he would be covered by
the Comprehensive/Package Policy. This aspect has now been settled by
National Insurance Company v. Smt. Thungala Dhana Laxmi & Ors.
2026:INSC:793, where the Supreme Court held that the scope of
Comprehensive/Package Insurance Policy covers liability, injury, death
or damage to the property of occupants of the vehicles, including, those
travelling in the rear seat of two wheelers and four wheelers. Relevant
finding of the Court is extracted as under:
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
“1. In the present appeal, this Court had proceeded on
primarily two issues, which arose for consideration.
The first being, the lack of compliance of Section 146
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 19881 which requires all
vehicles to have a valid insurance policy covering
third-parties. Secondly, whether there should be a
uniform motor-vehicle policy structure covering all
occupants of a vehicle, in addition to the statutorily
mandated coverage of third-party risks.
…
13. The various insurance companies before us have
submitted that insurance policies can broadly be
categorized as follows:
…
ii. Comprehensive Insurance Policy: This type of
insurance covers liability for injury, death, or
damage to the property of occupants of both
vehicles concerned. For instance, pillion riders of
two-wheelers and other occupants of a fourwheeler are also covered under this insurance.
34. It is well settled that in matters concerning motor
accident claims, Courts should not adopt a hypertechnical approach. As rightly submitted by the
claimant respondents, in accordance with the circular
of the IRDA dated 16.11.2009, insurance companies
are liable to compensate for any occupant in the
vehicle under a comprehensive/package policy.
Consequently, we find no reason to disagree with the
reasoning adopted by the High Court. The present
Civil Appeal is dismissed to that extent.”
(emphasis added)
43.
Reliance may also be placed upon the decision of Supreme Court
in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Balakrishnan & Anr. (2013) 1
SCC
731,
where
distinction
was
made
between
a
Comprehensive/Package Policy and an Act Only Policy. The claimant
was the Managing Director of the Company and was travelling in the
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
Company owned vehicle when it met with an accident. While, MACT
granted compensation to injured by treating him as a third party and
holding the Insurance Company liable, High Court treated owner of the
vehicle to be liable and held that, since injured was only an occupant of
the car, Insurance Company was liable to indemnify.
44.
Reference was made to decision of this Court in Yashpal Luthra
v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 4291, which
recorded evidence of the competent authority of Tariff Advisory
Committee (‘TAC’) and Insurance Regulatory and Development
Authority (‘IRDA’) in the context of circular dated 16th November 2009
issued to all Insurance Companies. The circular was issued with respect
to liability of Insurance Companies of a pillion rider on a two-wheeler
and occupants in a private car under the “Comprehensive/Package
Policy”. The circular stated that liability of an insurer with respect to an
occupant travelling in a private car and as a pillion rider on a twowheeler was covered under the Standard Motor Package Policy. IRDA
stated before the High Court that TAC had issued instructions to all
Insurance Companies to cover the pillion rider of a two-wheeler under
Comprehensive/Package
Policy.
It
was
also
admitted
that
Comprehensive Policy is presently called Package Policy. Observations
of this Court in Yashpal Luthra (supra) were extracted by the Supreme
Court as under:
“27. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the
comprehensive/package policy of a two wheeler covers
a pillion rider and comprehensive/package policy of a
private car covers the occupants and where the vehicle
is covered under a comprehensive / package policy,
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
there is no need for Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to
go into the question whether the Insurance Company is
liable to compensate for the death or injury of a pillion
rider on a two-wheeler or the occupants in a private
car. In fact, in view of the TAC‟s directives and those
of the IRDA, such a plea was not permissible and
ought not to have been raised as, for instance, it was
done in the present case.”
(emphasis added)
45.
The Supreme Court in Balakrishnan (supra), concluded that there
was no doubt that a ‘Comprehensive/Package Policy’ would cover the
liability of insurer for payment of compensation for an occupant in a car.
But an ‘Act Only Policy’ stands on a different footing, as it will not cover
third-party risk of an occupant in a car. Therefore, decision of the High
Court was set aside and the matter was remitted back to Tribunal to
scrutinize the insurance policy from a proper perspective and for readjudication of the matter.
46.
