Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:39856
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1517 of 2026
Reserved on: 14.09.2026
Cr. MP(M) No. 1687 of 2026
Reserved on: 15.09.2026
Date of Decision: 18.09.2026
1.
Cr.MP(M) No.1517 of 2026
Mandeep Singh
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
2.
…. Respondent
Cr.MP(M) No. 1687 of 2026
Harmohit Deep Singh
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner(s)
: M/s Sukh Charan Gill, Advocate,
through Video Conferencing, and
Mr
Udit
Shaurya
Kaushik,
Advocate, in both the petitions.
For the respondent/State
: Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General in Cr.MP(M)
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:39856
No.1517 of 2026.
Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General in Cr.MP No. 1687 of 2026
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petitions
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 139 of 2025, dated 03.09.2025,
registered at Police Station Manali, District Kullu, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 27 and 29
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act
and Section 25 of the Arms Act.
2.
Since both the petitions have arisen out of the
common FIR, both of them are being taken up together.
3.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police party intercepted one vehicle bearing registration No.
PB18U-8718, on 3.09.2025, based upon a secret informant. The
person sitting on the front seat threw a bag towards the rear seat,
and the driver started the vehicle after seeing the police. The
driver identified himself as Sanjay Kumar. The person sitting on
the front seat identified himself as Harmohit Deep Singh
(present petitioner). The persons sitting on the rear seats
identified themselves as Krishna Singh alias Manish and
2026:HHC:39856
Mandeep Singh (present petitioner). The police checked the
vehicle and recovered one backpack containing 258.750 grams of
heroin, one pistol, two live cartridges and one magazine. The
police arrested the occupants. Subsequently, Manish, Mohan Lal,
Dilbarjeet Singh and Akshay Kumar were arrested based on the
call detail records and the financial transactions. The Court has
released Akshay Kumar and Mohan Lal. The investigation is
complete, and no recovery is pending from the petitioners. Bail is
the rule, and jail is the exception. The petitioners Mandeep Singh
and Harmohit Deep Singh are real cousins, and the call detail
records and financial transactions do not amount to any
incriminating circumstance. The petitioners would abide by any
terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was
prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners
be released on bail.
4.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that police were on patrolling duty on 03.09.2025. They
received secret information that four persons were selling heroin
in the vehicle bearing registration No. PB18U-8718. A huge
quantity of heroin could be recovered by searching the vehicle.
2026:HHC:39856
The police reduced the information to writing and sent it to the
Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Manali. The police joined
Subhash Thakur and Mittal Kumar and went towards the spot,
where the vehicle bearing registration No. PB18U-8718 was
found parked. The police went towards the vehicle. The person
sitting in the front seat threw one bag towards the rear seat, and
the driver started the vehicle. However, the police stopped the
vehicle. The driver identified himself as Sanjay Kumar. The
person sitting in the front seat identified himself as Harmohit
Deep Singh (present petitioner). The persons sitting in the rear
seats identified themselves as Krishna Singh alias Manish and
Mandeep Singh (the present petitioner). The police checked the
vehicle and found a backpack containing 258.750 grams of
heroin, one pistol, two live cartridges and one magazine. The
police seized the articles and arrested the occupants of the
vehicle. Harmohit Deep Singh (present petitioner) revealed
during the interrogation that he had purchased the heroin from
Dalbir. The bank account statements of the occupants were
checked, and it was found that Mohan Lal had deposited
₹1,36,700/- in the account of Krishna Singh alias Manish. Akshay
had also deposited various amounts in the account of Harmohit
2026:HHC:39856
Deep Singh (present petitioner). The police arrested Mohan Lal
and the other co-accused. The police also checked the call detail
records and found that Krishna Singh alias Manish had talked 23
times to Mohan Lal between 26.08.2025 and 01.09.2025. The
articles were sent to the SFSL, and as per the report, the heroin
was confirmed to be a sample of diacetylmorphine, the pistol was
found to be a firearm, the magazine could fit in the magazine
chamber of the pistol, the live cartridges could be used in the
pistol, and Tramadol, Codeine and Acetylcodeine were found in
the blood sample of Dilbar Jeet Singh. The petitioners used to sell
heroin to the young boys and girls. This was corroborated by the
call detail records and the financial transactions. Heroin is
adversely affecting the young generation. F.I.R. No. 90 of 2021,
dated 17.09.2021, has been registered against the petitioner
Mandeep
Singh.
