The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no patent illegality, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference with the impugned Award in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
24. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Full Judgment Text
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*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 15th September, 2026
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CNR No. DLHC010671912006
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
HARI PRAKASH
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Chirayu Jain &
Onaizha Habib, Advs.
Mr.
versus
N.D.M.C.
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Nirvikar Verma, ASC for
the State for NDMC.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
1.
The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India assailing award dated 27.03.2004 (hereinafter
‘impugned award’) passed by the learned Labour Court, rejecting the
claim of the petitioner.
2.
Briefly stated, the petitioner was engaged as a Safai Karamchari
by the respondent on 01.12.1990, on daily wage basis. The services of
the petitioner were subsequently terminated by the respondent on
17.09.1991. The petitioner, thereafter, raised an industrial dispute
against the said termination and consequently the following reference
was made by the appropriate government to the learned Labour Court:
"Whether the services of Shri Hari Prakash have been terminated
Illegally and /or unjustifiably by the management, and If so, to
what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this
respect"?
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
11:33:36
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
3.
The learned Labour Court vide the impugned award observed
that the workman had not completed 240 days of service with the
respondent and was thus not eligible for protection under Section 25F
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘ID Act’). The learned Labour
Court further observed that there was no evidence on record to show
that juniors to the petitioner were kept in service before his services
were dispensed with. Consequently, the learned Labour Court
answered the reference in negative.
4.
Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been filed.
5.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned
Labour Court has erred in holding that the petitioner had not
completed 240 days of continuous service with the respondent.
6.
He submits that while calculating the period of service of the
petitioner, the learned Labour Court has excluded Sundays and
holidays. He submits that, in terms of Workmen of American Express
International Banking Corporation v. Management of American
Express International Banking Corporation : AIR 1986 SC 458,
Sundays and holidays are required to be counted for determining
continuous service under Section 25B of the ID Act. He submits that,
once the same are included, the petitioner had completed 240 days of
continuous service and, consequently, his termination without notice,
notice pay and retrenchment compensation was in violation of Section
25F.
7.
He submits that, even otherwise, completion of 240 days of
service is not a requirement for attracting Sections 25G and 25H of the
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
11:33:36
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
ID Act. He submits that the learned Labour Court has failed to
appreciate that the petitioner had categorically deposed that juniors
were retained and fresh persons were recruited after his termination,
and this testimony remained uncontroverted in cross-examination. He
further submits that MW1 admitted that Safai Karmcharis were being
engaged in large numbers during the relevant period. He submits that
the aforesaid evidence clearly establishes violation of Sections 25G
and 25H of the ID Act.
8.
Per Contra, the learned counsel for the respondent vehemently
opposes the present petition. He submits that the petitioner was
engaged only as a casual/daily-rated worker from 01.12.1990 to
05.09.1991 and had worked for only 231 days in the preceding twelve
months. He submits that the petitioner, therefore, had not completed
the mandatory 240 days of continuous service required for protection
under Section 25F read with Section 25B of the ID Act.
9.
He submits that there is no violation of Sections 25G and 25H
of the ID Act in the present case. He submits that the petitioner has
failed to produce any evidence to establish that any junior workman
was retained after his disengagement or that persons junior to him
were subsequently engaged. He submits that the learned Labour Court
has correctly recorded that there was no evidence on record to
establish that any junior was retained.
10.
I have heard the arguments and perused the record.
11.
At the outset, it is necessary to note that the scope of
interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
11:33:36
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
with an Award passed by the Labour Court is limited. Interference is
warranted only where the Award suffers from patent illegality,
perversity or an error apparent on the face of the record. The present
Petition does not invite this Court to re-appreciate the evidence or
disturb findings of fact but is confined to examining the legality and
propriety of the relief granted by the Labour Court.
12.
Adverting to the merits of the present case, the principal
contention of the petitioner is that the learned Labour Court
erroneously concluded that the petitioner did not complete 240 days of
continuous service with the respondent.
13.
Reliance has been placed upon the judgment in Workmen of
American Express International Banking Corporation (Supra) to
contend that Sundays and holidays ought to have been counted while
determining whether the petitioner had completed 240 days of
continuous service with the respondent. However, in the opinion of
this Court, the aforesaid judgment does not advance the case of the
petitioner. The said judgment was rendered in the context of a
temporary worker, where the holidays in question were paid holidays
and, therefore, formed part of the period of continuous service. In the
present case, the petitioner was a daily-rated worker and was paid only
for the days on which he actually worked. It has further come on
record that whenever the petitioner availed leave, wages for the said
day were deducted. In these circumstances, the days of continuous
service have to be determined on the basis of the days for which the
petitioner was actually paid.
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
11:33:36
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
14.
