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2026:HHC:20680
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
CARBA No. 15 of 2025
Date of decision: 27.05.2026
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd.
…Appellant
Versus
HCL Infotech Ltd.
…
Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G. S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice.
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin C. Negi, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Appellant:
Ms. Sunita Sharma, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Saurav Upadhyay and Mr.
Dhananjay Sharma, Advocates.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Suneet Goel, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Vivek Negi, Advocate.
G. S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral)
The present appeal is directed against the order of
the learned Single Judge in OMP(M) No. 55 of 2024, titled as
Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. vs. HCL
Infotech Ltd., dated 10.10.2025.
2.
application
The learned Single Judge has dismissed the
for
condonation
of
delay,
in
filing
the
objections/petition under Section 34(1) & (2) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act (for short ‘the Act’) which was against the
award dated 15.03.2024, on the ground that it was filed
2026:HHC:20680
beyond the period of 90 days but within the extended period
of 120 days. The sufficient cause, which was made out by the
appellant, was rejected and it was held that the file had been
pending with the different authorities and not properly taken
up with the Managing Director of the appellant’s organisation.
Keeping in view the gravity of the matter and, therefore, the
appellant could not show sufficient cause for the period of 22
days beyond the prescribed period of three months and it had
also not been explained as to why the objections could not be
preferred within the prescribed period of three months, the
application was dismissed.
3.
The learned Counsel for the appellant has referred
to the order passed by us recently in Arb. Appeal No. 451 of
2025, titled as State of H.P. & Anr. vs. M/s Garg Sons
Estate
Promotors
Pvt.
Ltd.,
decided on 22.05.2026,
wherein the issue as such of condoning the delaying while
filing objection under Section 34 of the Act, was subject
matter of consideration.
4.
We had noticed that Section 34 of the Act is a
substantive remedy to challenge the award and it is already
limited in scope and it is imperative to interpret the limitation
provisions liberally and there is only a limited window to
challenge the arbitral award, which would be lost sight of and
2026:HHC:20680
grave prejudice shall be caused to a party against whom an
Award has been passed.
5.
Various aspects regarding bureaucratic procedures
which have been cited as ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of
delay were taken into consideration while allowing the appeal
of the State wherein also the delay was beyond the period of
90 days but within 120 days. The relevant portion of the order
reads as under:“10. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to state
that since the learned single judge has refused to
condone the delay, in the case at hand, therefore in
appeal, this Court would be entitled to consider if delay
should be condoned or not afresh. In this respect,
reference can gainfully be made to the Apex Court
judgment in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 titled
Shivamma (dead) By LRs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board
& Others, decided on 12.09.2025. Relevant extract
whereof reads as follows;
“It is no more res integra that where a court below
refused to condone the delay, then the court
sitting in appeal would be entitled to consider if
delay
should
be
condoned
or
not
afresh,
notwithstanding the decision of the lower court.
However, some weight and importance would have
to be given to the reasons which swayed the court
below from refusing to exercise its discretion.
Because refusal to condone the delay is also,
nevertheless an exercise of discretion to not
2026:HHC:20680
exercise discretion. However, the scope, available
to the appellate court to substitute its findings in
such scenarios would enjoy a considerable degree
of play in its joints.”
11. The primary object of the Act as enunciated by the
Apex Court in Icomm Tele Limited Vs. Punjab State
Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Anr. (2019) 4
SCC 401 is to reach a final disposal of disputes in a
speedy, effective, inexpensive and expeditious manner.
In order to make the arbitration process more effective,
the interference of the Courts has been specifically
restricted. The relevant extract reads as follows:“25. Several judgments of this Court have also
reiterated that the primary object of arbitration is
to reach a final disposal of disputes in a speedy,
effective, inexpensive and expeditious manner.
Thus, in Centrotrade Minerals & Metal Inc. v.
Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2017) 2 SCC 228, this
court held:
“39. In Union of India v. U.P. State Bridge
Corpn. Ltd. [(2015) 2 SCC 52] this Court
accepted the view [O.P. Malhotra on the Law
and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation
(3rd Edn. revised by Ms Indu Malhotra, Senior
Advocate)]
that
the
A&C
Act
has
four
foundational pillars and then observed in para
16 of the Report [sic] that:
“16. First and paramount principle of the first
pillar is ‘fair, speedy and inexpensive trial by
an Arbitral Tribunal’. Unnecessary delay or
expense would frustrate the very purpose of
2026:HHC:20680
arbitration. Interestingly, the second principle
which is recognised in the Act is the party
autonomy in the choice of procedure. This
means that if a particular procedure is
prescribed in the arbitration agreement which
the parties have agreed to, that has to be
generally resorted to.”(Emphasis in original)
26. Similarly, in Union of India v. Varindera
Constructions Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 794, this
Court held:“12. The primary object of the arbitration is to
reach a final disposition in a speedy, effective,
inexpensive and expeditious manner. In order
to regulate the law regarding arbitration,
legislature came up with legislation which is
known as Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. In order to make arbitration process
more effective, the legislature restricted the
role of courts in case where matter is subject
to the arbitration. Section 5 of the Act
specifically restricted the interference of the
courts to some extent. In other words, it is
only in exceptional circumstances, as provided
by this Act, the court is entitled to intervene in
the dispute which is the subject- matter of
arbitration. Such intervention may be before,
at or after the arbitration proceeding, as the
case
may
intervene
be.
In
short,
with
the
court
subject-
shall
not
matter
of
arbitration unless injustice is caused to either
of the parties.”
2026:HHC:20680
12. Based on the aforesaid, while considering an
application for condonation of delay in filing an
appeal under Section 37 of the Act, the Apex
Court in Govt. of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) represented by Executive Engineer
Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt.
Ltd.
(2021)
SCC
460,
observed
that
an
application for condonation of delay under Section
5 of the Limitation Act filed under the Arbitration
Act has to be considered in the context of the
object of speedy resolution of disputes. The
relevant
extract
is
being
reproduced
herein
below:“32. Thus, from the scheme of the Arbitration
Act as well as the aforesaid judgments,
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act has to be seen in the context of
the object of speedy resolution of disputes.”
13. In the aforesaid context, in Government of
Maharashtra’ case (supra), the Apex Court held
that the delay in filing an appeal under section 37
of the Act beyond the prescribed period is to be
condoned by way of an exception and not as a
general rule. Short delays beyond the prescribed
period wherein the party seeking condonation has
acted bona-fidely and not in a negligent manner,
in the discretion of the Court, can be condoned.
The relevant extract whereof reads as follows:“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of
speedy disposal sought to be achieved both
2026:HHC:20680
under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37
of the Arbitration Act that are governed by
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or
Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act,
a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days,
respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case
in which a party has otherwise acted bona
fide and not in a negligent manner, a short
delay
beyond
such
period
can,
in
the
discretion of the court, be condoned, always
bearing in mind that the other side of the
picture is that the opposite party may have
acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party’s inaction,
negligence or laches.”
14. For the purpose of the present lis, we are
concerned with Section 34(3) of the Act which
reads as follows:“34. Application for setting aside arbitral
award:
(3) An application for setting aside may not
be made after three months have elapsed
from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award
or, if a request had been made under section
33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
2026:HHC:20680
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application within the said
period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty
days, but not thereafter.”
15. The characteristics of Section 34(3) of the Act
have been highlighted in the judgement of the
Apex Court inP. Radha Bai and Ors. Vs. P. Ashok
Kumar and Anr. (2019) 13 SCC 445, in the
following terms:
“32. Section 34 is the only remedy for
challenging an award passed under Part I of
the
Arbitration
Act.
Section
34(3)
is
a
limitation provision, which is an inbuilt into
the remedy provision. One does not have to
look at the Limitation Act or any other
provision for identifying the limitation period
for challenging an Award passed under Part I
of the Arbitration Act.
32.2. The time limit for commencement of
limitation period is also provided in Section
34(3) i.e. the time from which a party making
an application "had received the Arbitral
Award” or disposal of a request under Section
33 for corrections and interpretation of the
Award.
