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Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP No. 39 of 2019
Date of Decision: 28.09.2022
Smti Hesilla D. Shira
Vs.
Smti Chebit Ch. Momin
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Ms. S. Bhattacharjee, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. E.B. Sangma, Adv.
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This Petition under Rule 6 of the Meghalaya High Court
(Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 2014 read with Article
227 has been filed against the order dated 25.09.2019, passed by the
Judge District Council Court, Tura in T.S. Appeal No. 3 of 2014.
2.
The brief facts are that the predecessor of the petitioner, namely
one (L) Herison Ch. Momin, as plaintiff had instituted a suit being T.S.
No. 4 of 2007, for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land
situated at Chisrigre, P.O Garobadha, West Garo Hills, which stood in
the name of the mother of the plaintiff (L) Roheni Ch. Momin which was
covered by Periodic Patta No. 6, Dag No. 22. The claim of the plaintiff
was that his parents having only two sons and no female issue, had
adopted the grandmother of the respondent in the year 1950, who
however, as per the pleadings, deserted the house of the plaintiff’s
parents. As such, after the death of the parents, the plaintiff had sought
for mutation of the suit land before the Revenue Officer, GHADC, in his
name, which however, was dismissed by order dated 28.06.2007. A Title
Suit that is T.S. No. 4 of 2007, was then filed by the plaintiff (L) Herison
Ch. Momin, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner, before the
Subordinate District Council Court, Tura, which was decreed in his
favour by judgment dated 25.02.2014, holding him to be the owner of
the suit land. The defendant who is the predecessor in interest of the
respondent herein, being aggrieved preferred an appeal before the Court
of the Judge District Council Court, Tura, which was numbered as T.S.
Appeal No. 3 of 2014. The learned Court of the Judge then by judgment
dated 25.09.2019, which is impugned in the instant Revision
Application, allowed the appeal, thereby sitting aside the order dated
25.02.2014 passed by the Trial Court.
3.
Apart from other grounds that have been raised, with regard to
the rights and claims of the petitioner over the suit land, and the
contention that the Lower Appellate Court has not only misconstrued,
but misinterpreted the practice prevailing amongst the Garos, as per
customary law, the petitioner has raised a very pertinent ground with
regard to the propriety of the Judge, District Council Court, Tura in
taking up the appeal and passing the impugned order. This ground is
based on the fact that the Judge, District Council Court, Tura who had
decided the appeal, in his earlier capacity as the Revenue Officer of the
Garo Autonomous District Council, had passed the order dated
28.06.2007, dismissing the application for mutation filed by (L) Herison
Ch. Momin, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. This to the mind
of the Court before embarking on the main issues is to be examined to
determine as to whether the contention as raised by the petitioner has any
substance.
4.
In this context it has been submitted by Ms. S. Bhattacharjee,
learned counsel for the petitioner that though the Judge, District Council
Court, when passing the order dated 28.06.2007 in Case No.
GDC/LR/56(M) of 2004 in his capacity as Revenue Officer of the Garo
Hills Autonomous District Council, had recorded that the case was
dismissed without going into the merits, the same is not borne out by the
order itself. It is contended by the learned counsel that while dismissing
the mutation application, the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case were discussed by the Revenue Court and also the submissions of
the objectors on the point of Garo customary law, as to inheritance were
recorded. It is submitted that the Judge, District Council Court, therefore
could not and should not have taken up the appeal to maintain judicial
propriety, but instead, inspite of pointed objections being raised in the
hearing of the appeal, disregarded the same by holding that the order
dated 28.06.2007, did not discuss anything on merits, but had merely
dismissed the case on default of the petitioner.
5.
On the other grounds raised, the learned counsel has submitted
that the learned Judge, District Council Court, has misconstrued the
customary practice prevailing amongst the Garos, and has interpreted the
same without considering the factual position between the parties and
claims made there under. It is also submitted that, the learned Judge,
District Council Court, ignored various authorities in Garo law, which
specifies that an adopted daughter who is a Nokna, forfeits all her rights
of inheritance, in the event she deserts the household and stays
separately, as has happened in this case. She lastly submits that, there
being grave miscarriage of justice, the impugned judgment and order is
liable to be set aside.
6.
