Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Reserved on: 30th October, 2025
Pronounced on: 20th January, 2026
+
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & CRL.M.A. 30417/2018
HARKIRAT SINGH SODHI
S/o. Shri M. S. Sodhi,
R/o 210-A, Golf Links, New Delhi
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Lalit Gupta, Mr. Rajat Asija,
Ms. Mansi Singh, Mr. Anmol Ghai,
Ms.
Ishita
Nautiyal
and
Ms. Shreeyam Kedia, Advocates
versus
1.
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI
Through its Chief Secretary,
Delhi Secretariat, I.P. Estate, New Delhi.
2.
RAVINDER SINGH
S/o Late Shri M. S. Sodhi,
R/o. M-77, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi
Through:
+
.....Respondents
Mr. Ajay Vikram Singh, APP for the
State.
CRL.M.C. 5891/2019 & CRL.M.A. 40685/2019
HARKIRAT SINGH SODHI
S/o. Late Shri Mohinder Singh,
R/o 210-A, Golf Links, New Delhi
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Lalit Gupta, Mr. Rajat Asija,
Ms. Mansi Singh, Mr. Anmol Ghai,
Ms. Ishita Nautiyal and Ms.
Shreeyam Kedia, Advocates
versus
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
1.
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI
Through Standing Counsel (Crl.),
Delhi High Court.
2.
RAVINDER SINGH (RAVINDRE SINGH GANDOAK)
S/o Late Shri Mohinder Singh,
R/o. M-77, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi
.....Respondents
Through:
Mr. Ajay Vikram Singh, APP for the
State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M
E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1.
The aforesaid two Petitions have been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
on behalf of the Petitioner, Harkirat Singh Sodhi, for quashing of the
Complaint under Section 200CrPC for the offences 499/500 IPC filed on
behalf of Respondent No.2, Ravinder Singh Gandoak, and the summoning
Order dated 06.07.2017 of the Ld. MM, which have been upheld by the
Revisional Court vide Order dated11.07.2018 and 18.07.2019.
2.
The brief facts are that a Complaint Case No. 89247/2016 was filed
by Respondent No. 2, Shri Ravinder Singh Gandoak, against the Petitioner,
Shri Harkirat Singh Sodhi - his brother-in-law (husband of the sister)- under
Section 200 Cr.P.C. for offences under Sections 499/500 IPC. The
Complainant/Respondent No. 2 asserted that the Petitioner has been
involved in various disputes concerning the property and assets of their
deceased mother, Sardarni Surinder Kaur Sodhi, who expired on
31.12.2013.
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
Two testamentary petitions are pending before this Court. Test Case
3.
No. 38 of 2014 titled Harkirat Singh Sodhi v. State & Ors., before this
Court, was filed by the Petitioner seeking probate of a registered Will dated
13.01.1987 executed by his mother in his favour.
The second Test Case No. 42 of 2014 was filed by Smt. Amita
4.
Gandoak, Respondent No. 2’s wife (and Petitioner’s sister), to seek probate
of an alleged unregistered Will dated 07.09.2004, which purportedly
revoked the 1987 Will. Amita Gandoak asserted that her mother had left a
handwritten Will dated 07.09.2004, whereby she bequeathed her house
bearing No. 210-A, Golf Links, New Delhi, jointly to Amita Gandoak and
the Petitioner, Harkirat Singh Sodhi. She had earlier executed a registered
Will dated 13.01.1987, which was allegedly revoked by a Registered
Revocation Deed dated 05.06.2004. The Petitioner has claimed that he is
contesting this petition and has disputed its validity, contending that it was
forged and that the 1987 Will remained the last valid testament. He also
denied the existence or validity of any revocation deed, asserting that the
original registered Will of 1987, was never lawfully revoked.
5.
Both testamentary petitions remain pending adjudication before this
Court.
6.
The Respondent No. 2 filed a Complaint under Sections 499/500 IPC
alleging that the Petitioner, Harkirat Singh Sodhi, made defamatory
statements against him (Ravinder Singh Gandoak) and relied on the
following three instances:
a) Police Complaint dated 02.08.2014 filed by the Petitioner before
Police Station Tughlak Road, New Delhi, against Respondent No.