Accordingly, this Court is inclined to accept the submission of
respondent no.1/injured claimant, that he was travelling as an occupant
in the offending vehicle and would therefore, be entitled to compensation
by appellant/Insurance Company.
Agony of the Moment
47.
Another issue was raised by Mr. Chhaya, counsel for
appellant/Insurance Company, as to whether the accident occurred due to
the negligence of respondent no.2/driver on account of the dog passing
by in front of the car.
48.
Respondent no.2/driver testified that a dog had suddenly come in
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
the front of the car and, therefore, he swerved and dashed against the
divider in an attempt to save the dog. Mr. Chhaya, therefore, pleaded
that this would amount to a ‘sudden danger’ which when confronted
with, the driver was left with no option but to take action to save them as
any prudent person would act and therefore, the accident took place in
the ‘agony of the moment’ and not due to negligence of the driver.
49.
‘Agony of the Moment’ or ‘sudden danger’ are phrases which have
been used by Courts across the world to broadly describe situations a
driver may suddenly be faced with, triggering a dilemma and thus,
forced to take avoidance measures, which may lead to an accident.
50.
Certain decisions have been rendered by the Supreme Court and
other High Courts, that are being referred to which have dealt with the
issue of similar situations involving the driver being put in a dilemma,
due to the ‘agony of the moment.’
(i)
An early decision of the Kings Bench in England in Jones
v. Boyce [1816] 171 ER 540 was a case where the plaintiff who
had been travelling as a passenger had jumped out of a carriage,
anticipating that the carriage would overturn due to defective
reins. Even though the carriage did not overturn, the defendant
was held to be liable on the basis that the plaintiff was placed in a
‘reasonable degree of alarm’ that necessitated this reaction for
the purpose of self-preservation and if the act was prudent and
sufficient to prove the defendant's fault which forced the plaintiff
into a perilous choice.
(ii) Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi
Tak & Ors., (2002) 6 SCC 455. In this case, the appellant
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR MAC.APP. 585/2016
13:07:16
(therein) had been driving a car when a truck came to the central
portion of a 22 feet wide road from the opposite side at an
excessive speed. The car driven by appellant collided with the
right-side wheels of the truck. High Court held the appellant
liable for contradictory negligence and reduced the compensation
by 30%. In appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the question of
contributory negligence has to be decided on the same principle
as that of defendant’s negligence, i.e. the standard of reasonable
man.
What is reasonable care, depends on the circumstances of the
case and as also upon the nature of duty that has to be performed
by the defendant. Contributory negligence focuses on the conduct
of plaintiff and duty owed by the defendant is one of the main
factors to be weighed in. Therefore, accepting the principle that if
one party places another in a situation of danger which compels
them to act quickly in order to extricate themselves, the same
does not amount to contributory negligence.
Relying upon the opinion penned by Lord Viscount Hailsham in
the decision of House of Lords in Swadling v. Cooper 1931 AC
1, the Supreme Court held there was no contributory negligence
at all and noted as under:
“the truck driven by the second respondent,
almost came to the centre of the road and the
appellant must have been put in a dilemma and
in the agony of that moment, the appellant’s
failure to swerve to the extreme left of the road,
did not amount to negligence.”
The opinion of Lord Viscount Hailsham, which was relied upon
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by the Supreme Court is extracted as under:
“Mere failure to avoid the collision by taking
some extraordinary precaution does not in
itself constitute negligence: the plaintiff has no
right to complain if in the agony of the collision
the defendant fails to take some step which
might have prevented a collision unless that
step is one which a reasonably careful man
would fairly be expected to take in the
circumstances.”
(emphasis added)
(iii) In K. J. Jestine v. Prasad K. 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 24255,
the Court was dealing with a case where the appellant suffered
injuries on account of being hit by another motorcycle which
came from behind. The injury was sustained due to falling from
the bike by skidding, after being intercepted by another
motorcycle. Kerala High Court expostulated on the ‘Bywell
Castle Rule’ which emanates from the decision of the Court of
Appeal in London Steamboat Company v. Bywell Castle
(Owners Of), (1878) 9 Probate Division 219, wherein, it was
held that if due to wrong manoeuvres, one ship has placed
another ship in a position of extreme danger, that other ship will
not be held liable, if it has done something wrong and not
manoeuvred with perfect skill and presence of mind. The ‘Bywell
Castle Rule’ was expressed by the Kerala High Court as, “where
a person is put in sudden danger, he cannot be expected to
exercise the due care, skill, coolness and wisdom which a man of
ordinary prudence would have taken. The person or the plaintiff
is perplexed or agitated by the act of the defendant. What is done
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or omitted to be done, in the agony of the moment, cannot fairly
be treated as negligence.” Interception of the motorcycle causing
the appellant to skid his vehicle, could be seen as a justified
manoeuvre in order to save himself and, therefore, does not
constitute negligence.
