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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 13.08.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010664222015
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RC.REV. 146/2015, CM APPL. 5022/2015 (Stay) &
APPL. 33239/2026 (U/O VII Rule 14 (3))
HAJI GHAZANFAR ALI
Through:
CM
.....Petitioner
Mr. I.A. Khan, Advocate.
versus
MOHD ABID & ORS
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr.
Chandra
Prakash,
Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 19581, assailing the Judgment & Order
dated 12.11.20142 passed by the learned CCJ-cum-ARC, Central
District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi3, in Eviction Petition bearing
No. 334 of 20134 filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, titled
“Mr. Mohd. Abid & Ors. v. Mr. Haji Ghazanfar Ali”, whereby the
leave to defend Application filed under Section 25-B(4) of the DRC
Act by the Petitioner herein in the Eviction Petition came to be
dismissed by the learned ARC and consequently, the Petitioner herein
DRC Act
Impugned Order
learned ARC
Eviction Petition
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
was evicted from the tenanted premises i.e. shop/portion on ground
floor having area measuring 46 square metres forming part of Property
bearing No. 7524/B, Gali Qabron Wali, Quresh Nagar, Sadar Bazar,
Delhi-110006.
2.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner premises
the challenge herein to the sole aspect that the Respondents were
never the owner of the tenanted premises and that they were also not
the landlords. He submits that in terms of the Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act, the requirement is that the Respondents herein would have
to be the owners of the tenanted premises in order to maintain the
Eviction Petition as against the Petitioner herein.
3.
This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner at length, and, with his able assistance, perused the relevant
documents as well as the Impugned Order.
4.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
5.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.5, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
Singh6, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua7, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
appellate jurisdiction.
6.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.8, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover9.
7.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
8.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
9.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
10.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
11.
This Court takes note of the fact that the Eviction Petition itself
came to be filed by the Respondents herein who were the children of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
Mr. Nasruddin, who was the person to whom the Petitioner herein was
originally paying rent. This Court also take note of the discussion
accorded to the aspect of “Ownership and Landlord-Tenant
Relationship” and the consideration accorded by the learned ARC,
which is reproduced hereinbelow:
“Ownership & landlord-tenant relationship.
12.
The respondent has disputed the ownership of the petitioner
over the suit property stating that the suit property is under the
ownership of custodian of evacuee property under Govt. of NCI of
Delhi and that the petitioner is a tenant with respect to the same
alongwith other occupants of the suit property and ail the
occupants of the said property are paying rent to the government
department for possession of the said property, it is further averred
that even the respondents are tenants under custodian of evacuee
property and are not the tenant of the petitioner and therefore,
earlier respondent used to deposit the rent with father of the
petitioner Sh. Nasiruddin so that the said father would deposit the
same with custodian of evacuee property but when it came to the
knowledge of the respondent and other occupants that the said
father of the petitioner was not depositing the rent with the
government, the respondent as well as other occupants stopped
paying any money to the petitioners. Per contra, it is averred by the
petitioners that they are the owners of the suit property and also the
landlords of the respondent and even the respondent has admitted
the ownership of the petitioner over the suit property and also
existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioners
and respondent in case titled as "Nasiruddin, since deceased
through LRs. Vs. Haji Ghazanfar Ail", which has been filed by
father of the petitioners against the respondent seeking perpetual
injunction.
13.
I have heard the arguments of both the parties and have also
gone through the record.
14.
Perusal of record clearly shows that the respondent has
admitted in the suit for permanent injunction filed by father of the
petitioner against the present respondent that the respondent had
entered into agreement dated 20.11.1961 in respect of the suit
premises with the petitioner stating that Sh. Amir Bux, i.e.,
grandfather of the petitioner had let out the shop, i.e., suit premises
to the respondent and respondent is a tenant in the suit property.
Even otherwise, in the final judgment passed by Ld. Civil Judge in
the said case, it has been clearly held that the defendant, i.e. present
respondent is estopped u/s 116 of the Indian Evidence Act from
denying landlordship of the petitioner over the suit property, it is
clearly mentioned in the said judgment that the respondent herein
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
has received the shop under his tenancy from predecessor-ininterest of the petitioners. Further, Ld. Civil Judge has also passed
an order dated 09.12.2011 upon application u/o 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC
of the petitioners whereby restraining the respondent from carrying
out any addition/structural changes in, the suit premises. Perusal of
record further shows that respondent also moved an application u/o
6 Rule 17 CPC in the said suit with the sole motive of deleting his
admissions made by him in written statement but the said
application was also dismissed by Ld. Civil Judge on the ground
that respondent cannot be allowed to deny the admissions made by
him.
15.
Another averment made by the respondent is that the Rent
Agreement dated 20.11.1961 alleged to have been executed
between Sh. Amir Bux and the present respondent is not regarding
the suit property as the property in question is situated in khasra no.
385 whereas, the rent agreement is with respect to property no.
