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( 2026:HHC:16313 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 30 of 2026
Date of decision: 04.05.2026
The Government of H.P.,
through the Secretary HPPWD& another
...Appellants.
Versus
Randeep Singh & another
...Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellants
:
For the respondents :
Mr.
Manish
Thakur,
Advocate General.
Deputy
Mr.
Bhupinder
Advocate.
Ahuja,
Singh
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral):
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and
decree, dated 29.10.2024, as passed by the learned District
Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 14/13 of 2024,
whereby
the
appeal
preferred
by
the
present
appellants/defendants has been ordered to be dismissed and
the judgment and decree dated 06.04.2024, as passed by the
learned Civil Judge, Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil
Suit No. 267-1 of 2021, titled as Randeep Singh @ Ranjit Singh
& another vs. Government of HP through the Secretary HPPWD
& another, have been affirmed, whereby the suit filed by the
the
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
judgment?
-2- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
plaintiffs/respondents
for
permanent
prohibitory
and
mandatory injunction was partly decreed by directing the State
to pay compensation to the plaintiffs alongwith statutory
benefits.
2.
Brief
facts
of
the
case
are
that
the
plaintiffs/respondents filed a suit for permanent prohibitory,
mandatory injunction and compensation in the Court of
learned Civil Judge, Jhandutta, District-Bilaspur, HP on the
ground that the defendants/State constructed a road, namely,
Panol-Jhandutta-Nand-Nagraon through the land being owned
and possessed by the plaintiffs comprising in Khatauni No.5,
Khasra Nos. 74/17, 75/17, 23 and 77/26 measuring 07-09-00
bighas, situated at Village Nagraon, Tehsil Jhandutta, District
Bilaspur, H.P.
3.
It was averred by the plaintiffs that the Government
notification was duly issued for acquisition of some of the lands
of the adjoining villages but no steps were taken to make the
payment to the affected persons including plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs requested the officials of the appellants/State to pay
the amount of compensation on account of utilization of the
land of the present respondents but except for making
assurances, no steps were taken by the appellants/State in
-3- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
that regard. It was further averred that the defendants are very
influential, resourceful and clever persons. They are trying to
grab the suit land and also trying to dig road, change the
nature threatening to cut trees and destroy the crops without
any right, title and interest over the suit land.
4.
As per plaintiffs, servants and agents of the
appellants/ defendants are threatening to dig the adjacent land
to the road, to destroy the crops, to cut the trees, break stones,
and to change the nature of the suit land. Therefore, decree for
prohibitory, mandatory injunction and compensation was
sought from the learned trial Court.
5.
The suit was contested by the defendants/State by
raising preliminary objections qua maintainability, limitation,
cause of action, valuation, jurisdiction, estoppel etc.
6.
On merits, it was averred that the road in question
had been constructed by Gram Panchayat in the year 1995
with verbal/express consent
predecessor in interest
of
the plaintiffs and their
including other land owners. It is
further submitted that defendants started maintaining the said
road during the year 2002 after which HRTC buses started
plying over the said road. The total length of the road is 21.250
kms on both sides and the land falls in Village Nagraon. The
-4- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
road was constructed in the year 1995 by the Gram Panchayat
with the express/implied/verbal consent of the plaintiffs and
his predecessor in interest. The road is in existence since 1995
and has been passed for the vehicular traffic during 2002.
Since the road was constructed with the consent of the
plaintiffs, therefore, the plaintiffs are estopped to file the
present suit.
The defendants have spent huge amount to
provide all weather road connectivity to the public at large,
therefore, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit filed
by the plaintiffs.
7.
The
plaintiffs
filed
replication
to
the
written
statement wherein the contents of the plaint were reiterated.
8.
On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial
court on 20.08.2022 framed the following issues:“1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of
injunction(s), as prayed for ?......OPP
2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of
compensation, in alternative or in addition to aforesaid
relief?.....OPP
3. Whether the present suit is not maintainable, as
alleged?.....OPD
4. Whether the suit is time barred, as alleged?.....OPD
5. Whether the plaintiffs have not come to the court
with clean hands, as alleged?.....OPD
6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the present
suit by their own, acts, conducts, omissions and
commissions, as alleged?.....OPD
-5- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
7. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the
purpose
of
court
fee
and
jurisdiction,
as
alleged?.....OPD
8. Whether the plaintiffs have not complied with the
mandatory provisions of section 80 CPC, as
alleged?......OPD
9. Relief.
9.
