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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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CNR No. DLHC011010652025
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BAIL APPLN. 4848/2025 and CRL.M.A. 37315/2025
HARJINDER SINGH @ RINDI
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Sunil Kumar Mehta, Advocate.
versus
THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP.
SI Dharmender, Spl. Cell, NR & STF.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
ORDER
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01.09.2026
1.
The applicant by way of this application seeks for grant of regular bail
in connection with FIR No. 63/2015 for offence under Sections 18/21/22/25
29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985
registered at Police Station Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, Delhi.
2.
Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that the applicant
is innocent and has been falsely implicated. It is contended that there has
been non-compliance with Sections 41, 42, 50, 52A and 57 of the NDPS
Act, which, according to learned counsel, casts doubt on the alleged
recovery. It is further submitted that there is no material connecting the
applicant with the alleged conspiracy.
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3.
Learned counsel further submits that the applicant has undergone
more than eight years of incarceration, whereas only 6 out of 53 prosecution
witnesses have been examined so far. It is, therefore, contended that the trial
is likely to take some time to conclude. Learned counsel also submits that
the other co-accused have already been granted regular bail.
4.
Learned counsel further submits that the applicant had earlier been
granted interim bail on various occasions and had complied with the
conditions imposed upon him. It is submitted that there is no likelihood of
the applicant tampering with the prosecution evidence or evading the
process of law and that he is willing to abide by any condition that may be
imposed by this Court.
5.
Mr. Mukesh Kumar, learned APP for the State, strongly opposes the
present application. He submits that 1 kg of heroin was recovered from the
Verna car of the applicant at the time of his apprehension. It is further
submitted that the material on record includes the recovery, the disclosure
statements, CDR connectivity, intercepted calls and the FSL report
regarding the voice samples of the accused persons. Learned APP submits
that the alleged recoveries in the present case form part of a larger chain of
narcotic transactions involving the co-accused and that the quantity involved
is commercial.
6.
Learned APP further submits that the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act are attracted, having regard to the nature and quantity of the
contraband involved. It is also submitted that the applicant has previous
involvement in four criminal cases. On these grounds, learned APP submits
that the applicant is not entitled to the grant of regular bail.
7.
Learned APP further submits that the applicant had earlier been
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granted interim bail and, thereafter, was arrested in another case. It is
contended that the applicant did not surrender upon expiry of the interim
bail and was consequently declared a proclaimed offender. Learned APP,
therefore, submits that there is a likelihood of the applicant not being
available for the proceedings if released on bail.
8.
In response, learned counsel for the applicant submits that, out of the
cases relied upon by the prosecution, the applicant has already been
acquitted in two cases, namely FIR No. 37/2014 under Section 15 of the
NDPS Act, registered at P.S. Division No. 7, District Jalandhar, and FIR No.
27/2015 under Section 22 of the NDPS Act, registered at P.S. Mehatpur,
District Jalandhar. In respect of FIR No. 249/2023, registered at P.S.
Sidhwan Bet, District Ludhiana, under Sections 15 and 25 of the NDPS Act,
Section 25 of the Arms Act and Section 473 IPC, the applicant has been
granted regular bail by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana vide order
dated 14.07.2026. It is submitted that the applicant is entitled to
consideration of bail, inter alia, on account of the prolonged incarceration
and the delay in conclusion of the trial.
9.
I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties and have perused the record.
10.
The facts of the case would indicate that the present applicant,
Harjinder Singh, was apprehended on 18.11.2015 pursuant to secret
information, when 1 kg of heroin was allegedly recovered from his Verna
car. The prosecution case is that the applicant was part of a larger narcotics
syndicate involved in the supply of heroin across different States. The
prosecution relies, inter alia, upon the recovery, the vehicle seized from the
spot, the disclosure statements, CDR connectivity, intercepted calls and the
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FSL report regarding the voice samples. Charges have been framed against
the accused persons and the trial is presently underway.
11.
There are nine accused persons in the present FIR, out of whom three
have been declared proclaimed offenders. Of the remaining six accused
persons, five have already been enlarged on regular bail, whereas the present
applicant continues to remain in judicial custody.
12.
The recovery whether satisfied the test laid down under the provisions
of NDPS Act or otherwise would be an aspect which will have to be
considered by the concerned Trial Court at the time of passing the final
decision.
13.
As per the nominal roll dated 01.09.2026, the applicant has undergone
judicial custody of 5 years, 2 months and 23 days in the present case.
14.
Learned counsel for the applicant, however, disputes the aforesaid
computation and submits that the period during which the applicant
remained in custody in FIR No. 249 dated 12.12.2023, registered at P.S.
Sidhwan Bet, District Ludhiana, is also liable to be taken into consideration
for computing the period of incarceration in the present case.
15.
Whether the aforesaid period of custody is liable to be reckoned in the
present case is an issue which would require consideration by the concerned
Court. However, even without taking into account the period of custody
undergone in the said case, the applicant has undisputedly remained in
custody for more than five years in the present case.
16.
This Court, vide order dated 23.07.2026, directed the concerned Court
to submit a report regarding the stage of the trial, which has since been
received. The report indicates that approximately 755 cases were pending
before the concerned Court. The said Court has, vide order dated
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01.08.2026, been abolished by this Court and the matters have been
redistributed amongst other Courts; accordingly, the timeline for conclusion
of the present trial would have to be indicated by the newly designated
Court. Out of 55 prosecution witnesses, 13 have been examined so far. The
evidence recorded is voluminous and involves lengthy examination and
cross-examination. The trial is, therefore, likely to take some time to
conclude.
17.