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
2’s wife (Amita Gandoak, who is also the Petitioner’s sister),
wherein the Petitioner stated that “Mr. Ravinder Singh Gandoak has
earlier also committed such forgeries in respect of his late father‟s
properties and assets and also in respect of his late father‟s Will and
other documents, which my sister had informed me earlier”;
b) Objections
dated
22.12.2014
filed
by
the
Petitioner
in
Testamentary Case No. 42/2014 titled Amita Gandoak v. State &
Ors., pending before the Delhi High Court, wherein the Petitioner
reiterated allegations of forgery of cheques of the mother by Amita
Gondoak and dishonest conduct against Respondent No. 2,
referencing findings in CS (OS) No. 82/2005; and
c) An unsigned letter dated 04.01.2015, allegedly circulated by the
Petitioner in the Greater Kailash RWA, which again questioned
Respondent No. 2’s integrity and reputation and contained derogatory
and defamatory statements against him and his children.
7.
According to Respondent No. 2, these averments made by the
Petitioner in his objections are completely bogus, falsely and mala fide and
smack of sensationalism and intentional defamation, with a view to
wrongfully and illegally harass the Complainant so that his wife (the
Petitioner’s sister) would be pressured into abandoning her rightful claims in
their deceased mother’s estate. The statements made by the Petitioner in his
objections in the aforementioned Testamentary Case No. 42/2014, as well as
in his police Complaint dated 02.08.2014, are false, baseless, and
sensational. These statements were made with the sole intent to
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
unnecessarily harass the Complainant (Respondent No. 2) and to harm his
hard-earned goodwill and reputation in society.
8.
The Complainant (Respondent No. 2) further asserted that he was
shocked to read such scathing, mischievous, baseless, and overtly
defamatory accusations against him.It was therefore, asserted in the
Complaint that the Petitioner had committed the offence of defamation
under Section 500 IPC.
9.
The Learned MM summoned the Petitioner for offences under
Sections 499/500 IPC vide Summoning Order dated 06.07.2017.
10.
The petitioner has sought the quashing of the Complaint and the
summoning Order dated 06.07.2017 before the learned Additional Sessions
Judge (ASJ), but the Revisions were dismissed.
11.
The aforesaid Petitions have been filed to challenge the Complaint
and the Summoning Order on the ground that Respondent No. 2, Ravinder
Singh Gandoak, is himself an accused in FIR No. 149/2014 under Sections
420/468/471/120-B IPC, registered at PS Tughlak Road, based on
allegations of conspiracy involving forgery of cheques and documents. The
investigation in the said FIR is still pending; hence, the defamation
complaint predicated on the same allegations is premature and not
maintainable during the pendency of adjudication in the said proceedings.
12.
Furthermore,
the
averments
regarding
forgery
attributed
to
Respondent No. 2, by the Petitioner in his objections dated 22.12.2014 in
Testamentary Case No. 42/2014 and in the police Complaint dated
02.08.2014, were based on the judicial record of CS (OS) No. 82/2005, a
Partition Suit between Respondent No. 2 and his siblings. In that suit,
Respondent No. 2 had propounded a Will dated 27.11.2003, which was
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
disbelieved by this Court in its judgment dated 08.01.2014 due to
“suspicious circumstances.” Crucially, no finding of forgery was recorded
against Respondent No. 2, and no allegations of fraud or mischief were
levelled against the Petitioner in that judgment. Therefore, no actionable
case of defamation is made out, especially since the Petitioner’s statements
were substantially true reports of judicial proceedings and findings,
protected under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Nineth
Exceptions to
Section 499 IPC.
13.
The Ld. MM committed a grave error not only in summoning the
Petitioner vide order dated 06.07.2017, but also in framing Notice against
him vide order dated 15.04.2019, and subsequently the Ld. ADJ in
dismissing the Revision challenging the same. The Complaint contains no
specific averment demonstrating actual harm to the reputation of
Respondent No. 2 as required under Explanation IV to Section 499 IPC and
fails to disclose any prima facie offence of defamation.
14.
Furthermore, the alleged circulation of a letter in the Greater Kailash-I
Resident Welfare Association (RWA) did not form the basis of the
summoning order dated 06.07.2017, as expressly noted by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate. Although the submission that Respondent No. 2
was defamed “in the area of his local residence” appears in the Order dated
15.04.2019, this fact was not pleaded in Paragraph 12 of the original
Complaint. Consequently, it could not validly serve as a ground to invoke
territorial jurisdiction. The learned Magistrate erred in entertaining the
Complaint, as no part of the cause of action arose within his territorial
jurisdiction, once the RWA letter was discarded as a basis for prosecution.
