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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 25.03.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 06.04.2026
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O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 121/2025, I.A. 30696/2025 & I.A.
279/2026
HIMANSHU SHEKHAR
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Manish Vashisht, Sr. Adv
with Mr. Rajeev Ahuja, Mr.
Harshit Ahuja and Mr. Shikhar
Bansal, Advs.
versus
PRABHAT SHEKHAR
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Ravi Prakash, Ms.
Nupur Singh, Ms. Riya Kumar,
Ms. Shreya Sethi &Mr. Krishna
Gembheer, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
JUDGMENT
1.
The petition is filed under Section 14 read with Section 12(5) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short „the Act‟) for
termination of the mandate and substitution of the arbitrator.
2.
The relevant facts are that the petitioner and the respondent
entered into an understanding on 04.10.2021 for resolving disputes
pertaining to reconciliation, scrutiny and settlement of accounts of the
parties by arbitration. The name of the sole arbitrator was mutually
agreed by the parties. The parties to the lis are brothers engaged in a
family jewellery business carried under the name of „Manohar Lal
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Sarraf and Sons Jewellers Private Limited‟ (for short „MLSSJPL‟).
There are three directors in MLSSJPL each holding an equal share of
33.3% each. Two of the directors are party to the lis while third is
their brother Sh. Sudhir Singhal. The arbitrator upon entering in
reference passed orders dated 04.10.2021 and 08.10.2021 under
Section 17 of the Act directing the parties to maintain status quo in
respect of all properties pertaining to the arbitral dispute. The
petitioner, Sh. Sudhir Singhal and MLSSJPL filed appeals under
Section 37 of the Act. The impugned orders dated 08.10.2021 and
14.10.2021 were set aside by this Court with the consent of the parties
and respondent in the present appeal sought liberty to file an
application for impleadment of the affected parties.
2.1
The petitioner earlier filed a petition under Section 14(2) read
with Section 15 of the Act before this Court for termination of the
mandate of the sole arbitrator for violation of entry no.9 of Seventh
Schedule of the Act. The contention was rejected holding that
arbitrator cannot be described as having a close family relation being
the co-father-in-law (samdhi) of Sh. Vivek Shekhar, brother of the
parties in dispute. The court took note of the statement made by the
counsel for Sh. Sudhir Singhal that he would like to join the arbitral
proceedings and agree to be signatory to the arbitration agreement
provided the arbitrator is substituted. It was observed by the court that
Sh. Sudhir Singhal holds 33.3% share in MLSSJPL and that a
complete and effective resolution may not be possible without his
joining the arbitral proceedings. The SLP against the decision of this
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Court was dismissed on 21.04.2023.
2.2
On 07.11.2025, the respondent filed an application for
impleadment of Sh. Sudhir Singhal, MLSSJPL and Manohar Lal
Sarraf & Sons Private Limited. The petitioner on 14.11.2025 sent an
email to the arbitrator for filing fresh declaration under Section 12 of
the Act in view of the parties sought to be impleaded. On 24.11.2025
petitioner sent the application to the arbitrator attaching the copies of
cheque of rupees one crore dated 31.03.2025 issued by the arbitrator
in favour of Sh. Sudhir Singhal and bank documents returning the
cheque. It was stated that there was financial interest or business
relationship between the arbitrator and Sh. Sudhir Singhal and the
arbitrator cannot continue under Section 12(5) read with Seventh
Schedule of the Act. The arbitrator without filing a declaration under
Section 12 of the Act proceeded to decide application for
impleadment. The application was dismissed on 11.12.2025. It was
held that in view of the dismissal of the impleadment application there
was no requirement to file a fresh declaration under Section 12 of the
Act and declaration already filed on 04.10.2021 was sufficient.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in MLSSJPL
Himanshu Shekhar, Prabhat Shekhar and Sh. Sudhir Singhal are the
only three directors, having equal share holding. The arbitrator had
financial relationship with the parties sought to be impleaded by the
respondent and cannot continue.
3.1
The contention is that the disclosure under Section 12 of the Act
is a continuing requirement. Reliance is placed on decision of the
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Supreme Court in the case of Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture
Company (2025) 4 SCC 641 (for short „CORE‟). It is argued that for
non-filing of the declaration by the arbitrator adverse inference is to be
drawn.
4.
Learned senior counsel for the respondent submits that the
remedy available for the petitioner against the dismissal of the
application under Section 12 of the Act is at the stage of Section 34 of
the Act and the grievance cannot be raised at this stage.
4.1
The contention is that „party‟ as defined under Section 2(h) of
the Act means a party to arbitration agreement and Sh. Sudhir Singhal
is not a party to the agreement therefore Seventh Schedule of the Act
shall not apply.
