Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:21231
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 672 of 2025
Reserved on: 2.4.2026
Date of Decision: 3.6.2026.
Hritik Gupta
...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & another
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Petitioner present in person.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate
General
for
respondent No.1.
For Respondent No.2
:
None.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present petition has been filed against the order
dated 14.8.2025, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Kangra, at Dharamshala (learned Trial Court) in Private
Criminal Complaint No.25 of 2022, titled Hritik Gupta Vs.
Amritanshu Gupta. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:21231
the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
Court for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for committing the
offences punishable under sections 415, 417, 500 and 504 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the complainant is
residing at Dharamshala and is working remotely from his
home. The complainant and the accused had put up their
matrimonial profiles on a matrimonial website. The accused
accepted the complainant’s request to connect on the website on
4.8.2022. A mobile number xxx383 was shared with the
complainant for further discussion. Complaint’s mother had a
brief discussion with the father of the accused. Both parties
found the alliance suitable, and the father of the accused shared
the
mobile
number
of
the
accused,
xxx080,
with
the
complainant’s mother. The accused and the complainant had
phone calls, and they discussed a matrimonial alliance. They
also exchanged messages on WhatsApp. Complainant and the
accused made inquiries about each other’s past lives. The
complainant’s aunt asked the complainant to visit Noida to meet
2026:HHC:21231
the accused. The complainant asked the accused to meet at
Jallandhar, Phagwara or Ludhiana, but she expressed her
inability. The complaint also suggested meeting at Chandigarh,
to which proposal the complainant initially agreed but
subsequently rescinded. They also discussed their personal
affairs, including the post-marital intimacy on the phone calls.
The complainant also revealed to the accused on 15.8.2022 that
he used to visit Spa Centres due to his desk job. The accused
made fun of this and insinuated that the accused was going to
the spa for pleasure. The accused also admitted on 19.8.2022 that
she had shared the personal details of the complainant with her
maternal aunt. The complainant objected to it and forbade her
from revealing his personal details to anyone. The complaint
went to Noida at the instance of the accused on 25.8.2022. They
met on 26.8.2022 at around 5.00 p.m. and spent about four hours
together. The accused had a shopping trip at the complainant’s
expense. The accused advised the complainant to undergo
various tests on 27.8.2022. She asked the complainant to meet
her on 27.8.2022 to see each other's divorce papers. The
complainant went to the appointed place and waited for more
than one hour for the accused, but the accused did not bring her
2026:HHC:21231
divorce papers. The accused took the complainant to her
maternal aunt’s home, where he was made to wait outside the
building. Subsequently, the accused told the complainant that
her maternal aunt and her brother wanted to meet the
complainant. The complainant objected by saying that he was
not ready for this unplanned and unexpected meeting. She also
handed over her mobile phone to her maternal aunt, who
compelled the complainant to meet him. The aunt of the accused
handed over the mobile phone to the brother of the accused, who
made vague and imaginary allegations against the complainant.
Subsequently, the accused called the complainant on 27.8.2022,
at about 1.57 pm to 2.00 p.m. and alleged that the complainant
had told her some weird, irritating and cheap stuff. The brother
of the accused also talked to the complainant and said that he
should not talk to anyone about the personal issues. The other
family members also accused the complainant of discussing
intimate things with the accused. The complainant's mother
also called the father of the accused, and he also made
defamatory remarks about the complainant. He alleged that the
complainant had asked the accused about having a baby and
other personal details. The accused had committed the offences
2026:HHC:21231
punishable under Sections 415, 417, 500 and 504 of the IPC.
Hence, the complaint was made to the Court for taking action
against the accused.
3.
The learned Magistrate examined the witnesses of
the complainant and called for the report from the SHO, Police
Station, Dharamshala, under the provisions of Section 202 of
Cr.PC. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate held that meeting a
prospective life partner is not uncommon in today’s society. The
discussion amongst the prospective partners to assess their
compatibility is also common. If the complainant had met the
accused and spent money, it would not constitute the
commission of any offence. Therefore, the learned Trial Court
dismissed the complaint.
4.
Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present revision
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in law by directing
an investigation under Section 202 of Cr.PC. The Investigating
Officer conducted an enquiry in a biased manner. The
complainant had filed an application for monitoring the police
enquiry or conducting an independent enquiry through the
2026:HHC:21231
Superintendent of Police, Kangra/Vigilance Department. The
learned Trial Court acted in a biased manner in not ordering an
investigation against the erring police official. The complainant
had filed written objections, which were summarily dismissed.