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
15.
It is further asserted that Respondent No. 2 has also filed Civil Suit
No. 58116/2016 for Damages and Permanent Injunction, in which issues
have been framed against the Petitioner. Additionally, the wife of
Respondent No. 2, Smt. Amita Gandoak, has filed two separate Criminal
Complaints against the Petitioner, which are false and frivolous.
16.
In one such Complaint i.e. CC No. 183/1A/2014 before MM, Patiala
House, the Application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was dismissed and the
Criminal Revision against that Order, was also dismissed. In another
Complaint i.e. CC No. 10/1/15 before MM, Tis Hazari, the Section 156(3)
Application was initially dismissed, but the Criminal Revision was allowed
by the ASJ, leading to the registration of an FIR pursuant to the Order dated
21.01.2017. However, that Order was challenged by the Petitioner in
CRL.M.C. No. 327/2017 before this Hon’ble Court and the operation of the
impugned order has been stayed.
17.
A Prayer is, therefore, made that the CC No.89247/2016 filed by
Respondent No.2 against the Petitioner, along with the Summoning
Order under S.499/S.500 IPC, be set aside.
18.
Reliance has been placed on Kishore Balkrishna Nand vs. State of
Maharashtra & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.2291/2011;
Dhulipalla
Venkateswarlu vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, CRL.P.9480/2012; Oil and
Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors (1994) 4 SCC 711;
Dr. Subramaniam Swamy vs. Prabhakar S Pai Mayor of Bombay & Anr.
(1983) SCC OnLine Bom 103; Subramanium Sethuraman vs. State of
Maharashtra and Anr. (2004) 13 SCC 324; M.K. Varghese Cor Episcopa vs.
State of Kerala 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 85; Sanjay Mishra vs. Govt. (NCT of
Delhi), 2012 SCC OnLine Del 1779; Prabhakaran vs. Gangadharan 2006
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
SCC OnLine Ker 302; Sukra Mahto vs. Basdeo Kumar Mahto (1971) 1 SCC
885; Arvind Kejriwal vs. State 2024 SCC OnLine Del 719 and Neeru
Shabnam vs. Manoj Kumar MANU/HP/2563/2019.
19.
Respondent No.2/Complainant in his Reply to the Petitions, has
taken the preliminary objection that the aforesaid both Petitions are a total
misuse of the due process of law, wholly misconceived, and do not warrant
any interference by this Court.
20.
On merits, while the factual matrix about the inter se litigation
between the parties is not disputed, it is denied that the learned Trial Court
had discarded the Letter dated 04.01.2015 to RWA, GK-I. However, the
authorship, identity, and veracity of the Letter dated 04.01.2015 remains to
be decided during the trial. Moreover, there are clear averments in the
Complaint of Respondent No.2 that the said Letter containing wild and
defamatory allegations against Respondent No.2, had been authored by the
Petitioner, as is amply indicated by surrounding circumstances. The
averments made by Respondent No.2 in the Complaint cannot be
disbelieved at this stage as they are yet to be proved during the trial.
21.
Respondent No.2 has examined CW-2 Shri Rupak Vaish from the
Resident Welfare Association (RWA), Greater Kailash-1, New Delhi, who
is an independent witness and has deposed regarding the publication and
circulation of the Letter containing defamatory allegations made by the
Petitioner against Respondent No.2. It is wrongly alleged that this Letter
dated 04.01.2015 has been discarded by the learned Trial Court. In fact,
reliance has been placed upon the objections taken by the Petitioner to
conclude that prima facie the Petitioner has committed the act of
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
defamation. However, the authorship, identity, and veracity of the letter
dated 04.01.2015 are to be decided during the course of the trial.
22.
In addition, the Police Report also clearly stated that it appears to be a
defamatory Letter circulated by the Petitioner. In the said letter, Respondent
No.2 has been portrayed as a hardened, unscrupulous criminal who regularly
indulges in the forgery of documents. The said words are in no way a
reproduction or amount to true reporting or interpretation of a judgment, as
is sought to be propagated by the Petitioner. Respondent No.2 has
reproduced only one set of defamatory allegations, which are part of the
subject matter of the present controversy.