4.2
It is emphasised that substitution under Section 14 of the Act
can only be in case of the arbitrator becoming de jure or de facto. The
argument is that for de jure inability, the disqualification by
prescription of law has to be there and not mere apprehension of bias.
4.3
It is contended that the endeavour of the petitioner by
repeatedly challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is to stall the
proceedings and that a similar relief earlier sought by the petitioner
was rejected.
4.4
The Supreme Court in the case of HRD Corporations v. GAIL
(India) Limited (2018) 12 SCC 471 held that an arbitrator falling in
one of the categories mentioned in Seventh Schedule is ineligible to
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act as an arbitrator and in such a case an application under Section
14(2) of the Act can be filed for termination of the mandate. The
relevant para is quoted below :
“12. After the 2016 Amendment Act, a dichotomy is
made by the Act between persons who become
“ineligible” to be appointed as arbitrators, and persons
about whom justifiable doubts exist as to their
independence or impartiality. Since ineligibility goes to
the root of the appointment, Section 12(5) read with the
Seventh Schedule makes it clear that if the arbitrator
falls in any one of the categories specified in the
Seventh Schedule, he becomes “ineligible” to act as
arbitrator. Once he becomes ineligible, it is clear that,
under Section 14(1)(a), he then becomes de jure unable
to perform his functions inasmuch as, in law, he is
regarded as “ineligible”. In order to determine whether
an arbitrator is de jure unable to perform his functions,
it is not necessary to go to the Arbitral Tribunal
under Section 13. Since such a person would lack
inherent jurisdiction to proceed any further, an
application may be filed under Section 14(2) to the
Court to decide on the termination of his/her mandate
on this ground. As opposed to this, in a challenge
where grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule are
disclosed, which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the
arbitrator‟s independence or impartiality, such doubts
as to independence or impartiality have to be
determined as a matter of fact in the facts of the
particular challenge by the Arbitral Tribunal
under Section 13. If a challenge is not successful, and
the Arbitral Tribunal decides that there are no
justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality
of the arbitrator/arbitrators, the Tribunal must then
continue the arbitral proceedings under Section
13(4) and make an award. It is only after such award is
made, that the party challenging the arbitrator‟s
appointment on grounds contained in the Fifth
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Schedule may make an application for setting aside the
arbitral award in accordance with Section 34 on the
aforesaid grounds. It is clear, therefore, that any
challenge contained in the Fifth Schedule against the
appointment of Justice Doabia and Justice Lahoti
cannot be gone into at this stage, but will be gone into
only after the Arbitral Tribunal has given an award.
Therefore, we express no opinion on items contained in
the Fifth Schedule under which the appellant may
challenge the appointment of either arbitrator. They
will be free to do so only after an award is rendered by
the Tribunal.”
5.
The Supreme Court in CORE (supra) held that the person
ineligible under Section 12 of the Act is de jure and liable to be
substituted under Section 14 of the Act.
“48. Section 12(5) does not prescribe a method to
challenge the appointment of an ineligible person.
Section 14 deal with the termination of the mandate of
an arbitrator who is unable to perform their functions.
A person who is ineligible to be appointed as an
arbitrator in terms of Section 12(5) becomes de jure
unable to perform functions according to Section 14.
Resultantly, the mandate of such an ineligible person
gets automatically terminated and they are liable to be
substituted by another arbitrator under Section 14.”
6.
The application for impleadment of the parties was filed in
pursuance to the liberty granted by this court in the order passed in
appeal under Section 37 of the Act and the relevant paras of the order
are quoted below:
“5. Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel on behalf of
Prabhat Shekhar i.e., the respondent in ARB.P. 1/2022
and respondent No. 2 on ARB.A. (COMM.) 79/2021,
on instructions, states that the impugned Orders dated
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08.10.2021 and 14.10.2021 may be set aside with
liberty to the respondent to file applications in
accordance with law to implead such affected parties
and seek relief against them.
6. Consequently, since the Appellants were not heard
before passing the impugned Orders dated 08.10.2021
and 14.10.2021, the same are set aside.
7. As and when the applications are filed by the
respondent, subject to the Appellants opposing the
same in accordance with law, the learned Arbitral
Tribunal shall decide the same in accordance with
law.”
7.