The learned Trial Court erred in focusing on expenses of
travelling and refreshment and ignoring the specific allegation
of a sustained campaign of inducement, pressure, defamation
and cheating. The complainant could not array the father of the
accused as a party because his address was not known. The
complainant had prayed to the learned Trial Court to investigate
whether the accused was still married, but this aspect was
ignored by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the present petition.
5.
I have heard the petitioner in person through video-
conferencing and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate
General, for the respondent No.1/ State.
6.
The petitioner in person submitted that the accused
had cheated the complainant by inducing him to talk to her,
travel to Noida and bear expenses for her shopping. The
complainant had shared the intimate details with the accused,
which she revealed to her family members, who made fun of the
2026:HHC:21231
complainant by repeating those details. They also falsely
accused the complainant of demanding the intimate details of
the complainant. These allegations disclosed the commission of
the offences punishable under Sections 415, 417, 500 and 504 of
the IPC. Learned the Trial Court erred in seeking the report from
the Investigating Officer. The complainant had filed the various
applications for taking action against the biased enquiry, but no
orders were passed on them. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial
Court be set aside.
7.
Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the respondent No.1/State submitted that the learned
Magistrate had directed the police to conduct an enquiry in
terms of Section 202 of the CrPC. The police conducted the
enquiry and submitted the report to the Court. There was no bias
in the enquiry, and false allegations were made against the
police. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
2026:HHC:21231
9.
It is undisputed that the accused is residing at Noida
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court at Dharamshala. Section 202
of the Cr.PC, (as amended w.e.f. 23.6.2006 by the Act 25 of 2005)
provides that any Magistrate shall in a case where the accused is
residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his
jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process against the accused
had either enquire into the case himself or direct an
investigation to be made by a Police Officer or by such other
person as he thinks fit. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Abhijit Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar, (2017) 3
SCC 528, that where the accused is residing at a place beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate, the Magistrate is bound
to conduct an enquiry. It was observed:“24. The essence and purpose of this amendment has
been captured by this Court in Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima
Mamtaj [Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC
638 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 479] in the following words : (SCC
p. 644, paras 11-12)
“11. Section 202 of the Code, inter alia,
contemplates postponement of the issue of the
process in a case where the accused is residing at a
place beyond the area in which he exercises his
jurisdiction, and thereafter to either inquire into
the case by himself or direct an investigation to be
made by a police officer or by such other person as
he thinks fit. In the face of it, what needs our
determination is whether, in a case where the
2026:HHC:21231
accused is residing at a place beyond the area in
which the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction,
inquiry is mandatory or not.
12. The words ‘and shall, in a case where the
accused is residing at a place beyond the area in
which he exercises his jurisdiction’ were inserted
by Section 19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Act (Central Act 25 of 2005) w.e.f.
23-6-2006. The aforesaid amendment, in the
opinion of the legislature, was essential as false
complaints are filed against persons residing at
far-off places in order to harass them. The note for
the amendment reads as follows:
‘False complaints are filed against persons residing
at far-off places simply to harass them. In order to
see that innocent persons are not harassed by
unscrupulous persons, this clause seeks to amend
sub-section (1) of Section 202 to make it obligatory
upon the Magistrate that before summoning the
accused residing beyond his jurisdiction he shall
enquire into the case himself or direct investigation
to be made by a police officer or by such other
person as he thinks fit, for finding out whether or
not there was sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.’
The use of the expression “shall” prima facie
makes the inquiry or the investigation, as the case
may be, by the Magistrate mandatory. The word
“shall” is ordinarily mandatory, but sometimes,
taking into account the context or the intention, it
can be held to be directory. The use of the word
“shall” in all circumstances is not decisive. Bearing
in mind the aforesaid principle, when we look to the
intention of the legislature, we find that it is aimed
to prevent innocent persons from harassment by
unscrupulous persons from false complaints.
Hence, in our opinion, the use of the expression
“shall” and the background and the purpose for
2026:HHC:21231
which the amendment has been brought, we have
no doubt in our mind that inquiry or the
investigation, as the case may be, is mandatory
before summons are issued against the accused
living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
Magistrate.”