The learned trial court directed the respective
parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions to
corroborate their respective case. The learned trial court vide its
judgment and decree dated 06.04.2024 decreed the suit of the
plaintiffs/respondents and defendants/State were directed to
pay the compensation to the plaintiffs alongwith statutory
benefits including solatium, interest etc. within the period of
three months, treating
it as a case of deemed acquisition in
line with Ext. PW-1/B, Ext. PW-1/C and Ext. PW-1/D awarded
by it. The defendants/State has further been directed to pay
legal costs and expenses
of
Rs. 10,000/- to the present
plaintiffs.
10.
Feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and decree,
dated 06.04.2024, the defendants/State preferred an appeal
before the learned First Appellate Court on 30.05.2024, which
came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated
29.10.2024.
-6- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
11.
Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments
and decrees, the appellants/State have preferred the present
regular second appeal.
12.
It is contended by Mr. Manish Thakur, learned
Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State that the
impugned judgments and decrees, as passed by the learned
courts below, are erroneous and are liable to be quashed and
set
aside.
He
submits
that
the
suit,
as
filed
by
the
plaintiffs/respondents are not maintainable, since the claim as
put forth by the plaintiffs/respondents is highly belated and the
plaintiffs/respondents are not entitled for any compensation on
account of the fact that the road was constructed on the
implied and express consent of the present respondents.
13.
learned
On the other hand, Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja,
counsel
for
the
respondents
has
defended
the
judgments and decrees as passed by the learned courts below.
He submits that the land of the respondents was utilized for the
construction of the road in question, therefore, in view of the
mandate as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, whereby
it has been repeatedly held that no person can be deprived of
his property without following the due process of law, therefore,
-7- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
the impugned judgments and decrees deserve to be affirmed by
imposing huge and special cost upon the appellants/State.
14.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
have also gone through the material available on the case file.
15.
With the consent of the parties, the case is finally
heard at admission stage on the following substantial question
of law:“Whether the judgments and decrees passed by the
learned Courts below are based on mis-appreciation
and
misinterpretation
of
the
oral
as
well
as
documentary evidence placed on record.”
16.
The Court of the first instance as also the First
Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of the
plaintiffs/respondents was utilized for construction of road,
namely, Panol-Jhandutta-Nand-Nagraon without payment of
compensation to them. No dispute has been raised as to such
findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf of the
defendants/State that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was time
barred. In alternative, it was contended that since the
plaintiffs/respondents remained silent for such a long period,
they were estopped from raising the stale claim. Principle of
acquiescence has also been sought to be applied against the
plaintiffs/respondents on the premise that the plaintiffs/
-8- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
respondents were aware about the construction of road and the
road was constructed with their implied consent. Now they
cannot,
turn
around
to
raise
objections
against
the
construction of road.
17.
The defendants/appellants are constituents of a
welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot
claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit on
the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right
could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of
adverse possession by the other.
Admittedly, the respondents/plaintiffs are the title
holder of the suit land. Being owner of the suit property, they
may file a suit at any stage until and unless the said right is
defeated by the present appellants/ defendants by perfection of
title by way of adverse possession.
19.
Being
the
owner
of
the
suit
land,
the
plaintiffs/respondents are well within their right to file a suit
for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction, since the
suit land was utilized by the State for construction of the road
in question without adopting due process of law including the
payment of amount of compensation.
-9- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
20.
Admittedly, the appellants/defendants were not in
possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had
consented for construction of road through their lands. When
specifically asked this question from the learned Deputy
Advocate General, he is unable to answer the query of the
Court in this regard. No document has been appended with the
present proceedings which may demonstrate that the present
respondents have orally consented for the construction of the
road in question.