(iv) Satish Kumar v. Bysakh P. 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 16826
was a case where the appellant therein had been riding a
motorcycle, when he sustained injuries after being hit by a jeep.
The Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that the appellant therein
could have avoided the accident, if he was diligent and attributed
contradictory negligence. The Kerala High Court relied upon the
decisions in Pramodkumar (supra) and K. J. Jestine (supra) and
stated that the appellant was put in a fear of sudden danger and in
a perplexed and agitated mood and further due to its agony, did
or omitted to do something that he cannot be held to be negligent.
51.
While the decisions noted above deal with situations arising from
a sudden danger caused due to the act of defendant driving a vehicle, and
therefore the element of contributory negligence has been considered by
the Courts. However, these decisions do not deal with situations where
the sudden danger is caused by a completely unconnected factor i.e. a
natural cause or an animal. Reliance may be placed upon the following
decisions that deal with such situations.
(i)
The factual matrix in State of MP v. Davi, 1980 SCC
OnLine MP 83, was such that the deceased was travelling in a
government jeep and the jeep had overturned due to the sudden
appearance of goats. The question before the Court was whether
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the driver was negligent in driving the vehicle, as a result of
which it overturned. It was held that the driver was negligent in
not slowing down the vehicle, which could have avoided the
sudden application of brakes and overturning of the vehicle. It
was held that caution has to be more, since its common
experience that behaviour of animals on the road is uncertain.
Relevant finding of the Court is extracted as under:
“3.…Having regard to the facts stated above, it
cannot be said that the speed of 30 to 40 Kms.
at which the jeep was being driven at the
relevant time, was a reasonable speed. It is not
the case of the driver that the goats were not
visible from a distance. A reasonable driver
would have foreseen the possibility of the goats
straying on the road on the approach of the
vehicle and would have considerably reduced
the speed. In our opinion, the driver was
clearly negligent in not slowing down the
vehicle which would have avoided sudden
application of brakes and the overturning of the
vehicle.”
(emphasis added)
(ii) In Chaman Lal v. Anil Kumar 2006 SCC OnLine P&H
1255, a cow had appeared in front of a jeep due to which the jeep
hit a scooter which was being driven on the side and the claim
petition had been filed by the pillion rider of the scooter. It was
held that the jeep driver was negligent, as mere appearance of a
cow would not absolve them of liability. The driver ought to have
stopped if he was driving at a normal speed. Relevant paragraph
is extracted as under:
“12. On the basis of the judgment of the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant was that
merely because a cow had appeared all of a
sudden which was the cause of the accident and
the deceased had made a statement to this
effect, it could not absolve the jeep driver of his
liability. In the present case, it would be seen
that in case the jeep driver was at a normal
speed, then he ought to have stopped the jeep
rather than to go on the wrong side of the road
and hit the scooter. This act of the jeep driver
clearly shows that the jeep was being driven
rashly and negligently.”
(emphasis added)
(iii) The Kerala High Court in Babu Cherian v. K.P. Varghese
2008:KER:43199, was dealing with a matter, where the vehicle
had hit against a concrete wall while trying to save a dog which
had been standing on the road. It was held that the vehicle would
not have gone off the road and out of control, if it was not being
driven at a high speed, therefore, there is ‘intrinsic’ negligence
on the part of the driver. Relevant paragraph is extracted as
under:
“…Even though the car was swerved to save a
animal which is a spontaneous and reflex action it
will lead to ouster from the road and hit a
roadside wall at high speed unless the driver
could not control the vehicle. Going by the
damages caused to the vehicle as recorded in the
report of the A.M.I, it is obvious that the vehicle
at the time of the accident was driven at a high
speed and hence he could not control the vehicle
or otherwise the vehicle would not go out of the
road. In any case the impact of the accident itself
proves high speed while driving in the middle of
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the night and therefore there is intrinsic
negligence of the driver is self-evident.”