25. For this reason, the amended provision casts an
obligation on the Magistrate to apply his mind carefully
and satisfy himself that the allegations in the complaint,
when considered along with the statements recorded or
the enquiry conducted thereon, would prima facie
constitute the offence for which the complaint is filed.
This requirement is emphasised by this Court in a recent
judgment, Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad
Tunda [Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda,
(2015) 12 SCC 420 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 124] in the following
words : (SCC pp. 429-30, paras 20 & 22)
“20. The extensive reference to the case law would
clearly show that cognisance of an offence on
complaint is taken for the purpose of issuing process
to the accused. Since it is a process of taking judicial
notice of certain facts which constitute an offence,
there has to be an application of mind as to whether
the allegations in the complaint, when considered
along with the statements recorded or the inquiry
conducted thereon, would constitute a violation of law
so as to call a person to appear before the criminal
court. It is not a mechanical process or a matter of
course. As held by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v.
Judicial Magistrate [Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial
Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400], to set
in motion the process of criminal law against a person
is a serious matter.
***
22. The steps taken by the Magistrate under Section
190(1)(a) CrPC followed by Section 204 CrPC should
reflect that the Magistrate has applied his mind to the
2026:HHC:21231
facts and the statements and he is satisfied that there
is ground for proceeding further in the matter by
asking the person against whom the violation of law is
alleged to appear before the court. The satisfaction on
the ground for proceeding would mean that the facts
alleged in the complaint would constitute an offence,
and when considered along with the statements
recorded, would, prima facie, make the accused
answerable before the court. No doubt, no formal
order or speaking order is required to be passed at that
stage. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires a
speaking order to be passed under Section 203 CrPC
when the complaint is dismissed, and that too the
reasons need to be stated only briefly. In other words,
the Magistrate is not to act as a post office in taking
cognisance of each and every complaint filed before
him and issue process as a matter of course. There
must be sufficient indication in the order passed by the
Magistrate that he is satisfied that the allegations in
the complaint constitute an offence and when
considered along with the statements recorded and the
result of inquiry or report of investigation under
Section 202 CrPC, if any, the accused is answerable
before the criminal court, there is ground for
proceeding against the accused under Section 204
CrPC, by issuing process for appearance. The
application of the mind is best demonstrated by the
disclosure of mind on the satisfaction. If there is no
such indication in a case where the Magistrate
proceeds under Sections 190/204 CrPC, the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC is bound to invoke its inherent
power in order to prevent abuse of the power of the
criminal court. To be called to appear before the
criminal court as an accused is a serious matter
affecting one's dignity, self-respect and image in
society. Hence, the process of the criminal court shall
not be made a weapon of harassment.”
2026:HHC:21231
26. The requirement of conducting an enquiry or
directing an investigation before issuing a process is,
therefore, not an empty formality. What kind of
“enquiry” is needed under this provision has also been
explained in the Vijay Dhanuka case [Vijay Dhanuka v.
Najima Mamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 479],
which is reproduced hereunder : (SCC p. 645, para 14)
“14. In view of our answer to the aforesaid question,
the next question that falls for our determination is
whether the learned Magistrate, before issuing
summons, has held the inquiry as mandated under
Section 202 of the Code. The word “inquiry” has
been defined under Section 2(g) of the Code, which
reads as follows:
‘2. (g) “inquiry” means every inquiry, other
than a trial, conducted under this Code by a
Magistrate or court.’
It is evident from the aforesaid provision, every
inquiry other than a trial conducted by the
Magistrate or the court is an inquiry. No specific
mode or manner of inquiry is provided under
Section 202 of the Code. In the inquiry envisaged
under Section 202 of the Code, the witnesses are
examined, whereas under Section 200 of the Code,
examination of the complainant only is necessary,
with the option of examining the witnesses
present, if any. This exercise by the Magistrate, for
the purpose of deciding whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under
Section 202 of the Code.”
10.
Therefore, no fault can be found with the order
passed by the learned Trial Court in ordering the enquiry in the
present case.
2026:HHC:21231
11.
