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UKHC010139602026
2026:UHC:7206
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Appeal against Order No. 298 of 2026
Harendra Aggarwal
...... Appellant
Vs.
Gurubaksh
..... Respondent
Present:
Mr. Akshay Padhan, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. S.K. Mandal, and Mr. Deepak Singh Bisht, Advocates for the respondent.
JUDGMENT
Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral)
The challenge in this appeal is made to the
judgment and decree dated 13.05.2026, passed in Civil Appeal
No.04 of 2026, Gurubaksh v. Harendra Aggarwal (“the appeal”), by
the court of Additional District Judge, Laksar, District Haridwar.
By it, an order dated 04.12.2025, passed in Original Suit No.86 of
2020, Gurubaksh v. Harendra Aggarwal (“the suit”), by the court
of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Laksar, District Haridwar, has
been set aside, and it was directed that the suit be registered in
its original number, and proceeded accordingly.
2.
Heard learned counsel for the appellant and
perused the record.
3.
The respondent did file the suit for specific
performance of an agreement dated 29.05.2013. It has been the
case of the respondent that the appellant agreed to sell a piece of
land to the respondent for Rs.14,50,000/-, and registered
agreement to sale was executed on 29.05.2013; it was agreed
between the parties that the sale deed shall be executed till
15.11.2013.
Despite
repeated requests, the appellant did not
execute the sale deed. Hence, the suit.
4.
The facts go beyond what is stated hereinbefore,
and these are as below:(i)
Before filing of the suit, the respondent
had filed Original Suit No.164 of 2016, Gurubaksh v. Harendra
Aggarwal, for specific performance of the agreement dated
29.05.2013, (“the former suit”). The former suit was filed on
15.11.2016. In the former suit, on 16.10.2019, on the question of
pecuniary jurisdiction, the court held that, since that court had
no pecuniary jurisdiction, the plaint be returned. Subsequent to
it, the suit was filed by the appellant on 21.12.2020.
(ii)
In the suit, an application under Order 7
Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the CPC”) and
Section 151 of the CPC was moved by the appellant on the ground
that since the agreement to sale is dated 29.05.2013, and the suit
has been filed on 21.12.2020, in which the cause of action has
been shown to have arisen on 20.12.2020, the suit is barred by
limitation.
4.
It has been the case of the appellant that under
Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“the Limitation Act”), the
limitation for filing the suit of such nature is three years. This
application, which was filed by the appellant, was objected to by
the respondent on the ground that the question of limitation is a
mixed question of law and fact. It is also submitted that the
former suit was filed, which was returned on 16.10.2019.
Thereafter, there was COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Therefore,
the suit is not barred by limitation. Issue relating to the
applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act was also raised.
5.
After hearing the parties,
by
the
order
dated
04.12.2025, passed in the suit, the court held that the suit is
barred by limitation, and, accordingly, the plaint was rejected.
6.
This order dated 04.12.2025, passed in the suit,
was challenged in the appeal, which was allowed by the impugned
judgment and order dated 13.05.2026, which is impugned.
7.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that
after return of the former suit on 16.10.2019, the same plaint
ought to have been presented in the court of competent
jurisdiction, which was not done. Therefore, the suit is not in
continuation of the former suit. He also raises the following points
in his submission:(i)
When the suit was again presented on
21.12.2020, it was filed with the fresh cause of
action, which, according to Para 11 of the plaint in
the suit had arisen lastly on 20.12.2020.
(ii)
There is no ground to condone the delay
from the return of the former suit on 16.10.2019
till the suit was filed on 21.12.2020.
Therefore, it is argued that the appellate court has
committed an error in setting aside the order dated 04.12.2025,
passed in the suit, and rejecting the application field by the
appellant under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and Section 151 CPC.
8.
Learned counsel for the respondent submits that
the present suit is continuance of the former suit; the question of
limitation is mixed question of law and fact.
9.