Though the entire delay in conclusion of the trial may not be
attributable to the prosecution, and some part of the delay is attributable to
the repeated non-production/absence of the accused, execution of coercive
proceedings against the absconding accused, disruption caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic and other administrative and judicial constraints, the
overall period of incarceration and the attendant circumstances can
nevertheless be taken into consideration.
18.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the alleged recovery
is of commercial quantity and, therefore, the embargo contained in Section
37 of the NDPS Act would ordinarily govern the consideration of the
present application. Equally, however, it is now well settled that the
restrictions under Section 37 cannot be construed in a manner so as to
completely eclipse the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, particularly where an undertrial has
remained incarcerated for an unduly long period and the trial shows no real
prospect of early conclusion.
19.
The Supreme Court in the case of Rabi Prakash v. The State Of
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Odisha,1 has duly observed:
“4. As regard to the twin conditions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
learned counsel for the respondent - State has been duly heard.
Thus, the 1st condition stands complied with. So far as the 2nd condition re:
formation of opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the petitioner is not guilty, the same may not be formed at this stage when
he has already spent more than three and a half years in custody.
The prolonged incarceration, generally militates against the most precious
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and in
such a situation, the conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo
created under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act.
[Emphasis supplied]
20.
In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial
Prisoners) v. Union of India,2 recognised that while Section 37 of the
NDPS Act imposes stringent conditions for the grant of bail, denial of bail
coupled with prolonged delay in trial would result in continued deprivation
of personal liberty without a timely adjudication of guilt, a consequence
incompatible with the guarantee of a fair and speedy trial under Article 21 of
the Constitution:
"15. On account of the strict language of the said provision very few persons
accused of certain offences under the Act could secure bail. Now to refuse bail
on the one hand and to delay trial of cases on the other is clearly unfair and
unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of Section 36(1) of the Act, Section
309 of the Code and Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. We are
conscious of the statutory provision finding place in Section 37 of the Act
prescribing the conditions which have to be satisfied before a person accused
of an offence under the Act can be released. Indeed we have adverted to this
section in the earlier part of the judgment. We have also kept in mind the
interpretation placed on a similar provision in Section 20 of the TADA Act by
the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569].
Despite this provision, we have directed as above mainly at the call of Article
21 as the right to speedy trial may even require in some cases quashing of a
criminal proceeding altogether, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court
in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225], release on bail, which can
be taken to be embedded in the right of speedy trial, may, in some cases be the
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109
(1994) 6 SCC 731
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demand of Article 21. As we have not felt inclined to accept the extreme
submission of quashing the proceedings and setting free the accused whose
trials have been delayed beyond reasonable time for reasons already alluded
to, we have felt that deprivation of the personal liberty without ensuring speedy
trial would also not be in consonance with the right guaranteed by Article 21.
Of course, some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided in
such cases; but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long,
the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt.”
[Emphasis supplied]
21.
The Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,3 held that
statutory restrictions on the grant of bail, including those contained in
special enactments such as Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA and NDPS Act, do
not denude constitutional courts of their power to grant bail where continued
incarceration results in a violation of the fundamental right to personal
liberty and speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
“12. Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention)Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”) which too have somewhat rigorous
conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(1999) 9 SCC 252] , Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 11 SCC 569 and
Umarmia v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 2 SCC 731 enlarged the accused on bail
when they had been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of
early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in
such special enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of
speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians.”
***
“15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed
by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only
due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v.
Union of India, it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained
pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts
unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the
practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the
risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the
courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released
pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible
(2021) 3 SCC 713
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and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the
courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.”
[Emphasis supplied]
22.
The aforesaid principle has been specifically applied to prosecutions
under the NDPS Act by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v.
State (NCT of Delhi)4. The Court observed that an interpretation of Section
37 which results in an accused remaining in custody for years awaiting
conclusion of trial would militate against the guarantee of a speedy trial
under Article 21.
“22……Grant of bail on ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be
fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section 436A which
is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too (ref. Satender Kumar Antil
supra). Having regard to these factors the court is of the opinion that in the
facts of this case, the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail.”
23.
As aptly observed by division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Hakim v.
State (NCT of Delhi)5, the Court must play the role of a “doctor” rather than
a “coroner”, by protecting the right to a speedy trial before it is rendered
illusory by prolonged incarceration, instead of recognising its violation after
the constitutional injury has become irreversible.
24.
Tested on the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the applicant
has remained in custody for more than 5 years. Investigation already stands
completed and the chargesheet has been filed. The trial has progressed at a
slow pace and out of 53 witnesses only 6 witnesses examination-in-chief has
been carried out, despite the long period of incarceration undergone by the
applicant. Trial doesn’t seem to be concluded in near future.
25.
Bearing in mind the period of incarceration undergone by the
(2023) 18 SCC 166
2021 SCC OnLine Del 4623
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applicant and the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court
deems it appropriate to enlarge the applicant on regular bail, subject to such
terms and conditions as may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court. The
Trial Court shall, inter alia, require the applicant to furnish two local
sureties and impose such other conditions as may ensure his presence before
the concerned Court on each date of hearing. In the event of the applicant’s
involvement in any other case of a similar nature, the Investigating Agency
shall be at liberty to seek cancellation of the bail.
26.
Nothing stated, hereinabove, shall be construed as an expression on
the merits of the case. The observations made herein are confined solely to
the adjudication of the present bail application. The Trial Court shall
adjudicate the matter independently and in accordance with law, on the basis
of the evidence adduced before it.
27.
The application stands disposed of.
28.
Copy of the order to be forwarded to the concerned Jail
Superintendent for necessary compliance.
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J
SEPTEMBER 1, 2026
aks
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