Mr. E.B. Sangma, learned counsel for the respondent, in reply
submits that the ground of objection of the petitioner, as to the said Judge,
District Council Court, taking up the matter after he had dealt with the
same as a Revenue Officer, cannot be taken to disable the said Judge,
District Council Court, as the mutation case was dismissed for default
and the merits had not been entered into or discussed. He further submits
that, a party cannot force recusal of a Judge, from hearing a case, unless
such circumstances exist, such as, financial interest, affinity or enmity
with a party, which raises doubts about his impartiality. Learned counsel
has referred to the judgment rendered in the case of Indore Development
Authority (Recusal Matter-5 J.) v. Manohar Lal and others reported in
(2020) 6 SCC 304, which he submits that the decision on recusal rests
on the Judge concerned, and if he considers, he would be able to deliver
impartial judgment, then he need not succumb to party’s pressure.
7.
The learned counsel on the other issues, submits that the
allegation of desertion of the adopted daughter could not be proved by
the plaintiff, respondent in appeal before the Court below, and the
assertion of the suit land being gifted or that there was a will, also could
not be proved. By operation of the Garo customary law, he submits that
the transfer of land from one clan to another cannot be effected, without
the approval of the other clan members, and that also only female
members of the family can inherit property of their parents. He submits
that there being no infirmity with the impugned order, the instant
Revision Application deserves no consideration.
8.
Considering the submissions advanced by both the parties, it
would be expedient to first address the issued raised with regard to the
objections of the petitioner herein as to the propriety of the learned Judge,
District Council Court in taking up the appeal, when in his earlier
capacity as a Revenue Officer had dealt with the matter. A perusal of the
order in question passed by the learned Judge as a Revenue Officer dated
28.06.2007 in Case No. GDC/LR/56(M) of 2004 reveals that the
contentions of the rival parties had been noted which is extracted
hereinunder:“On perusal of the material available in the record, it appears
that the disputed land which is covered by P.P. No. 6 Dag No.
22,110 area 11B-3K-18Ls in total standing in the name of
Rohoni Ch. Momin, W/o Ronsing Ch. Marak at Bongpara. It
also appears that Smti. Rohoni Ch. Momin and Shri Ronsing
h. Marak have two sons, i.e., Shri. HelisonCh. Momin and
Shri Herison Ch, Momin having no daughter. The objector
Smt Enak Ch. Momin in her Written Statement dt 25/8/05
contended that her mother Smti Jeolish Ch. Momin has been
adopted as the Nokma daughter by Rohoni Ch. Momin and
Ronsing Ch. Marak and being the only daughter of Jeolish
Ch. Momin, she (Objector) has the right to inherit all the
movable and immovable properties of deceased mother and
grandfather. The petitioner Shri Herison Ch. Momin is also
contended with the Written document dt 15/3/65 (tampered
with control the date) that the land in question has already
given to him by his mother. Hence, it reflects that both the
parties are contesting for ‘Nokma’ and ‘Nokdang properties’
of deceased Rohoni Ch. Momin and Ronsin Ch. Marak. So, I
am of the opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to decide
the question of ‘Nokma’ and ‘Nokdang properties’.
Both the parties were asked and given a chance to settle
the case amicably outside the court as the land in question is
the landed property of ‘Nokdang’ of Cheran Mahari but both
the parties could not reach at an amicable settlement of the
case. Hence this case.
It also appears from the record that the petitioner Sri
Herison Ch. Momin had remained absent for number of
consecutive dates and the persons who took steps were also
absent on repeated cal. Hence this exparte proceedings.
Heard the sub-mission of learned counsel for objector
and submitted the written argument. The learned counsel for
objector submitted that the present petitioner Shri Herison
Ch. Momin has no right to claim the land in question because
as per Garo customary law the properties passed from mother
to daughter and not to a son and more-over he (Herison) has
got married with the different clan (Mahari) hence the case
be dismissed.
Therefore, considering the above circumstances, the
petition dt. 2/4/04 filed by shri Herison Ch. Momin for
mutation of P.P. No. 6 Dag No. 22,110 area 11B-3K-18Ls
standing in the name of Rohoni Ch. Momin cannot be
entertained and hence the case is dismissed without going into
the merits of the case. Case is disposed of.
Parties shall bear their own cost.”
9.
The learned Judge as a Revenue Officer by the above quoted
order, it can be seen came to the finding that the Revenue Court had no
jurisdiction to decide on the question of ‘Nokna’ and ‘Nokdang’
properties of the deceased Rohini Ch. Momin and Ronsing Ch. Marak.