32.3 Section 34(3) prohibits the filing of an
application for setting aside of an Award after
three months have elapsed from the date of
2026:HHC:20680
receipt of Award or disposal of a request
under Section 33. Section 34(3) uses the
phrase “an application for setting aside may
not
be
made
after
three
months
have
elapsed”. The phrase “may not be made” is
from the UNCITRAL Model Law and has been
understood to mean “cannot be made”.
The High Court of Singapore in ABC Co. Ltd v.
XYZ Co. Ltd. Held:
“The starting point of this discussion must be
the Model Law itself. On the aspect of time,
Article 34(3) is brief. All it says is that the
application may not be made after the lapse
of three months from a specified date.
Although the words used are ‘may not’ these
must be interpreted as ‘cannot’ as it is clear
that the intention is to limit the time during
which an award may be challenged. This
interpretation
relating
to
is
supported
the
discussions
by
material
amongst
the
drafters of the Model Law. It appears to me
that the court would not be able to entertain
any application lodged after the expiry of the
three months period as Article 34 has been
drafted as the all encompassing, and only,
basis for challenging an award in court. It
does not provide for any extension of the
time period and, as the court derives its
jurisdiction to hear the application from the
Article alone, the absence of such a provision
2026:HHC:20680
means the court has not been conferred with
the power to extend time".
32.4 The limitation provision in Section 34(3)
also provides for condonation of delay. Unlike
Section 5 of Limitation Act, the delay can only
be
condoned
for
days
on
showing
sufficient cause. The crucial phrase “but not
thereafter” reveals the legislative intent to fix
an outer boundary period for challenging an
Award.
32.5 Once the time limit or extended time
limit
for
challenging
the
arbitral
award
expires, the period for enforcing the award
under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act
commences. This is evident from the phrase
“where the time for making an application to
set aside the arbitral award under Section 34
has expired”. There is an integral nexus
between the period prescribed under Section
34(3)
to
challenge
the
Award
and
the
commencement of the enforcement period
under Section 36 to execute the Award.”
16. Besides the aforesaid, Section 34 of the Act is
a substantive remedy available to challenge an
Award. The statutory remedy is limited in scope,
hence, it is imperative to interpret limitation
provisions liberally, or else even the limited
window to challenge the arbitral award would be
lost and grave prejudice shall be caused to a party
against whom an Award has been passed. In this
regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the
2026:HHC:20680
authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in
My Preferred Transformation and Hospitality Pvt.
Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.,
(2025) 6 SCC 481 (Civil Appeal No.336 of 2025).
The relevant extract reads as follows:“41.3. The substantive remedies available
under Sections 34 and 37 of the ACA are, by
their very nature, limited in their scope due to
statutory
prescription.
necessary
to
interpret
It
is
therefore
the
limitation
provisions liberally, or else even the limited
window available to parties to challenge an
arbitral award will be lost. The remedy under
Section 34 is precious, and courts will keep in
mind the need to secure and protect such
remedy while applying limitation provisions. If
this limited remedy is denied on stringent
principles of limitation, it will -12-cause great
prejudice and has the effect of (a) denying
the remedy, and (b) in the long run, it will
have the effect of dissuading contracting
parties from seeking resolution of disputes
through arbitration. This is against public
policy.”
17. In cases, other than under the Act, wherein
bureaucratic processes are the reasons for delay
in approaching the Court by the State, the door for
condonation of delay is not completely shut.
Though while considering such cases, Courts are
circumspect and reluctant. In instances, wherein
bureaucratic procedures are cited as “sufficient
2026:HHC:20680
cause” for condonation of delay, the true test for
condoning delay is whether the “explanation”
demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable
diligence and whether the delay occurred despite
sincere efforts to act within time owing to the
inherent complexities of governmental decisionmaking (See Shivamma Supra).
