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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 111 of 2026
Date of decision: 06.07.2026
The Government of H.P.,
through the Secretary HPPWD & another
...Appellants.
Versus
Prem Lal & others
...Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellants
:
Mr.
Manish
Thakur,
Advocate General.
Deputy
For the respondents
:
Respondents proceeded against exparte vide order dated 17.06.2026.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral):
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and
decree, dated 29.10.2024, as passed by the learned District
Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 16/13 of 2024,
whereby the appeal preferred by the present appellants/
defendants has been ordered to be dismissed and the judgment
and decree dated 06.04.2024, as passed by the learned Civil
Judge, Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 2641 of 2021, titled as Prem Lal & others vs. Government of H.P. &
another, have been affirmed, whereby the suit filed by the
plaintiffs/respondents was partly decreed by directing the State
the
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
judgment?
-2to pay compensation to the plaintiffs alongwith statutory
benefits.
2.
Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs/
respondents filed a suit for permanent prohibitory, mandatory
injunction and compensation in the Court of learned Civil
Judge, Jhandutta, District-Bilaspur, HP on 09.04.2021. As per
the averments as made in the plaint, it has been stated that the
plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the suit land and the
defendants/State
constructed
a
road,
namely,
Panol
Jhandutta-Nand-Nagraon through the land without the implied
and express consent and prior permission of the residents.
3.
It was averred by the plaintiffs that the Government
notification was duly issued for acquisition of some of the lands
of the adjoining villages but no steps were taken to make the
payment to the affected persons including plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs requested the officials of the appellants/State to pay
the amount of compensation on account of utilization of the
land of the present respondents but except for making
assurances, no steps were taken by the appellants/State in
that regard. It was further averred that the defendants are very
influential, resourceful and clever persons. They are trying to
grab the suit land and also trying to dig road, change the
-3nature, threatening to cut trees and destroy the crops without
any right, title and interest over the suit land.
4.
As
per
plaintiff,
servants
and
agents
of
the
appellants/ defendants are threatening to dig the land adjacent
to the road, to destroy the crops, to cut the trees, break stones,
and to change the nature of the suit land. Therefore, decree for
prohibitory, mandatory injunction and compensation was
sought from the learned trial Court.
5.
The suit was contested by the defendants/State by
raising preliminary objections qua maintainability, limitation,
cause of action, valuation, jurisdiction, estoppel etc.
6.
On merits, it was averred that the road in question
had been constructed by Gram Panchayat in the year 1995
with verbal/express consent
predecessor in interest
of
the plaintiffs and their
including other land owners. It is
further submitted that defendants started maintaining the said
road during the year 2002 after which HRTC buses started
plying over the said road. The total length of the road is 21.250
kms on both sides and the land falls in Village Nagraon. The
road was constructed in the year 1995 by the Gram Panchayat
with the express/implied/verbal consent of the plaintiffs and
their predecessor in interest. The road is in existence since
-41995 and was passed for the vehicular traffic during 2002.
Since the road was constructed with the consent of the plaintiff,
therefore, the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit. The
defendants have spent huge amount to provide all weather road
connectivity to the public at large, therefore, the defendants
prayed for dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff.
7.
The
plaintiff
filed
replication
to
the
written
statement wherein the contents of the plaint were reiterated.
8.
On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial
court on 20.08.2022 framed the following issues:“1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of
injunction(s), as prayed for ?......OPP
2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for relief of
compensation, in alternative or in addition to aforesaid
relief?.....OPP
3. Whether the present suit is not maintainable, as
alleged?.....OPD
4. Whether the suit is time barred, as alleged?.....OPD
5. Whether the plaintiffs have not come to the court
with clean hands, as alleged?.....OPD
6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the present
suit by his own, acts, conducts, omissions and
commissions, as alleged?.....OPD
7. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the
purpose
of
court
fee
and
jurisdiction,
as
alleged?.....OPD
8. Whether the plaintiffs have not complied with the
mandatory provisions of section 80 CPC, as
alleged?......OPD
-59. Relief.
9.
The learned trial court directed the respective
parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions to
corroborate their respective case. The learned trial court vide its
judgment and decree dated 06.04.2024 decreed the suit of the
plaintiffs/respondents and defendants/State were directed to
pay the compensation to the plaintiffs alongwith statutory
benefits including solatium, interest etc. within the period of
three months, treating
it as a case of deemed acquisition in
line with Ext. PW-1/B, Ext. PW-1/C and Ext. PW-1/D awarded
by it. The defendants/State has further been directed to pay
legal costs and expenses of Rs. 10,000/- to the plaintiffs.