However, further in the order, apart from observing that the applicant,
Shri Herison Ch. Momin was absent for a number of consecutive dates
further submissions were recorded on objections on the question of Garo
customary law but in conclusion, it was held that the said application
could not be entertained and was dismissed without going into the merits.
10.
There are no definite rules on recusal from a matter and recusal
cannot be given a uniform prescription, but it is dependent on the
interpretation of a situation in a particular case. A request for recusal of
a Judge by either the parties in a way, undermines judicial independence
and raises questions about the impartiality of a Judge. Recusal may also
cause obstruction and delay proceedings in a given case. However,
recusal of a Judge would be expected if the Judge has pecuniary interest
or there is a real danger or reasonable suspicion of bias. The case cited
by the counsel for the respondent Indore Development Authority
(Recusal Matter-5 J.) v. Manohar Lal and others (supra) will not apply
to the present case as that concerns a Bench made up of other Judges of
which the concerned Judge was a constituent.
11.
In this backdrop, in the considered view of this Court though
the Judge, District Council Court in his capacity as a Revenue Officer
had rejected the application for mutation, rejection can be said to be in
limine even if the submissions have been recorded, as the merits were
not discussed. Therefore, the learned Judge, District Council Court
cannot be said to have been disabled from hearing the appeal. This issue
being settled, this Court now shall proceed to examine the other issues
raised in the instant revision application.
12.
Though the scope of examination of the matter in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction under Rule 6 of the High Court of Meghalaya
(Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 2014, is limited and as
has been held by this Court, must be exercised in conformity with
revisional powers under Section 115 CPC, on examination of the records
and the orders, however, it appears that it is necessary that this Court
delves a little deeper into the matter. In this context, two issues i.e., issue
No. 5 and 8, as framed by the Trial Court are important to be discussed
as these two issues and the findings of the Courts below are the crux of
the entire case. For the sake of convenience, the two issues are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“5. Whether Jewilish Ch. Momin alias Tukul Ch. Momin the
adopted daughter of Lt. Ronsing Marak and his wife Lt.
Roheni Ch. Momin had deserted/abandoned her foster
parents, who were the parents of the plaintiff and eloped with
a married man named Rujin Sangma of Garobadha and left
the old couple and went to Garobadha and lived there at
Garobadha permanently with her eloped husband never to
return to the house of her foster parents.
8. Whether the parents of the plaintiff have executed any
WILL before their death in favour of the plaintiff and his
elder brother in respect of their properties both moveable and
immovable including the present S/L?”
13.
From a reading of the Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court
orders, it appears that on the evidence adduced by the parties, different
conclusions have been arrived at. In the case of the Trial Court as far
as the issue No. 5 is concerned, the finding is that the (L) Jewilish Ch.
Momin alias Tukul Ch. Momin did not stay with her foster parents but
stayed with her natural parents, and as such she had deserted the
family that adopted her, thereby forfeiting her rights to inherit the
property. On issue No. 8, the recorded finding is that the plaintiff (L)
Herison Ch. Momin was in physical possession of the suit land and
that he had been gifted the same by the document dated 15.05.1965.
14.
The Lower Appellate Court on issue No. 5 by re-appreciation
of evidence has held otherwise by observing that nowhere is it
recorded in the deposition that there was any desertion but however
has confused the names by recording the name Enoch Ch. Momin
instead of Jewilish Ch. Momin, which indicates that the evidence as
tendered was not dealt with properly. On issue No. 8, the finding is
that though in agreement with the Trial Court as to the circumstances
under which ‘Wills’ can be executed under Garo Customary Law, has
however held that the Will document dated 15.05.1965 has not been
proven except the assertion by the plaintiff, and that though the
document as exhibited contained 7 signatures none of these
signatories were produced as witnesses.
15.
The contradictory findings of the two Courts below on these
two crucial issues, especially on the document dated 15.05.1965,
where in the findings of the Trial Court, it has been recorded that the
defendants could not dislodge the factum of execution of the gift
document in favour of the plaintiff, and the factum as to whether (L)
Jewilish Ch. Momin had deserted her foster parents, has left the matter
in a state of uncertainty with no definite solution.
16.
