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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
ARB.P. 1857/2025
HONASA CONSUMER LIMITED
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Udian Sharma, Advocate
through video-conferencing.
versus
RDV DESIGN TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED
.....Respondent
Through:
Mr. Aayush Gautam, Advocate
through video-conferencing.
%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
ORDER
20.01.2026
1.
The present Petition, under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 [“Act”], has been filed seeking the
appointment of an Arbitrator for the adjudication of disputes inter se
the parties arising out of the Vendor Agreement dated 29.05.2023
[“Agreement”] .
2.
Clause 13.3 of the Vendor Agreement, which contains the
arbitration clause, reads as follows:
“13.3. If any dispute arises between the Parties hereto during the
subsistence of this Agreement or thereafter, in connection with, or
arising out of, this Agreement, the dispute shall be referred to
arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(Indian) to be adjudicated by a sole arbitrator to be appointed by
Purchaser. Arbitration shall be held at Delhi India. The proceedings
of arbitration shall be in the English language. The arbitrator's
award shall be final and binding on the Parties. The Agreement
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of
India. The courts of Delhi, India, shall have exclusive jurisdiction
in connection with this Agreement.”
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3.
The material on record indicates that, pursuant to the disputes
that arose between the parties, a Notice under Section 21 of the Act
dated 27.08.2025 was issued by the Petitioner. Vide reply dated
04.09.2025, the Respondent refused to give its consent for invoking
arbitration and denied the existence of any disputes between the
parties.
4.
Hence, the Petitioner has approached this Court by way of the
present Petition seeking the appointment of a sole Arbitrator.
5.
The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. This Court in Pradhaan Air Express Pvt Ltd v. Air Works
India Engineering Pvt Ltd [2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022]
has
extensively dealt with the scope of interference at the stage of Section
11. The Court held as under:“9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning,1 while considering all earlier
pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of
seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 &
the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re2 has held that scope of inquiry
at the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent
of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing
else.
10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no. 114 in the
case of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. that observations made
in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn.,3 and adopted in NTPC
Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd.,4 that the jurisdiction of the referral court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facienon-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re :
Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no. 114 in the case of SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd. reads as under:—
“114. In view of the observations made by this Court
in In Re : Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of
enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
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agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it
difficult to hold that the observations made in Vidya
Drolia (supra) and adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that
the jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the
issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11
extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the
subsequent decision in In Re : Interplay (supra).”
11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have
been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is
equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the
case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P)
Ltd.,5 however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11
must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time-consuming and
costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated such
as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim through
arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the limited
scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the interest
of the parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal
eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne
by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the other
parties to the arbitration.
12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the
adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent
and malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration
proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts
of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:—
“20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 : 2024 INSC
532], frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which the
referral court should not decide at the stage of Section 11
as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent to
adjudicate the same.
21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the
limited jurisdiction of the referral courts under Section 11
must not be misused by parties in order to force other
parties to the arbitration agreement to participate in a
time consuming and costly arbitration process. This is
possible in instances, including but not limited to, where
the claimant canvasses the adjudication of non-existent
and mala fide claims through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of judicial
interference of the referral courts with the interests of the
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parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct
that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the party
which the Tribunal ultimately finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the
other party to the arbitration. Having said that, it is
clarified that the aforesaid is not to be construed as a
determination of the merits of the matter before us, which
the Arbitral Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to
determine.”
13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section 11
proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to
the extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of the
referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act and
further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally confined
to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural safeguards
but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the arbitral process.
Any transgression beyond this limited judicial threshold would not
only contravene the legislative intent enshrined in Section 8 and
Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk undermining the sanctity
and efficiency of arbitration as a preferred mode of dispute
resolution. The referral Court must, therefore, exercise restraint and
refrain from venturing into the merits of the dispute or adjudicating
issues that fall squarely within the jurisdictional domain of the
arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen that the scope of enquiry at the
referral stage is conservative in nature. A similar view has also
been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay
Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel6.”
6.
Learned counsel for the parties are ad idem that the matter may
be referred to arbitration by way of appointment of a sole Arbitrator
by this Court. Both parties are also desirous that the Arbitration be
carried out under the aegis of the Delhi International Arbitration
Centre [“DIAC”].
7.
The material on record further indicates that the disputed
amount is stated to be Rs. 96,45,559/8.
In view of the fact that disputes have arisen between the parties
and there is an Arbitration clause in the agreement, this Court is
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inclined to appoint an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes
between the parties.
9.
Accordingly, Mr. Raghavendra Mohan Bajan, Advocate
(e-mail
:
raghavendrambajaj@gmail.com
&
Mobile
No.
9810248083), who is empanelled with the DIAC, is appointed as the
sole Arbitrator.
10.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the Delhi
International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) and would abide by its rules
and regulations. The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees as per
the Schedule of Fees maintained by the DIAC.
11.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite
disclosure under Section 12 (2) of the Act within a week of entering of
reference.
12.
The Registry is directed to send a receipt of this order to the
learned arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through email.
13.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
14.
Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy
between the parties. Let a copy of the said order be sent to the
Arbitrator through the electronic mode as well.
15.
Accordingly, the instant petition stands disposed of.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 20, 2026/tk/va/jk
This is a digitally signed order.
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The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 24/01/2026 at 12:09:05
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