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2026:MNHC:178-DB
REPORTABLE
Sl. No. 17
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
MC(RFA) No. 2 of 2026
Shri Hijam Roben Singh, aged about 49 years, S/o Late
Nilla Singh of Thoubal Nongangkhong Lai Leirak, P.O. &
P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal District, Manipur.
….. Applicant
-Versus-
Shri Okram Birendra Singh, aged about 75 years, S/o
Late O. Narahari Singh of Thoubal Haokha Mamang
Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal District, Manipur.
..... Respondent
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
For applicant
Mr. T. Rajendra, learned senior counsel
instructed by Md. Shakir Khan, learned
counsel on record
For respondent
Mr. L. Seityandra, learned counsel along
with Ms. N. Kavita, learned counsel on
record
Date of Judgment and 14.08.2026
Order
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(ORAL)
[M. Sundar, CJ]
[1]
Instant order has to be read in conjunction with and in
continuation of earlier proceedings made by this Court in the listing on
11.06.2026 and scanned reproduction of the proceedings made by this
Court on 11.06.2026 is as follows :
2026:MNHC:178-DB
2026:MNHC:178-DB
2026:MNHC:178-DB
[2]
In addition to the abbreviations, short forms and short
references used in afore-referred proceedings made in the listing on
11.06.2026, the following abbreviations, short forms and short
references shall also be used in instant order, obviously for the sake of
brevity/convenience and clarity and a tabulation in this regard is as
follows :
2026:MNHC:178-DB
Sl. Abbreviation/
No. Short Form/
short reference
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
[3]
Full Form/Expansion
CoD
Limitation Act
Executing Court
Condonation of Delay
The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)
Court of Civil Judge Senior Division,
Thoubal, Manipur (to be noted, Executing
Court and said trial Court are one and the
same)
said
Execution Execution Petition No. 1 of 2021 on the file
Petition
of said Executing Court launched for
executing impugned decree inter-alia by
attachment and sale of immovable
property.
RFA
Regular First Appeal (an appeal under
Section 96 of CPC)
DPN
Demand Promissory Note
Cr.P.C.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act
No. 2 of 1974)
In the hearing today, Mr. T. Rajendra, learned senior
advocate instructed by Mr. Md. Shakir Khan, learned counsel on record
for the CRP petitioner and Mr. L. Seityandra, learned counsel along with
Ms. N. Kavita, learned counsel on record on behalf of the sole
respondent are before this Court.
[4]
Respondent has filed affidavit-in-opposition, MC applicant
has filed additional affidavit and pleadings are complete. Learned senior
counsel and learned counsel on both sides made elaborate submissions.
Captioned MC was heard out in full.
[5]
As would be evident from earlier proceedings made by this
Court in the listing on 11.06.2026, captioned MC has been filed with a
2026:MNHC:178-DB
CoD prayer qua 1662 days (more than four and half years) qua an RFA
against impugned decree which is an ex-parte money decree. In aforereferred 11.06.2026 proceedings an inadvertent typographical error has
crept in. Covid period exclusion is from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 (two
years) and not four years and two months. The point is, RFA with
captioned MC has been filed in this court on 21.05.2026 which is more
than 4 years and 2 months after Covid period two years exclusion had
elapsed on 28.02.2022. Instant order on being uploaded in official
website of High Court will serve as an Erratum/Corrigendum qua
paragraph 5 of afore-referred 11.06.2026 proceedings which is now an
integral part and parcel of this order. To be noted, RFA (along with
captioned MC) has been filed in this Court on 21.05.2026. The MC
applicant is sole defendant in said trial Court in said money suit.
Obviously, the lone respondent in captioned MC is sole plaintiff in said
money suit in said trial Court. It is also deemed appropriate to write
that post impugned decree, the MC applicant is judgment debtor and
the respondent in the captioned MC is the decree holder. As decree
holder, respondent launched said Execution Petition on 18.01.2021 and
it is now at a very advanced stage and there will be more allusion about
this elsewhere infra in this order.