The following factual narration is not disputed:(i)
An
agreement
to
sale
was
executed
between the parties on 29.05.2013. The sale deed
was to be executed till 15.11.2016.
(ii)
The
former suit was filed by the
respondent on 15.11.2016.
(iii)
Since
pecuniary
jurisdiction
was
exceeding, on 16.10.2019, the plaint in the former
suit was returned.
(iv)
The
suit
was
again
instituted
on
21.12.2020, in which, the respondent, in Para
No.11 of the plaint, has recorded that lastly the
cause of action arose on 20.12.2020.
10.
The question is as to whether the suit is within
limitation?
11.
What is being argued is that the plaint of the
former suit, which was returned to the respondent on 16.10.2019,
ought to have been represented before the court of competent
jurisdiction. This is definitely one proposition. But, there may be
multiple situations, where plaint, in the form, in which it is
returned, may not be filed before the court of competent
jurisdiction. For example, if the civil court returns the plaint on
the ground of jurisdiction to be presented before the revenue
court, perhaps, a new plaint is to be drafted or much amendment
is to be made in the returned plaint. But that is a separate
question. If plaint as such is not presented, and new plaint is
filed, it may, perhaps, give rise to the question of maintainability,
etc, but it may not affect the applicability of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, which reads as follows:“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide
in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the period
of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff
has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal
or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where
the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any
application, the time during which the applicant has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding,
whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision,
against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded,
where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court
which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like
nature, is unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of
Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),
the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a
fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court
under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is
granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason
of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a
like nature.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil
proceeding was pending, the day on which that
proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended
shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be
deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be
deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of
jurisdiction.”
12.
From 15.11.2016 to 16.10.2019, definitely, the
respondent was litigating before a court, which had no pecuniary
jurisdiction. The respondent was definitely pursuing in the former
suit with his due diligence. The plaint in the former suit was
returned on 16.10.2019. Therefore, the application of Section 14
of the Limitation Act would demand that while computing the
period of limitation in the suit, the period from 15.11.2016 to
16.10.2019 has to be excluded.
13.
The next question arises that the plaint was again
filed on 21.12.2020 with a fresh cause of action having been
arisen on 20.12.2020.
14.
Cause of action is not a single act. Cause of action
is bundle of facts, which culminates in the filing of the suit. In
fact, in the instant case, it had arisen the day the agreement was
executed between the parties on 29.05.2013, and on every
moment when the sale deed was not executed. Merely because
one more incident has been added in Para No.11 of the plaint by
the respondent, as giving rise to another cause of action on
20.12.2020, it will have no effect while invoking the provisions of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
15.
In addition to it, in the appellate court judgment,
reference has been made to the directions issued by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court In Re:Cognizance for Extension of Limitation,
(2022) 3 SCC 117, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that how the period of limitation has to be excluded, and in Para
5.3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:“5.3. In cases where the limitation would have
expired during the period between 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022,
notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation
remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90
days from 1-3-2022. In the event the actual balance period
of limitation remaining, with effect from 1-3-2022 is greater
than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.”
16.
There is concession of limitation in view of the
judgment in the case of In Re:Cognizance for Extension of
Limitation (supra). In the instant case, the plaint in the former
suit was returned on 16.10.2019, and, thereafter, the respondent
did file the suit on 21.12.2020. This Court has already held that
the period from 15.11.2016, when the former suit was filed, till
16.10.2019, when the plaint in the former suit was returned, shall
be excluded for computing the period of limitation. Therefore, this
Court is of the view that the appellate court has rightly interpreted
the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and has rightly
concluded that the suit is within time. The appellate court has
rightly set aside the order dated 04.12.2025, passed in the suit.
Accordingly, this Court is of the view that there is no reason to
make any interference in the impugned judgment and decree.
Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be dismissed at the stage of
admission itself.
13.
The appeal is dismissed in limine.
(Ravindra Maithani, J.)
13.08.2026
Ravi Bisht
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