The allegations in the complaint show that the
complainant and the accused had met each other with the
intention to enter into matrimonial relationships, which
somehow did not materialise. Both parties talked to each other
and shared their details. The complainant alleges that by forcing
him to spend money, the accused has committed an offence
punishable under Section 417 of the IPC. (The complainant has
mentioned Section 415 IPC, which is a defining Section and does
not provide for punishment). In order to constitute cheating, it
is necessary that the person should have a fraudulent or
dishonest intention right from the beginning. The ingredients of
cheating were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W.
Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241, as under:
“10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i)
there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a
person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived
should be induced to deliver any property to any person or
to consent that any person shall retain any property; or
(b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced
to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or
omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered
by (ii)(b), the act of omission should cause or is likely to
cause damage or harm to the person induced in body,
mind, reputation or property.
11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench,
in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4
2026:HHC:21231
SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has
expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15)
“15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in
mind that the distinction between mere breach of
contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the
time of inducement, which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent
conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract
cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is
shown right at the beginning of the transaction,
that is, the time when the offence is said to have
been committed. Therefore, it is the intention that
is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of
cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making
the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a
promise, subsequently, such a culpable intention right
at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise,
cannot be presumed.” (emphasis supplied)
12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating
and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court
interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed
the criminal proceedings.
13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 733], this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp.
696-97)
“7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts.
In the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’ or
‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver
any property; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit
to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part,
inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the
second part, the inducement should be intentional.
As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal
2026:HHC:21231
Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri
LJ 1116], a guilty intention is an essential ingredient
of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to
secure the conviction of a person for the offence of
cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person must
be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo
Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri LJ
1806] that in order to constitute the offence of
cheating, the intention to deceive should be in
existence at the time when the inducement was
offered.”(emphasis supplied)
14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8
SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of
existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on
criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings
are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing
of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482
CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception;
merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to
stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a
provision made in the agreement for referring the
disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a
criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a
criminal offence.
12.
A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad,
(2000) 3 SCC 693, wherein it was observed as under:
“7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While
in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or
“fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any
property; in the second part, the person should
intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a
thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be
dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the
inducement should be intentional. As observed by this
Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay
2026:HHC:21231
[AIR 1956 SC 575: 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483], a guilty
intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of
cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a
person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part
of that person must be established. It was also observed in
Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [AIR 1954 SC 724: 1954 Cri
LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of
cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence
at the time when the inducement was offered.
8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is
concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here, it is
the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the
complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by the
accused, which is material. Such inducement should
result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a
result of which the person concerned should have
suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body,
mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the
Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2
AWN 237], it was held by Mahmood, J.:
“That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a
caste different to the one to which she really
belongs, with the object of obtaining money,
amounts to the offence of cheating by personation
as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860,
which must be read in the light of the preceding
Section 415.”
13.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ram Jas v. State of U.P., (1970) 2 SCC 740, that there should be a
fraudulent or dishonest inducement before a person can be held
guilty of cheating. It was observed:
“3. In recording this finding and conviction, the High
Court lost sight of the fact that no such charge was framed
2026:HHC:21231
against the appellant in the trial court. As we have
indicated above, the persons, who were cheated or
attempted to be cheated, referred to in the charges framed
against the appellant, were Madan Lal, Chunni Lal, or the
office of the Relief and Rehabilitation-cum-Settlement
Officer, Saharanpur. There was no charge at all relating to
any cheating or attempting to cheat the Oath
Commissioner. In fact, the case was never brought to
Court with the intention of obtaining a conviction of the
appellant for any offence of cheating in respect of the
Oath Commissioner. Not only was there no charge in this
respect, but, in addition, the appellant, when questioned
under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after
the prosecution's evidence had been recorded, was not
asked to explain evidence relating to such a charge of
cheating the Oath Commissioner. No doubt, there was
mention of the commission of forgery of affidavits; but
the mention of the commission of that offence could not
possibly lead the appellant to infer that he was liable to be
convicted for abetting the offence of cheating the Oath
Commissioner. Further, in recording this conviction, the
High Court did not even cease to examine in detail
whether all the ingredients of the offence had been
established by the prosecution's evidence. The only
finding of fact was that the appellant, who was known to
the Oath Commissioner, wrongly identified some other
person as Govind Ram and got the affidavit attested by
the Oath Commissioner as if it was being sworn by Govind
Ram. This act of wrong identification committed by the
appellant cannot amount to the offence of cheating by
personation. Cheating is defined in Section 415 IPC, which
is as follows:
“Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or
dishonestly induces the person so deceived to
deliver any property to any person, or to consent
that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do
or omit to do anything which he would not do or
2026:HHC:21231
omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or
omission causes or is likely to cause damage or
harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or
property, is said to ‘cheat’.”