[6]
To be noted, for the sake of convenience and clarity, from
hereon and henceforth, in instant order, parties in captioned MC will be
referred to by their respective ranks in said trial court in said money
2026:MNHC:178-DB
suit. This means that the ‘sole MC applicant’ shall be referred to as
‘defendant’ and the ‘sole respondent in captioned MC’ shall be referred
to as ‘plaintiff’.
[7]
Factual matrix in a nutshell i.e., short facts shorn of,
elaboration and particulars not imperative for appreciating instant order
are that the defendant borrowed a sum of forty-four lakhs from the
plaintiff and executed a DPN dated 30.08.2015; that the plaintiff
demanded money under DPN in and vide a legal notice dated
30.11.2017; that the defendant received this legal notice/demand and
admittedly, the defendant neither replied nor complied; that thereafter,
the plaintiff presented said money suit in said trial Court vide a plaint
dated 04.12.2017 and the date of institution of the suit is 05.12.2017;
that the suit was assigned the number Original (Money) Suit No. 7 of
2017; that the said Money Suit was filed by the plaintiff by resorting to
Order XXXVII of CPC; that this means that the said Money Suit is a
summary suit; that on receipt of suit summons, the defendant entered
appearance, obviously within the prescribed time limit as defendant
applied for leave to defend and leave to defend was granted by said
trial Court in and by an order dated 03.05.2018; that the defendant did
not file written statement though leave was granted and the order
granting leave had become final; that it is to be noted that written
statement has not been filed by defendant until the impugned decree
was made by said trial Court on 05.08.2019; that, to be noted, there is
2026:MNHC:178-DB
no written statement on file even today; that post grant of leave to
defend on 03.05.2018, the defendant was set ex-parte vide Order IX
Rule 7 and this was in and by an order dated 21.07.2018; that the
defendant filed Judicial MC No. 74 of 2019 with a prayer to set aside
the order dated 21.07.2018 setting him ex-parte but this was also
rejected by the trial Court in and by an order dated 17.06.2019; that
the defendant came to this Court by way of a CRP under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India assailing the order setting him ex-parte in said
money suit and this is CRP (CRP Art. 227) No. 39 of 2019; that this CRP,
after full contest, was dismissed by a detailed order by Hon’ble
predecessor Chief Justice in and by an order dated 18.07.2019; that
this 18.07.2019 order of this Court made in CRP (CRP Art. 227) No. 39
of 2019 dismissing defendant’s challenge to the order setting him exparte has been given finality; that it has attained finality and has been
given legal quietus, as admittedly the defendant has not carried the
matter to Hon’ble Supreme Court; that thereafter, the said trial Court
made the ex-parte judgment and decree (Money Decree) dated
05.08.2019 which are collectively, for the sake of convenience being
referred to as ‘impugned decree’ in instant order; that the impugned
decree was made after examining 3 (three) witnesses on plaintiff’s side
(PW1 to PW3) and marking of 8 (eight) exhibits; that when this ex-parte
decree was made, while the year of the suit was correctly shown as
2017 in the judgment, it was wrongly shown as 2018 in the decree; that
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this was corrected by an order dated 04.05.2026 made by said trial
Court and this obviously is an order under Section 152 of CPC as it is
clearly a case of clerical error i.e., an accidental slip and it is nobody’s
case that the correction impacts the outcome of the decree in any
manner; that it is to be noted that this impugned decree was made after
drawing up and setting out 4 (four) points for determination; that post
impugned decree, defendant filed an application for setting aside the
ex-parte decree (impugned decree) by resorting to Order IX Rule 13 of
CPC; that this application was filed along with a CoD application; that
interestingly and intriguingly this CoD application and the application to
set aside the ex-parte decree were numbered simultaneously and more
intriguingly the application to set aside the ex-parte decree has been
given a prior number i.e., one number prior to the CoD application; that
it is to be noted that the CoD application is Judl. MC Case No. 59 of
2022 and the application to set aside the ex-parte decree is Judl. Misc.