Upon filing of the application for impleadment the petitioner
insisted that arbitrator should file a fresh declaration under Section 12
of the Act. On 24.11.2025 the petitioner supplied a copy of the cheque
of rupees one crore issued by the arbitrator in favour of Sh. Sudhir
Singhal along with bank documents showing return of the cheque. The
arbitrator adopted a novel method of not filing a declaration under
Section 12 of the Act and waited for the outcome of the impleadment
application to be decided by him only. The arbitrator violating the
statutory provisions of the Act decided an application for impleadment
by proceeding under Section 16 of the Act thereby deciding
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal with regard to non-signatories to the
agreement. The Supreme Court in Adavya Projects Private Limited v.
Vishal Structurals Private Limited & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 806
held as under:
“24. As briefly stated above, the determination of who is
a party to the arbitration agreement falls within the
domain of the arbitral tribunal as per Section 16 ACA.
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Section 16 embodies the doctrine of kompetenzkompetenz i.e., that the Arbitral Tribunal can determine
its own jurisdiction. The provision is inclusive and
covers all jurisdictional questions, including the
existence and validity of the arbitration agreement, who
is a party to the arbitration agreement, and the scope of
disputes referrable to arbitration under the agreement.
Considering that the Arbitral Tribunal's power to make
an award that binds the parties is derived from the
arbitration agreement, these jurisdictional issues must
necessarily be decided through an interpretation of the
arbitration agreement itself. Therefore, the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction must be determined against the
touchstone of the arbitration agreement.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.
The arbitrator chose to decide his competence with regard to
Sh. Sudhir Singhal and MLSSJPL in spite of documents on record
indicating financial interest or business relationship between the
arbitrator and the proposed party. The petitioner insisted for
declaration to be filed under Section 12 of the Act but arbitrator
avoided and ultimately refused to do so after dismissing its application
for impleadment.
9.
The contention of the respondent that remedy against dismissal
of impleadment application is under Section 34 of the Act after the
award is passed, is of no avail. The issue involved is of termination of
mandate and substitution of the arbitrator. The Supreme Court in HRD
Corporation v. GAIL (supra) held that ineligibility of arbitrator under
Section 12(5) read with Seventh Schedule of the Act can be decided
by the court in application filed under Section 14 of the Act.
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10.
The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that
Sh. Sudhir Singhal does not fall within the definition of „party‟ under
Section 2(h) of the Act and thus Seventh Schedule shall not apply in
the present case, lacks merit.
11.
The Supreme Court in ASF Buildtech (P) Ltd. v. Shapoorji
Pallonji & Co. (P) Ltd., (2025) 9 SCC 76 held that a non-signatory if
bound by the agreement or is a veritable party can be impleaded as a
party by the arbitral tribunal and not by the referral court. The relevant
paras are quoted below:
“103. Thus, even in the absence of the non-signatory being
made a party to the proceedings before the Referral Court,
and where the question of its impleadment has neither been
raised nor addressed or left open to the Arbitral Tribunal
by the Referral Court, the Arbitral Tribunal would be full
empowered to examine this issue in the first instance and
determine whether any non-signatory is bound by the
arbitration agreement based on the factual circumstances
of the case, and if necessary, implead such non-signatory
to the arbitration proceedings.
108. Put differently, although notionally the exercise of
determining “existence of the arbitration agreement qua
the non-signatory‟, may, on the surface appear to be
concerned with the arbitration agreement or clause in
question, yet one must be mindful that the actual focus of
such exercise lies in determining the existence of consent
of the parties through fact patterns to such arbitration
agreement or clause and not vice-versa. It is the existence
of mutual consent to arbitrate—not the formal existence of
the arbitration agreement—that is the heart of this inquiry.
110. Even if it is assumed for a moment that the Referral
Court in its jurisdiction under Section 11 of the 1996 Act
has the discretion to determine whether a non-signatory is
a veritable party to the arbitration agreement or not, by
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virtue of Cox and Kings (1), the Referral Court should only
refrain but rather loathe the exercise of such discretion.
Any discretion which is conferred upon any authority, be it
Referral Courts must be exercised reasonably and in a fair
manner. Fairness in this context does not just extend to a
non-signatory's rights and its apprehension of prejudice,
fairness also demands that the arbitration proceedings is
given due time to gestate so that the entire dispute is
holistically decided. Any determination even if prima-facie
by a Referral Court on such aspects would entail an
inherent risk of frustrating the very purpose of resolution
of dispute, if the Referral Courts opine that a nonsignatory in question is not a veritable party. On the other
hand, the apprehensions of prejudice can be properly
mitigated by leaving such question for the Arbitral
Tribunal to decide, as such party can always take recourse
to Section 16 of the 1996 Act and thereafter in appeal
under Section 37, and where it is found that such party was
put through the rigmarole of arbitration proceedings
vexatiously, both the Tribunal and the courts, as the case
may be, should not only require that all costs of arbitration
insofar as such non-signatory is concerned be borne by the
party who vexatiously impleaded it, but the Arbitral
Tribunal would be well within its powers to also impose
costs.