The
petitioners
would
indulge
in
the
commission of a similar offence in case of their release on bail.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.
5.
I have heard Mr Sukh Charan Gill, learned counsel,
through Video Conferencing and Mr. Udit Shaurya Kaushik,
learned counsel for the petitioners in both the petitions, and Mr
2026:HHC:39856
Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, in Cr.MP
No.1517 of 2026 and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General, in Cr.MP(M) No. 1687 of 2026, for the respondent/State.
6.
Mr Sukh Charan Gill, learned counsel for the
petitioners in both the petitions, submitted that the petitioners
are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The quantity of
heroin stated to have been recovered from the petitioners is
slightly more than the commercial quantity. The petitioners have
remained in custody for about one year, and the prosecution has
not completed the evidence. The petitioners’ right to a speedy
trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions
be allowed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of
his submissions:
Dharam Singh vs. The State of H.P. Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No.13782 of 2025; dated 10th November,
2025; and
Kuldeep Singh vs. State of Punjab PHHC010960242026
7.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the State submitted that the petitioners were found to be
present in the vehicle from which the police had recovered the
commercial quantity of heroin. The rigours of Section 37 of the
2026:HHC:39856
NDPS Act apply to the present case, and the petitioners have not
satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act; therefore, they prayed that the present petitions be
dismissed.
8.
I
have
given
a
considerable
thought
to
the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
9.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
2026:HHC:39856
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
2026:HHC:39856
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496; (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
2026:HHC:39856
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
2026:HHC:39856
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while
considering a bail application, courts cannot lose sight of
the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
10.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
2026:HHC:39856
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
11.
The present petitions have to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12.
The status report mentions that police intercepted a
vehicle bearing registration No. PB18U-8718 and recovered a
carry bag containing 278.750 grams of heroin, one pistol, two
live cartridges and one magazine. Sanjay Kumar, Harmohit Deep
Singh (present petitioner), Krishna Singh @ Manish and
Mandeep Singh (present petitioner) were found present in the
vehicle. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madan
Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664; 2003
SCC OnLineSC 874, that all the occupants of the vehicle would be
in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record
are that all the accused persons were travelling in a
vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known
to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to
how they travelled together from the same destination in a
vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
2026:HHC:39856
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles
an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act,
which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It
is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must
be conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious
possession and not mere custody without awareness of the
nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
that assumes different colours in different contexts. It
may carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the
Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC
52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition
of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in
the context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC
194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a
given case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in
the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power or
control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it
was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must
be considered to be in possession of the same. (See
Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844; 1976 QB
966; (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)].)
2026:HHC:39856
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
recognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn
from possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established.
It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
13.
Therefore, prima facie, all the persons would be
deemed to be in possession of the heroin.
The Central Government has notified 250 grams of
heroin as the commercial quantity, which means that the
petitioners were found in possession of a commercial quantity of
heroin and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the
present case.
15.
Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence
involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied
that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and
is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as
follows:
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
2026:HHC:39856
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19, section 24, or section
27A and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond
unless–
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force, on granting of
bail.”
16.
This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin& Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that
the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to
commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released. It was
observed:
2026:HHC:39856
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) offences involving a commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it
may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application
for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court
proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are
to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal
requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any
other enactment.
(1)
The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that the person is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.”
17.
This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In
Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it
has been elaborated as under: "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a
murder case, the accused commits the murder of
2026:HHC:39856
one or two persons, while those persons who are
dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in
causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly
impact on the society; they are a hazard to the
society; even if they are released temporarily, in all
probability, they would continue their nefarious
activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants
clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and
illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the
contention with regard to punishment under the
NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse
effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief
Secy. Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as
under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld and
the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction among
a sizeable section of the public, particularly
the adolescents and students of both sexes
and the menace has assumed serious and
alarming proportions in recent years.
Therefore, in order to effectively control and
eradicate this proliferating and booming
devastating menace, causing deleterious
effects and a deadly impact on society as a
whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made
effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of
specifying
mandatory
minimum
imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs
flooding the market, Parliament has provided that
the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial unless
2026:HHC:39856
the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not
abiding by the aforesaid mandate while
ordering the release of the respondent
accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take
a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic
consequences and health hazards which
would accompany trafficking illegally in
dangerous drugs, the court should implement
the law in the spirit with which Parliament,
after due deliberation, has amended."