Case No. 58 of 2022; that this is clearly an erroneous procedure as an
application filed with delay can be numbered only after the delay is
condoned; that doing the reverse is putting the cart before the horse
besides being a legally incorrect procedure as any petition, appeal or
application filed after prescribed period of limitation cannot be heard on
merits without the delay being condoned; that owing to the perimeter
of legal drill at hand, we refrain from dilating more on this but suffice
to write that all courts in Manipur shall ensure that such an erroneous
2026:MNHC:178-DB
procedure is not followed (to be noted, we find such a procedure in
many cases and that has impelled us to pen this part); that under such
circumstances, the CoD application being Judl. Misc. Case No. 59 of
2022 was allowed by said trial Court vide judicial order dated
27.02.2023, it is to be noted that it was allowed on terms i.e., Rs. 500/(rupees five hundred) to be paid to the plaintiff; that learned counsel
for plaintiff, on instructions from plaintiff, submits that this Rs. 500/has not been paid to the plaintiff until this date and there is no contra
material before this Court on the side of defendant in this regard; that
under such circumstances, said trial Court, took up Judl. Misc. Case No.
58 of 2022 and dismissed the same by way of judicial order dated
02.03.2026; that it is to be noted that this 02.03.2026 order dismissing
defendant’s Order IX Rule 13 application has not been assailed further
until today; that under such circumstances, as already alluded to supra,
the minor clerical error owing to accidental slip in the decree qua the
decree part of impugned decree was corrected on 04.05.2026 by way
of a judicial order; that in the interregnum, said Execution Petition was
launched by the decree holder, it proceeded and it had reached a stage
where the said executing court ordered attachment on 01.04.2026 and
fixed the next date as 04.05.2026 calling for a report; that on
04.05.2026, the matter was listed for report qua attachment; that it is
after this 04.05.2026 proceedings of said executing Court, when the
executing court had fixed the next date as 01.06.2026, RFA with
2026:MNHC:178-DB
captioned CoD MC has been filed in this Court on 21.05.2026; that as
already alluded to supra, captioned MC has been filed with a CoD prayer
qua 1662 days delay in filing RFA; that it is under such circumstances,
captioned MC was heard out elaborately.
[8]
This Court now proceeds to set out the contentions,
counter-contentions and set out its discussions and dispositive
reasoning one after the other and an adumbration of the same is as
follows :
(i) Learned
senior
counsel
for
defendant,
adverting to 27.02.2023 order made in Judl.
Misc. Case No. 59 of 2022 (CoD application
which was allowed on terms of Rs. 500/- to
be paid to plaintiff), adverted to paragraph 7
thereat and submitted that said trial court has
observed that explanation for delay in
obtaining certified copies of the judgment and
order dated 05.08.2019 appears to be
acceptable as the functioning of the Court was
affected by Covid 19. It was also pointed out
that certified copies
were obtained on
02.03.2021 and the defendant had filed the
CoD application on 19.03.2021 which is within
2026:MNHC:178-DB
30 (thirty) days. It was submitted that said
trial Court has observed that the CoD
application qua Order IX Rule 13 application
was filed within time. However, the Order IX
Rule 13 application (which was numbered
even
before
delay
was
condoned
and
assigned a number prior to CoD application)
came to be dismissed by way of a judicial
order dated 02.03.2026 and as rightly pointed
out by learned counsel for plaintiff the same
has not been assailed by the defendant in any
manner until this day and therefore, the
argument that said trial court has noticed that
the CoD application qua Order IX Rule 13
application has been filed within time is of no
avail as regards the captioned MC and it does
not come to the aid of the MC applicant as
02.03.2025 dismissal order (dismissing Order
IX
Rule
application
has
not
been
challenged). This puts an end to the first point
urged;
(ii) The next point that was urged is, time spent
in Order IX Rule 13 application should be
2026:MNHC:178-DB
excluded. In support of this contention,
learned senior counsel pressed into service
Bhivchandra Shankar More Vs. Balu
Gangaram More and Others reported in
(2019) 6 SCC 387. On facts, Bhivchandra
is a case which arose out of a partition suit.