23.
It is asserted that there are specific averments in the Complaint of
Respondent No.2 about the said Letter containing wild and defamatory
allegations against him, which have been authored by the Petitioner, as has
been amply indicated by surrounding circumstances.
24.
The learned Trial Court has also relied upon the Objections dated
22.12.2014 filed by the Petitioner in Test Case No. 42/2014 to conclude that
prima facie, the Petitioner has committed an act of defamation.
25.
It is submitted that under Section 105 Evidence Act, when a person is
accused of an offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances
to establish that the case falls within any of the general exceptions in the
Indian Penal Code or within any special exception or proviso contained in
any other part of the same Code or any other law defining the offence, lies
on the Accused, and till then, the Court shall presume the absence of such
circumstances. It is for the Petitioner/Accused to adduce evidence and
discharge his burden, and the Court cannot pre-judge the presence or
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
absence of good faith in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
26.
In order to establish the exceptions to Section 499 of IPC, the
Petitioner must step into the witness box and prove his defense. The pleas
propounded by the Petitioner are baseless and misconceived as actual harm
caused to Respondent No.2 by the impugned allegations is a matter of trial.
Reliance has been placed on Arundhati Sapru vs. Yash Mehra, 2013 SCC
OnLine Del 4521.
27.
It is apparent from the defamatory allegations made by the Petitioner
that the same amount to publication. The allegations virtually assassinated
the character of Respondent No.2 and have been made without any rhyme,
reason, or justification. The sole motive behind these allegations was to
tarnish the image of Respondent No.2 and cause harassment to him so that
his wife drops her rightful claims in respect of her mother’s property.
28.
It is alleged that the Petitioner’s husband, along with the Petitioner
and others, has indulged in various illegal acts of forgery of documents,
misleading this Court, making false statements, etc., as is evident from a
bare perusal of the records of CS (OS) No.82/2005, where the Sardar
Ravinder Singh (complainant), is one of the Defendants. The aforesaid
allegations raised by the Petitioner, are false and baseless.
29.
There is no merit in the present Petitions, which are liable to be
dismissed.
30.
A Status Report has been filed on behalf of the State, wherein details
of the cross-litigations between the parties, have been stated. It is submitted
that an enquiry was conducted into the alleged Letter received by Mr. Bimal
Kapoor, Secretary, RWA GK-I, containing allegedly defamatory language
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
against Ravinder Singh (Respondent No.2 herein) and his family with regard
to property disputes. During the enquiry, Mr. Ravinder Singh filed a copy of
the Judgment dated 08.01.2014 passed in CS (OS) No.82/2005, wherein
nothing adverse was found against him, as stated in the letter. It seems that
the letter containing allegations/defamatory language was posted by the
Petitioner/Harkirat Singh Sodhi.
31.
Respondent No.2/Ravinder Singh has filed written arguments,
wherein the same grounds have been taken as in the pleadings.
Submissions Heard and Record Perused.
32.
In the context of a complaint of defamation, at the stage the
Magistrate proceeds to issue process, he has to form his opinion based on
the allegations in the complaint and other material (obtained through the
process referred to in Section 200/Section 202) as to whether “sufficient
ground for proceeding” exists as distinguished from “sufficient ground for
conviction”, which has to be left for determination at the trial and not at the
stage when process is issued.
33.
Admittedly, there are multiple civil litigations between the parties,
pending adjudication. One Civil Suit No.82/2005 seeking partition has,
however, been decided vide Judgment dated 08.01.2014.
34.
It emerges from Test Case No. 38/2014 and Test Case No. 42/2014
that the rival parties had projected a respective Will of the deceased Sardarni
Surinder Kaur Sodhi, wherein both the parties had, in their respective
pleadings, alleged the Will propagated by the first party as a forged and
fabricated document.
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
I. Averments Made in Police Complaint:
35.
The first main allegation made by Respondent No.2/Ravinder Singh
in his Complaint was with reference to the Complaint dated 02.08.2014
made to Police Station Tughlak Road, New Delhi, wherein the averment
made in Paragraph 11 reads as under:
“Mr. Ravinder Singh Gandoak has earlier also committed
such forgeries in respect of his late father's properties and
assets and also in respect of his late father‟s will and other
documents, which my sister had informed me earlier.”