384. In this regard, perusal of record clearly shows that in the suit
for permanent injunction filed by father of the petitioners late Sh.
Nasiruddin against the respondent, a local commissioner was
appointed who had clearly stated that there is no khasra no. 384 in
the area and the suit property is a part of khasra no. 385, which is
even a part of property no. 7524/B, Gall Qabronwali, Quresh
Nagar, Sadar Bazar, Delhi and it has been held by Ld. Civil Judge
in the said suit that agreement dated 20.11.1961 is in respect of the
suit premises and not in respect of any other property as alleged by
the respondent. After going through the record, it is clear that the
respondent has intentionally and deliberately raised this ground
while the said point has already been decided and clarified by the
court of Ld. Civil Judge in the suit for permanent injunction and
certified copy of the report of local commissioner dated 29.10.2011
and the order to this effect of Ld. Civil Judge have also been placed
on record to prove that there is no property in khasra no. 384 and
there is only one property in khasra no. 385, which is now the suit
property. Thus, from the above said discussion, it is dear that the
respondent has previously admitted the existence of landlord-tenant
relationship between the petitioners and the respondent and also
ownership of the petitioners over the suit property on the basis of
which, judgment on admission has already been passed by the Ld.
Civil Judge and therefore, the respondent cannot deny the existence
of relationship of landlord and tenant or the ownership of the
petitioners over the suit property today, since, he is estopped from
doing the same as per Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act.
16.
It is further submitted by the petitioners that their
grandfather had constructed the entire property in question from his
own source of income on the plot of land, after being allotted the
same from the custodian of evacuee property and thereafter, he has
been paying charges/damages for using the same to the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
government. It is further submitted by the petitioner that it the
respondent has deposited any amount in the custodian department
by paying rent/damages for use of the suit premises, then he should
file receipt of the same but no such document has been filed by the
respondent to prove his tenancy under the said government
department. Even in the reply to RTI filed by the respondent with
the Govt. of NCT of Delhi, it has been clearly stated that there are
number of tenants in the property and Sh. Nasiruddin is in
occupation of the portion of the above said khasra and is paying
rent to the department. However, there is nothing on record to
show that the respondent is a tenant under the ownership of the
custodian of evacuee property or any rent has been paid by the
respondent in respect of the suit premises to the said department.
17.
It is further submitted by the petitioners that deceased father
of the petitioners was regularly paying charges to the custodian
department in his own name and after his death, the petitioners
have inherited and succeeded the said property and also that the
respondent with an ulterior motive has deposited house tax in
respect of the suit premises for the year 2011-12 in his name, for
which objections have been filed by the petitioners in MOD and in
reply of the same, MCD department has clearly mentioned that on
the basis of house tax receipt, the holder of the same shall have no
right or claim in the property in any manner. In view of above
facts, it is clear that the petitioners are the owners as well as
landlords in respect of the suit property and the respondent is
tenant under the petitioner with respect to the tenanted premises.”
12.
This Court has considered the aforesaid findings of the learned
ARC in the context of the challenge raised in the present proceedings.
The principal contention of the Petitioner is that the Respondents have
failed to establish their ownership of the tenanted premises and,
consequently, the relationship of landlord and tenant. However, the
aforesaid contention cannot be considered in isolation from the
material which was available before the learned ARC.
13.
The learned ARC has noticed that the Petitioner had, in the
earlier proceedings instituted by the father of the Respondents,
admitted the tenancy in respect of the very premises in question and
had traced the commencement of his tenancy to the predecessor-ininterest of the Respondents. The said proceedings had also culminated
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
in findings concerning the landlord-tenant relationship, and the
application seeking deletion of the said admissions had not been
allowed.
14.
The learned ARC has further taken note of the Rent Agreement
dated 20.11.1961, the report of the Local Commissioner and the
orders passed in the earlier civil proceedings, which, according to the
learned ARC, establish that the reference to Khasra No. 384 in the
said Rent Agreement did not relate to any separate property and that
the tenanted premises formed part of Khasra No. 385 and Property No.
7524/B. The learned ARC has also noticed the absence of any material
demonstrating that the Petitioner had been paying rent in respect of the
tenanted premises to the Custodian of Evacuee Property or any other
Government authority. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the learned
ARC was not based upon a mere assertion of ownership by the
Respondents, but upon the material and admissions emanating from
the earlier proceedings between the parties and their predecessors-ininterest.
15.
In these circumstances, the challenge raised by the Petitioner
essentially seeks a re-appreciation of the very material which was
considered by the learned ARC and an alternative conclusion to be
drawn therefrom. Such an exercise would fall outside the limited
scope of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. This Court finds no
perversity, material irregularity, jurisdictional error or error apparent
on the face of the record in the approach adopted by the learned ARC.
The findings returned by the learned ARC, therefore, do not warrant
interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
16.
For the reasons as stated above, this Court finds no merit in the
present Petition. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
17.
The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 13, 2026/tk/ma
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:14:03
RC.REV. 146/2015
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