More importantly, in Bhivchandra, on facts,
aggrieved by the dismissal of the Order IX
Rule 13 application on 03.09.2010, the
appellant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
and two respondents filed a Civil Appeal and
the same was withdrawn on 11.06.2013 but
on the very next day i.e., 12.06.2013, the
appellant and the two respondents (R14 and
R15) filed a Regular First Appeal challenging
the ex-parte decree passed in Regular Civil
Suit thereat. These facts are captured in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of Bhivchandra. Before
respectfully adverting to Bhivchandra which
was pressed into service by learned senior
counsel for defendant/MC applicant, this
Court deems it appropriate to respectfully
refer
to
oft
quoted
and
celebrated
2026:MNHC:178-DB
Constitution Bench judgment in Padma
Sundara Rao reported in (2002) 3 SCC
533 { Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and
Others Vs. State of T.N. and others}.
Padma Sundara Rao having been rendered
by a Hon’ble Constitution Bench, is more a
declaration of law than a ratio. Be that as it
may,
Padma
Sundara
Rao
is
an
authority/declaration of law regarding how
case laws have to be referred to. On facts,
Padma Sundara Rao arose under Central
Land Acquisition Act. The question in Padma
Sundara Rao was, after quashing of land
acquisition proceedings under Central Act
whether the State will get a fresh period for
making declaration under Section 6 of the
Central Act. In this fact scenario, Hon’ble
Supreme Court declared the law as to how a
case law has to be relied on. It was made clear
that Courts should not place reliance on
decisions without discussing as to how the
factual situation fits in with the fact situation
of the decision on which reliance is placed and
2026:MNHC:178-DB
it
was
made
clear
that
circumstantial
flexibility, one additional or different fact may
make
a
world
of
difference
between
conclusions in two cases. This declaration of
law was made inter-alia by relying on
articulation of Lord Morris in the celebrated
Herrington Vs. British Railways Board
reported in (1972) 2 WLR 537. Relevant
paragraph in Padma Sundara Rao is
paragraph 9 and the same reads as follows :
‘9.
Courts should not place reliance
on decisions without discussing as to how
the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance
is placed. There is always peril in treating
the words of a speech or judgment as
though they are words in a legislative
enactment, and it is to be remembered that
judicial utterances are made in the setting
of the facts of a particular case, said Lord
Morris in Herrington Vs. British Railways
Board (1972) 2 WLR 537.Circumstantial
flexibility, one additional or different fact
may make a world of difference between
conclusions in two cases.’
In the light of Padma Sundara
Rao, this Court very respectfully read
through facts in Bhivchandra and finds that
it is clearly distinguishable on facts for at
least two reasons. The first reason is,
2026:MNHC:178-DB
Bhivchandra arose out of a partition suit
and in a partition suit as much as there are
no plaintiffs and no defendants, there is no
limitation too. The second reason is, in
Bhivchandra, as adverted to in the earlier
part of this order, on dismissal of Order IX
Rule 13 application, the appellant with two
respondents filed an appeal assailing the
same, withdrew the same but on the very
next date, regular first appeal was filed.
(iii) In the case at hand, it is a money suit and
more so, a money suit filed by resorting to
Order XXXVII of CPC i.e., a summary suit
and the money suit is predicated on a DPN.
Be that as it may, the second distinguishable
feature is, challenge to the Order IX Rule 13
dismissal has never happened in instant
case. For these reasons, this Court has no
hesitation
in
respectfully
writing
that
Bhivchandra is clearly distinguishable on
facts and therefore, does not come to the aid
of the defendant/(MC applicant) in the
instant case.