(emphasis added)
(iv) The facts before the Uttarakhand High Court in Oriental
Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pankaj Singh Jantwal & Ors. 2011
SCC OnLine Utt 411, involved cattle which had suddenly
appeared in front of a tractor. As a result, the tractor overturned
and hit the claimant who had been standing on the side. The
Court held that the claimant was not liable for contradictory
negligence and, the tractor was held liable. Relevant discussion
of the Court is extracted hereunder:
“The question what is a negligent act, was also
considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Shri Laxman Iyer, [2004 (1) T.A.C.
3 (S.C.)]. It has been held by the Apex Court
that—
‘Negligence is omission of duty caused either
by an omission to do something which a
reasonable
man
guided
upon
those
considerations who ordinarily by reason of
conduct of human affairs would do or obligated
to, or by doing something which a prudent or
reasonable man would not do. Negligence does
not always mean absolute carelessness, but
want of such a degree of care as is required in
particular circumstances. Negligence is failure
to observe, for the protection of the interests of
another person, the degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. The idea of negligence and duty are
strictly correlative. Negligence means either
subjectively a careless state of mind, or
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objectively careless conduct.’
Lastly reliance was placed by the claimants on
a judgment dated 6-12-2004, passed by
Division Bench of this Court in A.O. No. 170 of
2002, United India Insurance Company v.
Sarafat Khan. The fact of case was almost
similar to that of case at hand. In that case also
wild animals appeared on the road and in
process to save the vehicle dashed against a
tree. The appeal of insurance company was
dismissed, following the judgment of Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Shri
Laxman Iyer [2004 (1) T.A.C. e (S.C.)].
In the instant case it is admitted case of parties
that at the place of accident a cow had come in
front of offending tractor and the driver of the
tractor tried to save the cow and in this process
the tractor overturned and hit the claimant and
he sustained grievous injuries. It is not the case
of the opposite party that the claimant himself
was also negligent in the accident. The driver
opposite party No. 3 in his written statement
has alleged that when the accident took place
the claimant was standing by the side of the
road. Thus, it is proved that the claimant
himself did not contribute the negligence and
he sustained injuries in the accident arising out
of use of motor vehicle.”
(emphasis added)
(v) The matter before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Harmesh Kumar v. Inderjit Singh, FAO 4522/2012. involved a
collision between two cars due to cattle crossing the road. The
High Court held that negligence cannot be attributed to any
person other than a human agency. The situation would be
different in case of a mechanical failure or nature's intervention.
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Relevant discussion of the Court is extracted as under:
“2. … All accidents have a latent quality of
want of care in some way. Negligence cannot
be attributed to any person other than a human
agency. A driver or passenger cannot say that
an animal was negligent for it is illogical and
does not come within the realm of legal
reasoning. The reasoning is that any person
that drives must factor his own driving skills
and not looking for excuses of how another
agency that is not human has created a
situation that had diminished his own driving
skills. Mechanical failure or nature's
intervention are different and wherever such
factors raised, they must be pleaded and
proved. That is how we must approach an issue
where a cattle crosses the road. No driver can
ever come to court to say that he carefully
dashed against yet another vehicle. It is
tautological. Careful driving of both drivers
and collision do not marry, one annihilates the
other. Therefore, if there was any statement by
any of the parties that both the drivers were
careful but it was an animal which was not
careful and therefore, accident was caused, we
must take that such statement lacks any sense
and we cannot give a legal approbation to such
a statement to deny a claim. The best that could
be said is that there was no criminal
negligence.”
(emphasis added)
(vi) In
SBI
General
Insurance
v.
Anju
Bala,
2025:PHHC:108510, the Punjab and Haryana High Court was
adjudicating a matter where the car had overturned, collided with
a tree and fell into a ditch, when stray cattle had appeared before
it. The court opined that drivers cannot evade liability by taking
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the excuse of stray animals or sudden obstructions. They have a
duty to anticipate foreseeable hazards and exercise control and
vigilance.