36.
It was claimed that the statement was defamatory, false, baseless, and
sensational and made only to unnecessarily harass the Complainant and
harm his hard-earned goodwill and reputation in society.
37.
Pertinently, FIR No.149/2014 dated 17.11.2014 under Sections
420/468/471/120B IPC was registered at P.S. Tughlak Road, New Delhi, in
regard to forgery, which is still pending adjudication.
38.
In this regard, it would be pertinent to refer to the case of Kishore
Balkrishna Nand vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2023] 11 S.C.R. 34,
wherein the Apex Court considered the question “whether the allegations
made in the complaint addressed to the SDM make out the offence under
Section 500 IPC or not?” The Court held as under:
“12. Section 499 of the IPC reads, thus: “499.
Defamation.—Whoever, by words either spoken or intended
to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes
or publishes any imputation concerning any person
intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe
that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to
defame that person.”
13. Eighth Exception to Section 499, to which reliance has
been placed by the learned counsel, reads as under:
“Eighth Exception.—Accusation preferred in good faith to
authorised person.—It is not defamation to prefer in good
faith an accusation against any person to any of those who
have lawful authority over that person with respect to the
subject-matter of accusation.”
14. The word “good faith” has been defined in Section 52 of
the IPC to mean: “52. „Good faith‟.—Nothing is said to be
done or believed in „good faith‟ which is done or believed
without due care and attention.”
15. We are of the view that no case is made out to put the
appellant to trial for the alleged offence. There is no
defamation as such.
16. Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is
not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation
against any person to any of those who have lawful
authority over that person with regard to the subjectmatter of accusation. Even otherwise by perusing the
allegations made in the complaint, we are satisfied that no
case for defamation has been made out.”
39.
In view of the same, at this stage, it is pre-mature, with there being no
finding by any Court of competent jurisdiction that these allegations are
misplaced or false.
40.
Prima facie, no case of defamation can be made out on these
averments.
II. Averments made in the Pleadings:
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
41.
The second ground for alleging defamation is the reference to the
Objections dated 12.12.2014 filed by the petitioner in Test Case No.42/2014
titled as Amita Gandoak vs. State and Anr., wherein in Paragraph 14, the
following contentions have been made:
“That it is also relevant to mention here that even
previously the Petitioner‟s husband along with petitioner
and others have indulged in various illegal acts of forgery
of documents, misleading this Hon'ble Court making false
statements, etc. as would be clear from a bare perusal of the
records of CS (OS) No. 82/2005 titled as Devinder Kaur &
Anr. Vs. Surjit Singh & Ors. wherein the husband of the
petitioner namely Sardar Ravinder Singh is one of the
defendants. The judgment dated 08.01.2014 passed by this
Hon'ble Court in the said CS (OS) No. 82/2005 would also
be very relevant to expose the real character of the
Petitioner and her immediate family members. In fact, the
petitioner and her immediate family members have no
regard for the truth and can go to any extent so as to cause
monetary loss to others including their own close relatives.”
42.
From the bare perusal of the averments made in the aforesaid, it is
evident that there is nothing which can be termed as defamatory or harmful
to the reputation of Respondent No.2. Pertinently, these averments have
been made by the Petitioner while contesting the Testamentary Suits filed
inter se the parties, which are still pending adjudication, and there is no
finding that the averments made by the Petitioner in his objections were not
true and if they were intended to defame Respondent No.2 in the eyes of a
third party.
43.
Insofar as the averments made in the pleadings are concerned, the
allegations made by a party in a judicial proceeding, are essentially intended
to assert a case which the party believes to be correct and true. Even if the
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
party loses the case, it cannot be said that the same was made with the sole
intent to bring disrepute to the other party. A litigant has the right to take all
legal pleas available to him, to prosecute or defend his case. If every
averment made in a judicial proceeding is scrutinized through the lens of
defamation while the litigation is still pending, it would stifle the right of a
party to approach the Court and present their case diligently, without a fear
of being roped in the allegations of Defamation.
44.
If a statement is made in a judicial proceeding and is alleged to be
false, the appropriate remedy lies under Section 340 Cr.P.C. for the offence
of perjury under Section 193 IPC and not by way of a separate Complaint
for defamation. The intention of such statements is to state a legal claim or
defense, not to harm the reputation of the other party within the meaning of
Section 499 IPC.