2026:MNHC:178-DB
(iv)
Learned senior counsel pressed into service
Koushik Mutually Aided Cooperative
Housing Society -vs- Ameena Begum &
Anr. reported in 2023 Legal Eagle (SC)
1212 and submitted that Order IX Rule 13
dismissal does not come in the way of RFA.
We respectfully and carefully read through
Ameena Begum. This Court finds that
Ameena Begum is an authority for the
proposition that an appeal will lie and an
appeal i.e. a regular first appeal under
Section 96 of CPC is maintainable even if an
application for setting aside ex-parte decree
under Order IX Rule 13 has been dismissed.
There can be no quarrel of this proposition.
There can be no quarrel that even an exparte decree is appealable but in the instant
case, we are not now on the maintainability
of RFA. This Court is now examining the CoD
application and as to whether sufficient
reasons have been shown for condonation of
delay qua RFA which has been filed on
21.05.2026 in this Court with a delay of 1662
2026:MNHC:178-DB
days. Therefore Ameena Begum also does
not
come
to
the
aid
of
the
MC
applicant/defendant in the case at hand i.e.,
in the captioned MC application as captioned
MC application is one that has been filed with
CoD prayer (1662 days delay) qua RFA.
(v)
As regards sufficient cause qua Section 5 of
Limitation Act, learned senior counsel
pressed into service Collector Land
Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. -vs- Mst.
Katiji & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC
1353. This case law shall be referred to as
Katiji for the sake of convenience. Relying
on Katiji case, learned senior counsel
submitted that the expression ‘sufficient
cause’ employed by the legislature is
adequately elastic to enable the Courts to
apply the law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice that
being the life and purpose for the existence
of institution of Courts. As regards Katiji
case, on respectfully following/applying
Padma Sundara Rao declaration of law
2026:MNHC:178-DB
about which there is allusion supra, it is
clear that Katiji is distinguishable on facts
and it does not come to the aid of the MC
applicant/defendant. The reason is, Katiji
is a case where four days delay was sought
to be condoned and the 4 days delay
sought to be condoned was qua assailing
upward revision of compensation for land
acquisition and upward revision of 800%
(percentage).
Therefore,
this
Court
respectfully holds that Katiji also does not
come to the aid of MC applicant/defendant.
Be that as it may, we are respectfully
applying the principle i.e., ensuring that it
subserves the ends of justice not only for
defendant but for plaintiff also who got a
money decree on the basis of a DPN way
back in 2019. Learned senior counsel
pressed into service State Of Nagaland
vs Lipok Ao & Ors reported in (2005) 3
SCC 752. Lipok Ao is an authority for the
proposition that in delay condonation
applications, what counts is sufficiency of
2026:MNHC:178-DB
cause more than the length of delay though
shortness
of
delay
is
one
of
the
circumstances that can be taken into
account in using discretion to condone
delay. 1662 days delay is not short by any
yardstick. This Court will now examine the
reason
for
delay
given
by
the
MC
applicant/defendant infra. Before doing
that, this Court deems it appropriate to
write that this is a case qua delay of 1662
days (more than 4 and half years) in
contradistinction to facts in Lipok Ao
where it was a case of 57 days delay in
filing an application for grant of leave in
terms of Section 378 of erstwhile CrPC. To
be noted, Section 378 of erstwhile CrPC
deals with appeals against acquittal and
Lipok Ao was a case where State went on
appeal against acquittal and there was a
delay of 57 days. Nonetheless, the cause
shown and whether it is sufficient cause
within the meaning of Section 5 of the
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Limitation Act in the instant case will be
examined in the following paragraphs infra.