“13. Judicial precedents have consistently held
that a driver cannot take refuge in the excuse of
stray animals or sudden obstructions to evade
liability. Every driver is under a bounden duty
to anticipate foreseeable hazards on the road
and to exercise due control and vigilance. The
very fact that the vehicle overturned, veered off
the road into the fields and struck a tree,
resulting in the death of Ashish Goyal, is by
itself demonstrative of culpable rashness and
conscious disregard of the duty of care
incumbent upon respondent No.3. The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur squarely applies, for the
nature of the accident itself speaks volumes of
the lack of reasonable care and skill in the
operation of the vehicle.”
(emphasis added)
52.
Analysing these decisions and the views taken by the Courts, the
picture which emerges is quite clear. The issue of contributory
negligence if pleaded against the plaintiff, in a situation of sudden
danger caused due to the act of defendant, may not succeed. Firstly,
there is a duty of care on the defendant to have taken reasonable care to
not trigger a perilous situation and; secondly, the prudent conduct of the
plaintiff being unable to avoid such a perilous situation and an attempt to
mitigate the situation.
53.
The other set of situations arise where there is no defendant, in
that, the accident has been caused due to a stray animal, an intervening
natural cause, which triggers a perilous situation. In such cases, the
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Courts have taken a view that it is for the drivers to expect such
situations to happen and therefore, to exercise reasonable care in order to
ensure that they do not cause any injury or harm to a bystander or to the
occupants of the car.
54.
The case at hand relates to the second situation, where it has been
pleaded that a dog had crossed the road and in trying to avoid the dog the
driver dashed against the divider ultimately resulting in the death of the
occupant in the rear seat. The ‘agony of the moment’ or the ‘sudden
danger’ is present in both situations, however, in the former set it is
caused by a human agency, whereas, in the latter set it is caused by a
stray animal or a natural cause.
55.
It would not be inapposite to observe that traffic on the roads in
India can be particularly unpredictable. Road users have a propensity not
to follow road discipline or to adhere strictly to traffic regulations. This
naturally triggers myriad unpredictable situations, which road users in
India are often faced with. To avoid mishaps, this naturally requires
faster reflexes, consistent alertness and presence of mind. The country is
beset with a huge number of motor accidents occurring due to various
causes, be it careless pedestrians, stray animals, aggressive drivers,
overspeeding, drunken driving, lane indiscipline, etc.
56.
The range of issues which trigger accidents has recently been
documented through statistical data by the Minister of Road Transport
and Highways in response to the Unstarred Question no. 1939, answered
on 30th July 2026, which provided details of road accidents, fatalities and
injuries reported in the last 5 years, with the data for 2026 available upto
27th July 2026. The response also provided category-wise details of
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accidents resulting out of over-speeding, drunk driving, distracted
driving, along with other causes. Relevant paragraphs are extracted as
under:
“(a) Government publishes report on “Road Accidents
in India” based on data received from States/ UTs.
Based on the data available with the Government, the
State-wise details of total number of road accidents
and fatalities on all categories of roads in the country,
during the year 2021 to 2025 and 2026 (upto
27.07.2026) is at Annexure-I. The details of fatalities
and injuries caused to pedestrians during 2021 to 2025
and 2026 (upto 27.07.2026) is at Annexure-II.
(b) As per the data, road accidents are multi-causal
phenomenon and are the result of interplay of various
factors. These can broadly be categorized into (i)
human error, (ii) road condition/environment and (iii)
vehicular condition.
The details of road accidents classified according to
major causes (Traffic rule violations) including overspeeding, drunk driving and other causes is given
below as Table 1 and the no. of accident attributed to
potholes during 2021 to 2025 and 2026 is given as
Table 2.
Table 1:
Road Accidents Classified According to Traffic Rule
Violations in India
Category
2025*
2026*
Overspeeding
2,95,522
3,33,323
3,28,727
3,45,024
82,124
46,075
Drunken
driving/consu
mption of
alcohol & drug
9,150
10,080
9,143
8,270
2,589
1,443
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Category
2025*
2026*
Driving on
wrong
side/Lane
indiscipline
21,491
22,586
25,242
22,530
4,089
2,397
Jumping red
light
2,203
4,021
2,440
1,559
Use of mobile
phone
6,530
7,558
7,122
4,935
Others
77,536
83,744
1,07,909
1,05,389
4,28,075
2,33,552
All India
4,12,432
4,61,312
4,80,583
4,87,707
5,19,314
2,85,770
* Data for year 2025 and 2026 (upto 27.07.2026) are
as per e-DAR.