45.
In any case, the imputations when made in pleadings need to be
considered in view of the law in relation to the same. It has been repeatedly
held that by the Courts that this privilege is not absolute.
46.
A coordinate bench of this Court in M.P. Singh Sahni vs. State &
Ors., in CRL.M.C 3779/2003 decided on 30.05.2013 held as under:
“16. In Bhagat Singh Sethi & Ors. Vs. Zinda Lal AIR 1966
J&K 106(6), on review of case law, while holding that if
defamatory statement is made in pleadings absolute
privilege is not applicable to cases under the Penal Code in
India but qualified privilege applies the learned Judge
expressed the opinion that if in a pleading of a party
certain matters are alleged which may not strictly be
correct but are made in good faith and are made to protect
the interest of the maker they are privileged and the person
making them cannot be prosecuted or convicted for
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
defamation. In that case the defamatory statements were
alleged to have been made in application seeking an order
of attachment before judgment and issue of temporary
injunction. The court held that the allegations were made in
good faith to protect the interest of the maker in the suit. It
was also noticed that no express malice has been pleaded or
alleged in the complaint or in the statement of the witnesses
before the trial Magistrate. In the present case, like the case
before the J&K Court, no express malice has been pleaded
or alleged in the complaint or the statement of the
complainant before the trial Magistrate. The Criminal
proceedings in Bhagat Singh Sethi‟s case were quashed.”
47.
Further, another coordinate Bench of this court in Bikramjit Ahluwali
& Ors. vs. Simran Ahluwalia & Anr., in CRL.M.C. 447/2013 decided on
01.05.2015, wherein the court was considering the Complaint under
S.499/500 IPC on the basis of S.161 Cr.P.C. statements held that “…the
statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are only exempted for usage at
any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time
when statement was made. So far as the use of such statement made in a
separate proceeding for prosecution of an offence under Sections
499/500 IPC is concerned, the bar of Section 162 Cr.P.C. would not be
attracted. Statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. can claim only „qualified
privilege‟ and not „absolute privilege‟.”
48.
This qualified privilege is only a privilege, if the statements made fall
within one of the ten exceptions to the S.499 IPC.
49.
It may thus, be seen whether the averments made in inter se
Complaints and pleadings fall within the exceptions under S.499 IPC and
thus, protected?
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
- Whether Averments Made in Pleadings are in Good Faith:
50.
Now, before we can consider the plea of good faith, the objection in
this regard is that it cannot be taken at this stage and that it should be tested
at the stage of trial.
51.
However, in this regard reference may be made to the case of Iveco
Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH vs. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya and Anr.,
(2024) 2 SCC 86, wherein the Apex Court referred to the case of Aroon
Purie vs. State of NCT of Delhi, in SLP (Crl.) Nos.5115-5118/ 2021 decided
on 31.10.2022, wherein the Court formulated the question and the answer to
it. The question, in paragraph 18, reads as follows:
“We now turn to the question: whether the benefit of any of
the exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC can be availed of
and on the strength of such exception, the proceedings can
be quashed at the stage when an application moved under
Section 482 of the Code is considered?”
52.
After quoting paragraphs 5 and 7 from the decisions in Jawaharlal
Darda and Ors vs. Manoharrao Ganpatrao Kapsikar and Anr. AIR 1998
SC 2117 and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande vs. Uttam & Another AIR
1999 SC 1080, respectively, and conscious of the legal position, the Court
cautiously proceeded to hold as follows:
“21. It is thus clear that in a given case, if the facts so
justify, the benefit of an exception to Section 499 of the IPC
has been extended and it is not taken to be a rigid principle
that the benefit of exception can only be afforded at the
stage of trial.”
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
53.
In view of the same, now, we may consider whether the averments in
the pleadings are made in Good Faith and fall in the exception 9 to S.499
of IPC.
54.
The Petitioner, in the instant case, has primarily taken defence of
Good Faith as provided in Exception 9 to Section 499, IPC, which reads as
follows:
“Ninth Exception - Imputation made in good faith by
person for protection of his or other‟s interests. –
It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character
of another provided that the imputation be made in good
faith for the protection of the interest of the person making
it, or of any other person, or for the public good.”