10.
Feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and decree,
dated 06.04.2024, the defendants/State preferred an appeal
before the learned First Appellate Court on 30.05.2024, which
came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated
29.10.2024. The plaintiffs/ respondents also filed
cross-
objections in the said appeal, which were also dismissed.
Learned
First
appellate
Court
accepted
the
version
of
defendants by setting aside the order of learned trial Court,
whereby
cost
of
defendants/State.
Rs.
10,000/-
was
imposed
on
the
-611.
Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments
and decrees, the appellants/State have preferred the present
regular second appeal.
12.
It is contended by Mr. Manish Thakur, learned
Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State that the
impugned judgments and decrees, as passed by the learned
courts below, are erroneous and are liable to be quashed and
set
aside.
He
submits
that
the
suit,
as
filed
by
the
plaintiffs/respondents is not maintainable, since the claim as
put forth by the plaintiffs/respondents is highly belated and the
plaintiffs/respondents are not entitled for any compensation on
account of the fact that the road was constructed on the
implied and express consent of the present respondents.
13.
This Court had issued notice to the respondents on
12.12.2025,
on
23.03.2026,
respondents No. 1 to 3
this
Court
observed
that
stands duly served, however,
none
appeared on their behalf, therefore, they were proceeded
against ex-parte. Thereafter, the case was listed on 09.04.2026
and on the said date, application filed by the State bearing No.
CMP(M) No.2209 of 2025 came to be allowed and delay in filing
the appeal was condoned. Again notices were issued for the
service of the respondents and vide order dated 17.06.2026, it
-7has been observed
by learned Additional Registrar (Judicial)
that notices sent to the respondents stood duly served.
Thereafter, again they were proceeded ex-parte.
14.
I have heard the learned counsel for the appellants
and have also gone through the material available on the case
file.
15.
With the consent of the appellants, the case is
finally heard at admission stage on the following substantial
question of law:“Whether the judgments and decrees passed by the
learned Courts below are based on mis-appreciation
and
misinterpretation
of
the
oral
as
well
as
documentary evidence placed on record.”
16.
The Court of the first instance as also the First
Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of the
plaintiffs/respondents was utilized for construction of road,
namely, Panol-Jhandutta-Nand-Nagraon without payment of
compensation to them. No dispute has been raised as to such
findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf of the
defendants/State that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was time
barred. In alternative, it was contended that since the
plaintiffs/respondents remained silent for such a long period,
they were estopped from raising the stale claim. Principle of
-8acquiescence has also been sought to be applied against the
plaintiffs/respondents on the premise that they were aware
about the construction of road and the road was constructed
with their implied consent and now they cannot, turn around to
raise objections against the construction of road.
17.
The defendants/appellants are constituents of a
welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot
claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit on
the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right
could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of
adverse possession by the other.
Admittedly, the respondents/plaintiffs are the title-
holders of the suit land. Being owners of the suit property, they
may file a suit at any stage until and unless the said right is
defeated by the present appellants/ defendants by perfection of
title by way of adverse possession
19.
Being
the
owners
of
the
suit
land,
the
plaintiffs/respondents are well within their right to file a suit
for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction, since the
suit land was utilized by the State for construction of the road
in question without adopting due process of law including the
payment of amount of compensation.
-920.
Admittedly, the appellants/defendants were not in
possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had
consented for construction of road through their lands. When
specifically asked this question from the learned Deputy
Advocate General, he was unable to answer the query of the
Court in this regard. No document has been appended with the
present proceedings which may demonstrate that the present
respondents had orally consented for the construction of the
road in question.
21.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that
no person can be forcibly dispossessed of his property without
any legal sanction and without following the due process of law
and depriving payment of just and fair compensation. The State
being a welfare State is governed by the rule of law cannot
arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the
Constitution. The Court has held as follows:
“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties
and perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was
forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when
the right to property was a fundamental right
guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution.
Vidaya Devi vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh on 8
January, 2020 Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property 1, which could not be deprived
-10without due process of law and upon just and fair
compensation.
12.2.
The
right
to
property
ceased
to
be
a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a
human right 2 in a welfare State, and a Constitutional
right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article
300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. The State cannot
dispossess a citizen of his property except in
accordance with the procedure established by law.