The ingredients required to constitute the offence of
cheating are—
(i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest
inducement of a person by deceiving him;
(ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to
deliver any property to any person, or to consent that
any person shall retain any property; or
(b) the person so deceived should be intentionally
induced to do or omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and
(iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act or omission
should cause or is likely to cause damage or harm to
the person induced in body, mind, reputation or
property.
4. In the present case, the finding of fact recorded only
shows that the Oath Commissioner was induced to attest
the affidavit by the deception practised by the appellant in
wrongly identifying a person as Govind Ram when he was
in fact not Govind Ram. That act done by the Oath
Commissioner of attesting the affidavit could not,
however, possibly cause any damage or harm to the Oath
Commissioner in body, mind, reputation or property. The
Oath Commissioner was obviously not induced to deliver
any property to anybody by this wrong identification, nor
was he induced to consent that any person should retain
any property. Thus, the facts found did not constitute the
offence of cheating at all. The conviction for an offence
under Section 419, substantively or with the aid of Section
109 IPC, could only have been justified if the facts proved
constituted all the ingredients of the offence of cheating.
In recording the conviction, the High Court neglected to
see whether all those ingredients were proved. On the face
of it, though the Oath Commissioner was induced to attest
2026:HHC:21231
the affidavit by wrong identification made by the
appellant, there was no likelihood of any damage or harm
to him in body, mind, reputation or property, so that the
Oath Commissioner was never cheated. Clearly, therefore,
the High Court fell into an error in recording the
conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section
419, read with Section 109 IPC and substituting that
conviction in place of the conviction for offences for
which he had been punished by the trial court.
14.
Similar is the judgment in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat,
(2009) 3 SCC 78, wherein it was observed: “14. An offence of cheating cannot be said to have been
made out unless the following ingredients are satisfied:
(i) deception of a person either by making a false or
misleading representation or by other action or
omission;
(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person
to deliver any property, or to consent that any person
shall retain any property and finally intentionally
inducing that person to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit.
For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the
complainant is required to show that the accused had
fraudulent or dishonest intentions at the time of making a
promise or representation. Even in a case where
allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the
accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable
intention at the time of making the initial promise being
absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code
can be said to have been made out.”
15.
This
position
was
reiterated
in
Raju
Krishna
Shedbalkar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 200,
wherein it was observed:
2026:HHC:21231
“7. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that the
offence of cheating is in two parts. The first is where a
person fraudulently or dishonestly deceives another in
inducing that person to deliver any property to any
person, etc. The second part of the offence would be made
out if somebody is deceived to do an act which causes
damage or harm to that person, “in body, mind, or
reputation or property, " and is said to have cheated.
Time and again, this Court has reiterated that in order to
make out an offence under cheating, the intention to
cheat or deceive should be right from the beginning. By
no stretch of the imagination, this is even reflected in the
complaint made by the informant.
8. In the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168, this Court held as under:
“15. In determining the question, it has to be kept in
mind that the distinction between mere breach of
contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the time
of inducement, which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct, but for this, subsequent conduct
is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot
give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless
fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the
beginning of the transaction, that is, the time when
the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore,
it is the intention that is the gist of the offence. To hold
a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he
had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of
making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up a
promise, subsequently, such a culpable intention right
at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise,
cannot be presumed.”(Emphasis supplied)
9. Further, in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC
India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736, this position was reiterated in
the following manner:
2026:HHC:21231
33. The High Court has held that a mere breach of
contractual terms would not amount to cheating
unless the fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right at the beginning of the transaction, and in the
absence of an allegation that the accused had a
fraudulent or dishonest intention while making a
promise, there is no “cheating”. The High Court has
relied on several decisions of this Court wherein this Court
has held that dishonest intent at the time of making the
promise/inducement is necessary, in addition to the
subsequent failure to fulfil the promise. Illustrations (f)
and (g) to Section 415 make this position clear:
“(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A
means to repay any money that Z may lend to him
and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him
money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats.