Table 2:
No. of road accidents attributed to
Year
Potholes
Distraction to
Driver
Accident due to Road
condition
47,049
22,647
1,23,322
39,388
1,46,025
37,865
2,03,897
46,898
2026- up to
27.07.2026
1,51,526
29,628
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Note: 1 The given data sets (Distraction to Driver,
Accident due to Road condition) are entered by State
police officials on e-DAR portal.
Note: 2 The given Potholes data sets are entered by
State Highways officials on e-DAR portal.”
57.
Road users in India have a propensity to take sudden unpredictable
deviations while travelling on the road, triggering alarming situations
which a road user may be faced with.
58.
For example, while crossing a semi-urban or a rural road, driver of
any vehicle ought to be alert to the possibility of stray animals crossing
the road. The same unfortunately would be the case in crowded,
congested urban areas as well.
59.
At all times, a driver on the road has to be alert with complete
visual focus, the road space in front of him and traffic at the rear. Aside
from this, the driver has to be in complete control of the vehicle which,
due to its mass and velocity has a high momentum and, therefore, needs
to be effectively controlled through steering and braking systems. A
quick response time may be required in certain situations and one cannot
simply absolve drivers on the roads from that duty of care.
60.
The view which has been taken and the various decisions cited
above also echo the same sentiment. In Harmesh Kumar (supra) the
Punjab and Haryana High Court noted that a driver cannot resort to
saying that an animal was negligent for its illogical act and the driver
must factor their own driving skills. The Court had opined that drivers
cannot evade liability by taking such an excuse and therefore, have a
duty to anticipate possible hazards and exercise control and vigilance.
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61.
The concept has been pithily put by the Supreme Court in
Laxman Iyer (supra) where, it was noted that, “the idea of negligence
and duty are strictly correlative. Negligence means either subjectively a
careless state of mind, or objectively careless conduct.”
62.
One cannot simply exonerate the driver from such liability, since
it would otherwise open a Pandora’s box of excuses being made for
negligent conduct. A driver's conduct could be negligent on various
fronts, such as, driving at a speed where they could not control the
vehicle, or not paying enough attention to the road, or not having visual
focus to be able to anticipate the danger much earlier. All these factors
could contribute to lack of reasonable care.
63.
Mr. Chhaya, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company, has relied
upon the decisions in Syed Akbar (supra) and Manjusha (supra) in his
support, however, the same shall not be applicable to the present case.
The Supreme Court in Syed Akbar (supra) dealt with a Criminal Appeal
preferred by a bus driver who had swerved the bus to the right side in
order to save a child who had been crossing the road, therefore, the
finding on negligence in a criminal case cannot be equated with principle
of preponderance of probabilities that is followed in MACT proceedings.
Manjusha (supra) on the other hand, was an appeal by claimants
travelling in a car where the accident occurred due to a mechanical
intervention i.e. a tyre burst. Compensation had been granted due to the
nature of the insurance policy being a ‘Comprehensive/Package Policy’,
therefore, the same can be distinguished on facts.
64.
Therefore, in this view, the Court is not inclined to accept the
appellant/Insurance Company’s plea on the driver not being negligent,
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due to the ‘agony of the moment’.
Quantum of compensation
65.
Mr.
Chhaya,
counsel
for
appellant/Insurance
Company,
challenged the quantum of compensation on essentially three grounds,
which are noted as under:
(i)
Firstly, he submitted that attendant charges have been
awarded twice by the MACT. Once under the standalone head at
Rs.21,35,000/- and also awarding Rs.33,00,000/- towards future
medical expenses, which was inclusive of medicines and
attendant charges.