18. The aforestated Court’s circumspection in
considering whether the explanation proferred
demonstrates reasonable diligence on the part of
the State stems from the fact that condoning
delay, as a matter of course in the name of public
interest
for
the
Government,
institutionalises
inefficiency. Resultantly, neither does its officers
act with vigilance nor does its instrumentalities
streamline procedures for timely action. Public
interest is better served by timely governmental
action rather than by condoning its lapses as a
matter of course. Limitation statutes, are enacted
in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of
finality, certainty, and public order. Repeated
indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of
bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding
the very object of limitation statutes. Law of
limitation has to be applied with all its rigour (See
Shivamma Supra).
19. For reasons stated supra (paragraph 16), while
considering an application for condonation of delay
in filing objections under Section 34 of the Act, it is
imperative
to
interpret
limitation
provisions
liberally. In the case at hand, the time limit of 90
2026:HHC:20680
days stood expired and the objections were filed
during the extended time limit for challenging the
arbitral award. While examining the explanation
offered, the Court has to be conscious of the
impersonal nature of the governmental functioning
(no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or
hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to
appeal), bureaucratic methodology imbued with
the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-thebuck ethos, the hidden forces that are at work in
preventing an appeal by the State being presented
within the prescribed period of limitation so as not
to allow a higher Court to pronounce upon the
legality and validity of an order of a lower Court
and thereby secure unholy gains. Besides “Every
day’s delay must be explained” does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. The
doctrine must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner. The explanation offered
in the case at hand, though involving bureaucratic
procedures, when examined in the aforesaid
perspective reflects a genuine and bona fide cause
for the delay in filing the objections under section
34 of the act.
20. A challenge to an Award by way of objections
under Section 34(3) of the Act can be laid within
120 days of the receipt of the Award. As has
already been stated supra, an Award can only be
enforced under Section 36 of the Act after the
expiry of 120 days. The nexus between Section
34(3) to challenge the Award and commencement
of enforcement under Section 36 of the award is
2026:HHC:20680
evident. Nothing has been acquired both in equity
and justice by the respondent in the case at hand
prior to the expiry of 120 days after receipt of the
Award, which would be lost, if in case, the
application for condonation of delay is allowed in
the case at hand.
21. Hence, for the reasons/sufficient cause stated
in the application & the aforesaid position of law,
delay in filing the present objections is condoned
and
impugned
judgment
dated
22.10.2024,
passed by the learned Single Judge, is set aside.
The matter is remanded back to the learned Single
Judge for the consideration of the objections under
Section 34 of the Act.
The present appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid
terms, so also the pending application(s), if any.”
6.
In the present case, it is to be noticed that a
specific plea of the State as such is that the award was
received on 21.03.2024 and the Junior Engineer, who was
dealing with the subject matter had been requisitioned by the
District Administration, Shimla in connection with the General
Elections, which was to be held in mid May 2024. He had
remained on election duty till the end of the first week of June,
2024 and thereafter the processing as such had taken place.
The Managing Director was also on leave w.e.f. 27.06.2024 to
11.07.2024 and approval could not be obtained.
2026:HHC:20680
7.
In such circumstances, we are of the considered
opinion that the basic principle is to be kept in mind that each
and every day’s delay is not to be explained as per the law
laid down in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs.
Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 and G. Ramegowda vs.
Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142, therefore, we
are of the considered opinion that sufficient cause was made
out as such to condone the delay and the learned Single Judge
has been parsimonious as such in not granting the said relief.
8.
Resultantly, we are of the considered opinion that
the above said judgment would cover the issue in question.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we allow the
application for condonation of delay and the matter is
remanded to the learned Single Judge for decision afresh on
merits.
9.
It is also brought to our notice that the amount of
Rs.28 crores has also been withdrawn by the claimant against
the bank gaurantee, as had been directed by us on
31.12.2025 and we had directed that bank guarantee would
be kept alive till the logical conclusion of the proceedings.
Resultantly, the claimant/respondent shall ensure that the
bank guarantee is renewed regularly till the decision of the
main case.
2026:HHC:20680
10.
Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed, so also
the pending applications, if any.
(G. S. Sandhawalia)
Chief Justice
th
May, 2026
(sanjeev)
(Bipin C. Negi)
Judge
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