The obligation to pay compensation, though not
expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in
that Article The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal
Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana
Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private
property, without following due process of law, would
be
violative
of
a
human
right,
as
also
the
constitutional right under Article 300 A of the
Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius
Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:
“ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise
of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with
the right of property of a person by acquiring the
same but the same must be for a public purpose and
reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5,
this Court held that:
-11“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away
except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the
Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the
Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of
the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of
India,
must
be
strictly
construed.”
(emphasis
supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC 627.
12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.
State of U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to
property as a basic human right in the following
words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of
property right is an indispensable safeguard against
tyranny and economic oppression of the Government.
Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long
subsist without the support of property.
"Property must be secured, else liberty cannot
subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the
view that property itself is the seed bed which must
be conserved if other constitutional values are to
flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and
jurists.” (emphasis supplied)
12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat,7 this Court held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be deprived
of his property save by authority of law. There has to
be no deprivation without any sanction of law.
Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or
taking possession under Article 300A. In other words,
-12if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” (emphasis
supplied) 10.3. In this case, the Appellant could not
have been forcibly dispossessed of her property
without any legal sanction, and without following due
process of law, there is no deprivation.”
12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any
legal sanction, and without following due process of
law, and depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995)
Supp. 1 SCC 596. payment of just compensation,
being a fundamental right on the date of forcible
dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or
her predecessors had “orally” consented to the
acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete
lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily
divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of
law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of
their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is
placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram
Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was
held that the State must comply with the procedure
for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode. The State being a welfare State
governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a
status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh
Kumar held that the right to property is now
considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory
right, but also a human right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353.
Human rights have been considered in the realm of
-13individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood,
health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a
multi− faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the
State before the High Court, that since it has been in
continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it
would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State
being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the
plea
of
adverse
possession,
which
allows
a
trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a
crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12
years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title
over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse
possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as
has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay
and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is
also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be
raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if
the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the
Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial
discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case.
It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
and the remedy claimed, and when and how the
delay
arose.
prescribed
for
There
the
is
no
period
of
limitation
courts
to
exercise
their
constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it.
-1412.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &
Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact
situation, held as follows : “There are authorities
which state that delay and laches extinguish the right
to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain
to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a
wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of
statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and
other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is
true that there are a few authorities that lay down
that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State
of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or
226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a
different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the
State took over possession of the land belonging to
the Appellants without any sanction of law. The
Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the
benefit of compensation. The State must either comply
with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the Appellant being an
illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural
area has been deprived of her private property by the
State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by
law. The Appellant has been divested of her right to
property
without
being
paid
any
compensation
whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of
action in the present case is a continuing one, since
the Appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her
-15property in 1967 without legal sanction or following
due process of law. The present case is one where the
demand for justice is so compelling since the State
has admitted that the land was taken over without
initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure
known
to
law.
We
exercise
our
extraordinary
jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the
Constitution,
and
direct
the
State
to
pay
compensation to the appellant.
22.
To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case
titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs. State of H.P. and
others (2022) 7 SCC 508 has held as under:
“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law,
that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property
without due process, or authorization of law. The
recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the
decision
of
the
King’s
Bench
in
Entick
v.
Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir Chand v.
The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in
several judgments, this court has repeatedly held
that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of
lenience, the State often has a higher responsibility
in demonstrating that it has acted within the
confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the
basic principle of the rule of law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property,
this court has upheld the high threshold of legality
that must be met, to dispossess an individual of
their property, and even more so when done by the
State. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab19 this court
-16rejected the contention that the petitioners in the
case were trespassers and could be removed by an
executive order, and instead concluded that the
executive action taken by the State and its officers,
was destructive of the basic principle of the rule of
law. This court, in another case - State of Uttar
Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and
Ors. 20, held: “A lessor, with the best of title, has
no right to resume possession extra-judicially by
use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or
earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or
otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the
lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods
to resume possession. Under law, the possession of
a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier
termination is juridical possession and forcible
dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law.
In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the
State does not place it in any higher or better
position. On the contrary, it is under an additional
inhibition stemming from the requirement that all
actions
of
Government
and
Governmental
authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'”.
16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional
right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the
State must meet while acquiring land, the question
remains – can the State, merely on the ground of
delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility
towards those from whom private property has
-17been
expropriated?