21.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that
no person can be forcibly dispossessed of his property without
any legal sanction and without following the due process of law
and depriving payment of just and fair compensation. The State
being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot
arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the
Constitution. The Court has held as follows:
“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and
perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was forcibly
expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to
property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article
31 in Part III of the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State
Of Himachal Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31
guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could not
-10- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
be deprived without due process of law and upon just and
fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a
welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300
A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority
of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property
except
in
accordance
with
the
procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be
inferred in that Article The State of West Bengal v. Subodh
Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana
Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private
property, without following due process of law, would be
violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right
under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed
on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:
“ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in
exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may
interfere with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be for a
public
purpose
and
reasonable
compensation
therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied)
12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this
Court held that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also
a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken
-11- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
away except in accordance with law. Article 300A
of
the
Constitution
protects
such
right.
The
provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right,
keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of
the
Constitution
of
India,
must
be
strictly
construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC
627.
12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as
a basic human right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of
property
right
is
an
indispensable
safeguard
against tyranny and economic oppression of the
Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty
cannot long subsist without the support of property.
"Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist"
was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that
property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if
other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus
among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)
12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7
this Court held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.
There has to be no deprivation without any sanction
of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not
acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A.
In other words, if there is no law, there is no
deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case,
the
Appellant
could
not
have
been
forcibly
-12- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law,
there is no deprivation.”
12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law, and
depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC
596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental
right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is
completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant
of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,
the State could not have deprived a citizen of their
property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed
on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &
Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State
must
comply
with
the
procedure
for
acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The
State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law
cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided
by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar
held that the right to property is now considered to be not
only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as right
to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human
rights have gained a multi− faceted dimension.
-13- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State
before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous
possession of the land for over 42 years, it would
tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a
welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of
adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a
person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title
over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be
permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the
doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its
own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and
laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable
to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a
case
of
a
continuing
cause
of
action,
or
if
the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.
Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,
which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in
the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon
the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no
period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise
their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &
Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact
situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which
state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put
forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service
-14- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to
them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for
educational facilities and other categories of similar cases,
etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that
lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from
seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of
T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of
the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without
any
sanction
of
law.
The
Appellants
had
asked
repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The
State must either comply with the procedure laid down for
acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate
person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has
been deprived of her private property by the State without
resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The
Appellant has been divested of her right to property
without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over
half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a
continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily
expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal
sanction or following due process of law. The present case
is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since
the State has admitted that the land was taken over
without
initiating
acquisition
proceedings,
or
any
procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary
jurisdiction
under
Articles
and
of
the
-15- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to
the appellant.
22.
To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs.
State of H.P. and others has held as under:
“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that
nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due
process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this
dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King’s
Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir
Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in
several judgments, this court has repeatedly held that
rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the
State often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating
that it has acted within the confines of legality, and
therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of
law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this
court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must
be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and
even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v.
State of Punjab19 this court rejected the contention that
the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be
removed by an executive order, and instead concluded
that the executive action taken by the State and its
officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule
of law. This court, in another case - State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20, held:
“A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee,
-16- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by
forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry'
in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods
to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a
lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is
juridical
possession
and
forcible
dispossession
is
prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise
than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact
that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher
or better position. On the contrary, it is under an
additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that
all actions of Government and Governmental authorities
should have a 'legal pedigree'”.
16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in
Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet
while acquiring land, the question remains – can the
State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its
legal responsibility towards those from whom private
property has been expropriated? In these facts and
circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable,
and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and
fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s
actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the
injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them
to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of
acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred
only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such
judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend
the benefit of the court’s directions to those who
-17- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
specifically
approached
the
courts.
The
State’s
lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of
initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in
respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had
approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other
land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in
CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No.
1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage,
the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring
land required for public use in the manner prescribed by
law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches
which conclude either way – as contended by both sides
in the present dispute – however, the specific factual
matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the
appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself
behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation;
there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in
a much earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held:
‘11…..."Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material.
-18- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon
mere
delay,
that
delay
of
course
not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the
validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles
substantially
equitable.