55.
For the 9th Exception to apply, two essential ingredients must be
satisfied: (i) the imputation must be made in good faith; and (ii) it must be
for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other
person, or for the public good.
56.
Section 52 IPC defines the term “good faith” as anything which is
done or believed with “due care and attention”. The onus to prove that their
case falls within an exception lies on the accused.
57.
Apex Court considered the question “whether the allegations made in
the complaint addressed to the SDM make out the offence under Section 500
IPC or not?”, in the case of Kishore Balkrishna Nand vs. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. [2023] 11 S.C.R. 34. The Court referred to the
definition of defamation and held that “Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly
indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation
against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
person with regard to the subject-matter of accusation. Even otherwise by
perusing the allegations made in the complaint, we are satisfied that no case
for defamation has been made out.”
58.
It has been held by the Apex Court in Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab,
(1970) 1 SCC 590, that under the 9th Exception to Section 499, if the
imputation is made in good faith for the protection of the person making it
or for another person or for the public good, it is not defamation. It has also
been held that the interest of the person has to be real and legitimate when
communication is made in protection of the interest of the person making it.
59.
But the question which poses itself is the stage at which benefit of
Exception can be taken.
60.
While examining the question whether the exceptions to Section 499
could be considered at the stage of issue of process under Section 204 CrPC
and equally for the High Court examining a petition to quash under Section
482, the Apex Court in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH (supra)
observed as under:
“Although there is nothing in the law which in express terms
mandates the Magistrate to consider whether any of the
Exceptions to Section 499 IPC is attracted, there is no bar
either. The Magistrate is under no fetter from so
considering, more so because being someone who is legally
trained, it is expected that while issuing process he would
have a clear idea of what constitutes defamation. If, in the
unlikely event, the contents of the complaint and the
supporting statements on oath as well as reports of
investigation/inquiry reveal a complete defence under any of
the Exceptions to Section 499 IPC, the Magistrate, upon due
application of judicial mind, would be justified to dismiss
the complaint on such ground and it would not amount to an
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
act in excess of jurisdiction if such dismissal has the support
of reasons”.
61.
It was further observed:“60.What the law imposes on the Magistrate as a
requirement is that he is bound to consider only such of the
materials that are brought before him in terms of Sections
200 and 202 as well as any applicable provision of a
statute, and what is imposed as a restriction by law on him
is that he is precluded from considering any material not
brought on the record in a manner permitted by the legal
process. As a logical corollary to the above proposition,
what follows is that the Magistrate while deciding whether
to issue process is entitled to form a view looking into the
materials before him. If, however, such materials
themselves disclose a complete defence under any of the
Exceptions, nothing prevents the Magistrate upon
application of judicial mind to accord the benefit of such
Exception to prevent a frivolous complaint from triggering
an unnecessary trial.”
62.
The same principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case
Shahed Kamal & Ors. vs. M/s A. Surti Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr, 2025
INSC 502. It has been further held that what is “excepted”, cannot amount
to defamation on the very terms of the provision and that the Magistrate is
not in any manner precluded from considering if at all, any of the Exceptions
is attracted in a given case.
63.
In the instant case, there is nothing to show that this pending
litigation, which is yet to be finally adjudicated, has led to any defamation of
the Complainant. The Petitioner has only set up a defense in the said
proceedings and he is well within his rights to do.
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
64.
Thus, mere averments made in the pleadings, either to prosecute or
defend oneself, does not tantamount to an offence of defamation having been
committed.
65.
The next significant aspect of defamation especially in the context of
pleadings is „publication‟ of a defamatory imputation, to establish the prerequisite of the lowering of estimation must happen in the public eye, to
amount as Defamation. But what constitutes as publication?
66.
In Charanjit Singh vs. Arun Puri ILR (1982) Delhi 953, the essence of
defamation has been stated to be publication of a false statement concerning
another person without justification. There can be defence of privilege, fair
comment, consent etc.
67.
The meaning of “publication” in the context of Criminal defamation,
was considered by the Apex Court in Mohammed Abdulla Khan (supra)
while relying on two judgments of Khima Nand vs. Emperor, (1937) 38 Cri
LJ 806 (All); Amar Singh vs. K.S. Badalia, (1965) 2 Cri LJ 693 (Pat),
wherein it was observed that “the essence of publication in the context of
Section 499, is the communication of defamatory imputation to persons
other than the persons against whom the imputation is made.”