(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A
means to deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo
plant which he does not intend to deliver, and
thereby dishonestly induces Z to advance money
upon the faith of such delivery, A cheats; but if A, at
the time of obtaining the money, intends to deliver
the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his contract
and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is
liable only to a civil action for breach of
contract.”(emphasis supplied).
16.
The allegations in the complaint do not show any
such intention. Both parties talked to each other, shared the
details and met each other at a place mutually agreed upon by
them. Therefore, the allegations in the complaint, even if
accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 417 of the IPC.
2026:HHC:21231
17.
The complainant alleges that the accused had
committed offences punishable under Sections 499 IPC and 500
IPC of the IPC. Again, Section 499 IPC is not a punishing Section
but a defining Section. Section 500 IPC deals with the
punishment. Subsection 409 IPC provides that an imputation
should have been published or made with the intent to harm or
with a knowing reason to believe that such an imputation will
harm the reputation of the person. It is undisputed that the
petitioner and the accused had shared the intimate details. The
petitioner himself asserted this fact in his complaint. Therefore,
the disclosure of these details by the accused to her relatives will
not constitute defamation because it was made for the
protection of the interest of the accused, since her relatives are
also entitled to know what kind of person she proposed to
marry. Therefore, the imputation would be covered under the
ninth exception, and no action could be taken based on the
statement volunteered by the complainant to her relatives.
18.
The complainant had also asserted that an offence
punishable under Section 504 of the IPC is made out. This again
is not acceptable. The ingredients of Section 504 of IPC were
2026:HHC:21231
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Wajid v. State
of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, as under: “29. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally
insulting a person and thereby provoking such person
insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a
person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted
may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public
peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may
not come within the purview of the section. But, the
words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an
intentional insult provoking the person insulted to
commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any
other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally
and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of
events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to
commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken
away from the purview of the Section merely because the
insulted person did not actually break the peace or
commit any offence having exercised self-control or
having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In
judging whether particular abusive language is attracted
by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in
ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the
abusive language used and not what the complainant
actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy, cool
temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary
general nature of the abusive language that is the test for
considering whether the abusive language is an
intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to
commit a breach of the peace, and not the particular
conduct or temperament of the complainant.
30. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may
not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of
Section504, IPCif it does not have the necessary element
of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a
breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of
2026:HHC:21231
the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to
commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person
insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each
case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the
light of the facts and circumstances of that case, and
there cannot be a general proposition that no one
commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely
uses abusive language against the complainant. InKing
Emperorv.Chunnibhai Dayabhai,(1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, pointed out
that: —
“To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C., it is
sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause
the other party to lose his temper and say or do
something violent. Public peace can be broken by
angry words as well as deeds.” (emphasis supplied)
31. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear
that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an
offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be
established that the accused had an intention to cause
alarm to the complainant.
32. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more
particularly, considering the nature of the allegations
levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the
offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may
probably be said to have been disclosed, but not under
Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the
offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also
be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all
that the first informant has stated is that abusive
language was used by the accused persons. What exactly
was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR.
One of the essential elements, as discussed above,
constituting an offence under Section504of theIPCis that
there should have been an act or conduct amounting to
intentional insult. Where that act is the use of abusive
words, it is necessary to know what those words were in
order to decide whether the use of those words amounted
2026:HHC:21231
to an intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it
is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of
intentional insult is present.”
19.
It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri)
795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 that mere abuse is not sufficient to
attract Section 504 of IPC. It was observed at page 217: 21. Section 504 IPC came up for consideration before this
Court inFiona Shrikhandev.State of Maharashtra[Fiona
Shrikhandev.State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014)
1 SCC (Cri) 715]. In the said case, this Court had the
occasion to examine the ingredients of Section 504 IPC,
which need to be present before proceeding to try a case.
The Court held that in the said case, the order issuing
process was challenged by filing a criminal revision. This
Court held that at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is
merely concerned with the allegations made out in the
complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether
there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the
accused. In para 11, the following principles have been
laid down: (SCC pp. 48-49)
“11. We are, in this case, concerned only with the question
as to whether, on a reading of the complaint, a prima
facie case has been made out or not to issue process by
the Magistrate. The law as regards the issuance of process
in criminal cases is well settled. At the complaint stage,
the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations
made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie
satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed
against the accused, and it is not the province of the
Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the
merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under
Section 202 is extremely limited in the sense that the
Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima
2026:HHC:21231
facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the
complaint. The Magistrate is not expected to embark
upon a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of
the case, but only to consider the inherent probabilities
apparent on the statement made in the complaint. In
Nagawwa v. Veeranna ShivalingappaKonjalgi [Nagawwa v.