116. Similarly, in Ajay Madhusudan (supra) it was held
that since a detailed examination of numerous disputed
questions of fact was required for determining whether the
non-signatory is a veritable party to the arbitration
agreement, the same cannot be examined in the limited
jurisdiction under Section 11 of the 1996 Act as it would
tantamount to a mini trial. Accordingly, the Arbitral
Tribunal was found to be the appropriate forum for
deciding the said issue on the basis of the evidence that
may be adduced by the parties.”
12.
The argument if taken to its logical end would mean that the
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compliance of Section 12 read with Seventh Schedule vis-a-vis a nonsignatory is not applicable even in case it is claimed that the party is
bound by the agreement and is a necessary party to the proceedings.
An arbitrator otherwise ineligible to continue shall decide its
jurisdiction qua a non-signatory to agreement and if rejects the prayer
would continue. The arbitrator shall decide its competence for a party
proposed to be impleaded even if there are documents on record
indicating violation of Section 12(5) of the Act read with seventh
schedule. In other words arbitrator shall decide the issue relating to a
party with whom financial interest or business relation arbitrator does
not want to disclose despite the statutory mandate.
13.
The Supreme Court in HRD Corporation v. GAIL (supra) held
that person falling in any category specified in Seventh Schedule
becomes de jure ineligible and cannot perform functions of an
arbitrator. The documents attached by the petitioner before the
arbitrator indicated financial interest and business relationship
between the arbitrator and Sh. Sudhir Singhal yet the arbitrator chose
not to deny business relation by filing a declaration but proceeded to
decide the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal vis-a-vis Sh. Sudhir
Singhal and MLSSJPL in which Sh. Sudhir Singhal is one of the
directors.
14.
The Supreme Court in CORE (supra) held that the disclosure
under Section 12 of the Act is a continuing requirement and
information can be required in the circumstances arising later in the
proceedings. The relevant para of CORE (supra) is quoted below:
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“49. The disclosure requirement helps prevent the
appointment of an unacceptable candidate. The duty of
disclosure is a continuing requirement to: (i) provide the
information to any party who did not obtain it before the
arbitrator‟s appointment; and (ii) secure information
about circumstances that only arise at a later stage of the
arbitral proceedings, that is, new business affiliations or
share acquisitions.”
15.
The argument of the respondent that repeated challenge to the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator is to stall the proceedings, is noted to be
rejected. The challenge now posed to the eligibility of the arbitrator is
consequent to the application for impleadment of the proposed parties
and gives new cause of action to the petitioner.
16.
In the case in hand, the circumstances changed with the filing of
an application for impleadment and the duty was casted upon the
arbitrator to make a declaration under Section 12 of the Act vis-a-vis
the proposed parties. More so, when there was a pleading on record
along with the documents pointing towards business relationship or
financial interest of the arbitrator with Sh. Sudhir Singhal. The
arbitrator erred in proceeding under Section 16 of the Act to decide
the application for impleadment without filing declaration under
Section 12 read with Seventh Schedule of the Act. The noncompliance of Section 12 after change in circumstances is fatal for the
mandate of the arbitrator. More so, when the cheque issued by the
arbitrator in favour of Sh. Sudhir Singhal is neither denied nor
explained despite insistence of the petitioner.
17.
There is no quarrel on the proposition that Section 14 cannot be
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invoked on an apprehension of bias. The case of the petitioner is that
of the arbitrator having financial interest or business relationship with
proposed parties to be impleaded was ineligible to continue and is not
a case of apprehension of bias.
18.
In view of the discussion above, the arbitrator is de jure
ineligible under Section 12(5) read with Seventh Schedule of the Act
and cannot continue.
19.
Ms. Justice (Retd.) Mukta Gupta (Mobile No.: 9650788600) is
appointed as the sole arbitrator and shall substitute the earlier
arbitrator.
20.
The fees of the learned Arbitrator will be governed by Schedule
IV of the Act. Before entering upon reference, the learned Arbitrator
will comply with Section 12 of the Act.
21.
It is made clear that since this Court has not expressed any
opinion on the merits of the rival claims of the parties, it will be open
for the parties to file their respective claims/counter claims before the
learned Arbitrator which will be considered in accordance with law.
22.
A copy of this order be forwarded to the learned Arbitrator for
information.
23.
The petition is allowed. All pending applications are also
disposed of.
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J.
APRIL 06, 2026
‘JK’
Reportable:- Yes
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