In
these
facts
and
circumstances, we find this conclusion to be
unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the
grounds of equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the
State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in fact
compounded
the
injustice
meted
out
to
the
appellants and compelled them to approach this
court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition
proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at
the behest of the High Court. Even after such
judicial intervention, the State continued to only
extend the benefit of the court’s directions to those
who specifically approached the courts. The State’s
lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action
of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only
in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who
had approached the court in earlier proceedings,
and not other land owners, pursuant to the orders
dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and
20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively.
In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to
shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for
public use in the manner prescribed by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and
laches which conclude either way – as contended
by both sides in the present dispute – however, the
specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh in
favour of the appellant-land owners. The State
cannot shield itself behind the ground of delay and
laches in such a situation; there cannot be a
‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in a much
-18earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held:
‘11…..."Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in
such cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the interval, which
might affect either party and cause a balance of
justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy."
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the
State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,
actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as
required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all
those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which
is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article
-1931 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly
warranted consideration, and intervention by the
High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This
court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where the
name of the aggrieved had been deleted from
revenue records leading to his dispossession from
the land without payment of compensation – held:
6“Having
heard
the
learned
counsel
for
the
appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected
before the court by the appellants is utterly
untenable and not worthy of emanating from any
State which professes the least regard to being a
welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned
counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should
be gracious enough to accept its mistake and
promptly pay the compensation to the respondent,
the State has taken an intractable attitude and
persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and
reasonable claim of the respondent.
Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights
available to the citizens are declared by the
Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted
by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution,
which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be
deprived of property save by authority of law.—No
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find
utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the
respondent's property by the appellants who are
State authorities. In our view, this case was an
eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction
-20of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution…
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while
dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held
as follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)
“11“There are authorities which state that delay
and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim.
Most
of
these
authorities
pertain
to
service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong
done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory
dues, claim for educational facilities and other
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay down that
delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution,
the case at hand deals with a different scenario
altogether. The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the appellants
without any sanction of law. The appellants had
asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of
compensation. The State must either comply with
the
procedure
laid
down
for
acquisition,
or
requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court
finds that the contentions raised by the State, do
not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected.
The State has merely averred to the appellants’
alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection, but
has
not
placed
any
material
on
record
to
substantiate this plea. Further, the State was
-21unable to produce any evidence indicating that the
land of the appellants had been taken over or
acquired in the manner known to law, or that they
had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to
note that this was the State’s position, and
subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.”
23.
The learned Courts below have duly appreciated the
oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record and
have rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are
entitled for grant of decree for compensation against the
defendants.
24.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no
person can be deprived of his properties without adopting due
process of law, therefore, under such circumstances, plea as set
up by the appellants-State is not tenable in the facts and
circumstances of the case. Once they have utilized the land of
the villagers without adopting due process of law, now the plea
as raised by the present appellants is not permissible, that too,
at the stage of Regular Second Appeal.
25.
DW-1 has admitted in his deposition that qua the
construction of similar road certain persons have been paid the
amount of compensation. The defendants have adopted the
policy of pick and choose which is not permissible in the eyes of
-22law. Once the defendants have chosen to pay the compensation
to similar situated persons, in that event, the plaintiffs cannot
be discriminated. However, in the present case, decree for
compensation has been passed in favour of the plaintiffs.
Therefore, the said finding does not call for any interference by
this Court.
26.
Learned
especially,
trial
Court
issues No. 3 to 8,
while
answering
issues,
has categorically held while
dealing with those issues, that nothing has been adduced or
substantiated by the State and no arguments were addressed
qua the said issues. Once the State/defendants have chosen
not to press or argue on the issue of limitation, especially, issue
No.
4,
therefore,
this
plea
is
not
available
to
the
defendants/appellants, at this stage. It is made clear that once
they have not pressed the said issue before the learned trial
Court, the defendants/appellants have not been able to plead
and prove or to corroborate the stand as being adopted in the
written statement that the road was constructed on oral and
express consent of plaintiffs. There is no material placed on
record by the defendants to substantiate the contention before
the learned trial Court while appearing in the witness box. The
official witnesses of the defendants, DW-1 and DW-2 in their
-23cross-examination have categorically admitted that no written
consent was given by the land owners or any oral consent by
the plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-interest. Therefore, learned
Courts below have rightly determined and adjudicated the point
in controversy in
hand by decreeing the suit as filed by the
plaintiffs with a direction to pay compensation to the plaintiffs
alongwith the statutory benefits including solatium, interest
etc. within the period of three months, treating it as a case of
deemed acquisition in line with Ext. PW-1/B, Ext. PW-1/C and
Ext. PW-1/D.