(vi)
As regards the cause shown, it is to be
noted that even according to averments of
MC applicant/defendant, the defendant
applied for certified copy of the impugned
judgment and decree (impugned decree)
on 19.08.2019 and ultimately obtained the
same on 02.03.2021 and this averment is
in paragraph No. 6 of captioned MC
application. This means that 19.08.2019 is
clearly the date of knowledge of the
defendant with regard to the impugned
decree but the RFA with captioned MC has
been filed on 21.05.2026 that too after
attachment order of executing Court and
report regarding attachment qua the
executing Court i.e., at an advanced stage
of the execution proceedings. The burden
of the song as regards the cause for delay
is, some deficiencies and difficulties on the
part of erstwhile learned counsel for
defendant in the said Trial Court and then
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a change of counsel in said Trial Court.
Another reason that is being cited is the
exclusion
of
the
Covid
period
i.e.,
15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 which was
excluded across the Board by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in and vide a judicial order
dated 10.01.2022 made in Suo-Moto Writ
Petition
No.
Cognizance
of
for
(In
Re:
Extension
of
Limitation). While there can be no
disputation or contestation as regards this
period, the
question is
whether MC
applicant/defendant can claim benefit of
exclusion of this period. As would be
evident
from
11.06.2026
proceedings
made by this Court and more particularly
paragraph No. 5 thereat, the excluded
period elapsed on 28.02.2022 but RFA with
captioned MC has been filed in this Court
only on 21.05.2026, more than 4 years and
2 months after the excluded period
elapsed. To be noted, Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while excluding the period from
2026:MNHC:178-DB
15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022, made an order
even before 28.02.2022 as the order of
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
is
dated
10.01.2022. Therefore, Hon’ble Supreme
Court,
while
making
order
dated
10.01.2022 had provided a further window
of
nearly
(seven)
weeks.
As
an
illustration, if Court vacation intervenes and
if period of limitation elapses on a date
during
Court
vacation,
if
the
application/petition/appeal is filed on the
re-opening day, the period of vacation will
be
excluded
but
if
the
same
application/appeal/petition is filed even
one day after re-opening, vacation period
will be added to the period sought to be
condoned. The same principle will operate
the instant case too. When the excluded
period elapsed on 28.02.2022, the MC
applicant cannot now be heard to contend
that the period which ended on 28.02.2022
should be excluded in the captioned MC
2026:MNHC:178-DB
which has been filed more than 4 years and
2 months later on 21.05.2026.
(vii)
Learned senior counsel, placed before this
Court an order made by one of us (M.
Sundar, CJ) sitting as Single Bench in
Nongmaithem
Tolhal
Singh
Nongmaithem
Maintomba
-vsSingh
reported in 2026 (1) MNLJ 117 : 2026
Legal Eagle 5. In Tolhal Singh, at the
outset, this Court makes it clear that
though Tolhal Singh case was authored
by one of us, the same was rendered by a
Single Judge Bench and therefore the same
cannot have any binding effect on this
Division Bench. Nonetheless, we carefully
considered Tolhal Singh. Tolhal Singh is
a case of litigation between two blood
brothers which has been passed on to their
legal heirs and which has been described
as an exception to the age old adage ‘blood
is thicker’. Be that as it may, it was a case
of two suits, a declaration suit and a
specific performance suit and while one
2026:MNHC:178-DB
CRP was filed assailing dismissal of a
transfer petition, another CRP was filed
assailing
dismissal
of
a
judicial
miscellaneous case with recall prayer.
There
was
also
a
Section
CPC
application. It is in this context, this Court
held that the Trial Court order caused
prejudice to both sides. It is not a case of
condonation of delay petition. It is not a
case where question as to when a party will
be
entitled
to
seek
benefit
of
Re:cognizance Supreme Court order and
seek exclusion of period from 15.03.2020
to 28.02.2022. Therefore suffice to write
that Tolhal Singh does not in any manner
come to the aid of MC applicant/defendant.