Veeranna ShivalingappaKonjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC
(Cri) 507], this Court held that once the Magistrate has
exercised his discretion in forming an opinion that there
is ground for proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts to
substitute their own discretion for that of the Magistrate.
The Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the
point of view of the complaint, without at all adverting to
any defence that the accused may have.”
22. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has noticed the
ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which are to the following
effect: (Fiona Shrikhande case[Fiona Shrikhandev. State of
Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715], SCC
p. 49)
“13. Section 504 IPC comprises the following
ingredients, viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult
must be such as to give provocation to the person
insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know
that such provocation would cause another to break
the public peace or to commit any other offence.
The intentional insult must be of such a degree that
it should provoke a person to break the public peace
or to commit any other offence. The person who
intentionally insults, intending or knowing it to be
likely that it will give provocation to any other
person and such provocation will cause a breach of
the public peace, or to commit any other offence, in
such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are
satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting
the offence is that there should have been an act or
conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the
mere fact that the accused abused the complainant,
as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a
2026:HHC:21231
conviction under Section 504 IPC.”
23. In another judgment, i.e.Manik Tanejav.State of
Karnataka[Manik Tanejav.State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC
423: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132], this Court has again occasion
to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In the
above case, a case was registered for the offence under
Sections 353 and 506 IPC. After noticing Section 503,
which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down
the following in paras 11 and 12 : (SCC pp. 427-28)
“11.***
A reading of the definition of “criminal
intimidation” would indicate that there must be an
act of threatening to another person, of causing an
injury to the person, reputation, or property of the
person threatened, or to the person in whom the
threatened person is interested and the threat must
be with the intent to cause alarm to the person
threatened or it must be to do any act which he is
not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which
he is legally entitled to do.
12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the
appellants have abused the complainant and
obstructed the second respondent from discharging
his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the
second respondent. It is the intention of the
accused that has to be considered in deciding
whether what he has stated comes within the
meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat
must be with the intention to cause alarm to the
complainant to cause that person to do or omit to
do any work. Mere expression of any words without
any intention to cause alarm would not be
sufficient to bring in the application of this section.
But material has to be placed on record to show that
the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant.
From the facts and circumstances of the case, it
appears that there was no intention on the part of
2026:HHC:21231
the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the
second respondent, causing obstruction in the
discharge of his duty. As far as the comments
posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it
is a public forum meant for helping the public, and
the act of the appellants posting a comment on
Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal
intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”
In the above case, the allegation was that the appellant
had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere
fact that the allegation that the accused had abused the
complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section
506 IPC.
24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the
complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the
appellant, with two or three other unknown persons, one
of whom was holding a revolver, came to the
complainant's house and abused him in filthy language
and attempted to assault him, and when some neighbours
arrived there, the appellant and the other persons
accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation,
taking on its face value, does not satisfy the ingredients
of Sections 504 and 506 as have been enumerated by this
Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult
must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person
to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.
The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused
the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid
down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona
Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhandev. State of Maharashtra,
(2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715].
20.
This position was reiterated in B.V. Ram Kumar v.
State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 275, wherein it was
observed:
2026:HHC:21231
“19. For appreciating the necessary ingredients required
to substantiate a charge under Section 504, IPC, a
reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of
this Court inFiona Shrikhandev. State of Maharashtra
(2013) 14 SCC 44, wherein the Court discussed the
essential ingredients of Section 504, IPC. The Court held
as follows: —
“13. Section 504 IPC comprises the following ingredients,
viz.(a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to
give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused
must intend or know that such provocation would cause
another to break the public peace or to commit any other
offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree
that it should provoke a person to break the public peace
or to commit any other offence. The person who
intentionally insults, intending or knowing it to be likely
that it will give provocation to any other person and such
provocation will cause a breach of the public peace, or to
commit any other offence, in such a situation, the
ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the
essential elements constituting the offence is that there
should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional
insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the
complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a
conviction under Section504IPC.”