68.
To further clarify the meaning and import of “publication,” reference
may be made to the case of Dow Jones & Company Inc vs. Gutnick (2002)
20 CLR 575 at [26], wherein the High Court of Australia observed as under:
“Harm to reputation is done when a defamatory publication
is comprehended by the reader, the listener, or the observer.
Until then, no harm is done by it. This being so it would be
wrong to treat publication as if it were a unilateral act on
the part of the publisher alone. It is not. It is a bilateral act -
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
in which the publisher makes it available and a third party
has it available for his or her comprehension.”
69.
There must necessarily be publication which necessarily requires a
second party to whom the imputation is made available for his own
comprehension and consequently results in lowering of estimation of the
Complainant.
70.
In the instant case, the allegations have been made in the pleadings
but they cannot, by any stretch of interpretation, be claimed to have been
circulated in public or having lowered the estimation of the Complainant in
the estimation of right thinking members of society, which tends to make
them shun or avoid that person.
III.
71.
Whether Letter dated 04.01.2015 are Defamatory:
Third document relied upon by the Petitioner was an anonymous
Letter dated 04.01.2015, which was received in the RWA, GK-1 which
reads as under:
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
72.
The Letter, aside from referring to the multiple litigations inter se the
parties, comments were also made about the conduct of Respondent No.2, of
being a person of fraudulent nature and character, and that he, along with
his wife, son, and daughter, intend to swallow the property belonging to his
wife‟s mother by the old method of creating forged documents, etc.
73.
It was further mentioned in the letter that Ms. Deepali Gandoak
(daughter) was trying to usurp and forcibly take possession by claiming past
possession in the property, of her maternal grandmother. Likewise, Parveet
Gandoak (son) was following the footsteps of his father and has also been
made an accused in the FIR for cheating and forgery. He has become an
expert in forging Wills and documents, etc. He, along with the accomplice,
under the active guidance and planning of his father and mother, has forged
some documents to illegally misappropriate the property. The entire family
is out to make themselves illegally rich, earn money by forgery, conspiracy,
and cheating, etc. Such malicious kinds of people and Amita Gandoak
should be removed from being an office bearer, and neither of her family
members should be allowed to participate in any further elections or take
part in the day-to-day affairs of the association.
74.
It has been rightly agitated by the Petitioner is that this Letter is
written by a „Group of concerned Residents‟ and it does not give the names
of the persons who have authored it. It is only a presumption that this Letter
has been written by the Petitioner merely because the Letter pertains to
multiple litigations with regard to the property pending between the parties.
75.
There is not even a prima facie indication that this Letter was
circulated by or at the behest of the Petitioner, from the testimony of CW-
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
2/Sh. Rupak Vaish recorded by the Complainant or from any other
circumstance.
76.
Mere conjectures and surmises about the Petitioner being an author
since the allegations were in reference to the disputes between the two
families cannot be sufficient even to make out a prima facie case of
defamation. In the absence of there being even an iota of evidence of the
Petitioner being the author of this Letter, the contents of the same cannot be
attributed to him so as to make a case for summoning him under Sections
499/500 IPC.
Conclusion:
77.
Even if the entire allegations made in the Complaint filed by the
respondent are accepted, no offence of defamation, as defined under Section
499 IPC, is made out.
78.
The Apex court in the case of Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik
GMBH (supra) observed,
“However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or
criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the
High Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid
down for quashing of a process issued under Section 204
read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due
satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of
the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the
complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary
evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that
proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an
abuse of the legal process. This too, would be
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
impermissible, if the justice of a given case does not
overwhelmingly so demand.”
79.
In view of the aforesaid, there is no averment in the Complaint to
substantiate the allegations of defamation under Sections 499/500 IPC.
80.
The Petitions are hereby, allowed, and CC No.89247/2016, along
with Summoning Order dated 06.07.2017 and the Order framing Notice, is
quashed.
81.
The pending Application(s), if any, are accordingly disposed of.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
JANUARY 20, 2026/R
Signed By:VIKAS
ARORA
17:51:43
CRL.M.C. 4225/2018 & 5891/2019
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review