Two
circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as relates to the remedy."
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the
State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,
actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as
required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all
those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which
is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article
31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly
warranted consideration, and intervention by the
High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This
court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where the
name of the aggrieved had been deleted from
revenue records leading to his dispossession from
the land without payment of compensation – held:
6“Having
heard
the
learned
counsel
for
the
appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected
before the court by the appellants is utterly
untenable and not worthy of emanating from any
State which professes the least regard to being a
welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned
-19- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should
be gracious enough to accept its mistake and
promptly pay the compensation to the respondent,
the State has taken an intractable attitude and
persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and
reasonable claim of the respondent.
Ours is a constitutional democracy and the
rights available to the citizens are declared by the
Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted
by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution,
which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be
deprived of property save by authority of law.—No
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find
utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the
respondent's property by the appellants who are
State authorities. In our view, this case was an
eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution…
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while
dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held
as follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)
“11“There are authorities which state that delay
and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim.
Most
of
these
authorities
pertain
to
service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong
done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory
dues, claim for educational facilities and other
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay down that
-20- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution,
the case at hand deals with a different scenario
altogether. The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the appellants
without any sanction of law. The appellants had
asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of
compensation. The State must either comply with
the
procedure
laid
down
for
acquisition,
or
requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this
court finds that the contentions raised by the State,
do not inspire confidence and deserve to be
rejected. The State has merely averred to the
appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of
objection, but has not placed any material on record
to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was
unable to produce any evidence indicating that the
land of the appellants had been taken over or
acquired in the manner known to law, or that they
had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to
note that this was the State’s position, and
subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.”
23.
The similar position has been reiterated and relied
upon by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.
491 of 2022, titled as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State
of Himachal Pradesh & another dated 20.10.2023. After
-21- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi &
SukhDutt Ratra’s case, the Court held as follows:
“7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that contention advanced by the State of
delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is
liable to be rejected especially when it is not in dispute that
petitioner are suffering continuous loss coupled with the fact
that they repeatedly requested the authorities to initiate
acquisition proceedings.
8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety, it
clearly emerges that land owners cannot be deprived of their
land, without following due process of law. If it is so, ground
raised by the respondents that petitioners have made their
land available with consent, is of no consequence rather,
this court, having taken note of the fact that the land of
petitioners stands utilized for the construction of road in
question, is compelled to agree with the submission of
learned counsel for the petitioners that her clients are
entitled
for
compensation
qua
the
land
utilized
by
respondents for construction of road in question.
10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized for
construction of road but till date, they have not been paid
any amount, which action of the respondent-State certainly
amounts to forcible dispossession of the petitioners from
their land, which is violative of provision contained under
Art. 300-A of the Constitution of India.
14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram
Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that
entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area and without
workable roads, no communication is possible; every person
is entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of the Constitution
of India; every person has right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the
Constitution of India to move freely, throughout the territory
-22- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
of India; for the residents of hilly areas, access to road is
access to life itself. Stand taken by the respondents that
there was a policy for providing roads on demand of
residents as a favour to them on conditions that they would
not claim compensation, cannot be sustained because such
stand is violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of
Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex
Court has held that though right to property is not a
fundamental right, but it is still a constitutional right under
Article 300A of the Constitution of India and also a human
right; in view of the mandate of Article 300A, no person can
be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. No
doubt, State possesses the power to take or control the
property of the owner of the land for the benefit of public, but
at the same time, it is obliged to compensate the injury by
making just compensation.”
24.
The Courts below, after appreciating the oral as well
as documentary evidence, placed on record and on the basis of
the title, decreed the suit as filed by the plaintiffs and have
rightly come to the conclusion that they are entitled for grant of
compensation alongwith statutory benefits including solatium,
interest etc. within the period of three months, treating it as a
case of deemed acquisition in line with Ext. PW-1/B, Ext. PW1/C and Ext. PW-1/D awarded by it. The defendants/State has
been further directed to pay legal costs and expenses
Rs. 10,000/- to the present plaintiffs.
of
-23- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
25.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no
person can be deprived of his property without adopting due
process of law, therefore, under such circumstances, plea as set
up by the appellants-State is not tenable in the facts and
circumstances of the case. Once they have utilized the land of
the villagers without adopting due process of law, now the plea
as raised by the present appellants is not permissible, that too,
at the stage of Regular Second Appeal. There are concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the Courts below.