Though the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the
judgments of the Gujarat High Court in Bhathibhai Valambhai Baria
v. State of Gujarat & Ors., Special Civil Application No. 16189 of
2020 and Medical Officer v. Dashrathsinh Gajubha Zala, Special
Civil Application No. 4258 of 2011, to contend that the principle laid
down in Workmen of American Express International Banking
Corporation (Supra) applies equally to daily-wage workers, and that
Sundays and other permissible holidays are required to be counted for
determining continuous service, this Court is unable to agree with the
view taken therein. In any event, in the facts of the present case, the
issue is academic, since even upon the petitioner’s own muster roll, he
has been shown to have worked for only 238 days including holidays.
15.
The entire controversy in the present matter can be put to rest
upon a mere perusal of the muster roll card of the workman, which is
the petitioner’s own document and was exhibited before the learned
Labour Court as WW1/7. It is the petitioner’s contention that the said
muster roll which shows that the petitioner has worked with the
respondent for a period of 238 days does not include Sundays and
other holidays and if the same were included he would have
completed 240 days.
16.
The relevant extract of the muster rolls of the petitioner
showing the period for which he worked is reproduced hereinbelow:
Period of Work
Month & Year
No. of days
Progress
live Total
01/12/90 to 31/12/90
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
11:33:36
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
17.
01/01/91 to 31/01/91
01/02/91 to 28/01/91
01/03/91 to 31/03/91
02/05/91 to 30/05/91
01/06/91 to 30/06/91
01/07/91 to 30/07/91
01/08/91 to 31/08/91
01/09/91 to 05/09/91
A perusal of the above makes it evident that in quite a few
months the muster rolls of the petitioner records that he had worked
on all days of the month, in such circumstances, the petitioner can by
no stretch of imagination contend that Sundays or other paid holidays
were not included in the said muster roll. Though MW1 in his cross
examination has stated that in the said muster roll Sundays and other
holidays are not shown, the same does not further the case of the
petitioner as evidently, Sundays and holidays have been accounted for
in the muster roll produced by the petitioner before the learned Labour
Court.
18.
It is well settled that the onus of establishing that the workman
worked for a continuous period of 240 days prior to his termination
lies upon the workman himself. In the present case, the petitioner
produced WW1/7, which was his muster roll, the same provided that
he had only worked for a period of 238 days from 01.12.1990 to
05.09.1991. Though the petitioner contended that he worked till
17.09.1991, he failed to produce any document before the learned
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
11:33:36
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
Labour Court to establish the same. The petitioner further also
admitted in his cross examination that he had been doing his own
business of selling vegetables after 07.09.1991. Additionally, it is not
clear whether the petitioner had taken a break from services during the
month of April, 1991 as the aforesaid muster roll shows that the
petitioner has not worked with the respondent for the month of April,
1991. The petitioner in his cross examination had just baldly denied
the assertion that he did not work for the respondent during the month
of April, 1991, however admitted that he did not have any evidence to
establish he had worked with the respondent during the said period.
19.
In these circumstances, the conclusion of the learned Labour
Court that the petitioner had failed to establish completion of 240 days
of continuous service is a plausible view based upon the evidence on
record. This Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, does not sit in appeal over such findings of fact. In the
absence of any perversity or patent illegality having been
demonstrated, no interference is warranted.
20.
The second contention of the petitioner is that the respondent
violated provisions of Sections 25G and 25H of the ID Act, while
terminating the services of the petitioner.
21.
Insofar as Section 25G is concerned, the petitioner’s case is that
juniors to him were retained in service after his disengagement.
However, the mere assertion of the petitioner in his statement of claim
and evidence is not sufficient to establish such violation. The
petitioner was required to place material on record to identify the
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
11:33:36
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
persons who were junior to him and demonstrate that they had been
retained while his services were discontinued. The learned Labour
Court, upon appreciation of the evidence, has recorded a categorical
finding that there was no evidence on record to establish that any
junior workman was retained in service. The petitioner has not been
able to demonstrate that the said finding is perverse. The finding of
the learned Labour Court with regard to Section 25G, therefore, does
not warrant interference.
22.
As regards Section 25H, the said provision does not arise for
consideration in the present proceedings. The reference made to the
learned Labour Court was confined to the question whether the
termination of the petitioner’s services was illegal and/or unjustified
and the relief, if any, to which he was entitled. There was no reference
before the learned Labour Court concerning the petitioner’s claim for
re-employment under Section 25H. Consequently, the learned Labour
Court was not required to adjudicate upon any alleged violation of
Section 25H, and no interference can be sought on that ground.
23.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no patent
illegality, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record
warranting interference with the impugned Award in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
24.
The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
25.
Pending applications (if any), also strand disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
SEPTEMBER 15, 2026/“SK”
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
11:33:36
W.P.(C) 11307/2006
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