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject
to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences
with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the
said section is in the negative form, prescribing the
enlargement of bail to any person accused of the
commission of an offence under the Act unless the two
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application, and the second is that the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these
two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail
operates.
21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires
2026:HHC:39856
the existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at
hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked
the underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to the
limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for
the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its
liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is
indeed uncalled for.”
18.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100; (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721; 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the
grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24
or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial
quantity are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to
oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an
offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of
this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv
Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505],
held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes
substantial probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this
2026:HHC:39856
reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning
which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now
like the jingling of a child's toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para
7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat)
(P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a
question of fact whether a particular act is
reasonable or not, which depends on the
circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal
Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd.
[Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills
Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for
2026:HHC:39856
the limited purpose essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail that the
court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of
acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High
Court and this Court are required to apply while granting
bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the accused has not committed an offence and
whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail.
Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the
NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug
trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the
grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
19.
It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without complying
with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
observed:
4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing
the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person
accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall
be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down
therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has
been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application;
and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any such
offence while on bail.
2026:HHC:39856
15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced
hereinbelow:—
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall
be cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable
for offences under section 19 or section 24 or
section 27A, and also for offences involving
commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or
on his own bond unless(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.”
16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no
person accused of an offence involving trade in a
commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on
bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.
20.
It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without
considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was
observed:
2026:HHC:39856
“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position
that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while
considering the application for bail, the Court is bound to
ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section
37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads
thus:—
“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.”
6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one
cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing
the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws
relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in
the acts themselves read thus:—
“An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control
and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of
property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the
provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters
connected therewith.”
In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the three-judge
bench of this Court considered the provisions under
Section 37(1)(b) as well as 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act,
with regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used
therein. This Court held that it means something more
than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates
substantial and probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore,
it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision would require the existence of such facts and
2026:HHC:39856
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.
As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii)
of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail, it was held therein that they are
cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the
existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the
‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above.
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by
this Court to be followed while considering an application
for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under
the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that
the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that
the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only
subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the
limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act.
Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions
thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would
operate.
8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the
consistent view of this Court that while considering the
application for bail made by an accused involved in an
offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring
the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is
impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for
granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be
avoided while passing orders on such applications.”
21.
It was submitted that bail is the rule and the jail is the
exception. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down
2026:HHC:39856
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v.
Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848 that in cases
under the NDPS Act involving the commercial quantity, the
negation of bail is the rule and its grant an exception. It was
observed at page 381:“Compliance with the mandate under Section 37
9. There has been a consistent and persistent view of this
Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is
punishable with a minimum sentence of ten years, the
accused shall generally not be released on bail. Negation of
bail is the rule, and its grant is an exception. While
considering the application for bail, the court has to bear
in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
which are mandatory in nature. The recording of findings
as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting
bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said
Act.”
22.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and the petitioners are entitled to bail because of the
delay. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K.
Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the
ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin
conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
observed: -
2026:HHC:39856
“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold
under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion
of this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control and
antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity
of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
2026:HHC:39856
23.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year and four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious since not only is the recovery much
in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondentaccused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated
below the trailer to conceal the contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is made out in the present matter.”
24.
Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the
ground of delay alone when the petitioners had not satisfied the
requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
25.
It was submitted that the quantity of heroin is slightly
more than the commercial quantity and the petitioners are
entitled to bail. Reliance was placed upon Kuldeep Singh (supra).
This submission is not acceptable. Once the Central Government
has notified the specified quantity as commercial quantity, the
Court is bound to adhere to the specification and cannot dilute
the same by holding that the quantity is slightly more than the
commercial quantity and the petitioners are entitled to bail. The
2026:HHC:39856
petitioners would only be entitled to bail if they satisfy the twin
conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
26.
It was submitted that there is an error in the weighing
machine. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dharam Singh (supra). This judgment was
delivered after the conclusion of the trial when the Hon’ble
Supreme Court found that there was no evidence regarding the
scale having been calibrated to show zero. In the present case,
the trial is yet to be concluded, and it is premature to say whether
the scale was calibrated to zero or not. Hence, cited judgments do
not apply to the present matters.
27.
No other point was urged.
28.
In view of the above, the present petitions fail, and
are dismissed.
29.
The observation made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petitions and will have no
bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
18th September, 2026.
(Ravinder)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review