Appreciation of evidence has to be done to anchor the facts and
to ascertain the truth, in order to arrive at a conclusion without any
bias. Proper appreciation of evidence, is one of the foremost tests to
consider the credentials of evidence brought by parties in a suit, as the
very purpose of a judicial proceeding is only for ascertainment of
certain rights or liabilities. Evidence therefore, is always to be
evaluated and weighed carefully. The duty of the First Appellate Court
before reversing the findings of the Trial Court, is that it should apply
its mind to the reasons given by the Trial Court and record cogent and
convincing reasons for disagreement. The evidence tendered should
be considered as a whole and the judgment of the Appellate Court
must clearly show that it had applied its judicial mind to the entire
evidence, because as a final Court of fact, it is duty bound to give an
independent and comprehensive consideration and assessment.
17.
In this context, on the subject of appreciation of evidence and
interference with finding of fact, it would be apposite to refer to the
decision in the case of Radha Prasad Singh vs. Gajadhar Singh and
others. reported in AIR 1960 Supreme Court 115, wherein in Para –
14, it has been held as follows:
“14. The position in law, in our opinion, is that when
an appeal lies on facts it is the right and the duty of the
Appeal Court to consider what its decision on the
question of facts should be; but in coming to its own
decision it should bear in mind that it is looking at the
printed record and has not the opportunity of seeing the
witnesses and that it should not lightly reject the trial
Judge’s conclusion that the evidence of a particular
witness should be believed or should not be believed
particularly when such conclusion is based on the
observation of the demeanour of the witness in Court.
But, this does not mean that merely because an appeal
court has not heard or seen the witness it will in no case
reverse the findings of a trial Judge even on the
question of credibility, if such question depends on a
fair consideration of matters on record. When it
appears
to
the
Appeal
Court
that
important
considerations bearing on the question of credibility
have not been taken into account or properly weighed
by the trial Judge and such considerations including
the question of probability of the story given by the
witnesses clearly indicate that the view taken by the trial
Judge is wrong, the Appeal Court should have no
hesitation in reversing the findings of the trial Judge on
such questions. Where the question is not of credibility
based entirely on the demeanour of witnesses observed
in Court but a question of inference of one fact from
proved primary facts the Court of Appeal is in as good
a position as the trial Judge and is free to reverse the
findings if it thinks that the inference made by the trial
Judge is not justified.”
Another judgment that is useful for the purpose of this
discussion, is the case of Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai and
others. reported in AIR 1983 Supreme Court 114, wherein in Para –
8, an extract whereof is reproduced below, it has been held as follows:
“8.
The question …………………………At this
stage, it would be right to refer to the general
principle that, in an appeal against a trial Court
decree, when the appellate Court considers an issue
turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it
does not enjoy the advantage which the trial Court
had in having the witnesses before it and of observing
the manner in which they gave their testimony. When
there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in
issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of
the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate
Court should permit the findings of fact rendered by
the trail Court to prevail unless it clearly appears that
some special feature about the evidence of a
particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial
Court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability
to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies.
……….”
Another relevant decision on this issue is the case of B.V.
Nagesh and Another vs. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy reported in (2010)
13 SCC 530, wherein in Para – 4 it has been held as follows:
“4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse
or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first
appeal is a valuable right of the parties and
unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein
open for rehearing both on questions of fact and
law. The judgment of the appellate court must,
therefore, reflect its conscious application of
mind and record findings supported by reasons,
on all the issues arising along with the
contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties
for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a
court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High
Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence
led by the parties before recording its findings.
The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties
have a right to be heard both on questions of law
and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal
must address itself to all the issues of law and fact
and decide it by giving reasons in support of the
findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari, SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v.
Sangram, SCC p. 758, para 5.)”
18.
In the instant case, while reversing the findings on the two most
crucial issues as framed, the Lower Appellate Court does not appear
to have given adequate consideration to all the issues in contention or
to weigh the evidence as tendered on re-appreciation of the same. As
such, in view of the foregoing discussions and in the facts and
circumstances thereof, the impugned order is set aside and the matter
remanded back to the Learned Lower Appellate Court for rehearing.
It is also made clear that pending disposal of the Appeal, status quo as
regards the suit land in question shall be strictly maintained by the
parties herein.
19.
Revision Application is accordingly disposed of.
20.
The Lower Court Records to be transmitted back immediately.
It is expected that the matter shall be dealt with as expeditiously as
possible.
21.
No order as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
28.09.2022
“D.Thabah-PS”
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