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2026:HHC:47934
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 683 of 2026
Reserved on: 13.10.2026
Date of Decision: 02.11.2026.
Hritik Gupta
...Petitioner
Versus
Amritanshu Gupta
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Present in person through V.C.
For the Respondent
:
Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition against
the order dated 19.09.2026 passed by the learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Dharamshala, District
Kangra, HP (learned Trial Court) vide which an application filed
by the petitioner under Section 94 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) was dismissed. (The parties shall hereinafter
be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision petition are that the petitioner/complainant filed a
complaint before the learned Trial Court, which was listed for
recording preliminary evidence on 27.08.2026. The complainant
filed an application under Section 94 of BNSS to summon the
Chief Administrative Officer/Superintendent attached to the
Court of District and Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, Punjab, the
Record Keeper attached to the Court of Principal Judge, Family
Court, Jalandhar, Punjab, and the Court of Additional Principal
Judge-II, Family Court, Jalandhar, Punjab, and direct them to
produce the complete judicial record of the mutual divorce
proceeding under Section 13B(1) and 13B(2) of the Hindu
Marriage Act titled Amritanshu Gupta versus Aseem Handa. It
was asserted that the non-applicant no. 1 told the complainant
that she was legally divorced on 04.08.2022, but she did not show
her divorce-related documents to the complainant on 27.08.2022
during their in-person meeting at Noida, Uttar Pradesh. The
non-applicants no. 1 and 2 stated in their statements recorded at
Police Station, Dharamshala, on 08.07.2025, that non-applicant
no. 1 had married Aseem Handa in the year 2021 and obtained a
divorce by way of mutual consent in the year 2022 within a
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comparatively short span of time. It is necessary to ascertain how
the non-applicant no. 1 could have entered into the marriage and
obtained mutual divorce before she had commenced discussions
regarding the matrimonial alliance with the complainant on
04.08.2022 and met the complainant in person on 27.08.2022.
The relevant record of the mutual divorce proceedings is
material. The non-applicant no. 1 was a legally married person at
the time of discussion with the complainant. The judicial record
is necessary to prove these facts. Therefore, the application was
filed to direct the summoning of the officers with the record.
3.
Learned Trial Court held that the main complaint was
filed with the allegation of cheating under Section 318 of
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) regarding a representation made
by non-applicant no. 1 about her marital status. Therefore, the
factum of marriage and date of its dissolution were important.
The pleadings, application, statement, order, decree and
accompanying documents may not be relevant, but only the
judgment and decree would be relevant. A roving enquiry cannot
be conducted under Section 94 of the BNSS. There was no
justification for summoning the complete record. Hence, the
application was dismissed.
4.
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Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present revision
asserting that the learned Trial Court found the record to be
relevant but dismissed the application on the ground that the
complete record could not be summoned. The application was
not an attempt to discover an unknown offence, but to verify a
specific fact from identifiable judicial proceedings. The absence
of the precise case number or the Court could not be treated as a
material defect. The names of the parties were masked on the eCourt's website, and it was not possible to ascertain the case
number. The learned Trial Court could have narrowed the record,
and the dismissal of the application was not proper. The
production of the documents is necessary for proving the
complaint filed before the learned Trial Court. Hence, it was
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed
by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
5.
The petitioner/complainant Hritik Gupta appeared in
person through video conferencing and submitted that the
learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the application on the
ground that the case number was not mentioned and an attempt
was being made to conduct a roving enquiry. The learned Trial
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Court could have summoned the relevant record, and it was not
proper to dismiss the application. The complainant has a right to
produce the documents which are necessary for the adjudication
of the dispute before the Court. The learned Trial Court had itself
found that the documents were necessary for the adjudication of
the complaint pending before it and erred in dismissing the
application. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set
aside. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal
(2020) 7 SCC 1, Rajendra Prasad vs. Narcotic Cell (1999) 6 SCC 110,
Young Indian vs. Subramanian Swami and Anr (2016) and State of
Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Pandhi (2005) 1 SCC 568 in support of his
submissions.
6.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
7.
The petitioner has filed a revision against an order
dismissing an application filed under Section 94 of BNSS
[corresponding to Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC)]. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
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Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam, (2009) 5 SCC 153: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
627: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 575, that an order rejecting an
application under Section 311 of CrPC or Section 91 of CrPC for
production of documents is an interlocutory order and no
revision lies against such an order. It was observed at page 154:
5. Secondly, what was not realised was that the orders
passed by the trial court refusing to call for the documents
and rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC were
interlocutory orders and, as such, the revision against
those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) CrPC.
The trial court, in its common order, had clearly
mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the
respondent-accused and the only defence that was raised
was that his signed cheques were lost and that the
appellant complainant had falsely used one such cheque.