(viii)
Another point of contention is, impugned
decree i.e. ex-parte money decree is not a
decree made under Order XXXVII but a
regular decree. Submissions were made to
the effect that even for a ex-parte decree,
the plaintiff has to discharge burden of
proof. These are all in the realm of merits
2026:MNHC:178-DB
of the matter and the defendant who has
not chosen to file written statement and
who has not chosen to assail the earlier
CRP order of this Court dismissing the
challenge to Order IX Rule 7 orders cannot
now be heard to contend on this aspect of
the matter. Be that as it may, without going
into merits, on a cursory examination, we
find that while making impugned decree, in
said Trial Court, as already alluded to
supra, three witnesses were examined
(PW1 to PW3) and eight exhibits have been
marked. Therefore, it is not a case of a
judgment which has been made solely
because the defendant remained ex-parte.
(ix)
There is another interesting and intriguing
aspect of the matter which impacts the
legal drill at hand. This is, on an extreme
demurer, even if the delay is condoned and
if the RFA is taken up, written statement of
the defendant is not before the Court. The
written statement of the defendant cannot
be taken on file as earlier CRP order made
2026:MNHC:178-DB
by the predecessor Hon’ble Chief Justice on
18.07.2019 (CRP No. 39 of 2019) has
attained finality and has been given legal
quietus.
(x)
In the captioned MC, there is an averment
to the effect that the grounds raised in the
RFA shall be treated as grounds in
captioned MC also. The question of
examining grounds raised in RFA will arise
only when the delay is condoned, RFA is
numbered and taken up for hearing.
However, this Court notices that as many
as 15 (fifteen) grounds have been raised in
the RFA. A careful perusal of the 15(fifteen)
grounds brings to light that defendant has
neither pleaded denial of execution of DPN
nor pleaded discharge. A faint attempt has
been made vide grounds (iii) and (v) to say
that said Trial Court in the judgment dated
05.08.2019 (impugned decree) has not
examined whether the transaction has
been proved. In effect, as the defendant
has neither pleaded denial of execution of
2026:MNHC:178-DB
DPN nor pleaded discharge and in the
absence of written statement, we find that
an RFA under Section 96 CPC at advanced
stage of execution (post attachment) with
MC for condonation of 1662 days delay is
an untenable effort on the part of the
defendant.
(xi)
Reverting to the reasons for delay, as
already alluded to supra, the burden of the
song of the defendant/MC applicant is
difficulty/certain deficiencies qua erstwhile
counsel in Trial Court and change of
counsel and that the defendant could not
effectively instruct the counsel. This, in the
considered view of this Court, in the facts
and circumstance of instant case, is a nonstarter. It is hardly sufficient cause within
the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act that too for condoning 1662 days delay
qua a RFA which has been filed more than
4 years and 2 months after elapsing of
exclusion of Covid-19 period but claiming
exclusion.
2026:MNHC:178-DB
(xii)
This Court should also take into account the
fact that a right crystalises in favour of the
decree holder and this is a case where a
right crystalised in favour of the decree
holder more than 7 years ago i.e. on
05.08.2019 and the judgement debtor
admittedly was aware of the decree at least
on 19.08.2019 when the judgment debtor
made application for certified copies of the
judgment and decree. This is more so as
decree holder has launched execution and
obtained an order of attachment qua
immovable property. To be noted, RFA has
been filed after this attachment order.
[9]
Ergo, the sequitur of the narration, discussion and
dispositive reasoning thus far is, captioned MC is bereft of merits and it
deserves to be dismissed. Captioned MC is dismissed. This Court
imposes self-restraint on itself and refrains from imposing costs.
JUDGE
CHIEF JUSTICE
FR/NFR
Sushil/Bipin
P.S. I : Upload forthwith
KHOIROM
BIPINCHAN
DRA SINGH
P.S. II : All concerned will stand bound by instant order vide web
copy uploaded in High Court website inter-alia as the
same is QR coded.
KHOIROM
BIPINCHANDRA
SINGH
Date: 2026.08.15
16:25:49 +05'30'
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