27.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope
of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.
Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:
“18. It has been noted time and again that without
insisting for the statement of such a substantial
question of law in the memorandum of appeal and
formulating the same at the time of admission, the
High Courts have been issuing notices and generally
deciding the second appeals without adhering to the
procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC.
It has further been found in a number of cases that
no efforts are made to distinguish between a
question of law and a substantial question of law. In
exercise of the powers under this section in several
cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate court
are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in
mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor
-24an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a
substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in
accordance with law in force at the relevant time.
The conditions mentioned in the section must be
strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be
maintained and no court has the power to add or to
enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be
decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent
findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High
Court in exercise of the powers under this section.
Further, a substantial question of law has to be
distinguished from a substantial question of fact.
This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v.
Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314)
held that : "The proper test for determining whether a
question of law raised in the case is substantial
would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general
public
importance
or
whether
it
directly
and
substantially affects the rights of the parties and if
so whether it is either an open question in the sense
that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the
Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free
from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative
views. If the question is settled by the highest court
or the general principles to be applied in determining
the question are well settled and there is a mere
question of applying those principles or that the plea
raised is palpably absurd the question would not be
a substantial question of law.
" 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were
arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first
appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate
court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted
-25by the trial court in respect of credibility but even
where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the
trial court, the same is no ground for interference in
second appeal when it is found that the appellate
court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In
a case where from a given set of circumstances two
inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the
lower appellate court will not be interfered by the
High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other
approach is not permissible. The High Court will,
however, interfere where it is found that the
conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were
erroneous
being
contrary
to
the
mandatory
provisions of law applicable or its settled position on
the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex
Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or
arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 20. to 22 xx
xx xx xx
23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be
debatable, not previously settled by law of the land
or a binding precedent, and must have a material
bearing on the decision of the case, if answered
either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before
it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in
the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in
the pleadings and the question should emerge from
the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of
facts and it must be necessary to decide that
question of law for a just and proper decision of the
case. An entirely new point raised for the first time
before the High Court is not a question involved in
the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It
will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance
of each case whether a question of law is a
-26substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the
paramount overall consideration being the need for
striking
a
judicious
balance
between
the
indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages
and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in
the life of any lis.”
28.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.
Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be
determined by a court of fact after appreciating the
evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first
appellate court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a
second appellate court exercising power(s) under
Section 100 CPC can interfere with a finding of fact
on limited grounds, such as, (a) where the finding is
based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in
ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it
is based on misreading of evidence; and (d) where it
is perverse. But that is not the case here.
17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in
paragraph
of
its
judgment,
accepted
the
endorsement (Exb. A-2) made on the back of a
registered document (Exb. A-1) after considering the
oral evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant and the
circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1
and D-2 were not disputed, though claimed as one
obtained on a blank paper. The reasoning of the first
appellate court in paragraph 29 of its judgment was
not addressed by the High Court. In fact, the High
Court, in one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a
signed blank paper, observed that genuineness of
-27Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our view, the High Court fell
in error here. While exercising powers under Section
100 CPC, it ought not to have interfered with the
finding of fact returned by the first appellate court on
this aspect; more so, when the first appellate court
had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the
evidence available on record as also the circumstance
that signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the
document (Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise
also, while disturbing the finding of the first appellate
court, the High Court did not hold that the finding
returned by the first appellate court is based on a
misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of relevant
evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed no
occasion for the High Court, exercising power under
Section 100 CPC, to interfere with the finding of the
first appellate court regarding payment of additional
Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above the sale
consideration fixed for the transaction. 18. Once the
finding regarding payment of additional sum of
Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first
appellate court is sustained, there appears no logical
reason to hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not
ready and willing to perform its part under the
contract particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of total
consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and,
over and above that, additional sum of Rs.1,95,000
was paid in lieu of demand made by D-1 & D-2. This
we say so, because an opinion regarding plaintiff’s
readiness and willingness to perform its part under
the contract is to be formed on the entirety of proven
facts and circumstances of a case including conduct
of the parties. The test is that the person claiming
performance must satisfy conscience of the court that
-28he
has
treated
the
contract
subsisting
with
preparedness to fulfill his obligation and accept
performance when the time for performance arrives.”
29.
No other point was raised by the learned counsel for
the parties.
30.
Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the
point in controversy after considering the oral as well as
documentary evidence placed on record. The substantial
question of law is answered accordingly.
31.
In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of
any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
July 6, 2026.
(Nisha)
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