(ii) Secondly, Rs.33,00,000/- (Rs.5,50,000/- for six months with
effect from 1st March 2016) awarded towards future medical
expenses carried a pre-condition that the same may be refunded
to the Insurance Company in case the injured claimant expired
during the said period considering that he had been in coma since
the date of accident. Since the injured claimant passed away on
22nd August 2020, this amount should be refunded.
(iii) Thirdly, he contended that the expenses incurred by the wife
of injured claimant/Smt. Neena Chandra Gupta which were
withdrawn by her amounted to Rs. 79 lakhs, however, the same is
contrary to her testimony given as PW8.
66.
As regards the first contention for payment of attendant charges,
the Court has perused through the testimony of Ms. Divya Jyoti
Dungdung (‘PW6’), who was the injured claimant’s nursing attendant
and was charging Rs. 42,000/- per month. In support of her testimony,
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she has provided the original payment receipts, which has been exhibited
as Ex. PW 6/5 (Colly). The said receipts have been perused by the Court,
along with the statement of Dr. Akhilesh Singh, MD, Physician, M/s
Super Speciality Hospital (‘PW9’).
67.
PW9 stated that, from the date of accident till the date when he last
visited the injured claimant on 16th December 2015, he was in
coma/unconscious state. He further stated that the patient cannot be left
alone without an attendant and had advised the family of injured
claimant to arrange for a qualified medical/nursing attendant for 24
hours. Even if the injured claimant regains consciousness in the future,
he will not be able to perform his day-to-day activities and will remain
bed ridden.
68.
Accordingly, considering the nature of his injuries, the Court is
not inclined to displace the finding of MACT as regards the
compensation awarded for attendant charges, as also the compensation
awarded for future medical expenses.
69.
As regards the second contention, injured claimant had
subsequently passed away on 22nd August 2020, as noted in the death
certificate annexed to the appeal. Therefore, appellant/Insurance
Company’s submission in this regard shall also not be sustainable, since
the period for refund of the amount towards medical expenses was for 6
months w.e.f. from 1st March 2016.
70.
As regards the third contention, the Court is inclined to consider
the detailed testimony of the wife of injured claimant (PW8) who has
tendered the receipts of medical expenses incurred for treatment. Ex. PW
8/3 is a list of dates and fees charged by Dr. Akhilesh Singh. Ex. PW8/4
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is the payment receipt issued by Ms. Dolma Tsering for November 2014
and January 2015 to May 2015. Ex. PW 8/5 is the original receipt issued
by Sh. Tsering Dawa for October 2014, December 2014, February 2015
to October 2015. Ex. PW 8/6 is the receipt issued by Sh. Rakesh R for
October 2014 to December 2014. Ex. PW 8/7 is the payment receipt of
Rs. 37,200/- issued by Dr. Akram Khan. Ex. PW8/8 is the payment
receipt of Rs.32,500/- issued by Dr. Manish Gupta. Original medical
bills of Rs.15,70,405.44/- and Rs.1,57,405/- have also been exhibited as
Ex. PW 8/9 and Ex. PW 8/10. Further bills of Rs.1,88,200/- issued by Dr.
Akram Khan, have been exhibited as Ex. PW8/11.
71.
The contention raised by Mr. Chhaya, that the testimony given by
the wife of injured claimant in terms of affidavit pursuant to order dated
25th August 2017, may not sustain, considering that a breakup of the
payments made through cash and cheque mode, along with amount
received in insurance and paid through credit card has been provided.
Considering that the accident occurred on 28th May 2014 and the injured
claimant was in coma till the date of his death on 22 nd August 2020,
MACT has correctly awarded the amount towards medical expenses.
Conclusion
72.
Therefore, in view of the above, the appeal of Insurance Company
lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed.
73.
By order dated 6th September 2016, the Court had directed the
Insurance Company to deposit 50% of the compensation along with upto-date interest before the Registrar General and the said amount was
kept in FDRs to be released to the injured claimant through his wife.
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74.
Considering that the appeal of Insurance Company has been
dismissed, the balance 50% amount, along with accrued interest, shall be
deposited before the Registrar General and shall be released as lumpsum,
considering that the injured claimant has since passed away.
75.
Statutory deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the Insurance
Company, only if the order of deposit has been complied with.
76.
Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
(ANISH DAYAL)
JUDGE
OCTOBER 05, 2026/sm/rk/sp
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