26.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments
has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No
doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under
Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on
limited grounds such as - (a) where the finding is based on
inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the
relevant
admissible
evidence;
(c)
where
it
is
based
on
misreading of evidence and (d) where it is perverse, but that is
not case in hand.
27.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope
of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.
Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:
“18. It has been noted time and again that without insisting
for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the
-24- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the
time of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices
and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering
to the procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It
has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts
are made to distinguish between a question of law and a
substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under
this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first
appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to
be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural
nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a
substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in
accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The
conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled
before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has
the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second
appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The
concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High
Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a
substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a
substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V.
Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR
1962 SC 1314) held that : "The proper test for determining
whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial
would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public
importance or whether it directly and substantially affects
the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open
question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this
Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is
not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative
views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the
general principles to be applied in determining the question
are well settled and there is a mere question of applying
-25- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd
the question would not be a substantial question of law.
" 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived
at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It
is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily
reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of
credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses
accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for
interference in second appeal when it is found that the
appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so.
In a case where from a given set of circumstances two
inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower
appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in
second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not
permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it
is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate
court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory
provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the
basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was
based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring
material evidence. 20. to 22 xx xx xx xx
23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable,
not previously settled by law of the land or a binding
precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision
of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of
the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law
"involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it
laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from
the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts
and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a
just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point
raised for the first time before the High Court is not a
question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the
-26- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
matter.
It
will,
therefore,
depend
on
the
facts
and
circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a
substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the
paramount overall consideration being the need for striking
a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to
do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding
prolongation in the life of any lis.”
28.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.
Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be
determined by a court of fact after appreciating the evidence
available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate court is the
final court of fact. No doubt, a second appellate court
exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC can interfere
with a finding of fact on limited grounds, such as, (a) where
the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is
in ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is
based on misreading of evidence; and (d) where it is
perverse. But that is not the case here.
17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in
paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement
(Exb. A-2) made on the back of a registered document (Exb.
A-1) after considering the oral evidence led by the plaintiffappellant
and
the
circumstance
that
signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2 were not disputed,
though claimed as one obtained on a blank paper. The
reasoning of the first appellate court in paragraph 29 of its
judgment was not addressed by the High Court. In fact, the
High Court, in one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a
signed blank paper, observed that genuineness of Exb. A-2
is not proved. In our view, the High Court fell in error here.
-27- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
While exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it ought not
to have interfered with the finding of fact returned by the
first appellate court on this aspect; more so, when the first
appellate court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating
the evidence available on record as also the circumstance
that signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document
(Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while disturbing
the finding of the first appellate court, the High Court did not
hold that the finding returned by the first appellate court is
based on a misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of
relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed no
occasion for the High Court, exercising power under Section
100 CPC, to interfere with the finding of the first appellate
court regarding payment of additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1
and D-2 over and above the sale consideration fixed for the
transaction. 18. Once the finding regarding payment of
additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by
the first appellate court is sustained, there appears no
logical reason to hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not
ready and willing to perform its part under the contract
particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of total consideration of
Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and, over and above that,
additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand
made by D-1 & D-2. This we say so, because an opinion
regarding plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform its
part under the contract is to be formed on the entirety of
proven facts and circumstances of a case including conduct
of the parties. The test is that the person claiming
performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he has
treated the contract subsisting with preparedness to fulfill
his obligation and accept performance when the time for
performance arrives.”
-28- ( 2026:HHC:16313 )
29.
No other point was raised by the learned counsel for
the parties.
30.
Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the
point in controversy after considering the oral as well as
documentary evidence placed on record. The substantial
question of law is answered accordingly.
31.
In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of
any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
May 4, 2026.
(Nisha)
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