14. We may also indicate that it is not the law that the
actual words or language should figure in the complaint.
One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing
so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie,
that there has been an intentional insult to provoke any
person to break the public peace or to commit any other
offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within
the ambit of Section504IPC. It is not the law that a
complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or
words capable of provoking the other person to commit
any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the
occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or
persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of
2026:HHC:21231
the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant
factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint
lodged for initiating proceedings under Section504IPC.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. Thus, upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the
Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there
has been an intentional insult made by the accused to the
complainant to provoke the latter to break the public
peace or to commit any other offence, then only the act
complained of would fall within the ambit of Section 504,
IPC. The law does not mandate that the complainant
should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of
provoking him/her to commit a breach of peace or any
other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the
occasion, the manner in which the offending words are
used, the person to whom they are addressed, the time,
and the conduct of the person who has indulged in such
actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while
examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings
under Section 504, IPC.
21. Further, this Court in the case ofMohammad
Wajidv.State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951, while
discussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for
considering the circumstances wherein an abusive
language takes the form and shape of an intentional
insult and held thus: —
“28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally
insulting a person and thereby provoking such person to
breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing
it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as
to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other
offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the
section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might
amount to an intentional insult provoking the person
insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to
commit any other offence. If abusive language is used
intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary
course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or
2026:HHC:21231
to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken
away from the purview of the Section merely because the
insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit
any offence having exercised self-control or having been
subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging
whether particular abusive language is attracted by
Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in
ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the
abusive language used and not what the complainant
actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy, cool
temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary
general nature of the abusive language that is the test for
considering whether the abusive language is an intentional
insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a
breach of the peace, and not the particular conduct or
temperament of the complainant.
29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not
amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of
Section504, IPCif it does not have the necessary element of
being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach
of the peace of an offence and the other element of the
accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a
breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is
likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive
language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts
and circumstances of that case, and there cannot be a
general proposition that no one commits an offence
under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language
against the complainant.” (emphasis supplied)
22. Needless to say, mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or
insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within
the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore, it would
be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and
provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any
offence.
23. Section 504, IPC, IPC consists of two parts. Firstly, the
actus reus being the intentional insult that gives rise to the
provocation. Secondly, mens rea,i.e., the intention or
2026:HHC:21231
knowledge on the part of the accused that such
intentional provocation is likely to cause the person
insulted to break public peace or commit any other
offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that the
accused should ‘intentionally insult’ the other person
with the intention or knowledge that the provocation
caused by such insult is likely to result in the commission
of a breach of public peace or any other offence by the
person who has been so insulted. The offence is said to be
complete once the accused person makes an ‘intentional
insult’ with the aforesaid mens rea. Hence, intention or
knowledge on the part of the accused person that his
actions of making an ‘intentional insult’ have the
potential to provoke the person insulted is sine qua non
for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC.
24. The natural corollary of the above discussion is that if
the accused does not intend to give provocation, the
offence is not made out. An insult without an ‘intention to
insult’ is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Further,
‘intentional insult’ must be of such a degree that it has
the potential to provoke a reasonable person to break the
public peace or to commit any other offence.
25.It is trite that whether the person provoked further
commits an illegal act or not is immaterial to draw the
conclusion of culpability under Section 504, IPC. The
‘intentional insult’ and provocation must be so proximate
and close that the accused has either the intention or the
knowledge that the intentional insult made by him is
likely to cause the provoked person to break public peace
or commit some other offence. However, what would be
the nature of ‘intentional insult’ causing provocation, to
draw culpability under Section 504, IPC, would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The test to
be applied to determine if the intentional insult made by
the accused is sufficient to cause provocation is that of a
reasonable person,i.e., if the insult is sufficient to provoke
any reasonable person to break the peace or commit any
2026:HHC:21231
other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the
offence under Section 504, IPC.”
21.
In the present case, the complainant has not
disclosed that the words uttered by the relatives of the accused
amounted to an insult and the insult was of such nature as to
give provocation to the person insulted. Thus, the basic
ingredient of Section 504 of the IPC is not satisfied.
22.
Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held
that the allegations in the complaint, even if accepted to be
correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable
offence. No fault can be found with the order passed by the
learned Trial Court.
23.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
24.
A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the
learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.
25.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
3rd June, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review