The trial court also recorded a finding that the documents
were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner,
decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e. one
on the application under Section 91 CrPC for production of
documents and the other on the application under Section
311 CrPC for recalling the witness, were orders of an
interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2),
revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such
circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered
in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is
clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is
accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed.
8.
Therefore, the present petition is not maintainable
and is liable to be dismissed as such.
9.
Even otherwise, the application has been filed for
summoning the record lying before a competent Court. It was
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laid down by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in
Mahant Deepak Swami v. Addl. Distt. & Sessions Judge, (Fast Track)
No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur, reported in 2005 (6) RRD 1924 (Raj.)(DB),
that the Court cannot be construed to be a person within the
meaning of Section 91. It was observed:
“Summons/orders under Section 91, Cr. P.C., is meant to
be issued to a person. The Court cannot be construed to be
a person. A police officer issuing orders cannot be
construed to be an officer competent to issue any such
orders to a Court for production of any document. The
argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is not an
argument in consonance with the language used in Section
91 Cr. P.C. If police can be seen to be empowered to issue
orders to a Court, it will lead to a situation which cannot be
appreciated. The powers under Section 91 Cr. P.C. have to
be exercised in the manner prescribed only and not
otherwise…..”
10.
Therefore, the application was misconceived as no
such order could have been passed against the Court.
11.
In any case, the certified copy of the Court records is
admissible. Section 65(e) permits the party to give secondary
evidence when the original is a public document, but it also
provides that when the original is a public document, its certified
copy and no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible. It
was laid down by the Patna High Court in Jai Gopal Singh v.
Divisional Forest Officer, 1953 SCC OnLine Pat 29: AIR 1953 Pat 310,
2026:HHC:47934
that it is impermissible to lead any other evidence except the
certified copy of the public document. It was observed at page 311:
“12. What constitutes primary evidence in the case of a
document is defined in S. 62. The secondary evidence is
defined in S. 63, and under cl. (5) of that section, an oral
account of the contents of a document given by some
person who has himself seen it is also secondary evidence.
But S. 64 says that “documents must be proved by primary
evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned”.
Section 65 gives the list of cases in which secondary
evidence may be given of the existence, condition or
contents of a document. It has seven clauses. Clause (e) of
that section speaks about a case when the original is a
public document within the meaning of S. 74. In the
present case, the original of the notification is in the form
of an official Gazette, which, under S. 74, Evidence Act, is a
public document. As to such a document, the provision
laid down in S. 65 says that “a certified copy of the
document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is
admissible”. In this view of the provisions of law, I think,
the notification under Section 30 of the Bihar Private
Protected Forests Act, 1947, being in the form of a public
document, namely, the official Gazette, cannot be proved
by any other kind of secondary evidence save by its
certified copy.”
12.
A similar view was taken by Allahabad High Court in
Ganesh Prasad v. Badri Prasad Bholanath, 1980 SCC OnLine All 887:
AIR 1980 All 361, wherein it was observed at page 362:
6…..The court below has further relied upon another
assessment list of the subsequent quinquennial in which,
according to it, the name of Umesh Chandra Gupta is
mentioned. I do not find any certified copy of the aforesaid
year. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out
2026:HHC:47934
that there were two papers, 126C and 127C, which were
filed in court, and subsequently the same were proved by
the clerk concerned. These papers were filed per list 125/C
by the defendant's counsel, Sri Satya Narain Mishra,
Advocate, on 4-3-1978 after remand. I have looked at
these papers. These papers are not certified copies issued
by the Municipal Board in accordance with Section 33 of
the Municipalities Act. These have been issued by one
Rashid Ali. They do not bear any copying stamp, folio, or
seal of the Municipal Board. That also did not come under
the definition of certified copies as required by Section 65
of the Evidence Act. I compared these papers with the
certified copy on record, and I find that these papers were
incorrect and wholly inadmissible in evidence. They were
not issued by the Municipal Board as required, and
further, these papers, not being the certified copies, were
inadmissible as provided by Cl. (f) of Sec. 65 read with its
proviso. This proviso completely barred any other kind of
secondary evidence except a certified copy.”
13.
Therefore, only a certified copy of the Court record
could have been produced, and it was impermissible to summon
the record. Hence, the application was liable to be dismissed on
this ground as well.
14.
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra) deals with Section
65B of the Indian Evidence Act, Rajendra Prasad (supra) deals
with Section 311 of CrPC, and Debendra Nath Pandhi (supra) deals
with the stage at which the jurisdiction under Section 91 of CrPC
can be exercised and are not relevant to the adjudication of the
present revision. The complete citation of Young Indian (supra)
2026:HHC:47934
has not been provided, and nothing can be said about this
judgment.
15.
Therefore, even on merits, there is no infirmity in the
order passed by the learned Trial Court.
16.
In view of the above, the present petition fails and is
dismissed. The present petition is disposed of and so are the
pending application(s), if any.
17.
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the revision petition and will have no
bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
2nd November, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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