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2026:HHC:940
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2947 of 2025
Reserved on: 20.03.2026
Date of Decision: 31.03.2026
Harsh Dhiman
...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate
For the Respondent
:
Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional
Advocate General, with Mr HC
Sanjay Kumar No. 59 I.O. P.S.
Bangana, District Una, H.P., with
police record.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 112 of 2023, dated 17.12.2023,
registered for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 302, 341, 323, 324 and 325 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Bangana, District Una,
H.P.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:940
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
petitioner Harsh had inflicted an injury on the head of the
informant’s father on 17.12.2023 at about 10-11 am with an iron
rod. The informant intervened, and the petitioner inflicted an
injury on him as well.
The victim died on 03.03.2024, and
Section 302 of the IPC was added. The petitioner is innocent and
has no concern with the commission of crime. The incident
occurred in the courtyard of the petitioner’s house in Khasra No.
597, which belongs to the petitioner’s father. The informant
party attacked the petitioner and her mother in their house.
The petitioner was arrested on 19.01.2024. The investigation is
complete, and no recovery is to be effected from the petitioner.
The petitioner’s father suffered a brain haemorrhage leading to
paralysis on 17.02.2024. The petitioner wants to continue his ITI
Course in Mechanical from the Government Industrial Institute,
Mehatpur, Una, District Una, HP.
The statements of four
witnesses have been recorded, who have not named the
petitioner. There is a delay in the progress of the trial. The coaccused was granted bail on 27.08.2025 in Cr.MP(M) No. 1137 of
2025. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions
that the Court may impose.
Hence, it was prayed that the
2026:HHC:940
present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that Rakesh Kumar Pardhan Gram Panchayat,
Kharyalata, made a call to the police post-Zol on 17.12.2023 that
the family members of Narender Kumar and Dharam Singh were
quarrelling with each other. The police went to the spot for
verification of the information and found that the parties had
been taken to the hospital. The police reached the hospital and
found that Manjeet Singh and his father were admitted to the
hospital. Manjeet Singh had sustained an injury by a sharpedged weapon, whereas Dharam Singh had sustained an injury
by a blunt-edged weapon. Manjeet Singh made a statement on
17.12.2023 that he and his father, Dharam Singh, were returning
from their fields. Nisha Devi and petitioner-Harsh Dhiman had
thrown wooden sticks in their fields. When the informant
Manjeet Singh tried to remove the wooden sticks, the petitioner
stopped Dharam Singh and enquired as to why he was removing
the sticks. Petitioner was armed with an iron rod, and Nisha Devi
was armed with a Darat. Harsh inflicted an injury by means of an
iron rod on the head of Dharam Singh. Manjeet Singh tried to
2026:HHC:940
save his father, but the petitioner inflicted a blow by means of an
iron rod upon his head. Nisha also started quarrelling with the
informant and his father. The informant and his father
sustained injuries. The police conducted the investigation and
recovered the iron rod from Harsh. Dharam Singh was referred
to PGIMER, Chandigarh, for further treatment. As per the
opinion of the Medical Officer, he had sustained grievous
injuries, which were dangerous to life. The police arrested Nisha
and the petitioner. The clothes were sent for analysis, and it was
found that the blood of group ‘O was found on the clothes of
Dharam Singh and the iron rod. Dharam Singh died in the
hospital. The cause of death was septic shock as a consequence
of head injury, as per the report of the Medical Officer. The
police added Section 302 of the IPC. The police filed the charge
sheet on 18.04.2024. The matter is pending before the Court of
learned Sessions Judge-II, Una, District Una, H.P. Statements of
9 witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is now listed on
2nd, 4th, 5th, 18th, and 29th May, 2006. The co-accused, Nisha has
been released on bail on 27.08.2025. Hence, the status report.
2026:HHC:940
4.
I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. His right to a speedy trial is being violated,
and he is entitled to bail on this consideration. The petitioner
would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may
impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that there is no
delay in the progress of the trial. The prosecution has examined
9 witnesses out of 34 witnesses cited by it. The matter is now
listed in the month of May, 2026 the recording of the statements
prosecution witnesses; therefore, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
2026:HHC:940
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of
a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that
should be considered while granting bail, which are
extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering
with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting
the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational,
in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man
who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad
record, particularly a record which suggests that he is
likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard
to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
2026:HHC:940
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment which
conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means
and standing of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the
larger interests of the public or State and similar other
considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the
purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of
the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same
judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be
granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning,
this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
2026:HHC:940
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although
it is established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application
of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under
with regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
2026:HHC:940
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497
: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of
this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual
order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar,
(2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para
35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time
while considering an application for bail courts cannot
lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations
against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in
the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be
false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported
by adequate material brought on record to enable a
court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
2026:HHC:940
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and
must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts
of the case brought on record. Due consideration must
be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the
nature of punishment that would follow a conviction
vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is
likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of
justice and must weigh with us when considering the
question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
A perusal of the order passed by this Court in
Cr.MP(M) No. 1137 of 2025, decided on 27.08.2025, shows that
the bail was granted to her because she was armed with a Darat
2026:HHC:940
and no injury was caused by means of the Darat; therefore, the
roles of the petitioner and Nisha were different. She had not
caused fatal injury, whereas the petitioner had caused the fatal
injury; therefore, the petitioner cannot claim parity with the coaccused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sagar
v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584, that a person cannot be
released on bail after applying the principle of parity without
examining his position vis-à-vis other accused. It was observed:
“14. What flows from the above judgments, which have
been referred to, only to the limited extent indicated
above, is that the High Courts speak in one voice that
parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted.
That, undoubtedly, is the correct position in law. The
word ‘parity’ is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as
“equality, especially of pay or position.” When weighing an
application on parity, it is the ‘position’ that is the
clincher. The requirement of ‘position’ is not met only by
involvement in the same offence. Position means what
the person whose application is being weighed, his
position in crime, i.e., his role, etc. There can be different
roles played - someone part of a large group, intending to
intimidate; an instigator of violence; someone who
throws hands at the other side, instigated by such words
spoken by another, someone who fired a weapon or
swung a machete - parity of these people will be with
those who have performed similar acts, and not with
someone who was part of the group to intimidate the
other by the sheer size of the gathering, with another who
attempted to hack away at the opposer's limbs with a
weapon.”
2026:HHC:940
12.
This Court had noticed while deciding Cr.MP.M.
No.1137 of 2025 that adjournments were sought on behalf of the
petitioner, and charges could be framed on 28.12.2024. The
status quo reports show that statements of nine witnesses have
been recorded, and the matter is now listed on 2nd, 4th, 5th, 18th,
and 29th May 2006, for recording the statements of prosecution
witnesses.
The fact that matter has been listed on five
consecutive dates shows the concern of the learned Trial Court
to expeditiously dispose of the matter. Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim bail because of the violation of his right of speedy
trial. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil
Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of
incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a
crime like murder. It was observed at page 141:
“24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the
grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the
Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than
one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the
accused was in custody for more than one year may not be
a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala
v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri)
743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by
itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail.
2026:HHC:940
The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688”
13.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to
bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial.
14.
No other point was urged.
15.
In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to
bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.
16.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
31st March, 2026.
(ravinder)
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